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There are many ways to address the question of humanitarian intervention. The national strategic implications are complex, the international law is evolving and the moral case can be wrenching. I, however, come at it as a soldier.

When the decision is made to intervene in a region or country, that decision is often the same as making one to go to war. It's the soldiers who must risk their lives in the name of intervention; they are the ones who carry the weight of the mission and they are the ones who facilitate the opportunities for others to help. So I am not going to speak of legality and humanism, nor of strategy and interests, although all are important. Instead, I will urge that before we even consider sending our soldiers into another humanitarian intervention, three critical deficiencies must be addressed.

Our first critical deficiency is that both as a nation and an international community, we have failed to develop the appropriate capabilities for engaging in the types of conflicts generally called for under the mantra of humanitarian intervention.

Our international institutions were built for the Cold War, not for the complex civil wars, insurgencies and humanitarian emergencies that most threaten today. In particular, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations are based on a state construct that's often at odds with wars that don't respect national borders.

And our tools are equally outdated. We know how to provide a window of security, for example, but we have simply not developed the other capabilities necessary to win these wars. For example, we do not have proper reconstruction and development capabilities, and those who do are loath to operate in highly insecure environments. We do not have police divisions ready to deploy for rebuilding another country's force. We do not know how to properly rebuild a government, the key to long-term stability, and surely the ultimate goal of such interventions. And as a result, in the vacuum that results, our military is expected to either fill all of these roles or live with the consequences when those parts of a mission fail. There are precious few examples from the past where governance-building and reconstruction has equalled security operations.

What's more, even when we do have these pieces in place, we rarely have a coherent strategy. The pieces of our missions do not talk, work or plan together effectively. We are mired by endless process, risk aversion and transactional management. New concepts such as 3D (defence, development, diplomacy) and "whole of government" peace-building are moving us in the right direction, but so far, much of that has been talk. If the meetings in national capitals about this were measures of success, our missions would already be over. But if the effect on the ground is the measure of success, we are probably not winning.

Our second critical deficiency is that even if we had the capability to solve such complex conflicts and to rebuild nations, we do not have the capacity to do so. This operates on several levels.

Nationally, Canada has the resources to perhaps engage in one meaningful international operation at a time. Even here, the resources we bring to bear will only ever make up a small portion of the necessary resources for a single mission. In Afghanistan, we are one of 36 countries.

Internationally, the resources are similarly stretched. For better or worse, the countries with the largest capabilities, such as the United States, China and Russia, are often those more inclined to let national interests, rather than humanitarian values, drive their foreign policies.

The world can only intervene in so many conflicts. We can not go everywhere and do everything.

The third, and perhaps most important, critical deficiency is that despite all of the calls for more intervention in countries such as Sudan and Congo, the public simply does not have the stomach for the cost, time and human sacrifice required for effective engagement. We do not have the will.

There are no short-term solutions to these protracted conflicts. They require decade-long engagements and can all be described as enduring missions, taking a generation to be successful. They are incredibly expensive and they are dangerous, inevitably taking the lives of our soldiers. Does our public, living in a world of 30-minute dramas and quick-fix news cycles, have the will to sustain long-term realities of humanitarian intervention? I fear people want a quick fix to all the world's ills, but in the end, do not have the stomach for the types of action necessary to intervene responsibly and effectively.

The case of Darfur offers a prescient example of the challenges of humanitarian intervention. Currently, the UN mission is ineffective. Inserting the type of force necessary will require overthrowing the government in Khartoum. This will imply occupying and rebuilding a country, while fending off what is in many respects a regional war.

I am sympathetic of the need to "do something," but let's think very carefully about whether we will ultimately do more harm than good. In short, we are unprepared, under-resourced and lacking the public support necessary to successfully intervene in many of today's complex conflicts. Until these shortcomings are addressed, discussions on humanitarian intervention will remain purely academic.

Retired General Rick Hillier will appear Monday at the Munk Debate on Humanitarian Intervention. Globe and Mail readers can join the debate at www.munkdebates.com.