Barack Obama is sending 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and hopes that NATO will send another 10,000, a hope likely to be dashed. The chances of this infusion producing "success," as he's defined it, are regrettably slim. Why?
The United States and its allies are fighting a counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan. The President obviously feels that Afghanistan and Pakistan are the epicentre of the fight against al-Qaeda, although there's growing evidence that the Islamic swath across north-central Africa is now home to failed states, jihadi terrorism and increasing threats from al-Qaeda and local groups associated with it. He also believes that withdrawal would lead to civil war in Afghanistan and send a powerful message to jihadists everywhere.
What is required for success, and what impact will the additional troops have?
TIME
Insurgents, if sufficiently motivated, are patient. So outsiders must demonstrate resolve to stay with the fight. Otherwise, insurgents and, critically, the local population will know that the outsiders will disappear one day.
Mr. Obama is pushing fresh troops to Afghanistan as fast as he can. He expects full deployment by mid-2010, but then insists he will start withdrawing some troops a year later. That message suggests a lack of staying power. Only a few troops will be pulled out initially. The bulk will remain. For how long?
Afghan President Hamid Karzai predicted this week that his country could not take a leading role in combatting insurgents for five years, and could not pay the full military bill until 2024. So the U.S., by his reckoning, must remain for at least five years.
The war will soon enter its ninth year. Is the U.S. prepared to remain there into the 14th or 15th year of the war? Can a country already facing $9-trillion in debt afford a commitment that a U.S. government agency told Mr. Obama could cost almost $1-trillion (all borrowed money) over the next decade?
BORDER
A counterinsurgency's success is aided by sealed borders around the insurgency. This has never been possible in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Pashtun population scarcely recognizes the border (the so-called Durand Line) between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban fighters move easily back and forth.
The surge of troops might make migration somewhat more hazardous. Pressure from the Pakistani army against the Taliban (and al-Qaeda) on its side of the line would help. But the locals know the terrain much better, so the border is likely to remain porous, although perhaps a little less so than before.
MONEY
Insurgents often live on little money. Starving them out is difficult. Keeping weapons from them is imperative. The Taliban finance themselves in part from the opium trade, Afghanistan being by far the world's leading producer. All efforts in the south and east to curtail the poppy business have failed. Nothing suggests that another 30,000 U.S. soldiers will change this situation.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The "hearts and minds" campaign at the centre of counterinsurgency means persuading the local population to trust the existing government more than the insurgents. The Karzai government is thoroughly corrupt, as the Afghan elections showed. But "corruption," as Western countries understand it, has always been part of how business gets done in Afghanistan. The place runs on warlords, tribal chieftains and ethnic leaders getting their hands on the spoils and distributing some portion of them to their followers.
Populations often side with the "winners." Americans hope their surge will tip the military balance, thereby inducing Afghans, especially the Pashtun in the south, to believe the Kabul government will eventually win the struggle. Locals are likely to reserve their bets.
Moreover, foreigners (Americans and NATO today, Soviets and British before) are viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by many Pashtun. We might think we're protecting them from the Taliban, but many of them believe we're occupying their land, threatening their religion and importing dangerous foreign values. They also might think we're propping up a government in Kabul dominated (Mr. Karzai, a Pashtun, excepted) by other ethnic groups.
FORCE LEVELS
Counterinsurgency needs about a 10-to-1 advantage in men on the ground. Even after the surge, the Americans and NATO will fall short of that ratio. European and Canadian publics want out of Afghanistan, so the Americans will be disappointed in their call for more NATO troops.
NEGOTIATIONS
The U.S. believes the surge will inflict sufficient pain on the Taliban that at least some of their forces will prefer negotiating a deal with Kabul rather than carrying on the fight. The Americans will try a variation of their "surge" strategy in Iraq, whereby they bought the loyalty of some Sunni tribes and turned them against al-Qaeda. Chances of success? Iffy, although it's probably the best hope.
TRAINING
Every counterinsurgency depends on the assumption that, eventually, the local military will do the fighting. U.S. commanders believe a military and police force of 400,000 Afghans would be necessary to bring stability to the country.
Good luck to them. With a desertion rate today of 25 per cent, it will take a very long time (and perhaps $10-billion a year) to produce that result.