On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces swarmed over the 38th parallel, the border between communist North Korea and anti-communist South Korea. Korean leader Kim-il Sung had planned the invasion carefully and had received the backing of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who not only blessed the invasion politically but also supplied air and ground “advisers,” including pilots, and enough armour and artillery to overwhelm the South Korean forces. Within days, communist spearheads had captured Seoul and were driving hard toward the southern tip of the peninsula.
The United States had withdrawn virtually all of its ground troops from South Korea more than a year before. Washington had seemed to write off Korea as an unimportant asset. But as soon as president Harry Truman learned of the attack, he ordered U.S. forces into the fray and appealed for United Nations support for a major military effort to repel the invasion. Soon, U.S., British, British Commonwealth and other troops were swarming into Korea.
Canada was slow to respond. Defence minister Brooke Claxton did not want the country to get involved in a war in Asia and prime minister Louis St. Laurent was almost equally reluctant. The one previous time Canada had sent troops to the Far East had been just before the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, when Canadian soldiers disembarked in Hong Kong just weeks before the Japanese struck. The entire force of 1,975 was killed or captured by the Japanese; the survivors spent four years in intolerable, slave-labour conditions.
But external affairs minister Lester Pearson insisted that the West was being tested by the Soviet Union in Korea and must not fail as it had when faced with Adolf Hitler’s territorial demands in Munich in 1938. Supported by a solid majority of Canadians, and backed by the United States and the UN, Mr. Pearson won out. By early August, Canada had committed a small naval contingent, an air transport squadron and an entire brigade group consisting of about 8,000 infantry, armour, artillery and other troops.
The Canadian Army Special Force, as it was at first dubbed (it was later designated the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group), initially consisted primarily of Second World War veterans. They formed second battalions of Canada’s small regular army and borrowed a number of officers and senior non-commissioned officers from the army.
By February, 1951, the first Canadian unit, the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, was fighting on the line, along with British, Australian and New Zealand troops as part of a British Commonwealth brigade. On April 24/25, the brigade held back a major attack at Kap’yong by the Chinese, which had joined the war in support of North Korea. The battle was won largely because the Patricias, completely surrounded, held out against a Chinese force estimated at five times their size in a vicious night battle.
By the end of the fighting on July 27, 1953, Canada had sent almost 27,000 troops to Korea; 516 were killed in action or died on active service, and 1,042 were wounded.
The Canadian army was not prepared for Korea. Deep defence cuts after the Second World War had left a single brigade in the army. Most of the weaponry was outmoded. For example, their World War One era bolt-action rifles were completely inadequate against mass Chinese attacks. Canadian beer and whisky were briskly traded to the Americans for submachine guns and automatic carbines. It was strictly forbidden, but even officers did it. Even Canadian parkas, necessary for the bitter cold of the Korean winter, were discarded because they were noisy and gave off sparks. American parkas, radios and direct-fire guns were far superior.
Canada’s soldiers, as individuals, gave the best they had. The Patricias won a U.S. Presidential Unit Citation at Kap’yong. And Canada itself did the best it could. The Korea force was hastily assembled and badly equipped because Ottawa had refused after 1945 to maintain an adequate military for just such emergencies.
There is a lesson to be learned from Korea, just as there is from Afghanistan. So-called small wars can break out at any time. Some of them, like those in Korea or Afghanistan, will affect Canadian interests. Military forces don’t grow on trees, but need to be prepared for most eventualities. South Korea is a free, democratic and prosperous nation today because the communist invasion was turned back. The Koreans remember and are grateful. On the other hand, few Canadians will remember the significance of this day.
David Bercuson is director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and the author of Blood on the Hills; The Canadian Army in the Korean War.
