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How do the other federal parties need to adapt their strategies now that Michael Ignatieff has replaced Stéphane Dion as Liberal Leader?

Greg Lyle (former chief of staff for Gary Filmon and adviser to Mike Harris): Other parties should be nervous right now. Michael Ignatieff is no Stéphane Dion. Mr. Dion became a perfect storm - for the Liberals' opponents. It may not have had to be that way, but that is the way things turned out.

Under Mr. Dion, the Liberals secured four percentage points fewer votes than would have been expected if they had only won the votes of their brand-loyal voters. If they had also won their share of independent voters, they would have won more than 30 per cent of the vote. The departure of Mr. Dion creates an opportunity for those alienated voters to come home.

Who has the most to lose?

The biggest losers are likely to be the New Democrats. Most of the movement in Canadian federal election campaigns is centre-left voters moving back and forth between the NDP and the Liberals. In the last campaign, doubts about Mr. Dion and the Green Shift chased those swings voters into the NDP's arms.

Our polling in the last Liberal leadership showed Bob Rae was best positioned to win those NDP switch voters, not Mr. Ignatieff, so the new Liberal leader needs to earn his spurs with these folks. The NDP needs to define Mr. Ignatieff as a pro-American, pro-torture corporate puppet before he gets a chance to earn those spurs.

There is no immediate threat to the Bloc Quebecois. Its vote is reanimated and doesn't need Mr. Ignatieff to fight its fight given the Bloc's strong current balance-of-power role. True, Mr. Ignatieff has a much more nationalist-friendly message than Mr. Dion, but the new Liberal Leader has said a lot of things that give the Bloc lots of ammunition to demonstrate that Mr. Ignatieff is off-side with many key Quebecois values. This is particularly true of his positions on Iraq and torture. The challenge for the Bloc is to time its attacks correctly so it doesn't blow its best ammunition too soon.

Stephen Harper and the Conservatives do face a real threat. If Mr. Ignatieff appears to be a stronger alternative to Mr. Harper than Mr. Dion was - and how can he not? - the Liberals will both regain lost Conservative-Liberal switchers and mobilize Liberals who stayed home last time. As the Liberals gain, the Tories slip farther away from majority.

Like the NDP, the Tories also need to define Mr. Ignatieff before he defines himself, just as they did with Mr. Dion. They might be able to make a flip-flop image stick. They may also be able to run with the arrogance label.

The bottom line is simple: If the law of the jungle is eat or be eaten, the law of the political jungle is define or be defined. Mr. Ignatieff and his team need to make sure he defines himself before his opponents do it for him.

Leslie Campbell (former chief of staff to Audrey McLaughlin and former assistant to Gary Doer): The political drama of the past few weeks has confirmed that Canada's electoral framework has run its course and is now delivering unstable, regionally derived governments. Ontario, Quebec and Alberta already have their own parties, and now that the Conservatives have played the national unity card, it will only get worse. The Liberals and Conservatives both dream of turning back the clock to the days when one or the other could command a majority, but the balkanization of Canadian politics is likely to continue until we adopt a new election system or form party coalitions.

Michael Ignatieff has the potential to reinvigorate the Liberal brand and to build an attractive, broad-based national party. He is articulate, accomplished and cunning. But while he might retake a few of the Ontario and Atlantic seats lost to the Conservatives and NDP, a Liberal breakthrough west of Thunder Bay (or north of North Bay) is unlikely. The Conservatives will successfully paint Mr. Ignatieff as an aloof Toronto egghead with no connection to the concerns of - to paraphrase Sarah Palin - "real" Canadians. And the NDP will be difficult to beat in its incumbent seats.

While emerging from the election with newfound respect and modest gains, the NDP hit its electoral ceiling and needs a paradigm shift to make further inroads. Self-generated internal reform and a push to the centre wasn't being seriously discussed, but Stephen Harper's fiscal update fumble became the impetus for a new gambit.

Ed Broadbent and Jack Layton's instincts were correct — Canadians would respond positively to a co-operative effort between the Liberals and NDP — but the shaky execution of the coalition agreement and the inclusion of the Bloc was a PR setback.

Some variation of the coalition could yet be resuscitated if the principals establish attractive policy options, execute a communications plan and sell the benefits of party co-operation as opposed to Mr. Harper's scorched-earth tactics.

The ascension of Mr. Ignatieff, while making a formal coalition less likely, may be a boon to the NDP. The NDP's view is that a coalition agreement has been signed and, while the Liberals are free to choose any leader they want, a deal is a deal. Any retreat from the coalition by Mr. Ignatieff will be characterized by the NDP as a return to unprincipled Liberal support of the Conservatives, leaving the door open to appeal to disillusioned "left" Liberals.

The Conservatives will strike a tacit bargain with Mr. Ignatieff by co-operating sufficiently with the Liberals to buy temporary peace and stymie NDP ambition. This tactic may serve Mr. Harper's short-term needs, but he will be gambling that Mr. Ignatieff can't capture the imagination of the nation, and become the statesman Canadians crave.

