Rami Khouri is a senior policy fellow of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.
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The bizarre world of the U.S. fight against terrorist organizations and militants has suffered a bad few weeks, and there are no signs of things improving any time soon. This is a critical moment in the tug-of-war between those who call on Washington to assist or protect them from dangerous foes, and those who say the United States is not a reliable partner because it doesn't know what it is doing when it sends its military into action in distant lands. Three recent developments support those who distrust the United States or see it as incompetent in foreign military action.
First came the announcement by the U.S. Defence Department that it had only 60 trained Syrian soldiers in the field to fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, even though Congress last year allocated more than $500-million (U.S.) to train thousands of "moderate" Syrians to join the battle. Of the 60 that were prepared and sent to fight, most were killed or captured, and only "four or five" remained at their posts as of earlier this month, according to General Lloyd Austin, head of U.S. Central Command. In one case, some of the United States-supplied equipment and supplies with these troops ended up with the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front.
Next came the embarrassing revelation in a Sept. 26 New York Times article quoting a confidential report being prepared by U.S. intelligence analysts, which reportedly concludes that "nearly 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Iraq and Syria from more than 100 countries since 2011. A year ago, the same officials estimated that flow to be about 15,000 combatants from 80 countries, mostly to join the Islamic State."
The report suggests that about 1,000 fighters from all parts of the world are travelling to join the Islamic State every month. So the U.S. government's claim to have killed 10,000 Islamic State fighters or personnel during the past year of bombardments seems not to have done irreparable damage to either the Islamic State's ability to maintain control in areas it rules in Syria and Iraq, or to its fighting capabilities. This is more an indictment of the countries neighbouring Islamic State holdings, especially Syria and Iraq, than of the United States, as one would expect the local governments threatened by the Islamic State to be the main ones fighting. The combination of the incompetence of the governments in the Middle East with the limited impact of U.S. air strikes is both shocking and depressing.
The third nasty development is this week's news that Taliban forces in Afghanistan have taken control of the strategic northern town of Kunduz. This would be the first provincial capital the Taliban has recaptured since the United States-led invasion in 2001 drove them from power. The resurgence of the Taliban in numbers and organizational capabilities that allow them to seize provincial capitals suggests that all the money and effort the United States and NATO allies put into the battle against the Taliban – not to mention the 2,361 dead Americans and more than 20,000 others injured in the past 13 years – has not been able to put the Taliban out of business.
These three developments can be interpreted in many ways, and although some might be reversed over time, I doubt they will. I suspect we are witnessing the expected consequences of a major Western power sending its force into battles in faraway lands where it is almost oblivious to the issues on the ground that drive citizens to join militant organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State or the Taliban.
The fundamental problem for Washington is usually twofold. First, its use of massive military power often causes immense destruction that breeds resentment against the United States and weakens the local governance structures. That in turn drives many ordinary but desperate citizens in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan into the arms of the militant Islamists who promise order and better times ahead. Second, the United States usually supports corrupt and authoritarian local governments that end up enriching a small circle of friends and business associates, while barely touching the miserable living conditions of ordinary people.
So it is not surprising that we see mainly failures so far in the U.S. attempts to train "moderate" Syrian rebels, quell the flow of recruits to the Islamic State or free Afghanistan from the grip of the Taliban. These are not necessarily the United States' wars, and many other players are primarily to blame for the atrocious conditions in these and other countries.
But one thing is certain, and is being confirmed again and again: A bad local situation is always made much worse when U.S. or other foreign powers send in their armed forces, who open fire at will, because that shatters the local political landscapes as well as the thin credibility of the United States as a useful or reliable partner.