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Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper is applauded after speaking on the government's motion on a combat mission in Iraq following Question Period in the House of Commons Friday October 3, 2014 in Ottawa.Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press

Stephen Harper made the case for war with an unusual dose of realism. And though it didn't mask all the flaws in the plan, it bolstered the credibility of his proposal: a limited mission, to prevent the worst.

The Prime Minister's argument for sending jet fighters to Iraq rested on basics. Islamic State, he argued, is a threat to the region, and to Canada, one that will grow if it's not confronted by force. Without that now, he argued, a bigger, broader war will come.

To his credit, Mr. Harper moved beyond recounting of the "atrocities" of extremists to describe what the mission's goal really is – an effort to contain Islamic State, not to defeat it.

For a leader urging a nation into war, it was an unusually cool injection of realism. But few things could have buttressed the case more than restraint in describing what it's supposed to accomplish. That alone is a start in countering fears of mission creep.

Still, as he outlined the limits of the mission – and war-weary Canadians expect limits – they revealed some of the plan's weaknesses.

Mr. Harper's Canadian mission is for six months of air strikes, aimed, he said, at helping to weaken Islamic State by preventing it from operating bases openly or conducting large-scale military movements. But with no reliable ground force fighting to displace Islamic State, few expect the threat to be extinguished in six months. What then?

While Canadian CF-18s will hit one half of Islamic State, in Iraq, they won't join U.S. air strikes against the other half, in Syria. Mr. Harper said it might change if Syria's al-Assad regime supports a Canadian role – but if Islamic State safe havens are a threat to Canada, that's surely true on either side of the notional border.

Already, Mr. Harper knows he won't get opposition support for this mission – though the New Democrats and Liberals gave him very different reasons.

NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair argued that the strikes on Islamic State are the continuation of the United States' decade-old war, a fight against an old enemy under a different name, and one that's destined to go awry as long as the West tries to fix governance in the Middle East with bombs.

It was a far more forceful case than the one made by Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau, who argued that Mr. Harper, who was in favour of joining the Iraq war in 2003, couldn't be trusted to be clear and open with the country – and that Canada could do more good with humanitarian aid than a "few aging warplanes."

Mr. Harper, however, proposed a military mission of limits and restrained goals, all planned to address concerns of mission creep.

He plans a relatively low-risk air mission, and promised there will be no ground troops. Instead, he'll dispatch six CF-18 fighter jets – the same contribution Canada made for the Libya and Kosovo air wars, in what Royal Military College professor Christian Leuprecht dubs Canada's "six-pack policy" – plus refuelling and surveillance planes.

There are unanswered practical questions, including the cost. The Canadian air mission in Libya cost $347-million, and opposition leaders insist the money for air combat in Iraq would be better spent on aid – even if Mr. Harper insists it is not an either-or choice.

But the lingering questions about the purpose of the mission, and especially the exit strategy, are more fundamental.

Mr. Harper has ruled out ground troops, and set a six-month time limit. But he also rejected suggestions Canada could leave combat to others because, he said, Canada does not stand by while allies bear the burden, and will have little influence if it does. So what will Canada do six months from now, if allies are still conducting air strikes, or if they eventually decide ground troops are needed?

Those questions of exit strategy and mission creep, raised by both Mr. Mulcair and Mr. Trudeau, are what the Prime Minister needs to nail down now. After Afghanistan, those worries linger. But Mr. Harper has started by making a case full of lessons learned, by employing cold realism about the goal.

Campbell Clark is The Globe's chief political writer in Ottawa.

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