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Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Paul Delisle is escorted from Provincial Court in Halifax in January. (Andrew Vaughan/The Canadian Press)
Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Paul Delisle is escorted from Provincial Court in Halifax in January. (Andrew Vaughan/The Canadian Press)

Russian mole had access to wealth of CSIS, RCMP, Privy Council files Add to ...

“I will say this: he pleaded guilty to selling secrets of the United States and secrets of Canada to the Russians. That is obviously not good,” the ambassador told CTV’s Question Period.

 

 

How he did it

On the 10th day of every month for nearly five years, Jeffrey Delisle sold secrets to the Russians.

First, he downloaded military secrets from his secure office computers onto a floppy disk. Then, he put the data on a memory stick, took it home to his laptop, and then input the data in a “Draft” e-mail.

He used Gawab.com – a Web-based e-mail provider hosted in the Middle East. He and his Russian handlers shared a password to one account. That way, they could communicate via draft e-mails, without ever having to send more traceable messages across the Internet.

For this, Sub-Lieutenant Delisle was paid $3,000 a month. The amount was capped because, he told police, anything more than $3,000 “gets flagged.”

His paymasters told him not to be too “flashy” with his money .

He was paid by money orders. Records show SLt. Delisle picked up his funds at a number of Money Mart locations, regardless of whether he was stationed in Kingston, Ottawa or Halifax .

 

What he took

Two days before his arrest on Jan. 13, Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle was observed by police as he attempted to send two “secret” CSIS documents to Russia.

CSIS later determined the risk to national security was “high” given the documents could have helped identify intelligence officers, as well as a “shopping list” of other valuable reports.

That was one breach. But the vast amount of spying that SLt. Delisle committed over four and a half years of treachery was never observed.

Under interrogation, he said he passed Russia material originating from Canada, Britain, the United States and Australia. He also said he sent over conversations gleaned from electronic surveillance as well as “contact lists” of intelligence officials.

He denied ever giving up undercover spies.

“The full scope and nature of the injury, if ever fully known, can only be determined once the Service and its partners (domestic and foreign) have additional insight,” CSIS wrote in its “injury assessment.”

 

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Mandate: Human source spying

Delisle damage assessment: “Severe and irreparable”

Implications: “The unauthorized release of [CSIS] reports to a hostile foreign intelligence service could have allowed this foreign intelligence service to identify CSIS sources ... The service is unaware at this time if and how many other CSIS employees’ names were potentially passed to the Russians. Their association to the service might put might put these employees at risk by hostile intelligence services and terrorist groups.”

“Delisle admitted to providing contact lists of intelligence-related individuals .. he has put at risk the security of these individuals and the partnership of Canada’s closest allies.”

“[Delisle] may have 1.) damaged the Service’s relationship with its closest foreign partners... 2.) affected the safety/security of Service sources and that of its closest foreign partners; 3.) informed the Russians of the extent of the Service’s investigations; and 4.) compromised service methodologies including how it assess, reports and communicates information and intelligence.”

 

 

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