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A U.S. congressional commission recently predicted that it's more likely than not a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction will occur somewhere in the world by 2013, and that a biological attack is more likely than a nuclear one.

The commission recommended that the “United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic measures to prevent bioterrorism: (1) conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens; (2) develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities; (3) tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories; (4) promote a culture of security awareness in the life sciences community; and (5) enhance the nation's capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties.” This report by the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism should prompt Canadians to ask: Are we prepared for a possible bioterrorist attack? Have we done all we can to mitigate risk and ensure response and recovery?

To my knowledge, we have never conducted a broad, independent analysis of these questions in Canada. So the answer is: We don't really know.

Bioterrorism is rare but not hypothetical. In 2001, the U.S. anthrax attacks killed five people and sickened 17; an anthrax-laced letter shut down Congress briefly and closed the Hart Senate Office Building for months of expensive cleaning. The perpetrator, according to the FBI, was Bruce Ivins, a domestic scientist at Fort Detrick, Md., a U.S. biodefence facility.

Nature is the most effective bioterrorist. In Canada, the most recent test of our defences was the SARS epidemic. As a result of SARS, and the subsequent formation of the Public Health Agency of Canada, our public-health detection and response likely is better prepared for a bioterrorist attack than it otherwise would have been. In a bizarre way, SARS was a dress rehearsal for future onslaughts by nature, such as pandemic influenza, or by the intentional acts of terrorists.

Canadians need to be confident about our state of public-health preparedness: Many of our scientific communities also need to be prepared.

One of these is the life-sciences community in universities and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. Potential exists for unholy alliances between cutting-edge science and bioterrorism. The same knowledge that can be used to heal – for example, through the production of genetically engineered human insulin used by almost every Canadian diabetic – can also be used to kill.

Knowledge of life sciences can be utilized to genetically engineer pathogens so they resist antibiotics, to develop frightening new toxins that wipe out memory or immunity, and to pursue the holy grail of bioterrorism: the weaponization of pathogens or toxins.

Not all weapons of mass destruction are created equal. Nuclear protection is primarily about safeguarding materials such as highly enriched uranium. Knowledge about nuclear capabilities has always been closely guarded by states as “nuclear secrets,” although the Pakistan-based A. Q. Khan network has poked holes in that veil of secrecy.

By contrast, biological knowledge is widely disseminated, openly published in journals for the whole community to read. Unlike nuclear capacity, there is no need for huge capital investments in equipment such as centrifuges. A technique that wins a Nobel prize today will be used by high-school students five years from now. Knowledge spreads around the world almost instantaneously.

On balance, the open dissemination of life-sciences knowledge is a very good thing: It enables progress in the fight against disease and hunger. Nevertheless, we have a responsibility to ensure we are doing all we can in the public and private sectors to mitigate the risk of misuse by rogue scientists. As the congressional report states with chilling clarity: The “United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists.” There is an important interface between public-health and life-sciences communities and other communities – emergency responders, law enforcement, border security, intelligence and national security. A constructive relationship between these communities is itself an important defence. Preparedness for bioterrorism is complex, in part because it requires co-operation between these communities, which have very different cultures, and also with the public.

More than five independent reports in the U.S. have addressed the biosecurity threat and how best to prepare against it. Each has raised awareness and made recommendations, many of which have been followed by the U.S. government and other stakeholders.

In Canada, to my knowledge, we have not conducted a similar independent assessment of how well we are prepared for bioterrorism. Since 2005, we've had a group of independent bodies of top scientists similar to the U.S. National Academies – the Council of Canadian Academies, the Royal Society of Canada, the Canadian Academy of Health Sciences, and the Canadian Academy of Engineering – which would be well positioned to conduct such an assessment.

In 2006, when a previous U.S. report on biosecurity – one on which I had served – was released, I wrote: “The Government of Canada should examine how the U.S. National Academies' recommendations apply to Canada.” I find myself making the same plea again, hoping that no one will ever have the chance to point to these urgings as warnings unheeded.

Peter Singer is the director of the McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health, University Health Network and University of Toronto