AD HOC COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS

February 19, 2024

The Honourable Steven MacKinnon  
Leader of the Government in the House of Commons  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0A6

The Honourable Andrew Scheer  
House Leader of the Official Opposition  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0A6

Alain Therrien  
House Leader of the Bloc Québécois  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0A6

Peter Julian  
House Leader of the New Democratic Party  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0A6

Dear House of Commons Leaders,

We are writing to you in our capacity as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Parliamentarians, established by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated October 31, 2022, signed by the House Leaders.

The MOU was established in relation to the production of government documents from the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) related to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in March 2019, and the subsequent revocation of security clearances for, and termination of the employment of, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Dr. Keding Cheng, which the House ordered produced in the previous Parliament on June 2, 2021.

This Committee held its first meeting on June 6, 2023, where we received briefings and contextual information from officials. Over the subsequent weeks and months, we reviewed the documents referenced above in detail.
We assessed these documents, focusing on those related to the revocation of security clearances for, and termination of the employment of, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Dr. Keding Cheng, to determine whether the information therein was relevant to matters of importance to Members of Parliament, and whether the use of the information was necessary for the purpose of holding the government to account.

In conducting our review, we applied the following principles:

To uphold the commitment to transparency, as much information as possible should be released to tell the full story of what happened, and for Parliament to be able to properly hold the Government to account.

To respect the protection of personal information, names of Canadians and permanent residents should remain redacted, but titles are important to show levels of accountability for issues such as decision making and consultations. However, names and titles of foreign officials of the People’s Republic of China should not be entitled to protection and should therefore not be redacted. Personal information such as addresses, and email addresses should remain redacted.

Except in specific circumstances, the names of the two scientists should be released. Their naming in the media, and in Parliament, has created a reduced expectation of privacy and are easily discernable. The release of their names in the records also provide important context to the information.

The Committee understands that the material in the CSIS documents should be protected to a greater extent, due to issues related to specific guarantees. That said, most should be released through lifts or substantive summaries because the information provides important context to understand what happened. References to specific CSIS methods should remain redacted, but the information derived from those methods should, through lifts or summaries and to the greatest extent possible, be made public.

The Committee feels the majority of the PHAC material should be lifted. The information appears to be mostly about protecting the organization from embarrassment for failures in policy and implementation, not legitimate national security concerns, and its release is essential to hold the Government to account.

In November 2023, we referred the information that we determined to be both relevant and necessary to the Panel of Arbiters established through this same MOU.

We, as the Committee, met with the Panel of Arbiters on January 31, 2024, where they presented to us their conclusions. Their letter concluding their work is annexed here. The documents have not been included as they remain protected under the terms of the MOU until such time as they are tabled.
This brings to conclusion the work of this committee, thus fulfilling the terms of the MOU. We ask that the materials be tabled by the Government at the next sitting of the House of Commons.

Sincerely,

Iqra Khalid  
Member of Parliament  
Mississauga-Erin Mills

John Williamson  
Member of Parliament  
New Brunswick Southwest

René Villemure  
Member of Parliament  
Trois-Rivières

Heather McPherson  
Member of Parliament  
Edmonton Strathcona

Attachment (1)
To the Members of the *ad hoc* Committee of Parliamentarians:

On October 31, 2022, the then Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and the House Leaders of the Official Opposition, the Bloc Québécois and the New Democratic Party entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in order to resolve a dispute respecting the disclosure of government documents from the Public Health Agency of Canada. These documents related to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in March 2019, and the subsequent revocation of security clearances for, and termination of the employment of, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Dr. Keding Cheng.

The signatories to the MOU recognized that the disputed documents contain information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations, or other public or private interests (the “protected interests”), if publicly released.

The MOU provided for the establishment of an *ad hoc* Committee of Parliamentarians to have access to both redacted and unredacted versions of the disputed documents. The MOU provided that with respect to each redacted document the *ad hoc* Committee was required to determine whether redacted information contained in the document “is relevant to matters of importance to the Members of Parliament, and whether the use of such information is necessary for the purpose of holding the government to account.”
Where the *ad hoc* Committee determined that redacted information in a disputed document is both relevant and necessary, the Committee was required to refer the disputed document to a Panel of Arbiters which was required to determine “how that relevant and necessary information will be made available to Members of Parliament and the public without compromising national security, national defence or international relations, or any other public or private interest — either by redaction or the writing of summaries or such techniques as the Panel may find appropriate, bearing in mind the basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency.”

The Panel was to be comprised of three jurists, agreed upon by both the Government and Opposition signatories to the MOU.

As the jurists appointed to comprise the Panel of Arbiters, we received from the *ad hoc* Committee of Parliamentarians the disputed documents considered by it to be both relevant and necessary for the purpose of holding the government to account. We also received advice from the *ad hoc* Committee about the principles it applied to determine the relevance of redacted material and principles it suggested for addressing the redacted information.

We received and reviewed the disputed materials and the *ad hoc* Committee’s direction while meeting together in Ottawa the week of November 28, 2023. After a number of days of internal discussions, we held sessions separately that same week with representatives from the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to further consider the rationale for the claimed redactions. We questioned those representatives and, after discussion, requested them to seek further information and clarification about the redactions. As a result of our review and our meetings with representatives of PHAC and CSIS, we provided directions to both PHAC and CSIS with respect to disclosing or summarizing redacted information. These directions were issued for the purpose of providing the maximum disclosure of redacted information without compromising the protected interests.
Revised redacted documents were received from both PHAC and CSIS and reviewed by us on January 8 and 9, 2024 in light of our December directions. In some instances, we concluded that the redactions were still excessive or that the proposed summaries did not adequately capture the content of the original text. As a result, and after again meeting separately with representatives of the PHAC and CSIS, we provided further directions concerning the scope of the redactions and the content of proposed summaries.

Subsequently, further revised redacted documents were received which we further reviewed in Ottawa on January 24 to ensure conformity with our directions.

Throughout our review of the disputed documents, we applied the following principles to the claimed redactions:

i. The basic objective of the MOU is stated to be “maximizing disclosure and transparency.” Therefore, each claimed redaction was approached on the basis of prima facie disclosure unless outweighed by the harm that disclosure would cause to national security, national defence or international relations, or other protected public or private interests.

ii. In circumstances where we concluded that the redacted information could not be disclosed, we considered whether the redacted information could nonetheless be summarized without compromising national security, national defence or international relations, or unjustifiably causing harm to any public or private interest.

