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A collection of well-meaning academics and security experts recently proposed the creation of an international rapid reaction force that could be deployed within 48 hours of a green light from the United Nations. It's a bad idea.

In 1945, at the founding conference for the UN in San Francisco, it was agreed that the military resources of the self-appointed permanent five members of the Security Council - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and, shortly thereafter, France - would be available as required by the UN.

The original film produced by the UN to sell the concept of the new world body to the public shows the military commanders of the Perm 5 in an art deco headquarters on a hill discussing an emerging international threat in a faraway country. Within days, a UN force of 200,000 soldiers, 4,000 aircraft, 1,000 ships and one atomic bomb are launched in the direction of the threat, returning a few weeks later having sorted out the bad guys in the interests of mankind.

The military commanders of the Perm 5 were to regularly meet under the title Military Staff Committee. That was 61 years ago, and the committee has yet to have its first meeting at the commander-in-chief level.

That brings us to this month, when academics and security experts raised the idea of a standing professional UN army numbering 15,000 military, police and civilian staff, including logistics and nation-building specialists. Details of the concept are found in the book A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, which was presented at the UN.

The authors opine that such a force would accelerate the UN's glacial response to the myriad of peace and security problems that cry out for intervention, and they cite Rwanda and Darfur as prime examples. They suggest that the UN force could be on its way to a trouble spot within 48 hours and perhaps even be pre-deployed to nip an emerging crisis in the bud before it blossoms.

As attractive as the concept might sound, it will not improve the UN's record of untimely and inadequate crisis intervention.

The popular myth and chronic excuse offered when the UN fails to respond to an obvious security crisis is a lack of resources. In reality, this is merely a convenient way to let the Security Council's Perm 5 off the hook and mask the dominant role played by their own national self-interests.

When the Security Council authorizes interventions, it might not be easy finding the necessary soldiers. But the $150 (U.S.) per soldier per day paid by the UN to the governments of the contributing countries has certainly helped find a good many of the 80,000 troops currently deployed around the world. In the vast majority of cases, the soldiers actually stand by for months waiting to deploy on a particular mission while the Security Council "is seized of the crisis" but can't get an authorizing resolution watered down enough to satisfy all of the Perm 5 members.

In 1945, when the Perm 5 gave themselves a veto whereby any one of them could thwart approval of any resolution dealing with peace and security issues, they didn't stop there. It is a little advertised fact that their vetoes also apply to the procedures that govern the conduct of the Security Council - in other words, the rules dealing with membership, voting and the use of the veto.

To suggest that the existence of a UN army would have helped stop the genocide in Rwanda or could be used to take on the current genocide in Darfur is naive. The stumbling block for both was and is not a lack of resources but rather a lack of commitment beyond national self-interests by some of the Perm 5 members. In the case of Rwanda, there were no self-interests strong enough to authorize intervention; in Darfur, the self-interests of at least two members (related to oil production) mean their vetoes stand in the way of any forceful action. If a UN army did exist, it would still be sitting on its hands far away from Darfur.

I would not be the least bit surprised if the Security Council itself would veto any attempt to create a UN army. If one exists, there would be pressure to use it - and the Perm 5 wouldn't like being backed into a decision-making corner.

If the international community is serious about dealing with security crises as they develop, forget the overworked idea of creating a UN army and concentrate on changing the rules governing the self-appointed 1945 "superpower" club. Adding more members, permanent without the veto and rotating, would just extend debate time. Until the veto is jettisoned and majority rules - as in all other Security Council issues except peace and security and procedure - nothing will change.

Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.