While the United States is grappling with the aftermath of the controversial Bowe Bergdahl and Taliban prisoner swap, Afghans are not only anxious about the fate of the five notorious Taliban detainees who were released, but also struggling to make sense of the future at a time when they are in the midst of a crucial political and security transition.
With runoff elections due to take place on June 14, Afghans are immersed in the presidential campaigns between the two leading candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai.
Last week, President Barack Obama, upon his return from a Memorial Day visit with U.S. troops at Bagram airbase, announced the post-2014 U.S. security commitment to Afghanistan. The new policy calls for a residual force of 9,800 trainers, advisers and anti-terrorism units; the transfer of half a dozen key military bases to Afghans; and the merging of military personnel into the American embassy compound by 2016.
NATO is expected to announce its own additional contribution in the weeks to come, estimated to be about half the U.S. number.
Clearly, the planning is contingent upon the signing of the U.S.-Afghan bilateral security agreement by a new Afghan leader, once President Hamid Karzai is out of office. Both leading candidates have indicated their desire to sign the agreement in the first days of their presidency.
Then news of the prisoner swap made headlines. Seen as a necessity by Washington and flaunted as a major victory by the Taliban, it reinforced Afghan public suspicions about the American endgame.
To some, the U.S. announcements have caused an untimely distraction from electioneering. To others, election security concerns trump all other worries as the Taliban have vowed to disrupt the runoff.
On Friday, a well-planned suicide bombings targeted Dr. Abdullah's convoy in Kabul. The candidate escaped unharmed, but 10 people were killed including three of his bodyguards and a young campaigner. No side has yet taken responsibility.
On the same day, Mr. Ghani, speaking at a rally in Kandahar, invited the leaders of the armed opposition militias, the Taliban's Mullah Omar, and a Hizb-e Islami faction headed by Gulbuddin Helmatyar, to enter into direct peace talks.
Not only are Afghans now questioning American resolve to fight terrorists affiliated to radical outfits. They are also wondering whether the timelines coincide with their own strategic agenda in terms of the critical political transition, the readiness of Afghan forces to stand on their own and the ability of the country to avoid bankruptcy while protecting past achievements.
U.S. officials have since made a concerted effort to dispel the notion of abandonment by reiterating that the United States will not halt security and development assistance to the country after 2016.
Failure to keep to that pledge would not only create an image and goodwill problem for the U.S., but will also jeopardize the gains made by Afghans over the last decade in fields as varied as education, health care, private sector development, gender and human rights, and media.
Two key question arise: First, will the new Afghan Government be provided the level of support that is necessary to prevent backsliding? And second, will other key stakeholders use all means possible to push for a political settlement during the two-year window that remains?
Failure to do so might not only bolster the Taliban and their affiliates, but also encourage international terrorist organizations to become deadlier.
What should concern Western and other security officials – including the Chinese, Russians and others – is the ability of al-Qaeda-like outfits to re-emerge and reintegrate within local radicalized jihadi outfits, as they did in the 1990s. This would easily enable recruitment and training of fighters from various parts of the world.
Since most militant safe havens are on Pakistani soil, Islamabad, a key regional player with serious domestic security challenges on its hands, has two options – adopt a new policy that discourages proxy and militant activities or tolerate the growth of violent and anti-democratic radicalized militants at its own peril.
There are signs that the new Narendra Modi government in New Delhi may play a role and help Islamabad make the right choice.
While some segments of the Afghan Taliban are going through their own rethink, those wishing to see an end to violence and an honourable return to their homeland, are under constant pressure by the militia's hardcore leadership in control of policy and resources. Even their families are not safe from intimidation or worse.
The U.S./NATO decisions about its future role in this pivotal region cannot be taken lightly. As a litmus test, the group of five notorious detainees cannot be allowed to engage in any destructive activities directly or indirectly while in exile in Qatar or thereafter.
Either the Taliban will grasp this occasion and move – at their own pace – toward a peaceful and just political settlement, or the hardcore will prevail and keep up the fight.
Consequently, Afghans need to be reassured of longterm strategic partnership for the sake of stability and growing prosperity in a vital part of the world.
Failing to assure a responsible endgame could have dire consequences for Afghanistan, the region and beyond.
Omar Samad is senior Central Asia fellow at New America Foundation. He was the Ambassador of Afghanistan to France (2009-2011) and to Canada (2004-2009) and Spokesperson for the Afghan Foreign Ministry (2002-2004).