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Despite the best efforts by coalition forces, the Taliban in Afghanistan have maintained, and perhaps even gained, strength.

The resilient Taliban, defeated in 2001, are now using classic guerrilla strategy in the struggle for control of Afghanistan. That includes targetting doctors, teachers, government officials and villagers.

"Most of the southern countryside is now paralyzed, beyond the influence of Afghanistan's central government, lacking any government services and unable to break the Taliban's stranglehold," wrote Globe and Mail foreign correspondent Geoffrey York recently while posted there.

Canadian forces are currently leading the mission to provide security in the area, and could remain there provide beyond the current commitment to 2009. But Taliban violence in the region have made safety of the troops a hot-button issue, with Captain Nichola Goddard being the most recent Canadian military member killed there. Just this week, Taliban fighters injured five Canadian soldiers in an early morning attack 20 kilometres west of Kandahar.

And Canadian soldiers aren't the only ones being targeted.

"The doctors and teachers have all left the rural areas because they are afraid of the Taliban. The rural areas are out of the government's control. Day by day, it is getting worse," a local physician, Dr. Mahmood Sadat, tells Mr. York.

Read Mr. York's full report: Taliban rising .

What do you think about the Taliban's presence in Afghanistan? How can the situation be improved? What should Canada's role be?

Earlier, Globe and Mail foreign correspondent Geoffrey York was on-line to take reader questions and comments.

Scroll down to read the questions and answers.

Geoffrey York is a graduate of Carleton University who has been a Globe and Mail reporter since 1981. He has been a foreign correspondent for the newspaper since 1994.

He was the Moscow bureau chief from 1994 to 2002. He has been the Beijing bureau chief since 2002.

He is a veteran war correspondent who has covered war zones since 1991 in places such as Somalia, Sudan, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Palestinian Territories.

He has just finished a one-month stint in Afghanistan. It was his fourth visit to Afghanistan since 2001. He first visited the country in the spring of 2001, when the Taliban ruled the country. He later covered the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban in the fall of 2001, and visited again in 2002.

He is the author of three books, including two books on aboriginal issues in Canada. He has received several journalistic awards, including nominations for National Newspaper Awards.

Editor's Note: The same rules will apply to this live discussion as normally apply to the "reader comment" feature. Globeandmail.com editors will read and approve each comment/question. Not all comments/questions can be answered in the time available. Comments/questions will be checked for content only. Spelling and grammar errors will not be corrected. Comments/questions that include personal attacks, false or unsubstantiated allegations, vulgar language or libelous statements will be rejected. Preference will be given to those who ask questions under their full name, rather than pseudonyms.

Allison Dunfield, globeandmail.com, writes: Hi, Geoffrey, and thank you very much for agreeing to take part in today's discussion. You say in your article that the Taliban have almost total control of the rural areas of Afghanistan. Can you talk a bit about what you think will happen in the next few years? Will they be able to continue that control, or is there any hope of reducing their presence? Secondly, can you give us a sense of what daily life is like for people in these Taliban-controlled areas?

Mr. York writes: It will be extremely difficult to root out the Taliban from their entrenched positions in the villages and rural districts, largely because there is no real alternative to their power in those districts. Government services have collapsed, the central government has virtually no presence in the rural regions, the district officials and the police are seen as corrupt and ineffective, and the international military coalition has not been able to reach into most villages with any kind of permanent presence. The Canadian troops have worked hard to get out into the villages, but they are simply not numerous enough to reach into most villages. Looking a few years ahead, the most likely scenario is a continuation of these problems. There is some hope of reducing the Taliban presence, but it will require a very determined effort to control the borders, boost the police and military numbers, and attack the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan — which will require heavy pressure from the United States, the only country with any realistic chance of influencing the Pakistan regime.

As for the ordinary people in these Taliban-controlled districts: I've talked to some of them, and it's a miserable existence. In most cases, their schools and doctors are gone — shut down or driven away by the Taliban. The NGOs and aid workers that helped them to survive have largely abandoned them now, for fear of Taliban attacks. They've had almost no assistance from their central government since the 1970s. The most powerful local figures are the warlords, the drug lords and the Taliban. The villagers might not like the Taliban, but they are obliged to give them food and shelter because the Taliban are heavily armed and pretty ruthless. And now they have a new threat to their lives: American air strikes, which can pulverize a village within a few minutes if the coalition is attacking a band of Taliban insurgents in a populated place. So we should feel a great deal of sympathy for these villagers. They're really trapped in a horrible situation.

Jimmy McKennistan from Canada writes: Hi, In the cold war, we identified communism as the enemy, because we were fighting an ideology. Is this the same case in the 'war on terror'? What motivates the Taliban and their recruits? Surely it isn't promoting 'you can get blown to bits by CDN and US troops - join now'. What is the pull for the Taliban and their allies in fighting this war. If we can remove their motivation, we can conquer the enemy, no? Or is it more complicated than that?

