The Middle East has undergone a seismic shift as the Arab world rejects autocracy. While many of the changes are positive, Israel finds itself in an increasingly uncertain situation, which demands radical new thinking.
The Arab Spring, which has empowered the Arab street, means other Middle Eastern governments will be less tolerant of Zionist overreach than their predecessors. The Israeli embassy in Cairo was put under siege last week by the mob, to the point where Egyptian security forces intervened to rescue them.
Relations with Turkey are at a low point and unlikely to improve as the government in Ankara takes a tough line respecting many Israeli practices. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has just completed a groundbreaking visit to Egypt, and bilateral ties will expand at what will almost certainly be Israel's expense. Israelis will pay an increasingly high price, both materially and emotionally, as this isolation accelerates.
Can they do anything, or are they the victim of events beyond their control?
The role of victim is a fundamental element in the Israeli psyche to which historic and modern experience lends overwhelming credence. But this doesn't mean the Jewish state should invariably react with sharp jabs or worse, as it too often does, when confronted with external crises.
The confrontation in Cairo followed the accidental killing of five Egyptian soldiers through an incursion into Sinai by the Israel Defence Forces, albeit in retaliation for terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. The dramatic cooling of Israeli relations with Turkey followed the death at IDF hands of Turks aboard a Gaza-bound "humanitarian relief" ship some 15 months ago. Israel did not in any direct way provoke the terrorist attack or the sailing of the Gaza relief ship. Nor did it violate international law in boarding the vessel.
Its immediate iron-fisted responses, however, play into the hands of its opponents. And the method and mode of Israel's reaction to such provocations is something Israel does indeed control. But Israeli governments too often react precipitously because of an ingrained belief that the Jewish state can never afford to show weakness. A retributive response that might be justified in dealing with non-state provocateurs such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad or even Hamas won't wash with sovereign mainstream states.
Dead Turkish nationals aboard a Turkish vessel or an incursion, no matter how limited, into another country's territory, as with Egypt and Sinai, will have consequences.
The Israeli government and the IDF itself are divided in response doctrine, the majority adhering to a school of what might be called "offensive realism." The "iron fist," which is easily congruent with the Israeli narrative, provides immediate emotional satisfaction and responds well to domestic public opinion. But it comes at the cost of further alienating those who don't share the Israeli narrative but whose tolerance Israelis badly need. Such Israeli action encourages the demonization of Zionism in any form, particularly in a region that finds it difficult to accept the legitimacy of any non-Muslim governing authority.
A less favoured alternative to the offence doctrine is "defensive realism," which maintains that the "iron fist" increases instability rather than diminishing it because it further angers already suspicious state players, as well as regional public opinion. It accepts that these neighbours have their own contrasting narratives that must be factored in.
Israeli decision-makers would benefit from deeper reflection before acting. While boarding Turkish vessels may be grudgingly accepted in a threatening situation, the accompanying killings, however inadvertent, come at the expense of much wider strategic Israeli interests. It suggests that military intrusion into the territory of another sovereign state such as Egypt will further distance those whose tolerance is essential. A warning across Egypt's bow that a strong response is inevitable should provocative jihadist acts continue is infinitely preferable to lashing out. Such a red flag is preferable to the red rage of the Cairo street.
Israel's situation requires tough and unenviable decisions, but the reality is that the camel's back won't be broken and that Israeli actions perceived as hostile won't pass unnoticed at the cost of Arab dignity.
Michael Bell, a former Canadian ambassador to Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian territories, is the Paul Martin Sr. Scholar in International Diplomacy at the University of Windsor.