Nowhere is the gap between expectations and reality hitting Barack Obama harder than in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Good intentions and the obvious American desire to promote a deal seem to have quickly crashed on the shoals of a reality that has confounded past mediators. It's no wonder that, in the region and outside, observers are questioning whether the two-state formula is still viable.
As with so many other tough policy questions faced by the U.S. President, the jury is still out on his performance. Mr. Obama certainly started out on the right track by stating firmly that “Israeli-Palestinian peace is an American interest.” But his actions thus far belie an understanding of what makes the parties tick and both sides are frustrated.
For example, Mr. Obama insisted for months on an unqualified settlement freeze by Israel (worthy on the merits but politically impossible) instead of quickly agreeing on a compromise formula. He then agreed to an Israeli demand for a quid pro quo – normalization steps from Arab governments – for a freeze he wasn't going to get. They, in turn, rebuffed him unceremoniously in the absence of an Israeli commitment.
The President still hasn't spoken directly to the Israeli public, which feels pressured to take enormous security risks. Despite public protestations to the contrary, there is tension between Jerusalem and Washington.
On the Palestinian side, getting too close to the U.S. is a liability. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is seriously weakened by accusations of betrayal. Pressured by Mr. Obama, he grudgingly met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New York. Then, pressed by the U.S. and Israel, he initially withdrew a resolution on the Goldstone Report (criticizing Israel's conduct in the December, 2008, fighting in Gaza) from the Human Rights Council – and later backtracked.
Hamas, Mr. Abbas's archrival for Palestinian primacy, is using his weakness to stall on intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks, and also hopes to benefit from whatever deal is made to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The improved economic and security situation in the West Bank doesn't compensate for Mr. Abbas's shaky political standing and he will be hard-pressed to bend in any process that is launched.
Mr. Netanyahu is buying time by reiterating his stated commitment to a two-state resolution of the conflict without doing much about it practically. The issue isn't a shaky coalition that might fall apart: the Prime Minister is backed by parties bent on staying in power, especially Labour leader and Defence Minister Ehud Barak, who believes that there is no Palestinian partner.
If Mr. Netanyahu wants to embark on a bold initiative and his partners bolt, public opinion will back him, as will opposition leader Tzipi Livni –their present acrimony notwithstanding.
It's fair to assume that he wants to leave a legacy that goes beyond political survival, but his past record as prime minister (1996-99) indicates that what really matters is who pressures him last and to what extent. So far, the only positive initiative he has put forward is a case for “economic peace,” arguing that economic improvements in the West Bank will create the groundwork for future political developments.
Recognizing the difficulty of moving in tandem, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has come up with his own plan for Palestinian state-building, leading to a declaration of independence two years hence, should talks lead nowhere. European governments are taken with the idea and, along with Tony Blair, their envoy to the region, are investing heavily in Palestinian institutions.
These are worthy and necessary efforts. But economic development and improved governance shouldn't be confused with political steps that are key to constructively unlocking what Mr. Obama refers to as a “dangerous status quo.” Repeatedly in the past, in the absence of political progress, an outbreak of violence has broken the deadlock. And, so far, any gains made in violent rounds have been short-lived.
Israelis naturally feel beleaguered by the political fallout of the Goldstone Report and are understandably angered by the Palestinians' decision to take their fight to international forums. Right now, the last thing Israel feels like doing is compromising – and Mr. Netanyahu astutely speaks to these emotions.
Mr. Obama's National Security Adviser, General James Jones, said this week that the President remains firmly committed to a two-state solution. But given the players, the plan to reach a comprehensive deal within two years seems increasingly unlikely to deliver – unless Mr. Obama gets equally creative and tough. That's unfortunate, because Israel's future as a state with a Jewish majority depends precisely on such a deal.
