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At first, it seemed slightly incongruous.

There was Japan's Prime Minister vowing to stand firm against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq.

Then there was the Philippines, known more for its red-hot economy and remittances, where a peace-process brokered by Malaysia might be falling apart after Muslim insurgents in the country's south struck out and killed 44 elite commandos.

And although many already knew Indonesia had long dealt with Islamic fundamentalists, who would have figured that in 2015, officials in China would view its relatively small Muslim Uyghur population as one of the superpower's most persistent internal security threats?

Such issues, long simmering or restricted to more chaotic parts of Southeast Asia, are discordant in the Pacific no longer. Islamic radicalism is increasingly a concern in Asia.

Most recently, this has been obvious to Japan. The country has no soldiers in the Middle East owing to the pacifist constitution imposed on it after the Second World War. But it finds itself in a wrenchingly public hostage situation because of its involvement in the fight against Islamic militancy in Iraq and Syria.

Shinzo Abe, who, before his "Abenomics" economic revival package, was known more for his right-wing nationalism and sabre-rattling, has tried as Prime Minister to bolster Japan's self-confidence partly by developing a more hawkish and muscular approach to foreign affairs.

Japan supports the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, and bankrolled Middle Eastern countries fighting jihadis with a $200-million package of non-military aid – part of a broader $2.5-billion promise that Mr. Abe made on a recent tour of the region.

That $200-million was mentioned by the Islamic State in a video featuring the two helpless Japanese hostages – one of whom has already been killed. With North Korea and China nearby, Mr. Abe has little choice but to ally himself with the United States and Europe. But even if Japan plays a slightly gentler role as a financier, it is still enough to expose it to the complex geopolitical realities that fuel resentment and violence against the other powers involved in these military expeditions – such as the United States, France or Australia.

In the Philippines, the situation is also tense. After decades of violence, the government was pursuing a peace deal with Muslim rebels in the country's south and had been debating a law to create an autonomous Muslim region there. In the middle of negotiations, 44 elite commandos were killed in an ambush and firefight while on the hunt for two infamous bombmakers – one of whom was part of the al-Qaeda-linked Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah.

Although the incident has set back negotiations, officials vow to press ahead with reconciliation. Indonesia, too, has been largely successful in dealing with Islamic militancy in its largely moderate population of 250 million – the former president called IS "embarrassing" to Muslims – despite signs that more Indonesians are heading to the Middle East. Singapore, too, has been vigilant about homegrown support for IS, and also joined the coalition, pledging to send more than 50 troops.

But then there is China, which has long liked to conflate problems with Uyghur separatists in its restive, northwest Xinjiang province with global terrorism. China has said Uyghurs are fleeing to fight in foreign conflicts. But unlike the situation in other countries in the region, China's problem with those it sees as religious radicals is getting worse. Repressive laws on religious freedom, hiring discrimination and the jailing of Uyghur activists in Xinjiang have fuelled resentment among Uyghurs, with many fleeing to nearby countries – some to Afghanistan and perhaps Syria, where they might receive training that could be used upon return (Indonesia knows this well, after fighters returned from battling the Soviets in Afghanistan).

With Southeast Asia a potential transit hub for Syria-bound fighters, China needs to re-examine its strategy not just for its own security or for the sake of innocent Uyghurs – but because its mistakes, in an increasingly integrated Asia-Pacific, make mishandling the problem everybody's concern.

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