Although Yemen appears to be the odds-on favourite as the world's next failed state and now enjoys 24/7 prognostication on its ills from the self-appointed experts who populate the cable news channels, Yemen as a source of instability on the Arabian Peninsula and a haven for terrorists is neither a new phenomenon nor as difficult to address as it might seem.
Unlike the failed states to which it is often compared, Yemen laid the groundwork for a long-term solution to extremism years ago through democratic and political reforms, led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh – paradoxically, given his recent performance as the country's leader.
That terrorism is increasing in Yemen now is more attributable to Mr. Saleh's reliance on an ever-shrinking group of corrupt cronies and to institutionalized poverty than to any inherent resistance among the populace to the idea of a prosperous, peaceful, democratic state.
Mr. Saleh and some enlightened advisers made the pragmatic decision after the 1990 reunification of North and South Yemen that democracy, or at least elements of democracy, was necessary to govern a quarrelsome, stratified, armed and proudly independent people in a poor, rugged and diverse country.
For years, Yemen led the countries on the Arabian Peninsula, indeed much of the Arab world, in political reform. It extended the voting franchise to women, held regular (and mostly fair) elections, encouraged the formation of non-governmental organizations, tolerated, even encouraged, the development of opposition parties and created elected local government councils to deliver services more effectively.
A successful 1993 election ushered in a power-sharing government that included secular former Marxists from the south, moderate Islamists, tribal leaders and ruling party technocrats. Although interrupted by a brief civil war in 1994, power sharing, dialogue and democratic progress resumed, leading to a significant period of relative calm and modest economic development.
Yemen's parliament, while flawed, became an important forum for seeking consensus on policy. Yemen's main opposition parties ejected extremists from their ranks and formed a coalition of moderate Islamists and former South Yemen socialists in 2003.
But a lack of economic development, dwindling oil supplies, persistent tribal conflict, governmental mismanagement and mischief-making by neighbours took their toll, leaving significant portions of the population alienated and vulnerable to recruitment by extremists.
The bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in 2000, the murder of Baptist missionaries in Jibla in 2002, the assassination by radical Islamists of moderate political leader Jarallah Omar in the same year, the steady stream of Yemeni jihadists to Iraq and Afghanistan, the attack on the U.S. embassy in Sanaa in 2008 and, of course, Yemen's ties to would-be airplane bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab are all grim reminders that Yemen can produce terrorists. But let's make sure the solution doesn't exacerbate the problem.
International discussions on Yemen inevitably emphasize security and development aid. The government needs both, but neither will solve the problem. Mr. Saleh has a long record of co-operating with the international community on security – to a point. There have been several instances of intelligence sharing and targeted missile strikes, but many suspect the Yemeni government has played the terrorism card for its own gain.
The focus on security allows the government to skirt responsibility for its own domestic failures. Perversely, some ruling party officials seem to welcome the country's infamy, believing that development aid – controlled mostly by Mr. Saleh's allies – and more military assistance will bolster their credibility.
So far, the international community seems happy to oblige. Foreign governments are offering large aid packages, weapons and training for security officials. Unfortunately, killing a few jihadists without a broader plan just mobilizes the clans and tribes of the dead to seek revenge. Absent a government that enjoys broad legitimacy, more areas of the country will become “no go” zones, harbouring yet more extremists.
The ultimate antidote to Yemen's instability can be found in continuing the political reform started almost 20 years ago. Inclusion and dialogue (with the Houthi insurgents in the north, the former South Yemen leaders and the moderate Islamists), combined with better governance and decentralization of services, will largely muzzle and constrain the jihadists.
Genuine power sharing, whether through new elections to parliament under conditions agreed to by the opposition or by including political rivals and senior tribal leaders in government, will cut off some of the terrorists' oxygen by marginalizing the rejectionists who are their patrons.
Economic development, especially if combined with a program to involve parliament and elected local councils, will further erode al-Qaeda's support. Finally, corruption must be addressed if Yemen's citizens are to have what they desire – legitimate, effective government.
Leslie Campbell is senior associate and regional director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Democratic Institute in Washington.
