Commissions of inquiry into national security matters in Canada used to be held in a stately procession, with goodly periods of quiet time between each. Thus, we had the 1946 royal commission into Igor Gouzenko's evidence of Soviet spies in Canada, followed by the Mackenzie inquiry of the late 1960s into the Cold War security sector, followed by the epic McDonald commission into the improprieties of the RCMP Security Service in its battle with the FLQ that ultimately gave birth to a civilian intelligence service (CSIS) in 1984 and a new era of accountability. The mere decade that separated Mackenzie from McDonald seemed a rush for a country unused to gazing at its secret navel.
Since 9/11, the pace has changed dramatically. First came Mr. Justice Dennis O'Connor's 2006 report into the role that Canadian officials played in the rendition of Maher Arar to Syria to face torture. On the back of that report now comes its sequel, retired Supreme Court justice Frank Iacobucci's report into the parallel question of the Canadian role in the detention and torture of three Canadians in Syria and Egypt.
The public concern that underlies both inquiries is whether Canadian intelligence, security and Foreign Affairs officials have so lost their way in the "war on terror" that they have systematically and deliberately engaged in practices that are repugnant to democratic values. It's an important concern, enough to throw the old stately procession out the window.
It's to the credit of successive Liberal and Conservative governments that they were prepared to take the risk of throwing a public spotlight on a highly sensitive activity and on potential misdeeds. The risk is not just a question of embarrassment and loss of reputation, a risk attenuated by the fact that governments that call inquiries of this sort generally know the outlines of what will be found. The bigger risk is one of public confusion and misunderstanding.
Nothing could be worse than if Canadians emerged with the wrong set of ideas and expectations from two long and expensive commissions of inquiry designed to learn lessons, improve the performance of government agencies engaged in national security and, to be frank, offer reassurance.
Judge O'Connor's 2006 report did signal service in telling Canadians some important truths. He found that, while Canadian officials were not complicit in the rendition of Mr. Arar by the U.S. to Syria, they had inappropriately shared flawed intelligence with their American counterparts that shaped Mr. Arar's fate. Judge O'Connor also reminded Canadians that intelligence sharing was a fact of life and a vital necessity for national security. The key, as far as he was concerned, was that the RCMP had to get much better at national security investigations in a post-9/11 age. He made plenty of recommendations to that effect, which we are told (though not shown) are being implemented.
Mr. Iacobucci faced similar questions in his report. He had to decide on Canadian complicity in the detention and torture of three Arab Canadians in the Middle East. He had to pronounce on the nature of Canadian intelligence sharing with traditional partners (the U.S.) and some newfound, expedient "friends" (Syria and Egypt).
The good news is that Mr. Iacobucci found no evidence that Canadian security officials were engaged in any nefarious practice to push Canadians they believed were terrorists into the waiting arms of Middle Eastern jailors and torturers. The bad news, as with Judge O'Connor's findings, is that Canadian officials contributed "indirectly" to the plight of Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou El Maati and Muayyed Nureddin. That plight was lengthy detention and mistreatment amounting, under United Nations conventions, to torture. The indirect contribution was a product of intelligence sharing and inadequate consular care.
