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In a Los Angeles Times report published Wednesday, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said NATO forces involved in a brutal and apparently interminable struggle against Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan "don't know how to do counterinsurgency operations." The assessment has been rejected in North Atlantic Treaty Organization capitals as a bizarre and offensive slur. But could he be right - not with respect to Canada, but with
regard to some of our allies?
Mr. Gates now pretends not. He has spent two days slathering praise not only on Canadian soldiers but on the British and Dutch for their "valour and skill in combat," trying to damp down the international furor inspired by his remarks, a furor that can only contribute to public ambivalence over the mission in
NATO countries. The timing is particularly problematic in Canada. A federal panel chaired by John Manley will next week weigh in with recommendations on the future of Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan. Mr. Gates seems particularly concerned to make clear he was not speaking about Canadians.
Yet despite the Pentagon's expansive damage-control operation, Mr. Gates has not come out and apologized for, or withdrawn, his original, frank assessment of the capability of the 11,700-soldier NATO force in the south - and that is telling. Is it possible that he has no reason to?
In his original remarks, Mr. Gates said: "Our guys in the east, under [American Major-General David] Rodriguez, are doing a terrific job. They've got the [counterinsurgency] thing down pat. But I think our allies over there, this is not something they have any experience with." The Los Angeles Times story develops this idea, quoting a senior U.S. military veteran of Afghanistan as saying NATO forces are "taking on a Soviet mentality ... They're staying in their bases in the south, they're doing very little patrolling, they're trying to avoid casualties, and they're using air power as a substitute for ground infantry operations, because they have so little ground infantry."
It's not just the U.S. military that has identified a problem. Canadian military historian J. L. Granatstein, in the current issue of a journal published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, notes that "Canadian senior officers in off-record discussions have been very critical of the British, astonishing some listeners, and positively scornful of the Dutch who stay close to their fortified camp."
Counterinsurgency operations are designed to protect local populations. If Canada's allies are failing to do that - if they don't want to stray from their bases and are in fact endangering civilians with an over-
reliance on air power - that is a serious problem for the mission in southern Afghanistan and may weigh heavily against its likelihood of success.
It should concern not only Mr. Gates and four-star U.S. Army General Dan K. McNeil, who commands NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. It should concern Canada, too. It might also help explain the U.S. decision to send 3,200 Marines into the south. Mr. Gates's biggest sin might just be indiscretion, for revealing in a newspaper interview tactical concerns that are usually communicated through military channels.
