Bitterly divided Palestinian factions met yesterday in Cairo on the first day of efforts to bridge their differences, but reconciliation won't be easy, observers say.
Pressured by Egypt, and by the international community that has put up some $5-billion for the reconstruction of Gaza and advancement of the West Bank, the groups have come to the table in five different committees aimed at addressing the host of issues that divide them.
"I want to remind you of the consequences ... if there were a failure to reach an agreement," Omar Suleiman, Egypt's chief of intelligence, warned rival factions at the start of talks.
"You have in front of you an opportunity that will not come again."
Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, warned that differences between the Palestinian factions frighten international donors.
"I have had many moments of desperation when talking to the many countries that have stood by us and said that you and [the Palestinians] are losing out because of the division," he said.
Some of the causes of that division, however, are easier to bridge than others.
"On the issue of the government and its program, we are not too far off," said Fatah senior negotiator Nabil Shaath, the faction's representative in the committee tasked with forming a mutually agreeable government.
Hamas and Fatah have experience negotiating governments of unity, or of neutral technocrats. In 2007, they agreed on a unity government only to have it dissolve when tensions in Gaza grew.
Planning for an election, the subject of another committee, is also not insurmountable, nor is the subject of reconciliation in general and confidence-building measures.
Reconciling security matters, however, with two rival security forces, will be a lot tougher.
"Does anyone really expect Hamas to surrender its security monopoly in Gaza," asked Ezzedine Choukri, former Middle East adviser to Egypt's Foreign Minister, and now a distinguished visiting lecturer at the American University in Cairo. "I don't think so."
Mr. Choukri said they might consider the Iraq model, where there's a central authority, but groups such as the Kurds have their own security forces.
Even tougher than that matter, however, is the subject of the last committee: reforming the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
Since 1967, Fatah, then under Yasser Arafat, has dominated the PLO and revelled in its status as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."
Hamas isn't even a member. Now it wants more than just a seat at the table.
"They want the whole table," says Emad Gad, head of Israel studies at the al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. "Hamas doesn't really want to reform the PLO," Mr. Gad said. "They want to become the PLO."
They might settle for 50 per cent of the seats in the organization, he said, but Fatah will never agree to that.
"In theory," Mr. Gad said, "the parties could agree to form a government and postpone final decisions on some of these other matters, just so they can get on with reconstruction."
The talks are expected to last for 10 days.
Palestinian reconciliation isn't the only matter causing grief for Mr. Suleiman, the Egyptian chief of security.
Five days before Israel's parliamentary elections last month, Hamas and Israel thought they had a deal on a long term mutual ceasefire complete with mostly open border crossings and an end to rocket attacks.
Mr. Suleiman had being toiling for weeks to coax the parties to just such an agreement, acting as a go-between for the two who refused to deal directly with each other.
On this promising day in early February, Hamas's Gaza leader Mahmoud Zahar flew to Damascus from Cairo to present the package to Hamas's political leader Khaled Meshaal. He expected to return to Cairo quickly, possibly the same day.
In Israel, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defence Minister Ehud Barak were salivating at the prospect of a ceasefire that would be credited to them and would benefit their respective political parties locked in battle with Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud and his supporters on the right.
But it wasn't to be.
Mr. Meshaal wasn't in Damascus. Unexpectedly, he had flown to Sudan and would not return for three days - too late to have any impact on the Israeli vote, says Mr. Gad, the Israel expert at al-Ahram.
That suited Mr. Meshaal just fine, explained Mr. Gad. "He's a hardliner who prefers to deal with another hardliner," he said. So things are more cut and dried.
But mostly, says Mr. Gad, the Hamas leader doesn't see much benefit for Hamas from a peace process that Ms. Livni might conduct. "As far as he's concerned, the peace process only benefits Fatah," said Mr. Gad.
"Meshaal would prefer not to have a peace process and to rebuild Gaza and Hamas's popular support instead."
Happy enough after the election to agree to a ceasefire, Mr. Meshaal finally approved the package Mr. Zahar brought him.
But that too wasn't to be, either.
When outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert received Hamas's agreement, he unexpectedly added a codicil: the release of Gilad Shalit, and Israeli soldier held in Gaza for almost three years. Hamas's demand that Israel release certain Palestinian prisoners in exchange was unacceptable to Israel.
There continues to be no formal ceasefire to this day.
"I think Olmert was getting back at Meshaal," Mr. Gad said.
