In examining what we are doing in Afghanistan and why, it is important to underscore that Canada is a G8 member and, as such, is expected to engage internationally, serving global organizations to which we belong in a manner befitting our responsibility, our capability and our interests - provided, of course, that we want to be a player, not a bystander, on major issues. As John Manley, chairman of the Afghanistan panel has stated, our role is a noble undertaking consistent with Canadian interests, values and traditions. He has also said, "For the first time in many years, we have brought a level of commitment to an international problem that gives us real weight and credibility."
Afghanistan represents the most robust expression of Canadian foreign policy since the Korean War. Our effort - military and civilian - is substantial and yet, as our panel report has indicated, it is hobbled by a collective effort - military and civilian - that is highly fragmented, under-resourced and ineffectively co-ordinated. These shortcomings contribute to understandable unease among Canadians about the utility of what we are doing and about the prospects for success. We have urged a series of moves that would respond to current deficiencies and better ensure that Canada's diplomatic voice is more disciplined and commensurate with our contributions - in terms of blood and treasure.
We have tried to give our Prime Minister some leverage to secure what is needed most: more troops for more security and for more training, as well as more balanced burden-sharing by our erstwhile allies. And he has begun to use it. Our willingness to extend the mission is contingent on new commitments from others. This is, after all, a test of resolve for NATO and the international community.
We could use more sensitive and more constructive leadership, too, from a reinvigorated and more confident America, an America with the will to tackle threats to global security with judicious elements of panache, diplomacy and respect, enabling others to share the responsibility.
To the critics who say fundamentally that we should not be in Afghanistan, I ask the following question: If we are not willing to commit our military resources when asked to do so by the United Nations, for a mission co-ordinated by NATO, in a country whose democratically elected government wants us and whose citizens desperately need us, then precisely where and when would Canada be prepared to do so?
Some have suggested that we would be better in Darfur, forgetting presumably that Sudan is not favourably disposed to such involvement by Canada. In any event, do we go to Darfur only to get out when the going gets tough? To what Canadian tradition or value would that speak?
History has too many examples of what can happen when the international community chooses not to engage in the face of aggression. It is not just the lesson of Munich, it is a more recent lesson from Rwanda. Roméo Dallaire's harrowing experience, recounted in his book Shake Hands with the Devil, illustrates what happens without collective international resolve.
Above all, peacekeepers need a peace to keep.
We need to recognize, too, that security is the essential condition for reconstruction and good governance. They are intrinsically linked. Security enables development and good governance enhances security.
We should not exaggerate either our influence or our capability, but there are some things we can do well and what we are doing in Afghanistan, I can assure you from personal experience, is making a difference. Will it succeed? Well, there are no guarantees and our panel had no illusions about the complexity of the challenge.
Progress is decidedly mixed, but there are genuine signs of improvement in terms of education, health and basic governance. For a country brutalized by 30 years of internal strife and that ranks as the fourth-poorest in the world with a per capita GDP half that of Haiti, expectations need to be conditioned by a healthy dose of realism.
Given the obvious limitations of the current effort in Afghanistan, a premature withdrawal or an abrupt shift to a non-combat role has no operational logic. It would simply shift the burden to others and, frankly, undercut any realistic prospect of success.
Perfection is not the goal. Making things better is.
We chose a tough responsibility in Afghanistan in one of the most difficult and dangerous regions of that country. There are problems that need to be addressed and our panel offered a candid assessment of what we think is needed. Canada has certainly earned the right to help shape better solutions, notably a more robust diplomatic role to complement our military effort, one that will help bring more coherence to the international effort, not just in Afghanistan, but in what is today the most dangerous region of the world.
We should never allow the fundamental freedoms we enjoy in Canada to become a source of weakness or reluctance when we are called on to support the establishment of those very same freedoms for those who do not yet have them. We need to concentrate more on hand-holding than hand-wringing. The ultimate objective is to equip the Afghans to handle their own affairs and to prevent their country from again becoming a sanctuary for global terrorism.
We had hoped, too, that our report would lift the parliamentary debate out of the partisan ditch. Today, that is, at best, a "work in progress." But, I have to believe that a degree of reason and informed debate will ultimately prevail. The sacrifices to date, and those directly engaged in Afghanistan on our behalf, merit at least that.
Derek H. Burney, a mMember of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan and a former ambassador to the United States, is a senior strategic adviser to Ogilvy Renault LLP. This article was adapted from Mr. Burney's Robert H. Catherwood Scholarship address in Toronto last night.







