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"Recent reports suggest that the Afghan government, its international backers and perhaps parts of the Taliban may be interested in pursuing peace negotiations," University of Ottawa Prof. Roland Paris wrote Saturday in his Globe essay Trying to reach the Taliban.

"Such talks are long overdue, but don't plan any celebrations.

"The road to a negotiated peace will be long and full of pitfalls.

"Afghan President Hamid Karzai offered to sit down with leaders of the insurgency more than a year ago, but the prospect of talks became serious last month, owing to four important developments.

"First, a perception is growing in diplomatic circles that the international mission is failing.

"The insurgency has been launching more sophisticated and bolder attacks; civilian and military casualties are higher than at any time since the Taliban regime was ousted in late 2001; and ordinary Afghans are becoming more frustrated with their corrupt and ineffective government.

"It doesn't matter that the Taliban have little hope of defeating international forces on the battlefield.

"By undermining public support for the Afghan government and forcing Afghans to turn to the insurgents for security and sustenance, they are making progress in their political struggle."

Prof. Paris goes on to argue: "History is littered with failed efforts to negotiate an end to wars and insurgencies — and those that succeed often take a long time and stumble through false starts.

"What's more, the particular circumstances of the Afghan war are not propitious for successful negotiation . . .

"These obstacles are real and sobering, but they do not diminish the desirability of pursuing discussions.

"Unexpected openings for compromise may appear, and they should be seized."

Whether you agree or not, it's a provocative thesis, so we at globeandmail.com are pleased that Prof. Paris was online Monday to take your questions on his essay and on the situation in Afghanistan in general.

Your questions and Prof. Paris's answers appear at the bottom of this page.

Roland Paris is University Research Chair in International Security and Governance at the University of Ottawa.

He is also the founding director of the Centre for International Policy Studies at the university, and Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

His research interests are in the fields of international security, international governance and foreign policy.

Paris's writings have appeared in leading academic journals including International Security and International Studies Quarterly.

His book At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, 2004) won the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving Global Order as well as the International Studies Association's prize for best book on multilateralism.

Before joining the University of Ottawa in 2006, he was Director of Research at The Conference Board of Canada, the country's largest think tank, and before that he was a foreign policy advisor in the Department of Foreign Affairs and later in the Privy Council Office. He received two public service awards for his work in government.

Editor's Note: globeandmail.com editors will read and allow or reject each question/comment. Comments/questions may be edited for length or clarity. HTML is not allowed. We will not publish questions/comments that include personal attacks on participants in these discussions, that make false or unsubstantiated allegations, that purport to quote people or reports where the purported quote or fact cannot be easily verified, or questions/comments that include vulgar language or libellous statements. Preference will be given to readers who submit questions/comments using their full name and home town, rather than a pseudonym.

Estanislao (Stan) Oziewicz, globeandmail.com Foreign Editor: Prof. Paris, it's my pleasure to host this discussion today. Thank you again for participating. Your essay has prompted many comments and questions, so let's not delay in getting right to them.

Gabriel Stefan, from Toronto: If a peace deal is struck between NATO and the Taliban it will more than likely force Washington into serious compromises that will be unwelcome in the United States. I do not doubt that Americans wish for peace in the region, but do you think the U.S. government (both current and future) will be able to swallow the bitter pill that may be necessary to achieve stability in the region?

Prof. Paris: There are strong signs in Washington (including recent comments by General David Petraeus mentioned in my article) of an emerging willingness to explore negotiation with elements of the insurgency. Of course, it will be up to the next U.S. president to determine the scope and direction of US policy towards Afghanistan and the region, but my guess is that the next U.S. Administration will pursue a more "comprehensive" approach to the Afghanistan conflict, including greater support for efforts to negotiate side deals with less hard-line elements of the insurgency and to split elements away from al-Qaeda, a significant increase in the number of US troops in Afghanistan, and at least the beginnings of a regional dialogue involving the surrounding countries.

Although the circumstances in Afghanistan are very different than those in Iraq, the willingness of the U.S. to strike deals with Sunni tribal groups in Iraq also suggests that Washington could be open to negotiation with Afghan insurgent leaders and groups that agree to stop fighting against the Karzai government and NATO forces. It is important to note, however, that any such deals would be negotiated by the Afghanistan government, not by NATO.