Mr. York writes: To Jimmy McKennistan: One of the biggest motivations for the Taliban's recruits is the brand of militant Islam that is taught in many of the madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan. They are indoctrinated in some extreme beliefs, including the belief that the foreign troops in Afghanistan are infidels who are attacking an Islamic country. In a sense, yes, this is an ideology, and the Canadian troops (and all the other coalition members) need to be ready for this ideology. The Canadians are trying to battle this ideology by showing on a daily basis that they are decent people who are trying to reconstruct and rebuild a war-shattered country. Every time they go into a village, every time they meet the Afghan people, they are trying to show that this is not a religious war, that the Taliban are wrong to brand the foreigners as an occupying anti-Muslim force. But the Taliban strategy is to lure the Canadians into a heavily armed military conflict, where the Canadians are forced to adopt a defensive military posture in every patrol and every meeting with ordinary Afghans. And the Taliban strategy might work, since the Canadian troops are obliged to put self-defence at the top of their priorities. Moreover, the Taliban ideology will continue to thrive as long as Pakistan refuses to crack down on madrassas that pump out a hostile anti-Western ideology.

Ron MacGillivray from Flatbush, Alberta writes: Mr. York, your article finally gave us a little realism on the situation in Afghanistan. I'm a proud member of the 'cut and run' crowd. I believe we are in Afghanistan to prop up a government that had little popular support and that our presence will accomplish nothing. But I want to pick up on this point about the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. As you are probably aware, the Taliban draw their support mainly from Pashtans in the south. The Pashtans are the largest ethnic group in the world, cantered in Afghanistan and next door in Pakistan. I have heard the Pashtans in Pakistan are mounting an insurgency of their own against the Pakistani government to break away and form an autonomous state of their own called Bachluchistan. Would it be fair to say the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan is part of a much larger struggle by the ethnic Pashtans to gain independence?

Mr. York writes: To Ron MacGillivray: I think there is definitely a tribal aspect to the Afghan conflict, and Pashtun tribalism is clearly a factor. But I don't think it's fundamentally an independence struggle. What happens is this: the Pashtun tribal connections are making it easier for the Taliban to recruit support on the Pakistan side of the border. The border itself is a somewhat artificial line, and it is widely ignored by a lot of Pashtun people. The border is too long and too porous to be easily controlled, and the Pashtuns can slip across without too much trouble. There is also a sense of tribal solidarity among them, so that a Pashtun from Pakistan can expect some shelter and support from his own ethnic people in Afghanistan when they travel across the border. These connections are making it difficult for the Canadian soldiers to separate the insurgents from the ordinary people in their villages.

William Sandham from St. Catharines Canada writes: When I woke up this morning and looked through the paper I was horrified to see that Canadian troops no longer have to regard Taliban prisoners as prisoners of war, thus effectively stripping them of all protections under the Geneva Convention. It is true, as Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier points out, Canada is technically not at war with another nation. However this does not necessarily mean that captured Taliban are not entitled to the protections that they, as humans, are entitled too. The global village has changed a great deal since 1949 when the convention came into effect and again since 9/11. We must reconsider what it means to go to war so that we can avoid these legal loop holes that the WOT opens up. The WOT is war none the less and the rules of war should apply regardless.

Mr. York writes: To William Sandham: It's interesting to recall that the Canadian military tried to use the Geneva Conventions to suppress photos of Canadian troops capturing Taliban prisoners in a recent operation near Gumbad. When the photographer returned with the photos, he was brought before two Canadian military lawyers who told him that he would be violating the Geneva Conventions if he published the photos. I find it rather odd that the military would try to use the Geneva Conventions to suppress photos of military activities, and then turn around and declare that the Canadian military is not bound by the Geneva Conventions when prisoners are captured.

Jonny Friendly from Vancouver, the wet coast, Canada writes: I saw a report from Arthur Kent last week in which he suggested a lot of progress is being made in the north where the Taliban are despised. Given the Taliban are largely Pashtun, and that their greatest influence is in the south and east, might it be practical to break the country up along tribal/ethnic lines? Thanks, Jonny.

Mr. York writes: To Jonny Friendly: Yes, there is an important regional aspect to this conflict. The Taliban are clearly much weaker in the north and the east. But I'm not sure if the problem could be solved by breaking up the country. Afghanistan is already a highly fragmented country, where Kabul exercises little control over most of the provinces. It would be hard to break up the country even more than it is currently broken up.