With respect to the advice provided by the ad hoc Committee of Parliamentarians, we have recognized the important privacy interest in protecting the names of Canadian office holders while at the same time ensuring that sufficient detail about the office held is disclosed to permit the required accountability for actions and decisions. Similarly, we have protected personal information such as phone numbers and email addresses of office holders.
The names of foreign official have been redacted in accordance with the Privacy Act but the titles and positions have been disclosed in the interest of transparency and in the furtherance of accountability.

The names of Doctors Qiu and Cheng have not been redacted. In our view the public interest in such disclosure clearly outweighs any harm to any privacy interest of these individuals.

With respect to statements given by Doctors Qiu and Cheng in circumstances where there was an expectation of confidentiality, we have attempted to strike the appropriate balance between disclosure of their exculpatory statements while respecting the expectation of confidentiality.

We have protected specific methods employed by CSIS while at the same time, to the extent possible, disclosing or summarizing information collected by it. We have also protected information collected by CSIS pursuant to guarantees of confidentiality given to third parties. Where possible we have had CSIS summarize the gist of such information relying on non-confidential sources for the information.

Finally, we have redacted information protected by solicitor client privilege.

Our panel held a meeting by Teams call with members of the ad hoc Committee on January 31, 2024 to review our work in light of the ad hoc Committee’s communication entitled “Principles for addressing Redactions [to Determine the Issues of Relevance and Necessity]”. We reviewed with the Parliamentarians our process (as described above) by which we set out to achieve the proper balance between “properly holding the government to account” and the avoidance of potential injury to national security, national defense, international relations and other protected public and private interests. In doing so we stressed to the Parliamentarians that both PHAC and CSIS had been thoroughly cooperative. In instances where we challenged redactions, the officials explained their rationale and concerns in detail, we tested their responses against the need for transparency and accountability, and in each case there followed a discussion. After discussing the matter further with members of the ad hoc Committee we expressed our belief that after considerable back and forth over two sets of meetings with the officials and our extended internal
deliberations, the final redacted documents provide a clear evidentiary record for Parliament’s deliberations.

On this basis, we are transmitting to you with this letter the disputed documents provided to us, revised to allow what is in our view the maximum measure of disclosure and transparency consistent with the protection of national security, national defence and the other public or private interests mandated by the Committee.

We would like to express our appreciation for the administrative assistance we received from senior officials from the Privy Council Office and for the cooperation of PHAC and CSIS in producing revised documents in conformity with our directions.

The Honourable Ian Binnie, C.C, K.C

The Honourable Eleanor Dawson, K.C

The Honourable Marshall Rothstein, C.C, K.C
National Security Management Division

Public Health Agency of Canada - Agence de la santé publique du Canada

Presidia Security Consulting

FACT FINDING REPORT

Breach of Trust, Conflict of Interest, Breach of Intellectual Property Policy and Breach of Public Servants Invention Act

Report date: March 23, 2019
National Security Management Division

Public Health Agency of Canada - Agence de la santé publique du Canada

A. SUBJECT OF FACT FINDING

The National Security Management Division (NSMD)'s Investigations Unit was mandated by the President of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) to conduct a fact finding investigation into allegations of whether a Breach of Trust was committed involving Xiangguo Qiu in relation to PHAC program Intellectual Property (specifically regarding information related to an Inhibitor for the Ebola Virus); and whether there was a Breach of Policy by Dr. Keding Cheng in relation to the attempted removal of laboratory materials by students under his escort/supervision.

B. MANDATING AUTHORITY FOR THIS INVESTIGATION

[Redacted]

President
Public Health Agency of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
Telephone: [Redacted]

C. RESPONDENTS

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu
Dr. Keding Cheng
D. BACKGROUND OF ALLEGATIONS

NSMD was advised September 27, 2018 that Dr. Qiu, a Public Health Agency of Canada employee, appeared as a listed inventor on a Chinese Patent that may contain scientific information produced at the Canadian Sciences Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Furthermore, it was alleged she shared the scientific data without the authority of the Public Health Agency of Canada. It was also alleged that Dr. Cheng potentially breached security policies in relation to students under his supervision who attempted to improperly remove laboratory materials from the CSCHAH.

E. INVESTIGATIVE OBJECTIVES

This investigation seeks to establish all relevant facts relating to the said allegations.

F. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The scope of this investigation consisted of:

- The contractor will need to visit the National Capital Region National Security Management Division office in Ottawa for face to face event(s) briefing;
- The contractor will need to travel to Winnipeg, Manitoba to visit our PHAC facilities located at 1015 Arlington street, Winnipeg, Manitoba;
- Conduct up to ten (10) of interviews, to gain an in depth understanding of the noted events;
- Assess the current restricted visitor (RV) program and provide comments and recommendations;
- Provide an investigative report for the noted events with possible considerations and next steps, including the collaborations with Canadian Food Inspection Agency and the University of Manitoba;
- Perform a Risk Management review of the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) programs to determine if there are any risks to PHAC Intellectual Property or assets and provide possible considerations and next steps.
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- Develop a Management Response and Action Plan (MRAP) to be submitted by the Departmental Security Officer (DSO) to the PHAC Deputy Head.
- The Contractor shall consider the following as part of their assessment:
  - Legal framework(s) for the handling of intellectual property (IP)
  - Departmental policies, governance, and tools associated with the noted event
  - Collaborative partner policies, governance, and tools
  - Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Security Policy Suite

Subsequent to the original mandate and scope, the DSO widened the scope and mandate to include the following:

- January 11, 2019 it was suggested to add [REDACTED] to the interview list;
- January 28, 2019 it was recommended that [REDACTED] be interviewed [REDACTED];
- January 30, 2019 the investigator was provided information by [REDACTED] on an incident that occurred on January 27, 2019 where an incorrect code was entered at the CSCHAH causing a security incident as well as Restricted Visitors (RVs) being unescorted in the laboratory. In addition, information was provided regarding an incident in May, 2018 where a package was received at the CSCHAH labelled (“kitchen utensils”) that actually contained vials of mouse protein addressed to Dr. Cheng. Finally, the name of Individual 18 [REDACTED] was provided and the investigator was asked to examine the relationship between this person and Dr. Qiu. It was agreed these incidents would be further examined and incorporated into the interviews where required. This also necessitated interviewing an additional 5 employees/students;
- February 7, 2019 the investigator was informed that Bio-risk may want to provide questions to assist them in their investigation (32 additional questions were proposed and incorporated); and
- February 12, 2019 SMD asked that 9 additional questions be asked regarding IT issues.