R. Carriere, from the Maritimes, Canada: Good day. On several occasions it has been reported that the Taliban will not negotiate while foreign troops occupy Afghanistan soil. The one aspect The Taliban and its supporters have in their favour is unlimited time — something NATO/ISAF nations do not possess for both political and financial reasons. Outgoing U.S. Gen. McNeil stated this fall that the tactical doctrine of fighting an insurgency would require an extra 400,000 troops. That being said, and realistically speaking, would you agree that the 'Go Big, or Go Home' philosophy should be adopted after almost seven years of little progress and no end-game plan in sight?

Prof. Paris: Yes, there have been various Taliban statements that foreign forces must leave Afghanistan before negotiations can begin. It is difficult to know what exactly to make of these statements. For one thing, the insurgency is comprised of many different groups and the self-proclaimed Taliban spokespersons do not speak for them all. Some "Taliban" have very local objectives or grievances, whereas others have been influenced by the transnational jihadism of al-Qaeda. Moreover, when negotiations have taken place in other conflicts, they have often started with unofficial contacts between representatives to explore possibilities for some kind of compromise, even though the public positions of their respective groups may remain recalcitrant. The only way to find out whether there are deals to be struck is to pursue these informal discussions in the hopes that some groups can be persuaded, at an acceptable "price," to join the political life of the country and give up their armed struggle.

That said, as I mentioned in the article, if the insurgency continues to make gains, the incentives for such groups to seek negotiated settlements may be limited. It is possible that this situation would improve with a deployment of additional U.S. troops, further progress in the training of the Afghan army, and revised counterinsurgency policy that provides Afghan people with better protection and basic services — but I'm not holding my breath.

Catherine Medernach, from Winnipeg, Manitoba: Negotiating with the Taliban is worth a try. Some have already quit the fight so others may be prepared to do so. The plans being made to keep them from being able to retreat and rest for the winter may also put some additional pressure on them. The constitution is what the people want and there should not be any question of compromising there. The international community needs to acknowledge its part in how the situation deteriorated so badly. President Karzai pleaded for months/years to have security extended beyond Kabul. Even when NATO finally took that step, it failed to recognize that the war on drugs was part of the war on terror and refused to deal with it. Without their assistance, Mr. Karzai simply did not have the resources to deal in any substantial way with the drug trade that has fueled the terrorists and undermined his government. This would go a long way to fostering greater support and stability for the government of Afghanistan.

Prof. Paris: I agree that the United States and NATO were slow to recognize the need to provide additional security beyond Kabul. This is one of many tragic side-effects of the Bush Administration's foolish decision to pursue "regime change" in Iraq, which drew vital resources and attention away from helping to secure the countryside and regional centres of Afghanistan. That vacuum was filled by warlords, opium traffickers, and, eventually, a reconstituted Taliban movement — and NATO has been playing catch-up ever since.

Phil Stooke, from London, Ontario: Negotiate all you like, it won't do any good. The Taliban will say anything to move toward their goal.

Prof. Paris: Again, we need to be conscious of the diversity of groups that comprise the insurgency, including within the Taliban itself. Some groups may be more open to compromise than others. On the other hand, one implication of your comment is that words must be matched by deeds — and there have, in fact, been cases of ceasefires and local peace deals negotiated with Taliban and related groups that quickly fell apart. For example, the Pakistani army negotiated deals with insurgents in the border territory of Waziristan that the insurgents did not observe. This is one of the reasons we need to have realistic expectations for any negotiation strategy, as I argued in my article. However, it is not a reason to give up on the idea of exploring peace agreements with specific groups that may be willing to lay down their arms.

Guitar Player, from Vancouver, British Columbia: On what possible basis can discussions be justified with a group so insistent on the application of its view of strict sharia law that it sees nothing wrong with the murder of women who go to work, and who (heaven forbid) work as activists in an attempt to help other women? On what basis can any sort of reasonable accommodation be reached with people of this sort?