Don Mitchell from Duncan, B.C. writes: Mr. York says that the situation is hopeless, the government and military says that the situation is improving. The truth is somewhere in the middle. All that I can see from my vantage point in Canada is that the Taliban have been taking some heavy casualties lately and I have no idea how long they can sustain such a pounding. Our casualties have been very light (contrast with D-Day 365 dead, Battle of Ortona 1,300 dead and wounded in 5 days). Don't think for a second that it will be any easier if we leave A-stan and go to Darfur.

Geoffrey York writes: To Don Mitchell: I never said that the situation is hopeless. In my article, at the end, I outlined some of the things that would have to be changed to give greater hope to the Canadians and the rest of the international coalition. But you are absolutely right that the Taliban has taken a severe pounding in recent weeks. The Taliban casualties are extremely high -- although the coalition's estimates of casualties might be somewhat exaggerated, since they cannot do an actual body count. (The Taliban usually remove their dead and wounded from the battle scene.) When civilians are removed from a building and only Taliban are inside, the building can be destroyed by a coalition air strike or artillery strike, and the Taliban death toll is inevitably very high. What's striking, however, is that the Taliban is continuing to operate very actively in southern Afghanistan, despite all of their deaths and injuries. Their pool of recruits and supporters is obviously much.

It's bigger than the coalition expected -- and the coalition has admitted that.

Liane Beattie from Victoria, BC Canada writes: What are your thoughts on reversing our traditional approach of trying to establish security first (through armed forces) to instead providing assistance first in the areas diplomacy and development which creates a more secure environment? For example: Could the 'Confidence in Government' CIDA program (initiated by Michael Callan, Richard Colvin) be even more successful if the meetings with Afghan elders were held WITHOUT the presence of Canadian armed forces and if Taliban representatives as well as unarmed Canadian citizen volunteers from Canadem and Canada Corps were included? I would also like to know your thoughts on expanding Canada's role as a leader in HOSTING citizens of developing countries from all areas of civil society as observers and to exchange training and information? Thank you for your thoughtful and probing articles on Afghanistan.

Mr. York writes: To Liane Beattie: I think you're on the right track here. These non-military programs, including CIDA's very interesting "Confidence in Government" program (which I wrote about in the Globe last week), can play a very crucial role in rebuilding Afghanistan. And you're right that the military should not be present at those meetings. In fact, CIDA is hoping that these meetings will be controlled and shaped by Afghans themselves, so that Afghan leaders and citizens can make their own decisions and set their own priorities. If a program is dominated by foreigners, Afghans will not trust it. If they set their own priorities, they will have some faith in the services that result from it. This is an excellent approach, but the question is whether it there is sufficient funding and support, and whether is too late to roll out this program in the Taliban-dominated districts. From what I've seen so far, it is a very slow and complicated process, and it might take a long time to make a difference.

David Stevenson from Ottawa Canada writes: Mr. York, It appears that the Taliban are making a comeback, at least in the area around Kandahar. Canadian casualties are rising. There was a riot this week in Kabul after a traffic accident, with the Afghans chanting 'death to America'. From what I read, most Afghans, while perhaps not supporting the Taliban, are unwilling or too afraid to actively oppose them or to support the western troops. Most government ministers are warlords, with their own militias. Corruption is rampant, poppy cultivation is through the roof, illiteracy is pervasive. This country is a disaster and too many Afghans seem only to want to enrich themselves rather than help their fellow citizens. Other than placating the Bush administration and vague notions of doing our international duty, what are we doing there? How can 2300 troops, out of which maybe a few hundred are combat troops, make much of a difference? I am starting to believe that our soldiers are fighting and dying for a lost cause.

Mr. York writes: To David Stevenson: You're right to identify the huge problems in Afghanistan, but I think it would be a mistake to assume that the Canadian troops are failing to make any progress. On an individual basis, the Canadians are doing a lot of good work. They are providing some security and safety in some areas. They are providing medical services in some villages (although it's not done regularly in each village). And they are doing some humanitarian work. At the very least, they are preventing the Taliban from overrunning the cities. And let's keep in mind that the Taliban really are a nasty bunch of characters — prone to murdering innocent people as a way of paralyzing the government. So I'm not quite as pessimistic as you. Certainly there are a lot of questions that can be asked about Canada's exit strategy, Canada's military policies and so on, and the overall success of the mission is still in doubt. But I think it would be unfair to ignore the good work that's being done.

Aubrey Charette from Ottawa Canada writes: Mr. York, I keep asking this question to individuals dealing with Afghanistan, but no one can give me a straight answer. Hopefully you can. My question revolves around who it is we are actually fighting in Afghanistan. As you know, the civil war was in essence an ethnic conflict. When the US and Canada entered the war we fought alongside the minority ethnicities (Tajiks, Uzbeks...) against the Taliban that derived its support, especially initial support, from the Pashtun majority. In many respects it appears we have taken sides in an ethnic conflict. We are now in Pashtun territory fighting so-called Taliban. I am concerned that really we are simply fighting Pashtuns, who have never accepted foreign domination and won't welcome ours. Can you comment on the ethnic makeup of this conflict and answer the question of who exactly the Taliban are? Are we simply fighting Pashtuns and joining in a long line of invaders that have attempted to civilize these people?

