The last time Stephane Dion visited our editorial board, a few months ago, the topic of Afghanistan got us talking in circles.
We had to communicate to our NATO allies, the Liberal leader said, that it was up to them to assume combat responsibilities in Kandahar from February 2009 forward. But what if our allies continued to pass the buck, as they had to date? Then we would tell them we were pulling out. So we would leave Afghanis in the most vulnerable region of their country to fend for themselves? Hopefully that wouldn't happen, because other NATO countries would take over. But what if they didn't? Well, they pretty much had to.
In other words, there was no Plan B. And for the considerable work put into the Manley panel's report on what to do with this mission - and some very lucid recommendations therein, particularly on CIDA, military equipment and domestic communication - the same problem persists.
Unlike Dion, John Manley et al want Canada in Kandahar past 2009; they want us there indefinitely, in fact. But just like Dion's withdrawal, their extension is contingent on our allies stepping up. "The hard truth is that an ISAF retreat from Afghanistan, before that country's own forces can defend its security, would most likely condemn the Afghan people to a new and bloody cycle of civil war and misrule - and raise new threats to global peace and security," they write. But Canada's commitment should be "expressly contingent on the deployment of additional troops by one or more ISAF countries to Kandahar province." And if that doesn't happen, "the Government should give appropriate notice to the Afghan and allied governments of its intention to transfer responsibility for security in Kandahar."
Who exactly that responsibility would be transferred to, other than an ill-suited Afghan army, is unclear. And therein lies the problem. Whether we're talking about pulling out or seeing the mission through, all the solutions put forward thus far are based on the good-faith assumption that, having shirked their responsibilities to date, our partners will suddenly bow to a bit of pressure from Stephen Harper and send in the troops.
The best hope is that, having rediscovered Afghanistan after losing interest for a few years, the U.S. will take on that burden virtually alone. But failing that, there's very little evidence to suggest leaders of other NATO countries will suddenly decide to take a political risk they've shied away from to date.
Maybe there is no conceivable Plan B, other than letting Kandahar blow up. But there's no point pretending, against the evidence to date, that it might not come to that.
