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The Daily Review, July 9, 2009

Islam and democracy: They can work together

Nineteenth-century French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that the relationship between religion and democracy in the West was the “great problem of our time.” While arguably it may be less significant in the West now, it is altogether a different matter in the Muslim world.

Canadian political scientist Nader Hashemi's book tackles the question in historical and comparative perspective, and proposes fresh ideas on reconciling the tensions among Islam, secularism and liberal democracy. His relatively short work – a revised doctoral dissertation – argues boldly for a fundamental rethinking of the relationship that de Tocqueville presciently identified as problematic.

  • Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies

    , by Nader Hashemi, Oxford University Press, 280 pages, $78

In the first of four chapters, Hashemi challenges the widely held beliefs that have been used to argue the incompatibility of religion and liberal democracy. He begins his deconstruction through a historical examination of the role played by religion in Western democratization. Piggy-backing on Fernand Braudel's longue durée view of history and Michael Walzer's work on the influence of Puritans on modernization, Hashemi extracts lessons to help understand political evolution in the Muslim world. Contrary to conventional wisdom, he argues, many of our ideals evolved out of clashes and bargaining. We should not expect otherwise from the Muslim world.

Many thinkers, including Islamists such as Rachid al Ghanoushi, have advanced such arguments. What is refreshing is Hashemi's extensive appeal to historical examples and the work of leading Western thinkers to make the case. He provides convincing evidence that the appearance of “saints” and religious zealots during societal upheavals are historical and sociological facts. For instance, the 1534 bloody takeover by Anabaptists of the German town of Munster eerily echoes – in words and deeds – the Taliban and extremists at similar junctures in the Muslim world.

Hashemi weaves a narrative about the parallels and argues that this kind of analysis makes it possible to see links and contributions made to democratization by radical religious protest movements. Essentially, he concludes that zealots serve as midwives to the process of modernization, by acting as catalysts to unwittingly force change (cycles of regression, renewal and reform).

The second chapter focuses on Locke's use of religion in support of democracy. “For obedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to the Laws,” is a statement attributed not to an Ayatollah, but to John Locke, a pre-eminent thinker – if not the father – of modern liberalism. Today, secularists as well as pro- and anti-democracy Islamists in the Muslim world all rely on interpretations of religious sources (what Hashemi calls “duelling scriptures” ). Indeed, it is illustrative that conservatives and reformists alike in Iran, for instance, employ Islamic rhetoric.

Chapter three contends that some form of secularism is assumed to be a sine quo non of liberal democracy and herein lays the most difficult tension. Hashemi does not challenge this, but he notes that secularism in the West is associated with positive developments. Many Muslims, on the other hand, associate it with the colonial/imperialist agenda, oppressive regimes and hostility to religion as exemplified by the more rigid (French) laïcité version. What needs to be defined, Hashemi asserts, is the precise relationship between secularism and liberal democracy. He suggests, echoing others, that there is considerable latitude in the form of secularism.

Hashemi sees an opportunity in this flexibility to use Alfred Stepan's groundbreaking concept of “twin tolerations.” The idea that religious institutions and the state must recognize and respect “the minimum boundaries of freedom of action” is at the core of this paradigm. Hashemi maintains that this form of mutual accommodation (a more tolerable secularism) may be more palatable.