Last year, after Michael Ignatieff unwisely declared that Stephen Harper's time was up, the Prime Minister alleged that the opposition parties were planning to repeat their attempted “coup” (as the Economist magazine called it) after the election.
Not so, Mr. Ignatieff's team whispered – their man was the last MP to sign the caucus letter. And, far from having reneged on his signature, he never supported the coalition.
For his part, Mr. Ignatieff stated that, if that were his intention, he could have already been prime minister. Which did not exactly shut the door. Nor was it quite true.
In December, 2008, Mr. Ignatieff's goal was to replace Stéphane Dion. Once that was accomplished, he had to face a hard reality. In contrast to Jack Layton and Bob Rae, Mr. Ignatieff understood all along that the Governor-General was not bound to transfer power to the coalition without an election – an election the Liberals would likely have lost, thereby returning him to Cambridge, Mass.
After examining the proposal Mr. Ignatieff put forward last week to limit prime ministerial power in proroguing Parliament, there can now be no doubt about his true intentions. He is trying to prevent Her Excellency from blocking an election he might lose, while still winning enough seats to replace Mr. Harper in a coalition government.
For one thing, the Liberals propose to amend House rules to block a prime minister facing a confidence vote from requesting prorogation. Forget about the Governor-General exercising her discretionary powers, as in 2008. And how else can one explain shutting the door on prorogation in all other situations only in the first year of the mandate – the period beyond which no constitutionalist argues that a gov-
ernor-general would hand over power without an election?
Although it was said by many last week that Mr. Ignatieff's secondary objective was to trump Jack Layton's legislative approach to achieving the same objective, it quickly became apparent that the two are working together again – notwithstanding the hard feelings after Mr. Ignatieff exploded the coalition. In fact, I'd not be surprised if there have been months of secret backroom discussions between their emissaries, as was the case in 2008.
This time, however, the Bloc appears distinctly lukewarm: They support the objective, but doubt that Mr. Ignatieff's approach would be effective or that Mr. Layton's bill would be constitutional. Yesterday, the Hill Times newspaper reported that Liberals and New Democrats agree with that assessment, but are discussing the option of knowingly introducing an unconstitutional bill – an inconceivable act in the case of a prime minister in waiting.
In part, Mr. Duceppe's standoffishness derives from political calculation: Unlike in 2008, when his commitment was for just 18 months, an election is looming. In Montreal, many Bloc candidates will face tight races against their erstwhile partners.
But, with the secessionist movement moribund in Quebec, there's another agenda at play. If you thought the attempted “coup” would have been a disaster for Canada had it succeeded, consider the implications of the Liberals and NDP moving forward without Bloc support.
If Mr. Duceppe insists on a constitutional amendment, he could force Mr. Layton to choose between Quebec – where his popularity has been soaring, Mr. Harper is at a low point and constitutional negotiations are almost a national sport – and the rest of the country. In British Columbia, I can already hear callers to phone-in shows recoiling at the prospect of another Charlottetown-like failure – at best.
Mr. Ignatieff would face the same decision. However, as leader of the party that gave us the 1982 Constitution without the consent of the National Assembly, and later under Jean Chrétien helped kill the best chance to repair its greatest flaw, his choice could prove fatal for the Liberals, and for his leadership.
For Mr. Duceppe, as it is, the coming months may offer an opportunity too good to pass up: Canada loses and secessionists win, whatever others decide. And, unlike Mr. Ignatieff's first blunder in this area, which ended in Parliament recognizing the Québécois nation, Canadians would not be able to count on the Prime Minister outmanoeuvring Mr. Duceppe to make the best of a bad situation.
