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The Supreme Court of Canada today restored a three convictions for sexual assault to a B.C. man who had sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter three decades ago.

In a 7-0 ruling, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin concluded that, contrary to a B.C. Court of Appeal finding, the trial judge in the case had provided sufficiently cogent reasons for finding him guilty.

The complainant in the case testified to 11 incidents of sexual assault by her stepfather – identified only as R.E.M. – when she was between the ages of 9 and 17.

R.E.M. had admitted to having sexual intercourse with the complainant - C.J. – at their home in Fort St. John, but he claimed that their relationship only became sexual after she was 15 – and that the intercourse was consensual.

The age of consent for minors at the time was 14. C.J. became pregnant by her stepfather in 1979 and gave birth to a son in 1980.

C.J. reported the sexual assaults in 1988. R.E.M. – who then lived in Washington State – was arrested when he arrived in Canada for a parental visit with another child. Granted bail, he absconded. He was arrested and extradited to Canada in 2003.

The judge at R.E.M.'s trial accepted most of the 45-year-old complainant's evidence as being credible, noting that some modest mistakes can be expected when a middle-aged adult is attempting to recall events that took place in childhood.

However, the B.C. Court of Appeal overturned his ruling on the basis that the trial judge's reasons had not adequately backed up his conclusions.

It said that he failed to mention some of R.E.M.'s evidence and make general comments about it; did not reconcile his generally positive findings on the complainant's evidence with the rejection of some of her evidence; and that he did not explain why he rejected R.E.M.'s denial of the charges.

In today's Supreme Court ruling, Chief Justice McLachlin attempted to define the line that divides unacceptable judicial reasons from those that are adequate.

She noted that judicial reasons were scanty and cryptic in the 19th and early 20th century, but there is now a strict requirement that a judge provide his or her thinking process in arriving at a finding.

“The law has progressed to the point where it may now be said with confidence that a trial judge on a criminal trial where the accused's innocence is at stake has a duty to give reasons,” she said.

Chief Justice McLachlin said that proper reasons are now recognized as being vital because they explain the decision to each party, provide public accountability, and provide appeal courts with a strong basis for reviewing a decision.

While general comments about a witnesses' credibility can be helpful, she said that, “it is enough that the trial judge has demonstrated a recognition, where applicable, that the witness's credibility was a live issue.

“Assessing credibility is not a science,” she said. “It is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events.”

There can also be subtle reasons why a judge may not wish to be overly explicit, she said: “Embellishing why a particular witness's evidence is rejected may involve the judge saying unflattering things about the witness.

“Judges may wish to spare the accused who takes the stand to deny the crime, for example, the indignity of not only rejecting his evidence and convicting him, but adding negative comments about his demeanour.”

Chief Justice McLachlin said that it would also make no sense to require trial judges to laboriously spell out every consideration that went into a finding of credibility or a conclusion of guilt or innocence.

“A trial judge is not obliged to discuss all of the evidence on any given point, provided the reasons show that he or she grappled with the substance of the live issues on the trial,” she added. “It is clear from the reasons that the trial judge considered R.E.M.'s evidence carefully, and indeed accepted it on some points.”

Having made clear that he preferred the complainants evidence over that of R.E.M., she said, “no further explanation for rejecting R.E.M.'s evidence was required.

“The central issue at trial was credibility. It is clear that the trial judge accepted all or sufficient of the complainant's ample evidence as to the incidents, and was not left with a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence or from the contradictory evidence of R.E.M.”

The Court also warned appellate courts to guard against “simply sifting through the record and substituting their own analysis of the evidence for that of the trial judge because the reasons do not comply with their idea of ideal reasons.”

It said that the B.C. Court of Appeal fell into precisely this trap when it “ignored the trial judge's unique position to see and hear witnesses, and instead substituted its own assessment of credibility.”