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Persons Interviewed:

- PHAC, Chief Science Officer, Ottawa
- Director, Business Office (Intellectual Property Management), CSCHAH
- Former Director, Security Operations, CSCHAH
- Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH
- Commissioner #1, CSCHAH
- Commissioner #2, CSCHAH
- Commissioner, Shift Supervisor, CSCHAH
- A/Manager Security, CSCHAH
- Casual Employee, CSCHAH (Individual 21)
- Research Associate #2, CSCHAH
- Technician #1, CSCHAH
- Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)
- Restricted Visitor #4, CSCHAH
- Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH
- Restricted Visitor #3, CSCHAH
- Dr. Keding Cheng (PHAC employee at CSCHAH)
- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu (PHAC employee at CSCHAH)

The methodology for this investigation included the examination of the allegations, collecting the facts and reaching a conclusion through the use of:

- Interviews of PHAC employees;
- Interviews of Restricted Visitors;
- Review of available policies and procedures; and
- Analysis of findings.

Presidio Security Consulting in conjunction with NSMD conducted the investigative process between December 21, 2018 and present.
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G. **INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUND**

The following interviews were conducted in support of the aforementioned investigations:

**At 1400 hrs, January 18, 2019** [Mike Amirault](Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by [Senior Investigator, Ottawa](interviewed) [PHAC, Chief Science Officer, Ottawa](PHAC, Chief Science Officer) in his office located at 130 Colonnade Road, Ottawa. The salient points of this interview are:

- He stated that the PHAC has an integrity policy (located online); every agency doing research has an integrity component; it is a trust relationship bound by a set of principles found in scientific integrity. PHAC patented the Ebola vaccine, researchers declared a patent and there are terms of confidentiality associated to that. The patents are rented (licensed) to a manufacturer and PHAC takes a percentage, the Queen owns the patent and we license it out. The license agreement should protect you from having the information copied. You could have the know-how but not the recipe and vice versa;
- He confirmed that is doubtful you could put someone’s name on a patent without their being aware of it; possible perhaps but not plausible. It would be counter-intuitive to include someone on a patent who wasn’t involved. It would be rare that a researcher would not know their name was used as it is in their core to brag about their work/results; and
- Researchers can benefit personally from their inventions through royalties; however, there is a cap. Those royalties become the researcher’s intellectual property.

**At 1200 hrs, January 19, 2019** [Mike Amirault](Presidia Security Consulting) conducted a telephone interview with [Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH](Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH) was at the CSCHAH accompanied by [Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg](Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg). The interview was audio recorded by [Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg](Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg) and the following relevant points were learned:
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stated there is a legislative requirement to disclose to the Crown any invention researchers create (Public Servants Invention Act). A patent would be sought if the invention is novel, non-obvious and has practical utility. The research cannot have been publicly disclosed anywhere prior to the patent application. Ultimately, the patent examiner makes the determination. A patent request would come to Section for initial assessment, a discussion would take place with the inventors to determine if it is useful and non-obvious; and

- As a public servant, you do not own the intellectual property, it belongs to the Crown. Having your name on a patent is a big deal; a publication would be seen as more important.

At 0830 hrs, February 7, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) interviewed Former Director, Security Operations, CSCHAH at Building 17, 51 Chardon Driveway, Tunney’s Pasture, Ottawa, ON. The salient points of this interview are:

- She previously managed security at the CSCHAH and advised that staff work around security to meet their needs;
- She stated that there is a 10-day visitor rule where people can visit without a clearance, they cannot work at the lab and the pass is locally produced. She further stated there is no RV policy and there is no Visitor Policy; meaning there is nothing describing hosting duties except for a small blurb in the Facility Access Request (FAR); and
- The security culture is affected by personalities combined with the historical lack of adherence to security practices. She advised that it is unlikely RVs are briefed on anything and someone other than the original host will sign out a RV, as there is no policy.

At 0838 hrs, February 12, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH was re-interviewed at 391 York Avenue, Office 131, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and signed.
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*a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following points were provided by*

Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH

- She advised that regarding the Chinese patent, it dealt with a treatment for preventative therapy; it is a compound that could be used to treat Ebola but it is not a vaccine. In her opinion, it is possible but not definitive the research came from the lab (CSCHAH). There are current internal Ebola projects underway looking for molecules and compounds to inhibit Ebola (antibodies as an example). There is crossover in terms of work being conducted at the lab;

- She believes the document (Chinese patent) raises several flags (what work has been done, what has been disclosed and patented by the Crown, what publications are coming from the lab and who is being collaborated with). In particular she stated it needs to be determined if the collaboration was documented and whether any materials were sent (lab or collaborative materials);

Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH

produced a 2017 news article regarding Chinese work on an AD5 factor Ebola vaccine; she also advised the CSCHAH was involved with the AD5 factor research and had previously set it aside. The news article notes that China approved its own vaccine dubbed AD5-EBOV. The article further states that the vaccine has been through a challenge experiment at the microbiology lab at the PHAC, the original developer of Merck’s rVSV-ZEOV. She has no record of this collaboration agreement.

Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH)

was originally involved with the AD5-factor research and Dr. Qiu collaborated with on another project;

The Intellectual Property Policy states you can collaborate; however, it needs to be documented and the agreement needs to be signed. It spells out how the parties will work together. Scientists feel they have an unfettered right to collaborate. As an example, she explained that the lab has a license that subcontractors with their approval. Dr. Qiu, without an agreement, collaborates with MAPBio and has cut out the license. Promises or commitments were made in the name of PHAC that is then tasked to fix.

Time/resources used at the lab must be disclosed and to remove certain items from CSCHAH, a Material Transfer Agreement needs to be filled out; and
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- She believes with the Chinese patent there is potential that Dr. Qiu violated the Public Servants Invention Act; it minimizes the Crown’s role and there are potential commercial losses. She believes it is highly unlikely Dr. Qiu would not have known she was named on a patent. The most significant concern she has is how Dr. Qiu circumvents the IP office and her relationship with MAPBio. MAPBio is a subcontractor while Defyrs is the licensee. If she helps MAPBio create a new treatment excluding Defyrs, it would create an issue. Dr. Qiu has published three papers recently with no collaboration agreements and while raises the issues, nothing changes as she believes there is a culture that this is allowed to happen.

