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Question: What do the Chevrolet Traverse, Lincoln MKS, Volkswagen Tiguan, Acura TL and Jeep Patriot have in common?
Answer: Each is a different take on the basic mechanical bits and pieces of at least one other model, sold by a different brand and its dealers.
The 2009 Traverse crossover? It shares its architecture with the GMC Acadia, Saturn Outlook and Buick Enclave.
The 2009 MKS? This new luxury sedan is loosely based on the full-size Taurus sedan and Taurus X crossover, which not long ago were sold as the Ford Five Hundred and Freestyle and which, if you really trace the lineage, are based on a Volvo S80 platform.
The Tiguan? It uses a platform based on the autobahn-bred VW Golf and Jetta. It appears VW is positioning the Tiguan as the VW GTI of compact sport utility vehicles. That is, it is on par with the sporty GTI hatchback. Well, the Tiguan does have the same 2.0-litre four-cylinder engine (200 hp) as the GTI.
The Acura TL? A dressy, better-equipped, sportier version of the Honda Accord, sold through Honda's upscale sales channel.
The ES 350? It shares the basic guts of the V-6 Toyota Camry and Avalon, though the Lexus is better-equipped, quieter and styled slightly differently. And if you buy, the Lexus sales and service piece is part of the deal.
The Patriot? It is built in the same plant and shares the same platform as the Dodge Caliber and Jeep Compass.
This is the essence of today's car market with its more than 300 different models, depending on how you count. To generate hard-earned profits and offer consumers abundant choices, global car companies repackage the same basic hardware with different styling and features and sometimes even chassis tuning. The various models are then sold at different price points through their various dealer sales channels.
And in many cases this works brilliantly. The Camry is the best-selling car in North America and has been for more than a decade. Meanwhile, the ES 350 is Lexus's best-selling car model.
Toyota's genius lies in being able to differentiate the two enough to satisfy two very different customers — especially the Lexus ones, who no doubt know and understand that the Camry and ES share the same platform.
In truth, there is nothing new here. Alfred P. Sloan, architect of the modern General Motors Corp., perfected the idea of the brand ladder that requires a range of models in different guises at different price points.
At the bottom is Chevrolet and at the top is Cadillac. In between are Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick. The Enclave, then, is the fanciest version of four different models, with the 2009 Traverse being the most basic and most affordable.
Sloan's idea was that as buyers increased in age and wealth, they would climb the GM status ladder, from Chevy up through Pontiac, Buick, Oldsmobile and, ultimately, Cadillac.
Today, every car company boss understands that building more vehicles from "common platforms" is at the core of a profitable strategy. What largely separates one manufacturer from the next is the relative success each has in making unique versions of vehicles which share virtually everything under skin.
So exterior design matters in brand building, as do separate showrooms and a sales and service process that is unique. On top of that, there is packaging — whether a car has leather seats, or a specific branded audio system.
Brand engineering doesn't work, however, when it becomes badge engineering. That is, when there is little to separate one brand's model from the next beyond the different badges.
Case in point: In 2004, when GM held a substantial stake in Subaru parent Fuji Heavy Industries, Saab got the 9-2X, a reskinned Subaru Impreza auto journalists dubbed the "Saabaru." It flopped because consumers not only saw through the superficial differences, but also saw no reason at all to visit a Saab dealer to buy a Subaru.
Brand engineering also fails when there is a radical mismatch between brands and the products produced using shared platforms.
For example, the Chrysler Crossfire and the Mercedes-Benz SLK were radically different in appearance, but the Chrysler brand and its sales, service and marketing supports were not strong enough to for such a radically styled coupe. In the end, the Crossfire hurt the Mercedes brand and did not help Chrysler at all.
Ford ran into similar problems with the Jaguar X-Type in 2001. The X-Type was based on the cheaper Ford Mondeo in Europe and buyers could see the similarities all too clearly. The public quickly tuned into the fact that the X-Type was a Ford, not a Jaguar, and this nearly wrecked the Jaguar brand permanently. Despite the X-Type debacle, however, India's Tata Motors saw enough value remaining to buy it from Ford in June for $2.3-billion (U.S.)
Surely the lessons of the X-Type have been carried over with that purchase. So while future Jaguars created and built under Tata ownership may share Ford mechanicals (the sale agreement calls for a period of technology-sharing between Ford and Jaguar/Land Rover/Tata), there is not likely to be another X-Type/Mondeo from Jaguar.
But just in case there is any doubt, here is a look at three examples of successful platform sharing among brands. In each case, both auto makers and their customers are happy with the outcome.
