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Prospects of Middle East peace just got a whole lot better. Thanks, in part, to the efforts of Turkey as a go-between, Israel and Syria announced last week they would begin negotiations aimed at a formal peace treaty. This opportunity is monumental. If successful, the balance of power will change dramatically.

While some have suggested that Israel's newfound willingness to negotiate may reflect its Prime Minister's hope to draw attention away from a domestic scandal engulfing him, Ehud Olmert has displayed courage and foresight in committing to negotiations. With the threat of Islamic radicalization rife in the region, Mr. Olmert realizes it's in Israel's most basic interest to make substantial concessions for peace, including, it seems, the return of territory to Syria.

This was not the inclination of his predecessor, Ariel Sharon, whose attitude as a territorial maximalist scuppered an earlier opportunity for these two countries to try to negotiate a treaty. I know because, at the time, I was Canada's ambassador to Israel, and Canada was involved in playing a bridging role of its own.

Approached by a prominent Syrian-American businessman, the Canadian government in 2001-2002 undertook a series of sub rosa consultations in Damascus and Jerusalem to determine whether there was sufficient common interest in commencing discussions. The consultations were carried out by a senior Canadian diplomat who journeyed several times to Syria, followed by meetings we held in Israel with Tzipi Livni, the current Foreign Minister, then minister without portfolio in Mr. Sharon's office.

Throughout these consultations, some of the closest advisers to Syrian President Bashar Assad declared that Syria was ready to negotiate a treaty. On the Israeli side, Ms. Livni responded with real interest to the Syrian overture; that is, until Mr. Sharon killed the idea. Publicly, the prime minister made it clear that Syria knew where to find Israel if Damascus really wanted to negotiate, an indication that his map of Israel included the occupied Golan Heights.

That situation now has changed.

Syria still sees the benefits of a peace agreement: The country would regain the Golan Heights, have a freer hand in Lebanon and gain long-sought recognition as a legitimate player in the Middle East.

For its part, Israel could expect to see Syria use its influence on Hezbollah - the militant Shia movement in Lebanon that has been a threat to the Jewish state - and produce quiet on its northern borders, akin to what it currently enjoys in the south and east with Egypt and Jordan.

Such a peace would be a serious blow to Iran's regional ambitions. Tehran would lose its only Arab ally, Syria, and ties to its client, Hezbollah, would be greatly weakened. All of which would make support for the Palestinian Hamas movement extremely difficult. Indeed, radical leaderships in the region are now off balance because they fear negotiations. They will do what they can to frustrate progress but, if negotiations succeed, the so-called Shia crescent, linking Iran, through Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon, could well crumble.

The U.S. response to the breakthrough has been tepid. George Bush appears not able to get beyond his axis-of-evil approach, even when it comes to the Jewish state's vital interests. Mr. Bush still appears to dream of a benign democracy in Syria, as he did in Iraq.

Of course, the U.S. President's recent address to the Israeli Knesset, in which he tore the wings off the Syrian wasp just days before the breakthrough was announced, now looks particularly foolish. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's protestations that Washington has no objection to Israel proceeding wear very thin, given the administration's clandestine efforts over the past year to sabotage the prospect of just such a process. One administration official has privately called Israel's commitment to negotiate with Syria a "slap in the face."

Polls show a majority of Israelis also oppose negotiations with Syria. This is understandable, since they find it difficult to reconcile their image of a Syrian demon with any expectation that Damascus will change it stripes following a signed peace treaty.

They focus on the importance of the Golan Heights as strategic turf ensuring effective defence. They find it easy to forget that the nature of warfare has changed since their occupation began in 1967. And they have not yet listened to the view of many in Israeli military intelligence who say that withdrawal from the Golan with appropriate guarantees of demilitarization would enhance, not imperil, security.

Negotiations over the possible return of the Golan also were conducted in 1999. They failed, not because of then-Syrian president Hafez Assad's grudging attitudes. They collapsed because then-Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak believed he could backtrack on a commitment made by one of his predecessors, Yitzak Rabin, to vacate the entire Golan.

Mr. Barak misjudged the situation, believing Mr. Assad would yield a small strip of shoreline on the Sea of Galilee. He guessed wrong. For the senior Mr. Assad, it was a deal breaker. His son Bashar sees it the same way - the importance of face and honour to Damascus should never be forgotten.

Syria's position has not changed after all these years: An Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines is a sine qua non. The difference now is that Mr. Olmert knows it.

Michael Bell is the Paul Martin Sr. Scholar on International Diplomacy at the University of Windsor.