At 1210 hrs, February 12, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by _______ conducted an interview with _______.

A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg

Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH

at 391 York Avenue, Office 131, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following relevant information was learned during this interview:

- She stated that in reference to the incident in May, 2018 a package was received labelled “kitchen utensils” at the lab. Safety and Environmental Services (SES) was contacted by shipping and the package was seized and once XRAY showed it contained vials with an unknown substance. The vials were subsequently tested and found to be mouse protein;
- Dr. Cheng (Keding) was contacted and he said he was unaware it was coming. Brokers will mislabel a package to make things easier. The Director was advised by SES and the samples were tested. The sender wanted them back but they were seized. Dr. Cheng was advised and received one on one training on shipping expectations; and
- She stated this was not an unusual occurrence, they receive mis-labelled and mis-packaged deliveries weekly.

At 1324 hrs, February 12, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by _______ conducted an interview with _______.

A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg

Commissionaire #1, CSCHAH

at 391 York Avenue, Office 131,
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1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB was accompanied by Human Resources Manager, Corps of Commissionaires, Winnipeg The interview was audio recorded and Commissioner #1, CSCHAH signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form (also signed the non-disclosure form). The following salient points were noted:

- Stated she was on duty in the control room at CSCHAH on October 12, 2018 monitoring the CCTV cameras. There were 3 unescorted RVs walking toward the XRAY; the host showed up several minutes later. She asked the supervisor what to do, she didn’t agree with the answer and called (security). She further stated “that although the Cares have instilled the rules into RVs, they run amok; they have a sense of entitlement”; and
- Within the last 4 months, there has been an increase in RVs not being escorted and she has heard of other incidents of individuals trying to remove vials.

At 1420 hrs, February 12, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by Conducted an interview with Commissioner #2, CSCHAH at 391 York Avenue, Office 131, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB was accompanied by Human Resources Manager, Corps of Commissionaires, Winnipeg The interview was audio recorded and Commissioner #2, CSCHAH signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following relevant points were learned during the interview:

- Regarding the incident on October 12, 2018 he saw RVs walking down the corridor; RV(21) had bags in his hands, and he could see vials in them. He had them stop and advised them they couldn’t take them out; and
- On October 31, 2018 stated two female RVs (#24 and another one no longer there) approached his location carrying two Styrofoam containers. They were empty and the ladies said they were going to store clothing in them. He advised them they could not be removed and the host returned them.

At 0803 hrs, February 13, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg and Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH
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...conducted an interview with [Commissionaire, Shift Supervisor CSCHAH] at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 130N, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. [Commissionaire, Shift Supervisor CSCHAH] was accompanied by [Human Resources Manager, Corps of Commissionaires, Winnipeg]. The interview was audio recorded and [Commissionaire, Shift Supervisor CSCHAH] signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following information was provided:

- Regarding the incidents on October 12 and 31, 2018; he saw the reports and gave them to the security manager, but didn't get any feedback; and
- He advised that as of late, RVs are causing a bit of trouble (in particular RV20) coming in and out.

At 1005 hrs, February 13, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by [A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg] and [Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH] Bio-risk and Occupational Safety Services) conducted a telephone interview with [A/Manager Security, CSCHAH]. The purpose of the interview was to gain knowledge of the 10-day Visitor Pass stated the following:

- She stated it is not a pass, it is more of a rule. When a person submits a visitor FAR, the box on back of the FAR indicates a 10-day visitor; it is for 10 consecutive days and the process is broken. The Security manager is the one who checks the box on a FAR request for 10 days and it may not specify why they require 10 days. Security doesn't question it if a Director or manager signs it off; people do not require a security clearance but if they come back after 10 days, they need a security clearance as this is a one-time deal.

At 1108 hrs, February 13, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by [A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg] and [Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH] conducted an interview with [Casual Employee, CSCHAH (Individual 21)] at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 130N, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and...
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[Redacted]

- He stated that while he has login credentials to the GC and Scientific Network, occasionally allows him to use his computer if he is logged in; and
- Regarding the incident on January 27, 2019 he had no pertinent information to provide.

At 1257 hrs, February 13, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg [Redacted] Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH

[Redacted] and [Redacted] conducted an interview with [Redacted] CSCHAH research associate – term employee at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 130N, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and [Redacted] signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following salient points were learned:

- He stated he has been at NML since March 2017 as a research associate;
- Regarding the incident that occurred on January 27, 2019 he is aware RVs are not always properly escorted; and
- He has been able to sign out RVs all the time; the front desk has allowed it, but he finds it confusing as only some persons on a list could sign out students but after a while, they were told anyone could sign them out.

At 1424 hrs, February 13, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg [Redacted] Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH

[Redacted] and [Redacted] conducted an interview with [Redacted] at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 130N, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and [Redacted] signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following information was learned:

- He advised he has been on staff at the University of Manitoba [Redacted] his boss is Dr. Qin;
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- Although he was in the lab on January 27, 2019 he had no pertinent information to provide; and
- RVs need to be signed in and out; there is a FAR form and a list of who can sign them in but who can sign them out is confusing. Some people at the front at reception let him sign people out, it isn’t always clear.

At 0802 hrs, February 14, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by

- A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH
- Senior Technician, WIV and Bio-Risk Officer, CSCHAH conducted an interview with
  - University of Manitoba staff and visiting researcher) at 391 York Avenue,
  - Board Room 139P, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following salient points were gleaned from the interview:

  - He has been with the UofM since February 2018, his boss is Dr. Qiu;
  - There are weekly lab meetings at NML and he conducts experiments there. He is a Restricted Visitor when at the CSCHAH and his project is related to the Ebola virus, DNA and protein. He stated that the level 4 lab in China is trying to get the Ebola virus and there are no official ties between the level 4 lab in China and the NML; although there are communications between the two;
  - He stated maybe once or twice a week he uses his personal email account to contact Dr. Cheng or Dr. Qiu. Dr. Qiu has provided him her personal email address that he sometimes uses; and
  - Regarding the attempt to remove vials on October 12, 2018 he at first stated he was never stopped trying to remove vials but then recalled one time he was running out of 250ml tubes at the UofM and he stated that NML shipping may not have been open. There were 6-8 tubes in one or two bags. He was not permitted to remove them by security and returned the tubes to the Lab.

