Skip to main content
opinion

Lewis MacKenzie

Why are we there? goes the chorus of late, as more and more Canadians question our presence in Afghanistan. And yet, this may have more to do with confusion surrounding the changing nature of NATO's mission than the mission itself.

In 2001, NATO's objective was clear: Oust the Taliban regime and eliminate the threat of future terrorist attacks on Western targets conceived, organized and sent forth from al-Qaeda's training centres in Afghanistan, which had been protected by the Taliban. In other words, we in the West would be safer at home once al-Qaeda - one of the primary transnational terrorist organizations - and its bases were eliminated.

In 2009, this same objective continues to be repeated, albeit with the slight modification that we must not let the Taliban regain power in Afghanistan or al-Qaeda will return as foreign guests and plot yet more attacks on the West.

Fortunately, the chances of that happening are somewhere between slim and none. One of the last places any intelligent cell of al-Qaeda would seek to set up shop is Afghanistan. There is no love for al-Qaeda within the Taliban.

After all, it was al-Qaeda that precipitated the West's intervention that drove the Taliban from power eight years ago, so why, except in isolated cases of common interest, would al-Qaeda be welcomed back? Also, al-Qaeda is a transnational terrorist organization hell-bent on killing infidels wherever they gather, and preferably close to high-profile targets and sophisticated media outlets. The Taliban, to date, have only rarely been transnational in their objectives, showing little interest or capability in attacking targets outside the primary neighbourhood that they seek to control in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In fact, al-Qaeda has many more attractive options than returning to Afghanistan. Granted, some small numbers are present in Afghanistan and Iraq, as they can't pass up the opportunity and satisfaction of fighting the West on a playing field tilted in their favour.

But if it were still necessary (and this is highly questionable) for al-Qaeda to establish a new "headquarters," surely Yemen, Sudan, Gaza, Somalia and some North African countries would be far more inviting.

The reality is that al-Qaeda doesn't need a "headquarters" or traditional training camps any more - the Internet has provided a far more effective means of organizing attacks. Since 9/11, the movement has metastasized: Dedicated freelance supporters of poster boy Osama bin Laden are recruited, trained and assigned via the Web. Just witness the London Underground and Madrid bomb attacks.

So, if this is the case, then Canadians can be forgiven for asking why we are still in Afghanistan. Well, here's the real reason: the neighbourhood.

The doomsday scenario that would follow a Taliban resumption of power in Afghanistan is much deadlier today than it was in 1989 when the Russians were evicted. Once firmly established as the government in Kabul, the Taliban could and would focus their energies and talents on the real prize, Pakistan, where their brothers in arms have managed to advance, in one case, within 100 kilometres of the capital, Islamabad. With Afghanistan under their control, a reinforced Taliban would have greater potential to close that gap and bring the control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and delivery systems within reach.

The odds are that once it appeared that the Taliban would be successful, al-Qaeda would be their newest friend. India, another nuclear power, would never tolerate such a scenario. Its guaranteed intervention would certainly wake up the rest of the neighbourhood - China, Russia and Iran. Now if that wouldn't threaten world peace, nothing would.

This is "why we are there" today. Until the Afghan security forces can handle the insurgency on their own - probably in three or four years - the No.1 priority is to defeat, or at least contain, the insurgency to keep the Taliban on the defensive so they can't reinforce their brethren in Pakistan and, with the help of al-Qaeda, threaten the very existence of a government with a nuclear capability - not to mention the neighbourhood and the rest of us.

Lewis MacKenzie is a retired major-general and the first commander of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.

Interact with The Globe