Go to the Globe and Mail homepage

Jump to main navigationJump to main content

Report on Business

Economy Lab

Delving into the forces that shape our living standards
Best Business Blog, EPPY awards, 2011 and 2012

Entry archive:

Economy Lab has moved

Only Globe Unlimited members will now have access to a wide range of insightful commentary
and analysis on the economy and markets previously offered on this page.


Globe Unlimited subscribers will be able to read these columns,
written by some of Canada’s most deeply respected economists,
such as Christopher Ragan, Sheryl King, Andrew Jackson, and Clement Gignac,
as part of our ROB INSIGHT section.


All of our readers will still be able to browse the Economy Lab archives and read our
broader coverage of economic data and news by accessing their 10 free articles a month.


Learn more about Globe Unlimited and how to subscribe.

New ECB President Mario Draghi delivers a speech during a farewell ceremony for outgoing president Jean-Claude Trichet in Frankfurt on October 19, 2011. (KAI PFAFFENBACH/KAI PFAFFENBACH/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)
New ECB President Mario Draghi delivers a speech during a farewell ceremony for outgoing president Jean-Claude Trichet in Frankfurt on October 19, 2011. (KAI PFAFFENBACH/KAI PFAFFENBACH/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

Martin Wolf

Be bold, Mario, put out that fire Add to ...

Dear Mario,

Congratulations and commiserations: next week, you will take up one of the most important central banking jobs in the world; but you will also bear a frightful responsibility. The European Central Bank alone has the power to quell the euro zone crisis. You must choose between two paths: the orthodox one leads towards failure; the unorthodox one should lead towards success.

More related to this story

The euro zone confronts a set of complex longer-term challenges. But the members will not get the chance to make needed adjustments and implement required reforms if it does not survive. The immediate requirements include putting Greece on a sustainable path; avoiding a meltdown in public debt markets of several large countries; and preventing a collapse of banks. Of these, it is the last two that matter.

The economist who has best explained the role of the ECB is Paul De Grauwe of Leuven university. Why, he has asked, do rates of interest on the debt of several big euro zone member countries exceed the UK’s, even though the latter’s fiscal position is far from superior: Spain’s deficits and net public debt are lower than the UK’s; Italy’s debt ratio is higher but its deficit far smaller; and the French deficit is smaller, though its debt is slightly larger.

It is surely surprising that markets view UK debt less sceptically than those of the others. It is not because Anglophones have devised a cunning plot to destroy the euro; they are not that clever. To put Prof. De Grauwe’s alternative explanation starkly, it is the central bank, stupid.

What, after all, determines the price of sovereign debt? Governments offer no collateral, while claims on tax revenue offer illusory security.

Consider the example of Italy: the net public debt is 120 per cent of gross domestic product; average maturity is seven years; and the fiscal deficit is 4 per cent of GDP. So its government needs to raise a fifth of GDP each year. Every creditor knows this. Suppose creditors feared that the government might be unable to borrow such vast sums. Could Italy survive by slashing spending? No. If the country tried to redeem its debt out of revenue, it would need to slash spending by far more than a fifth of GDP, overnight, since the very attempt would tip the country into a depression. No sane creditor imagines that a country could roll over its debt in this situation.

Government debt markets are lifted by their own bootstraps: the willingness to lend depends on the perceived willingness of others to do so, now and in the future. Such markets are exposed to self-fulfilling runs and so need a credible buyer of last resort: the central bank. The UK has one. Your members do not. In effect, they borrow in foreign currency.

Of course, members can reduce the risks. They can have lower debts and deficits, though Spain actually began the crisis with less of both than Germany. They can borrow long: in the 19th century, much UK debt was irredeemable. They can promise fiscal austerity, though whether that helps depends on the expected outcome: a promise of endless austerity rarely breeds credibility.

Any effort by the ECB to be the lender of last resort that members need will start a firestorm of protest. People will argue that the central bank may lose money, exacerbate moral hazard and stoke inflation.

To the first of these objections, the right response is: so what? The central bank’s aim is to stabilize economies, not make money. Indeed, it is far more likely to lose money through half-hearted interventions than through forceful interventions that succeed. On the second, a clear understanding of the rules governing fiscal and economic policy is needed. You also need to decide whether a country is credibly solvent. Surely, Italy and Spain are. On the third, no good reason exists to expect an out-of-control inflationary process as a result of central bank monetary operations. The expansion of base money does not lead automatically to an expansion in the overall money supply, as you know well. Indeed, during the current crisis, the monetary base has become disconnected from the money supply in all big economies. That is what a financial crisis means.

Suppose the ECB did succeed in stabilizing government bond markets in this way. It would also automatically stabilize the banks, since it is fears of sovereign defaults that are driving worries over banking insolvency. The capital to protect the European banking system from big defaults by important sovereigns simply does not exist. It is particularly ridiculous to suppose that sovereigns can provide effective insurance against their own default. Yet since there is no good reason for a well-managed euro zone to suffer such defaults in the first place, the answer is to stop them -- at source.

The qualification is deliberate. A well-managed euro zone is one in which growth is sustained and adjustment promoted. Again, the ECB has the central role to play.

The euro zone as a whole did not suffer huge asset bubbles and consequent financial crises: these were limited to a few peripheral members. No good reason existed for a big recession and subsequent weak growth. Yet the ECB has permitted nominal GDP and the money supply (supposedly, the “second pillar” of its policies) to stagnate. In the second quarter of 2011, nominal euro zone GDP was a mere 1.4 per cent higher than three years before. Broad money grew at a compound annual rate of just over 2 per cent in the three years to the end of August. Again, core inflation -- the only relevant target when commodity prices are so erratic -- has run at a compound rate of 1.4 per cent a year in the three years to September. To any sensible observer, all this screams that ECB policy has been far too tight. If the euro zone is to enjoy any hope of adjustment with growth this must change, and now.

The euro zone risks a tidal wave of fiscal and banking crises. The European financial stability facility cannot stop this. Only the ECB can. As the sole euro zone-wide institution, it has the responsibility. It also has the power. I am sorry, Mario. But you face a choice between pleasing the monetary hawks and saving the euro zone. Choose the latter. Explain why you are making the choice. And remember: fortune favours the bold.

Yours,

Martin

Follow us on Twitter: @GlobeBusiness

In the know

Most popular video »

Highlights

More from The Globe and Mail

Most Popular Stories