At 0929 hrs, February 14, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by

- A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH
- and Bio-Risk Officer, CSCHAH conducted an interview
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He stated he is a PhD student at UofM and Dr. Qiu is his boss at the lab. He is a Restricted Visitor at the CSCHAH. His projects are related to virus vaccines, antibody Lassa and one involving Ebola. Dr. Qiu has cooperation work with China; his supervisor in China knew Dr. Qiu and asked her to accept him at the lab; he first saw Dr. Qiu in China. He worked in a level 2 lab in China. He stated he does no work with pathogens, only works in the level 2 lab;

Regarding the incident on October 12, 2018 he stated a colleague had plastic bags, not sure what it was. Security said it had to go through shipping so his colleague took them back to the lab;

Regarding security in general, he admitted he did go to security alone once (to renew his pass) but it was close to the cafeteria so he misunderstood that he couldn’t go there. With regards to being without a host 4-5 days ago, he recounted he was with Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH looking for Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH. He was working later in the lab but hosts on the list were not with him so he needed to sign him out. He left the lab on the 2nd floor and went to security. He emailed to sign him out; and

Regarding the incident on January 27, 2019 he admitted he was left alone in the lab for 30 minutes.

At 1115 hrs, February 14, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH conducted an interview with Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH and Bio-Risk Officer, CSCHAH (Restricted Visitor under the supervision of Dr. Cheng) at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 139P, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following salient points were learned:
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- She stated she came to work in Canada in Dr. Cheng's lab, he is her supervisor. Supported by the provincial government in China, she came to Canada as a result of an invitation letter through the UofM, where she worked in Immunology and then came to Dr. Cheng's lab;
- She works with Shigella, Salmonella and E. coli; the lab is on the 2nd floor, south pod (on the left). She cannot access the computers as she has no login credentials so Dr. Cheng will use his login to give her access to a computer and let her send experiment data to him. She can access her Gmail from the computer in the lab to send him that data.;
- Regarding the incident on October 31, 2018 she recalls trying to remove a Styrofoam container to store her clothes. Dr. Cheng was with her and it was empty but security informed her that she couldn’t remove it so Dr. Cheng took it back. She had obtained the Styrofoam container from the recycling area; and
- She could not recall a time when she was without a host with while waiting for to sign them out.

At 1306 hrs, February 14, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH and Bio-Risk Officer, CSCHAH conducted an interview with Restricted Visitor #3, CSCHAH and Master's student under the supervision of Dr. Qiu) at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 139P, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and signed a witness form and a non-disclosure form. The following was learned as a result of the interview:

- He has worked at NML.
- Regarding the incident on October 12, 2018 he ran out of large test tubes at the UofM so he was taking some over there from the lab. Security said he could not take them out so he took them back to the lab. He wasn’t certain if the tubes should go through shipping or not, he was confused and thought he would give it a try; and
- He stated he uses a flash-drive at the lab to save his experimental data so he can take it home to organize on his personal computer.
At 0856 hrs, February 15, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by [redacted] Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg conducted an interview with Dr. Keding Cheng at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 123M, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building, Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and Dr. Cheng signed a voluntary statement form. The following salient points of the interview are:

- He stated he was a medical doctor in China for 14 years prior to immigrating to Canada in 1997/1998. He started working at NML in 2006.
- He hosts students, he is currently hosting one [redacted]. He started hosting in 2014, started with 2 (one staying with him and the other with Dr. Qiu), both were from his home province in China and a colleague in China helped him get them as there is funding available. The Centre for Disease Control (CDC), Henan, China helps him get the students;
- [redacted] is now the head of the CDC in Henan and he visited CSCHAH just before the Ebola crisis. The CDC has the MU77 antibody developed using the published sequence from NML. He believes that there is an agreement of some sort;
- Regarding security in general, he stated [redacted] will save data in a folder and she sends it on Gmail. He frequently uses his Gmail account, sometimes she sends information to him through his work account (Canada.ca). She logs into her Gmail from the Science Network computer and sends data to him once she logs in and gives her access. He uses Gmail at home and has a Science Network computer with Web Office at home;
- Regarding the incident in May 2018, he stated it was his first-time receiving materials from China. He informed the scientist [redacted] (Chongqing Medical University) if he ever sent materials there was a shipping process that must be followed. He did not know this was coming ("kitchen utensils"), it was addressed to him at the UofM. He knows professor [redacted] through his (Dr. Cheng’s) publication and she contacted him. He was not collaborating with her then or now. She sent it out of the blue, he couldn’t believe it. It wasn’t infectious, it was a protein gel and the entire incident made him very angry;
- He is collaborating with the CDC, his NML colleagues and those at the UofM. He contacted his director. Regarding his work with the CDC in China, there is a special type
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of tick carrying a virus with a high death rate in his home province and area (5%), South Korea and Japan is 40%. The CDC Director General came here and he (Dr. Cheng) said he would collaborate with the CDC. No formal documentation yet and it has been going on since 2017. The Chief tech director from CDC came to the CSCHAH for 3-4 months last year (left in Sept) and they talked about a sequence and started work on a sequence. He (Dr. Cheng) is working on the protein part of it. CDC can’t transfer the virus but he hopes to develop antibodies and do the trial here on animals (Dr. Qiu’s lab will likely develop a pseudo-virus) so he can develop the antibodies. There is no collaboration agreement yet but he admits that usually the collaboration agreement is first, then the collaboration starts;

• He stated he did not know of students removing materials from the lab, although he does recall on October 31, 2018 he tried to take out two Styrofoam containers for storage. He took them back and confirmed receiving a warning from security;

• On January 27, 2019 he entered the incorrect PIN# but not all of the numbers could have been wrong. He stated he has had the code for several years, it had to be a flaw, the second time it was correct. He admitted to leaving RVs in the lab not being properly escorted, it is built on trust. He follows them every day for months and then gives them freedom; it is a balance;

• He stated he had previously been accused of processing data secretly; he was not comfortable with the results of an experiment so he had a colleague check it. He was later accused of hiding data. He was writing a paper and everything is confidential until published. It was investigated and he stated it was determined that he did nothing wrong;

• He has no agreements with other universities; however, he is an Adjunct Professor at UofM and sits on committees there; and

• He admitted that the “bit password” is displayed for one of the computers as he sometimes forgets the password.

