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Parliament's recent vote to conditionally extend the mission in Afghanistan sets the table for a historic opportunity to remodel Canada's Afghan mission. It also enables Canada, working with the United Nations and like-minded countries, to significantly influence how the international community deals with failed and failing states. But these achievements will only be realized if the opportunity to do things better is not lost.

Ottawa's bookshelves are full of reports by panels, task forces, special committees and royal commissions. Many of these were forgotten almost as soon as they were published.

From that point of view, the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan was a roaring success. Embraced by the government, it provided the Official Opposition enough room to be able to reach a consensus with the government. The two major political parties put aside partisanship on this issue (something very rare in this period of minority government) and found room to compromise. To that extent, Canadians should be pleased. An election in which the parties attempted to differentiate themselves on the question of Canada's future in Afghanistan would have made Canadians and our allies very uncomfortable and may have increased threats to Canadian troops in the field.

Of concern, however, is the degree to which the panel's report has been reduced to the simple proposition that Canada should stay in Afghanistan if NATO provides an additional 1,000 troops. A military partner in Kandahar as a condition for Canada's continuing security role was a key recommendation, but, if that is the only aspect that receives attention, our panel's efforts will have been almost as much in vain as those whose reports sit on the bookshelves of Ottawa. (It is worth noting that the condition has served to increase the focus of several NATO countries on the situation in Afghanistan and may have encouraged France to possibly increase its troop commitment, something that was by no means certain when the panel reported in January.) Our panel found that more of the same in Afghanistan was not good enough. Our assessment, overall, was that at the present time, NATO and its allies are failing in the mission in Afghanistan. And the consequences of not reversing this failure would be severe for global security, for NATO, and for the UN and its ability to intervene effectively in failed and failing states.

We need a new and different approach to our mission in Afghanistan. In particular, there must be greater emphasis on diplomacy, reconstruction, development and building Afghan institutions of governance.

To get the needed results, we recommended that the Prime Minister personally lead a diplomatic initiative, making Canada's voice heard to a degree commensurate with our sacrifice. The objective would be not simply additional troops in Kandahar, but a comprehensive political-military plan for NATO, the UN and participating countries. Six years after the collapse of the Taliban government, we were shocked to find so little co-ordination and commonality among key participants in Afghanistan.

In addition, we urged the Prime Minister to demand concerted efforts by the government of Afghanistan to improve governance by tackling corruption and ensuring delivery of basic services to the Afghan people. Many Afghans are lost to the insurgency because they find their government to be corrupt and ineffective. Insurgencies are rarely, if ever, resolved by military means, so Canada should encourage political reconciliation with those who will renounce violence and accept the democratic constitution.

Finally, we called for forceful representations with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan, to reduce risks to regional stability.

In general, our panel found that the civilian effort in Afghanistan has been drastically overshadowed by the military one, imperilling support for the mission. Canada's light civilian engagement (47 people in the country) compared to the military (about 2,500) belies the importance of the civilian component of the mission. Enhancing our civilian content would reflect the priorities of Canadians and the needs of Afghans. Choosing and funding development projects that meet the needs of the Afghan population for roads, irrigation, electricity, schools and health care would contribute significantly to winning the hearts and minds of the people who need to be convinced that their lives will be improved by supporting their government rather than the insurgency.

In adopting our report, Parliament added a definite termination date - an entirely political decision that can be revisited at a later date if Parliament so chooses. We did not recommend a fixed date for the end of the military mission because we could find no operational rationale for any particular date. Our focus was on the task that our military must undertake - to train Afghan forces to take over security responsibility in their country.

If the 2011 date for the withdrawal of Canadian forces is to be met, the government must establish a series of clear milestones to be met between now and then. One thing is certain: Afghanistan's development and governance challenges will not be fully met by 2011. Let's hope it's not necessary to create another panel in 2010 to advise on Canada's role after 2011.

The world will face more cases of needing to intervene in failed states, and Afghanistan is a test case. Canada's renewed commitment provides us with an opportunity to shape these approaches. Let us not squander the opportunity.

John Manley, a former Liberal foreign minister, was chairman of the Harper government's Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan