At this point, it is only the short-term future of Iran's clerical regime that remains in doubt. The current protests could be repressed, but the unelected institutions of priestly rule have been fatally undermined. In the meantime, the government may be largely paralyzed anyway. Each of these things has its own dynamic and timetable, but this is not a regime that can last many more years.
When it comes to repression, the Islamic Republic's spectrum of security instruments that can be used synergistically include:
- The regular national police for routine crowd control without much use of force;
- Riot police units with batons that can beat up some demonstrators to discourage others;
- The much more brutal, underclass Basij militiamen, who enjoy hitting, even shooting, more affluent Iranians;
- The not incompetent technical arm of the regime that blocks cellular service to impede demonstrations, disrupts Internet services and intercepts opposition communications.
If violence were to escalate greatly, Pasdaran revolutionary guard troops, with their wheeled armoured vehicles, might also be called in, although at some risk to the regime: One unhappy losing candidate, Mohsen Rezai, was once their long-term commander. The alternative of calling in the regular army with its tanks would be much more risky, given that the loyalty of the generals is unknown. For the time being, the regime doesn't need either to control the demonstrators.
What has undermined the very structure of the Islamic Republic is the fracturing of its ruling elite. It was the unity established by its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that allowed the regime to dominate the population for almost 30 years, and it has now been lost. The very people who did much to create the institutions of priestly rule are now destroying their authority.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's leading rival for the presidency, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, was prime minister from 1981 to 1989, when the Islamic Republic acquired its administrative structure, including its unelected head, the “Supreme Leader” who commands all and must be obeyed in all things. But Mr. Mousavi now flatly rejects the orders of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept Mr. Ahmadinejad's re-election. In this, Mr. Mousavi is joined by another losing candidate, former speaker of the Majlis (elected parliament) and pillar of the establishment Mehdi Karroubi, a great many supporters of both and a yet-more-senior founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
President from 1989 to 1997, among other things, Mr. Rafsanjani is the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, whose 86 members choose the Supreme Leader and can ostensibly remove him. During the campaign, Mr. Ahmadinejad accused Mr. Rafsanjani and his children of corruption in the harshest terms, on live television. If his re-election is to be “definitive” and even “divine,” as the Supreme Leader has declared, Mr. Rafsanjani would have to resign from all his offices and his children would have to leave Iran. Instead, he is reportedly trying to recruit a majority of the Assembly of Experts to remove Ayatollah Khamenei, or at least force him to order new elections.
The other key undemocratic institution that makes the Islamic Republic what it is, and that Mr. Mousavi and Mr. Rafsanjani, among others, helped to create, is the 12-member Council of Guardians. It can veto any laws passed by the Majlis, and any candidate who presents himself for election (only Islamists qualify). In recent years, it has persistently sided with the extremists and Mr. Ahmadinejad, using its veto powers very aggressively.
Ayatollah Khamenei logically chose the council to deal with the election dispute. The council announced that it might recount 10 per cent of the ballots, and summoned Mr. Ahmadinejad's rivals: Mr. Mousavi, Mr. Karroubi and Mr. Rezai, the longest-serving (1981-1997) commander of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, another fundamental institution of the Islamic Republic with its own ministry, industries and overseas operations.
