Prime Minister Stephen Harper has riled many Canadians with his second suspension of Parliament in a year. On both occasions, the Prime Minister has shuttered Parliament in order to prevent our elected representatives from doing their most fundamental job of holding the government to account. Such manoeuvring is anti-democratic and demonstrates that it is time to put the decision to prorogue in the hands of the House of Commons.
Currently, the authority to prorogue, summon, and dissolve the legislature is one of the monarch's common law powers. However, the governor-general is bound by constitutional convention to exercise these powers in most circumstances only on the advice of the prime minister and cabinet. In practice, the decision has become a personal power of the prime minister.
The events in late 2008 and 2009 illustrate very clearly the dangers of empowering the executive to shut down Parliament whenever it suits them. For example, the government can successfully grant itself immunity against inquiries: the current suspension has neutered an investigation into the government's handling of Afghan prisoners.
The decision to prorogue does not sit well with the public either. A recent Angus Reid poll found 53 per cent of Canadians disagreed with this prorogation. Dissent was evident even amongst Conservative supporters, who were split 46 per cent in favour to 45 against. Only 23 per cent of Canadians agreed with the government's claim that Parliament was prorogued in order to allow the government to concentrate on developing its economic plan.
Some commentators have praised the decision as clever, because it allowed the government to reset the whole parliamentary agenda and gain control of Senate committees when Parliament does resume. But while political craftiness is an essential characteristic needed for any successful prime minister, it is important to distinguish between craftiness manifested in shrewdness, on the one hand, and something more questionable, on the other. This is the difference between putting Parliament to work in the government's interests and subverting Parliament in the government's interests.
Parliament's central role in our system of government is based on the fact that we elect members of Parliament, not governments. Whoever forms the government only has a democratic right to govern by commanding the confidence of a majority of our elected MPs. Indeed, the whole democratic character of our form of government is based on this fundamental requirement.
And in order for our elected representatives to decide whether the government of the day has their confidence, they must hold that government continually to account. MPs must be able to demand the government provides documentation and appears before committees when summoned.
Mr. Harper's government is certainly not the first in Canada to shut down Parliament to escape embarrassing situations. However, the repeated abuse of prorogation within a 12-month period to avoid censure is unprecedented.
It is time to change the rules and stipulate that no prime minister can advise the prorogation or dissolution of Parliament without a vote to do so in the House of Commons. This is not as radical a suggestion as it may sound, as the British government proposed in 2007 that dissolution should only follow a vote in the Commons.
This change could be implemented informally and quickly, with the passage of a resolution in the House of Commons to the effect that the prime minister would be in contempt of Parliament to advise prorogation or dissolution without being authorized to do so by the House. Such a resolution would preserve the important personal prerogative of the governor-general to either prorogue or dissolve Parliament on her own initiative if necessary. But it would also establish the norm that our MPs should decide collectively when it is time to stop Parliament's work. The decision to shut down Parliament should be made democratically, not autocratically.
Andrew Heard is an associate professor of political science at Simon Fraser University.