Prof. Paris: The Afghan government says it will not compromise the human rights principles enshrined in its constitution. Unless Kabul's position changes, any "reconciled" insurgents will presumably have to agree to live with those principles. But it remains to be seen if it will be possible to negotiate peace deals with insurgent groups on that basis.

Robert G. Smiley, from Vancouver, British Columbia: Of course we should be talking to the Taliban. We are on their turf, don't forget. Enemies are made, not born. For absolutely no good reason we have made an enemy of the Taliban. They are a nasty group of people but it's their country and their religion. It has absolutely nothing to do with us. They are not al-Qaeda, but may be allied with them now because of our actions. What we are doing in Afghanistan is making more and more terrorists rather than diminishing them. What a foolish foreign policy adventure this was and is. We must negotiate as soon as possible.

Prof. Paris: Elements of the Taliban have been allied with Al-Qaeda since the 1990s, when Al-Qaeda established itself on the territory of Afghanistan. Recall that it was the Taliban regime's refusal to hand over al-Qaeda leaders immediately after 9/11 that prompted the U.S. invasion in late 2001. So it is not accurate to say that the current NATO mission brought the Taliban and al-Qaeda together. (Whether the NATO mission is creating "more and more terrorists" is a different — and hotly debated — question.)

Brendan H., from Aukland, New Zealand: I found your essay to be excellent reading and I liked the points that you raised. While I am not in Canada, from what I understand the view of the war in the eyes of the Canadian public is generally negative, which is the prevailing view to New Zealand (along with other countries). The numbers of people who are against the war tend to be growing in numbers and I think I read a few months ago that about 50 per cent of Canadians were opposed to the war.

The growing number of those opposed has raised questions in recent (or upcoming) elections in different countries (in particular, the United States) about how long the respective countries are willing to commit to Afghanistan. With so many people wanting the occupation to end and politicians trying to put a date on the withdrawal, how likely is it that Afghanistan may be seen as a 'lost cause' and everyone simply pulls out their troops? This maybe a long way off (if ever) as it most likely would place Afghanistan in the same situation it was at the beginning the war. While it would be great if these talks worked, with the information presented in the media, it doesn't seem likely. I think to get this sorted, while taking a general overall view of peace from the national level, at more local levels the solutions may need to be tailored to the community instead of a one size fits all approach. Is there any evidence of this in other conflicts? If so, does this generally help promote peace or lead to further disharmony? Thanks for your time!

Prof. Paris: Thank you for your kind words about my article. Regarding the prospects for withdrawal, it really depends on which countries' forces you are talking about. The United States provides the lion's share of international troops in Afghanistan — and judging from the public statements of both U.S. presidential candidates I would say that the United States is likely to maintain or expand its forces in the country.

Regarding your comments on peace efforts elsewhere, you are right to say that there is no "one size fits all" approach to peace negotiations. Nor should we expect to see a "grand" peace conference with many insurgent groups sitting around a table. More likely, any negotiation effort would be focused on individual insurgent groups and leaders, quite possibly at the local level. But we will just need to wait and see.

D.P. Ludwig, from the United States: Considering the Taliban are trying to assert control over Central Asia, and considering the things they stand for, leaving the Taliban unchecked and allowed to grow, in Afghanistan and in a nuclear Pakistan, is incompatible with Canadian interests. It frightens me when the vast majority of Canadians advocate talking to the Taliban.

Prof. Paris:The U.S. experience in Iraq demonstrates that it is possible to explore negotiations with insurgent groups while maintaining counterinsurgency operations, so "talking to the Taliban" does not necessarily mean "leaving the Taliban unchecked." More broadly, however, I share your concern about the future stability of nuclear-armed Pakistan. The Islamabad government is fragile, and Pakistan is facing its own insurgency as well as serious economic problems. As bad as the situation is now, it could get worse.

Mr. Oziewicz, Foreign Editor, globeandmail.com: That's all the time we have today, Prof. Paris, I'm afraid. This was obviously an invigorating and informative discussion for our readers. I hope it was for you, as well."

Prof. Paris: It was my pleasure. Thank you for hosting this session. And thanks especially to all the contributors for your questions.