At 1417 hrs, February 15, 2019 Mike Amirault (Presidia Security Consulting) accompanied by A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg conducted an interview with Dr. Xiangguo Qiu at 391 York Avenue, Board Room 123M, 1st Floor Stanley Knowles Building,
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Winnipeg, MB. The interview was audio recorded and Dr. Qiu signed a voluntary statement form. The following pertinent points were gleaned from the interview:

- She stated that she started working at CSCHAH on June 18, 2003 with vaccines for viruses such as Ebola. She is still in contact with [redacted] they are writing a paper together and it was just accepted, it will be in the journal of virology. They are also writing another vaccine paper (along with others) about a vaccine; his student is the first author, she is in the middle – VSV-EBOV;

- She has three grad students and one student from China [redacted]. Regarding research, she stated a Material Transfer Agreement is required for sending some material (research) to another institution. Most of the time there is an MTA, but in some situations, she will discuss with her supervisor and has sent antibodies out without an MTA;

- Regarding the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control, she stated they do tests on products (food and drug). If it passes their tests it moves to the China Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval. They also do research with molecules with a pseudo-virus (they are only level 2) to see if they can inhibit the Ebola virus. They approached her and sent her the small molecules (most don't work) to test. Sometimes she doesn't obtain a Collaboration Agreement unless it is a bigger project. It can take a long time to get the agreement so sometimes between scientists, they just do the work. It could take a year or longer to obtain an Agreement. She stated she has sent the institute antibodies, a small amount without an MTA. She has collaborated with [redacted] Individual 4 at the China Institute;

- Regarding the Chinese patent and the fact her name is listed as an inventor; she stated she didn't know about the document (patent) and they did not have her permission to put her name on the patent. She reviewed the patent in Chinese and admitted some of the work was in fact done at NML; she recognized some of the work. She agrees there should have been a Collaborative Agreement but the paperwork takes too long and between the scientists the work gets done;

- She further stated she has another collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Medical Science; she tried to get a Collaborative Agreement but it didn't go anywhere as it took a
very long time. The research was done and she co-published one paper in antivirus research with \[Individual 23\] She sent the Collaborative Agreement in 2-3 years ago;

- She is in the process of becoming an Adjunct Professor at the Hebei Medical University, and is currently an Adjunct professor at the UofM. When asked about her knowledge of \[Individual 18\] she stated he is a scientist at Shandong University. She met him at a conference in China and he asked to be a visiting scientist. She co-published a paper with him regarding antibodies from a horse; the antibodies were tested at the CSCHAH without a Collaborative Agreement. The work started with \[Individual 14\] with no CA; she took over and her name and others are on the paper including \[Technician #1, CSCHAH\]

- When asked about her relationship with MAPBio, she stated she co-published three papers regarding an antibody compound (it is made by MAPBio). There was no Collaborative Agreement as it is US funded (Defence Threat Reduction Agency) and she has a support letter from \[Executive Director, NML, CSCHAH\] investigator was not able to confirm the letter’s existence at the interview). The agreement is between MapBio and the UofM, the funding goes through the UofM. She emphasized the fact that Defyru is ineffective and that MapBio has a new cocktail; and

- Regarding the article reference Ad5-EBOV being tested, she stated it was tested for the Beijing Institute of bio-technology. She believes she obtained a support letter for this in 2015 to do the testing.

H. INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

1. There is an immediate need for a detailed Visitor's Policy that defines Restricted Visitor, clearly states their responsibilities and limitations, defines who can be a host complete with their roles and responsibilities and provides clear direction for the appropriate use of the 10-day pass. Further, the policy must contain a section that denotes the consequences that will follow a breach of the policy. The Visitor Policy must have a strong security component to ensure the safety and security for the Department, Agency and the NML as a whole.

2. There are numerous violations of the IT policy including: staff signing into computers and allowing Restricted Visitors to download experimental data onto Gmail and sending it their homes, the use of flash drives to transfer experimental data between...
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Public Health Agency of Canada computers to personal computers and vice-versa, and the apparent use of Gmail to overcome IT restrictions associated with Public Health Agency of Canada supplied networks.

3. Regarding the incident in May, 2018 involving Dr. Cheng being sent vials of samples via courier from China marked as “kitchen utensils”. The Director of Bio-risk and Occupational Safety reports that shipping receives packages that are mis-labelled on a weekly basis. That information coupled with the information provided during the interview of Dr. Cheng satisfies the investigator that the broker deliberately mis-labelled the package shipped from China for ease of shipping and that Dr. Cheng played no role in the actions taken by the broker.

4. Regarding the attempted removal of 2 clear plastic bags containing 10 vials each by Restricted Visitors accompanied by Dr. Cheng on October 12, 2018; considering the interviews with the Restricted Visitors, Dr. Cheng and the two Commissionaires involved, the investigator believes a lack of willingness to follow known proper security procedures by the Restricted Visitors, coupled with the lack of appropriate action by the XRAY Commissionaire was the cause of this incident. Further, the investigator believes the tubes were in fact empty, that Dr. Cheng was not present with the Restricted Visitors when they attempted to exit the CSCHAH, the two bags contained 6-8 250ml tubes rather than a total of 10 vials and there was no authorized host with the Restricted Visitors;

5. Regarding the incident on October 31, 2018 where Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH accompanied by Dr. Cheng attempted to depart the CSCHAH with two empty Styrofoam containers, interviews with the Commissionaire involved and both Dr. Cheng and [REDACTED] lead the investigator to believe that security performed their job well and that Dr. Cheng and [REDACTED] lacked security awareness when it came to removing articles from the lab without following proper protocols.

6. Regarding the incident on January 27, 2019 involving an improper code being entered to gain access to the CSCHAH and the subsequent lack of supervision of Restricted Visitors, while the investigator finds it highly suspicious that Dr. Cheng happened to enter a 5-digit code to gain access to CSCHAH that was far removed from his own and was assigned to another employee, there is no evidence to suggest anything nefarious. The investigator ascertained that Restricted Visitors were not properly
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supervised and in fact, there was a period of time when a Restricted Visitor was left alone in the lab on that date. Due to the efforts of the A/Regional Security Manager, this was dealt with at the time very effectively but does emphasize the fact that some staff and Restricted Visitors have little appreciation for well-established security policies and choose not to adhere to them.

