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Canada's politicians are on the verge of putting Governor-General Michaëlle Jean in an extremely unenviable position, forcing our non-partisan vice-regal representative to set a precedent in the middle of a political mess.

If things unfold as they might, the Governor-General will have to make a decision. She has a number of options, any one of which could become controversial.

Canadians elect individual members of the House of Commons. They do not elect political parties, prime ministers, or governments. A prime minister is the person who is able to command the confidence of a majority of the members of House, the person whom the House trusts to form a cabinet and govern. A prime minister does not have to belong to any political party. He does not even need to be a member of the House.

The House of Commons supports the government of Canada through the convention of confidence. But the Crown retains constitutional power in a variety of situations. The Royal Prerogative is exercised by the person of the governor-general on the advice of the sitting prime minister. The Crown also has reserve powers that are exercised independent of ministerial advice.

Canadians are rarely aware of the Crown's powers. Their use has become almost entirely routine, with little possibility for controversy. But it is, technically, the governor-general who summons Parliament to begin a session, ends (prorogues) a parliamentary session and dissolves Parliament for an election. In practice, it is almost always the prime minister who determines when and how these things happen.

The Crown's powers work best when they are exercised least. That minimizes Crown interference in the activities of the elected representatives of the people in the House of Commons. It also tends to avoid establishing precedent that might limit the Crown in situations of deadlock or crisis.

Whenever a prime minister requests a dissolution of parliament for an election, the governor-general technically has a choice to say yes or no. However, almost always, the choice is clear. The governor-general simply accepts the advice of the prime minister. That is usually the most minimal use of the powers. But not always.

In 1926, Governor-General Julian Byng rejected Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's advice to dissolve parliament for an election after the government lost control of the House, though it had not been defeated on a confidence vote. Byng had three main grounds: that it was soon after the previous election, that there seemed to be another person who could command the confidence of the House, and that the government was facing a vote of censure in the House. Byng decided to let the House continue its work rather than accept the prime minister's advice for a new election. One of the reasons Mackenzie King asked for a dissolution in 1926, and one of the reasons Byng refused the request, was in an attempt to avoid a vote of censure in the House. King then resigned and Byng appointed Arthur Meighen as prime minister.

Some aspects of today's situation are clear. The House of Commons is just at the beginning of a session after a recent election. It has not had much chance to do its work or find its footing. The present government is facing a confidence vote.

If the House decides it does not have confidence in the present government, the Governor-General will have to wonder if the House might have confidence in a different government drawn from the same House. The opposition parties have attempted to address that point with their agreement and the letter they have written to Ms. Jean.

Constitutional experts say in that situation the most minimal use of the Royal Prerogative would be to let the House get on with its work and let a new prime minister test the confidence of the House.

Accepting the prime minister's advice for dissolution and an election in the present situation is also a possible, and proper, use of the prerogative. But that would establish a precedent, so far unknown, of the Crown interfering in the work of a newly elected House when it seems possible a new prime minister might be able to command the confidence of the House.

The current Prime Minister could ask the Governor-General to prorogue this session of Parliament, to delay the work of the House until the New Year, an exercise of the Crown's reserve powers. That request would raise questions that have never been raised before. It seems a murkier situation than a request for dissolution would be.

The Governor-General could refuse a prorogation request on the same grounds as refusing a dissolution request, that the refusal would represent the most minimal use of the Crown's powers and the least Crown interference with the work of the House. This session has hardly begun, and a confidence vote is scheduled within days.

Proroguing the House with the current government facing a confidence vote and a proposed new government waiting in the wings would set an interesting precedent. That could be interpreted as meaning that future prime ministers could avoid defeat on confidence votes simply by proroguing Parliament and continuing to govern as usual. That would have potential effects not only in minority government situations.

What if a future majority prime minister faced a revolt among his own supporters so serious it looked as if they might vote with the opposition on a confidence matter? John A. Macdonald's majority government was defeated in 1873 because of defections in the wake of the Pacific Scandal. Should a prime minister be able to avoid defeat simply by having Parliament prorogued and not facing the members of the House of Commons?

Constitutional scholar Ned Franks suggested to me that the prorogation situation is not black-and-white. There is a third, more complex, option.

The Governor-General could prorogue the House, but on the condition that the government operate as it would between the time of a dissolution of Parliament and an election. That means the government could manage day-to-day affairs until Parliament was again summoned. But it could not do many things governments usually do. It could not, for example, appoint judges or ambassadors, or negotiate treaties with other countries, or take major policy initiatives that might bind future governments. In other words, the Governor-General would not approve orders-in-council that require cabinet decisions.

A governor-general has never refused a prime minister's request for prorogation, or put conditions on it. But prorogations are usually very routine affairs. No prime minister has ever asked for one when he faced an imminent confidence vote. That could be seen as asking the governor-general to interfere to the extent of cancelling or delaying the exercise of the most basic right members of the House have, to express confidence or non-confidence in a government.

Today, we live in interesting political times. But there is now no constitutional crisis. Such a thing might be created if the Governor-General is put in the position of having to exercise the Crown's constitutional powers to solve political problems.

Bob Beal is an Edmonton historian, one of whose specialties is the historical development of the English and Canadian constitutions.