Steve Yetiv is the Louis I. Jaffe Professor of International Relations at Old Dominion University and author of the recently released Myths of the Oil Boom (Oxford University Press).
After the surprising withdrawal of top Arab leaders from a planned summit in Washington and Camp David beginning Wednesday, it's a good time to reassess how the United States and its allies approach the oil-rich Persian Gulf.
Contrary to the expectations of realpolitik, America has rarely practised balancing policy in the Middle East. But if there is any time to change course, it is now.
The goal of balancing policy is to prevent any one country in the region from becoming too strong or threatening. The last time the United States seriously balanced was in the 1970s, when it strengthened Iran and Saudi Arabia to balance against Iraq, which was allied with Moscow.
But since then, the U.S. has largely disregarded balancing approaches. For example, from 1988 to 1990, the administration of George H.W. Bush engaged in "constructive engagement" with Iraq – the near-opposite of balancing against it. This despite the fact that Iraq was the strongest and most threatening country in the region. Senior officials told me that they were aware of these realities but sought to bring Iraq into the international community by engaging it. That approach failed when Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990 – an event that set up a lot of the chaos we are currently seeing in Iraq.
Democratic administrations also have disregarded balancing policy. The administration of Bill Clinton practised what was called "dual containment" in the 1990s. This policy aimed to contain both Iran and Iraq rather than to balance against the stronger one or to try to see if they would balance each other. It didn't work.
The 2003 U.S.-led Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation seriously flouted balancing policy. In effect, the George W. Bush administration eliminated Iraq as a balancer against Iran. That outcome allowed Iran, which was already stronger than UN-sanctioned Iraq, to become dominant, to expand unchecked by Iraq, and in fact to gain influence over Iraq as well.
And so now the region faces a truly predominant Iran – a threat that Arab leaders think Washington dangerously underestimates at their expense, which partly explains their recent no-show diplomacy.
Whatever one thinks of their view, it is now time for the United States to balance.
First, many in Washington and abroad are arguing to expand the war against Islamic State, but the U.S. should innovatively contain and not try to outright destroy the Islamic State. This group is obviously hideous but it balances against the Iran-Syria axis and brutal Shiite militias as well, partly because the Islamic State leadership includes former Sunni Iraqi military officers who fought Iran under Saddam Hussein.
Crushing the Islamic State may also eventually require American and other boots on the ground and pit the U.S. against the Sunnis more broadly in this Sunni-Shiite struggle. That will sap American energy and, even if it succeeds, would further strengthen Iran and Shiite militias, alienate many Sunnis who hate the Islamic State less than the Shiites, and create new imbalances for the future.
Second, the U.S. should do even more to push for greater inclusion of Sunnis into Iraq's government and military. That may also help reintegrate Sunni tribal supporters of the Islamic State. These actions may help Iraq unify and eventually re-emerge to help balance Iran.
Third, the Sunni Arab regimes of the Gulf need to balance more against Iran. Their capabilities have improved significantly in the past 30 years and their fear of Iran should be a major motivator.
Such steps are even more important now that the U.S. and its allies are engaged in nuclear talks with Iran. The Arabs and Israel believe that lifting economic sanctions will further strengthen Iran and that a nuclear agreement (plus the North American oil boom) will leave Washington even less inclined to check Iran regionally.
Balancing would be less important if Iran moderates in the future. But that remains to be seen as it continues to seek power across the region.
Balancing is no panacea, but it should be more prominent in Washington's overall set of approaches. This policy can help pressure Iran to sign and abide by a serious nuclear deal that should include, most importantly, unfettered access to its military sites. It can also help assure the Arabs and Israel that Iran can be checked in the region; make Egypt and Saudi Arabia less likely to pursue their own nuclear programs out of fear of an unchecked Iran; and decrease chances that Washington and its allies will be sucked into a ground war in the Middle East.