7. Regarding the fact that Dr. Qiu’s name appeared on the Chinese Patent, several very knowledgeable people including Public Health Agency of Canada’s Chief Science Officer followed by the Director of Intellectual Property believe the likelihood of a researcher’s name appearing on a patent without the researcher’s knowledge is highly improbable. In fact, [REDACTED] said it would be rare that a researcher would not know their name was used as it is the core of a researcher to boast about their results. [REDACTED] stated that using someone’s name on a patent that did not belong there could rule the patent invalid. In this case, when it was mentioned to Dr. Qiu that her name appears on the Chinese patent, she stated it was “weird” and “they” did not have her permission to use her name, although she showed no outward signs of surprise. Furthermore, when provided the opportunity to view the patent, she admitted some of the work contained therein was performed at CSCHAH. She knew almost all of the listed inventors on the patent and has collaborated with the lead inventor listed on the patent. A student she supervises, while not listed as an inventor did perform some of the work located within the document as pointed out by Dr. Qiu. She agreed that there should have been a Collaborative Agreement but she stated “the paperwork takes too long so between scientists we get the work done”.

The investigator cannot definitively determine if Dr. Qiu knew her name was on the patent but it is highly improbable that she did not know or that the end result of her findings during research would not have assisted the Chinese in applying for a patent. The Intellectual Property Policy states the following:

When the PHAC and an external party such as a university, province, territory or other institution undertake collaborative research, they enter into a Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA) or related agreement. Under the CRA, each of them will retain ownership of the Background (pre-existing) IP each of them owns and contributes to the research project. When appropriate, non-exclusive licences may be granted to each other for the project and for post-project purposes, such as commercialization and future research. Licenses for any third-party IP to be
8. During the interview with Dr. Qiu, while discussing a discussion about the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control, she offered that she had collaborated with the Institute who is attempting to develop a vaccine for the SARS virus. She was admitted she did not file a Collaboration Agreement as she would only apply if it is a third party, and that no barriers to continued research transfer have been addressed, and that no barriers to continued transfer of technology in the research materials be addressed. Dr. Qiu also stated that the research materials involved in the collaboration were all used in collaboration with the Chinese Patent Office.

Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) A contract that governs the transfer of research materials between two organizations. It is a legal document that specifies the terms and conditions under which research materials will be transferred. The MTA should include details such as the purpose of the transfer, the materials to be transferred, the terms of the transfer, and any conditions or restrictions on their use.

Dr. Qiu admitted during her interview that there was no Collaboration Agreement in place with regards to the research that was completed at the CICFAR. The Collaboration Agreement is a contract that outlines the terms and conditions under which research materials will be transferred. It is used to ensure that all relevant IP has been disclosed and that all relevant research has been shared. The Collaboration Agreement should be made in writing and signed by both parties.

Section 4(1) states the following:

Duties of inventor: (1) Every public servant who makes an invention (a) shall inform the appropriate minister of the invention and provide the minister with such information and documents as the minister requires; (b) shall not use or otherwise exploit an invention for his or her own benefit or in contravention of the minister's requirements; and (c) shall in any application in Canada for a patent in respect of the invention, declare in his application in Canada for a patent in respect of the invention.
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big project. Further, she stated she sent them antibodies without a Material Transfer Agreement. She is collaborating with Individual 4, the Institute, who is the lead inventor on the Chinese Patent incident. This is a violation of Section 3.5 of the Intellectual Property Policy as it relates to Collaborative Agreements as well as Section 3.7 as it relates to the Material Transfer Agreement.

Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH

9. An article provided by [redacted] describes a collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. When Dr. Qiu was approached with this information during her interview, she stated she tried to get a Collaboration Agreement but it didn’t go anywhere as it took too long. The research was completed anyway and she co-published a paper with other authors on the research that was related to the Ad5-EBOV vaccine. Dr. Qiu did state that she may have obtained a Letter of Support from the CSCHAH for this project.

As a result of information supplied by Senior Investigator, Ottawa [redacted] Dr. Qiu was asked about her association with Individual 18. She stated she is a scientist at Shandong University, that she had met him at a seminar and that he asked if he could be a student of hers. Then she stated they co-published a paper regarding antibodies that were tested at the CSCHAH without a Collaboration Agreement. The work had started with [redacted] and [redacted] she took the research over with [redacted]. This is a violation of Section 3.5 of the Intellectual Property Policy as it relates to Collaborative Agreements.

Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH

11. [redacted] discussed her concerns with Dr. Qiu’s collaboration with MAP Bio, who is a sub-contractor for Defyrus, the holder of the license to produce the Ebola vaccine. Dr. Qiu stated that Defyrus is ineffective and MAP Bio has a new cocktail that may address 8 different issues vice only one with the Defyrus vaccine. The work is funded by the Defence Threat Reduction Agency through the University of Manitoba and Dr. Qiu has a letter of support from the Scientific Director General at the NML.

Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH

12. Dr. Cheng collaborates with the Centre for China Disease Control and Prevention; he is currently working on a tick virus that has a 5% death rate in his home province in China and a 40% death rate in South Korea and Japan. The CDC Director came to the NML and Dr. Cheng informed him he would collaborate with him. Dr. Cheng stated...
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there is no formal documentation regarding this collaboration (he may have informed his Director). Dr. Cheng is working on the protein portion of the collaboration and hopes to develop the antibody at the NML. If Dr. Cheng is correct and there is no formal documentation, he is in violation of Section 3.5 of the Intellectual Property Policy as it relates to Collaborative Agreements.

Recommended Further Investigative Steps

1. After the investigator’s departure from Winnipeg, it was learned that antibodies were transferred to the Thomas Jefferson University, Philadelphia, PA, USA, without a Material Transfer Agreement. It would appear that the University made a significant financial commitment in relation to their research that included the promise of hybridomas following the receipt of the antibodies. The CSCHAH has denied the access to the hybridomas that were promised by Dr. Qiu and Thomas Jefferson University is making it abundantly clear they want the promised materials. Should the information contained within the emails between the Thomas Jefferson University and the CSCHAH be in fact accurate, there is a clear violation of Section 3.5 of the Intellectual Property Policy as it relates to Collaborative Agreements. Further investigation is required to determine what was transferred, what was promised and what violations were committed in the process, if any, by Dr. Qiu. The current situation has the potential to tarnish the reputation of the CSCHAH, the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Minister of Health and is recommended for further investigation to determine the breadth of any breaches of policy.