Geoffrey York writes: To Aubrey Charette: I agree that the conflict has an ethnic dimension, but I think it is over-simplified to suggest that Canada is taking sides in an ethnic war. Among ordinary Pashtuns, there are many (probably a majority) who don't support the Taliban. I've talked to many of them over the past few weeks, and I can assure you that most Pashtuns simply want peace and stability and economic progress. There are thousands of hard-working Pashtun doctors and teachers and ordinary people who don't necessarily sympathize with the Taliban. These are the people that Canada is trying to protect and support. But where I agree with you is this: the Pashtuns (and most Afghans) don't want a permanent force of foreigners occupying their country. They will accept the Canadians and the other coalition forces only if they feel that these forces are providing real help to the country. If it gets to the point where the foreign troops are causing more harm than good — for example by crashing into civilian vehicles in Kabul and Kandahar, or by accidentally bombing the homes of innocent people — then the tide of opinion will turn against them.

Albert Heisenberg from Calgary Canada writes: The military refer to a simplistic model where everyone that the armed forces fights with are labelled as Taliban, who are portrayed as Muslim extremists who in the past harboured bin Laden in Afghanistan. But the reality is more complex than that. Juan Cole, for example, writes 'Taliban are, properly speaking, mostly Afghan orphans and displaced youths who got their education in neo-Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan and were backed by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence. It is not clear that those now fighting the US in southern Afghanistan are actually in the main Taliban in this technical sense', and 'While most anti-U.S. actions in Afghanistan come from the Pashtun ethnic group, these Kabul protests, which paralyzed the capital and resulted in the imposition of a curfew, heavily involved Tajiks.' Kabul is a largely Tajik city, and the Tajiks mostly hated the Taliban with a passion, and many high officials in the Karzai government have been Tajik. So they haven't been as upset with the U.S. invasion and presence as have been many Pashtuns, especially those Pashtun who either supported the Taliban or just can't abide foreign troops in their country (who have moreover installed the Tajiks in power) ... Significant numbers of Tajiks are clearly now turning against the U.S., and that is a very bad sign indeed.' For a Canadian interested in really understanding what's going on, several questions arise: (1) Who are the Canadians fighting, exactly? (2) Why? What is our strategy? What are our goals in Afghanistan? (3) Why are we not concentrating our efforts in finding bin Laden and his staff, and bringing them to justice?

Mr. York writes: to Albert Heisenberg: I agree with a lot of the points you make. But I should explain why we in the media are using the "Taliban" term. Of course it doesn't describe every single person who is opposing the international forces. Many have other motives — some are acting from tribal loyalty or for revenge for previous deaths. But to refuse to call them Taliban, on a technicality, would also be misleading. Their leadership and funding and organization is largely similar to the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Yes, they get a lot of their recruits from displaced youths, and a lot of their support comes from the Pakistan intelligence agency. But that was equally true in the 1990s when the Taliban was created and developed. In the field, on the ground, the Canadians have no doubt of their enemy. They are fighting the armed gangs that are shooting and terrorizing innocent people in the villages and towns. We call them Taliban because that is the best simple term for them, and it conveys the sense of their leadership and organization, even if it doesn't cover every single individual who is opposing the foreign troops.

Seamus F. from Ottawa Canada writes: Geoffrey, what would be the best way to pinch off the financial support of the Taliban? There must be some way of stopping the financial flow, or the flow of food and other supplies, is there not?

Mr. York writes: To Seamus F: This is a tough question. Part of the answer, as I mentioned earlier, is to choke off the extremist madrassas that are supporting the Taliban. These madrassas often get financial support from Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Arab states. A few years ago, the United States put heavy pressure on Pakistan to control and regulate these madrassas. Pakistan actually introduced laws to require the madrassas to be audited, to reveal their funding, to broaden their curriculum beyond just religious matters, etc. But these laws were never really enforced, because the Pakistan government has little interest in cracking down on the foreign-funded madrassas. In fact, this network of madrassas is very important to the political support of the Pakistan government. So this points to one of the biggest problems that needs to be tackled: the Pakistan government, which is failing to tackle the roots of the Taliban problem.

Allison Dunfield writes: Thank you so much, Geoffrey, for taking part in today's discussion. I think our readers appreciated your knowledge and expertise, as well as first-hand observations from Afghanistan. We hope you will join us again for another discussion in the future.

Mr. York writes: Thanks for all of the very interesting questions.

Allison Dunfield writes: Yes, thank you to our readers. I'm afraid that's all the time we have for today's discussion, but check back for more discussions on Afghanistan.