A Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is shown in this undated handout photo. A potential solution to the F-35's northern communication woes has been grinding its way through the federal bureaucracy for three years and has yet to receive the green light. THE CANADIAN PRESS/HO-Lockheed MartinLockheed Martin/The Canadian Press
Equipping the military is an expensive business; it is also a staple of Canadian election campaigns. We have had national arguments over fighter-maintenance contracts, rescue helicopters and previously loved nuclear submarines. And now we're talking about fighter jets, again.
Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau dragged the issue back into the public square on the weekend when he promised to abandon the controversial F-35 stealth-fighter acquisition program – a position lifted from his party's 2011 platform. He said a Liberal government would, if elected, buy a lower-cost jet and shift some of the resources to Navy shipbuilding. He made the announcement in Halifax, a city where ships are built.
Conservative Leader Stephen Harper countered that the F-35 program is critical to Canada's aerospace industry, despite the absence of a contract since 2012, when a damning auditor-general's report shamed Mr. Harper's government into suspending the purchase. NDP Leader Tom Mulcair excoriated the Liberals for wanting to short-circuit a public tender process by eliminating the F-35 from contention – something his party proposed in 2011, and anyway it's the stuff of fantasy to think the F-35 would ever be the low bid.
None of the candidates is addressing the central problem: finding a quick and cost-effective way of arming the Canadian Forces. It shouldn't be this hard. But far too often, regional politics and economic development enter into the equation, turning what should be a simple tendering regime into a morass of government complication.
The selection of the F-35 as the country's next fighter jet has been mired in government mishandling, and that doesn't even take into account the question of whether or not the thing actually works.
The combat software for the F-35 won't be ready until 2017, by which time the plane might even reliably stay in the air. And by then it will cost more than five times the original estimate.
This is sadly typical. On Sunday, internal government documents surfaced showing a $26-billion naval procurement is over-budget and late. The number of ships will probably need to be scaled back, and there is mounting risk of "a failed procurement."
One wonders if there is any other kind.