The Iraq war, intended by George W. Bush to make the West secure, defeat Islamic radicalism and make democracy a reality in the Middle East, is for now forgotten by a news media obsessed by Afghanistan, barring the occasional nasty headline from Baghdad. The U.S. troop surge of 2007 has been said by apologists to have righted earlier wrongs. Many political and academic gurus take comfort from examples showing Iraqis now able to work together. Iraq's parliament, still vigorous in debate, is seen as proof of how a civil society based on the rule of law, freedom of choice and respect for others could emerge.
As Barack Obama's administration continues to redeploy and withdraw from Iraq, Washington has little choice but to project a modicum of confidence and hope. Events on the ground are not given due weight publicly because they reveal too much suffering and tragedy, both now and in future. Acknowledging the destructive role of ethnic and religious nationalism is fraught with risk. Better to fudge now, allowing U.S. forces to get out and then pass the blame to the Iraqis themselves, having failed to meet the challenge.
Westerners often find ethno-religious nationalism disturbing. It contrasts so sharply with our own belief in the supremacy of civic values. We are reluctant to acknowledge that once communal violence predominates, maintaining a single governing entity becomes impossible. Hate and fear then dominate. In Iraq, tragedies have become badges of honour and the concept of victimization is lifeblood. The U.S. invasion of 2003 rid the world of a barbaric autocrat but in doing so released forces that assure the country's demise.
After six years of rebuilding and reforming, southern Iraq has become a de facto theocratic Shia state, with widespread dissension among feuding movements and leaderships. There is no single dominant grouping in this internal struggle for power. Paradoxically, the longer infighting continues the more Iran benefits, spreading Shia influence deep into the Sunni Arab heartland.
The Iraqi army most often behaves as a Shia militia. None of its members is permitted to enter Kurdistan, nor is the Iraqi flag flown on Kurdistani turf. The Shia-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appears determined to undercut the Sunni Awakening movement, so beloved by the Americans because it successfully challenged al-Qaeda. The Prime Minister's commitment to integrate Awakening militias into the regular army is stillborn. The Iraqi national army views them as a challenge to Shia predominance.
Mr. al-Maliki may be less an enemy of reconciliation than he is incapable of doing anything about it. But pressures exert themselves and the habit of autocracy sticks. Civil liberties are under threat as the American ability to influence events recedes. Reputable sources like New York-based Human Rights Watch, and more recently, the cautious Economist magazine, have reported that civil liberties are increasingly at risk: witness the ballooning security apparatus, routine torture, censorship, political arrests, night curfews and a “dirty squad” that allegedly reports to the Prime Minister's bureau.
Iraq's neighbours remain deeply concerned, each for different reasons: For the surrounding Sunni states, what they see as a Shiite enemy in their midst. For the Saudis, a focus of loyalty for their own much abused Shia minority. For Turkey, an independent Kurdistan appealing to its own disaffected Kurdish minority. For Jordan and Egypt, an imposed role as protectors of Iraqi Sunnis. For Syria, sectarian strife that threatens to spread to its own territory. And for all, fear of the new Iraq as a cocoon for terror. Only the Iranians have some reason to be content, Tehran's appetites fuelled by imperialism and oil.
The last chance for some kind of stability may be the division of Iraq into three nationally based independent states, where ties of blood and belonging provide enough homogeneity to make emergent majorities no longer feel threatened. Even this objective plays against all odds, so difficult will it be to separate out people, places and resources. (The fate of smaller sects does not bear speculation.) The partition of India and the former Yugoslavia stand out as examples. Afghanistan looms on the horizon. Other crises will follow until we accept that culture and identity cannot easily be tampered with, no matter how much we are convinced of the rightness of our cause.
Michael Bell is former chair of the donor committee of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, and a senior scholar on international diplomacy at the University of Windsor.