If the NDP champions the coalition and even proposes expansion of it through joint policy development and non-compete agreements, there is the possibility of a win-win scenario. If the Liberals co-operate, all the better. If not, the NDP - assuming that it is willing and capable - can become the leader of a new centre-left movement.

Scott Reid (former communications director for Paul Martin): Michael Ignatieff began his tenure as Liberal Leader with a display of quiet, composed and steely purpose. After only 36 minutes behind the podium, he had fixed responsibility for saving Stephen Harper's government solely on the shoulders of Stephen Harper, commanded the stage with unquestioned authority and made clear he would play his cards as they should be - one at a time and with wise measure.

Stephen Harper, consider yourself told. This man is not screwing around. If you want to remain as Prime Minister, you must provide two things in short order: a corrected economic program and a public expression of contrition. (It's telling that Mr. Harper will likely find the latter to be more of a challenge.)

There was an equally compelling message for the coalition partners: Mr. Ignatieff is in control. Of the Liberal Party. But also of the coalition's future. Which is exactly what the Liberals had in mind when they moved to replace Mr. Dion on an expedited basis.

And let's be precise in our analysis: This is a function of circumstance, not bullish behaviour. Mr. Ignatieff has not expressed the slightest bit of ungracious inclination. He didn't Lord his position over the NDP or Bloc. He hasn't rubbed anyone's face into the palm of his hockey glove. But the situation confronting Jack Layton and Gilles Duceppe is indisputable. For the next six weeks, their claim to future influence relies overwhelmingly on the reaction of a Liberal Leader who continues to withhold unqualified enthusiasm for their shared project.

In other words, Mr. Ignatieff changes and complicates everything. He has given his own party a renewed sense of self-respect and created apprehension in the offices of nearly everyone else. Here's how the other parties should think about moving forward.

For the Conservatives: tricky spot. To survive, you need Mr. Ignatieff's support. On the other hand, you can hardly afford to give this guy a free ride. Conservative success against Stéphane Dion relied heavily upon the unyielding and early efforts to mangle the former Unity Minister's image.

To date, the Conservatives have opted to double-track on Mr. Ignatieff. The Prime Minister talks outreach while his campaign director talks trash. The dichotomy is hard to overlook and could lead to unnecessary risk.

So the first piece of advice would be to prioritize. Job Number One is to get past the late-January confidence vote. Though it contradicts your every partisan impulse, try to show some restraint. For the next six weeks keep the attack ads in the laboratory and focus instead on a respectful engagement of Mr. Ignatieff on the economy. Then build a better budget and move on.

Lord knows, once the vote is passed, Mr. Harper can retreat to his feral instincts. Release your ads. Key your vitriolic bloggers. Have Pierre Polievere and John Baird question Ignatieff's loyalty, experience and favourite television programs. Whatever cranks your Conservative engine. But keep in mind: first, you need this budget to pass and second, Mr. Ignatieff is not Mr. Dion. Don't be surprised if you end up with a little more fight on your hands.

For the NDP: Engage. Engage. Engage. Mr. Layton can regard Mr. Ignatieff's position on the coalition as half-supportive or half-wary. What's the point of focusing on the latter? A stronger Liberal Party makes for a potentially stronger coalition. For now, take that and run. Keep your critics meeting with their Liberal counterparts; keep NDP staff meeting with Liberal staff; make it harder for Mr. Ignatieff to walk away from the coalition by highlighting every piece of poor economic news in the next six weeks and every missed chance by Mr. Harper to show regret for his behaviour.

The objective for Mr. Layton is not to sell the idea of the coalition. It is to sell the idea of defeating Mr. Harper — that's the more fertile ground.

In addition, pursue two specific tactics. First, begin to define publicly what sort of mea culpa you believe is needed from the Prime Minister. If you can shape that part of the equation, it may box the Liberals into demanding the same, which Mr. Harper is likely incapable of providing. Second, keep the hard left out of sight. The more centrist the coalition seems, the more palatable it is to Canadians and, by extension, Liberals. If the most visible advocates of the coalition remain the far left and organized groups dedicated to single interests, you increase the ease with which Mr. Ignatieff can walk in the other direction.

For the Bloc Quebecois: Make a move, now. Mr. Harper's desperate anti-nationalist wedge against the coalition pretty much cripples the Conservatives in Quebec and leaves political space for a refreshed federalist option. Mr. Ignatieff long ago captured the gaze of Quebec elites. Some polling suggests he has more recently begun to track with individual francophone voters. That is an unacceptable threat to the Bloc. As a consequence, it needs to spend the next few weeks building pressure on Mr. Ignatieff to see the coalition through. To be more exact, it must forcefully argue that the coalition is the best way to protect Quebec's interests at this time and that Mr. Ignatieff's support or rejection of it is, in effect, a litmus test of his commitment to Quebeckers.

The Bloc strategy should mirror Mr. Ignatieff's own. Whereas he is placing the burden on Mr. Harper to deliver a satisfactory budget, the Bloc must place the burden on Mr. Ignatieff to protect Quebec's interests by bringing the coalition to power. If it wins that framing battle, it gains ground no matter what happens.