2. With regards to Dr. Qiu, collaborating with the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control without a Collaboration Agreement in place and sending the Institute antibodies without a Material Transfer Agreement, further investigation and collaboration needs to take place with the assistance of the Director, Intellectual Property Management to verify that no Collaborative Agreement or Material Transfer Agreement were in place thus proving the breaches under the Intellectual Property Policy.

3. Regarding the collaboration between Dr. Qiu and the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences, Further investigation is warranted to determine whether or not there was a Letter of Support for her to conduct the research, what were the parameters within the Letter of Support and were any breaches of Policy or
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Legislative Acts committed as a result of the findings and the subsequent co-publishing of a paper with other authors involved with the research.

4. With reference to the information supplied by Senior Investigator, Ottawa regarding Individual 18 Dr. Qiu mentioned they met at a conference and then she mentioned they co-published a paper regarding antibodies from a horse that were tested at the CSCHAH without a Collaboration Agreement. Further investigation and collaboration need to take place with the assistance of the Director, Intellectual Property Management to verify that no Collaborative Agreement or Material Transfer Agreement were in place thus proving the breaches under the Intellectual Property Policy.

5. With regards to Dr. Qiu’s collaboration with MAP Bio, further investigation is warranted due to the fact that although there is a Letter of Support reference this project, what are the parameters involved and is there a risk of both a conflict of interest and a potential lawsuit. Considering that Defyrus is the licensee of the Ebola vaccine and appears to be cut out of this new research with their sub-contractor, all of which could result in a potential financial loss to the licensee, this requires further scrutiny. Collaboration with the Director, Intellectual Property and a legal advisor for this Director will be required to determine if there is potential for any breaches of Policy having occurred or more significant issues being identified.

6. Regarding Dr. Cheng collaborating with the Centre for China Disease Control and Prevention, further investigation and collaboration need to take place with the assistance of the Director, Intellectual Property Management to verify that no Collaborative Agreement exists thus proving the breach under the Intellectual Property Policy.

7. It was noted during the fact finding that there were several IT related incidents. Similar to the intellectual property concerns, there is a requirement for additional investigation into the sharing of user credentials and passwords between research staff and restricted visitors. It was also noted that there is a high probability that GC information has been shared via unapproved emails services (Gmail), and there are perceived weaknesses with the current security controls which are in place for the scientific network. Therefore, a further analysis and investigation is required to ensure the appropriate IT Security controls are in place.
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Response from the Departmental Security Officer (DSO)

☑ I concur with the recommendation

☐ I do not concur with the recommendation

APPROVED BY:

Departmental Security Officer,
Executive Director Security
Management Division, Ottawa

Date 23 March 2019
July 5, 2019

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu
Research Scientist
National Microbiology Lab
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, MB
R3E 3R2

Dear Dr. Qiu,

As you are aware, a fact-finding process, for which you were interviewed on February 15, 2019, was conducted to assess potential contraventions of policies in the course of your scientific work at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). Based on the results of the fact-finding, I have determined that an administrative investigation is now required to fully understand the concerns identified and their impact on the organization. The following allegations, and any others that may come to light during the course of the investigation, form the basis for the administrative investigation:

- That you failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of your scientific collaborations;
- That you or the Restricted Visitors under your supervision inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons, including, but not limited to, by using personal computer accounts to share data and information, and by storing and sharing data using unauthorized USB keys;
- That Restricted Visitors under your supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace;
- That you failed to abide by security policies regarding Restricted Visitors;
- That you acted in a manner that may have infringed on rights granted by the Crown to a third party under a license agreement; and,
- That you have been named in a patent outside of Canada without seeking proper approval.

The above noted allegations will be examined in relation to possible contraventions of Government of Canada policy in the following areas, among others:

- Government IT Security policies and standards, such as the Information Technology Security Directive for Health Canada (HC) and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard for HC/PHAC, and the Secure Use of Portable Storage Devices and Media Standard for HC/PHAC;
- TBS Policy on Government Security and several of its Standards, such as the Standard on Security Screening, the Operational Standard on Physical Security, the Directive on Departmental Security Management, and the PHAC Visiting Official Statement of Agreement;
- Public Servants invention Act;
- Intellectual Property Policy; and,
- The PHAC Values and Ethics Code.

The NML is known around the world for its scientific excellence. By working with public health partners in Canada and abroad, the NML advances science to support public health. The work that you perform for the NML and by extension, the Government of Canada, is extremely important. In this context, the above noted allegations must be taken seriously given the potential for negative impact on the organization and its accomplishments.

Based on the allegations noted above, an analysis was conducted in accordance with existing practices and based on jurisprudence to determine whether you should remain in the workplace during the time period of the investigation. This analysis concluded that your presence in the workplace represents a reasonably serious risk to the legitimate concerns of PHAC, which could be detrimental to the reputation of the organization. As such, pending the outcome of this investigation, you are to remain home with pay effective end of day today, July 5, 2019. This will allow you time to prepare for and participate in the
impending administrative investigation. You are reminded that you continue to be bound by the PHAC Values and Ethics Code and related conflict of interest obligations.

It is management’s intention that this investigative process be thorough and expeditious. You will be contacted in the near future by an investigator who will schedule an interview with you. You are expected to cooperate fully with the investigation process. You may be accompanied by a union representative or another support person of your choice during your meetings with the investigator, provided that their presence does not place them in a conflict of interest situation and provided that they have been approved by the investigator. Please refer to your collective agreement regarding your right to representation, as applicable. It is your responsibility to respond to the questions posed to you and not that of your representative or support person.

During the investigative process, and before management renders a final decision, you will be afforded an opportunity to present any clarifications or extenuating circumstances that you feel have not been addressed in the course of the investigation.

You are expected to keep all aspects pertaining to this investigation strictly confidential. It is our expectation that you will not advise anyone that this investigation is going on, and that you will keep confidential all information and not discuss the matters with anyone other than your union representative or support person. I further expect you not to ask individuals if they have participated in this process, nor to speak to any individuals who may participate in this process about the contents of their discussions with the investigator. Your failure to maintain confidentiality or to comply with these expectations could subject you to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.

Should it be determined that the allegations against you are founded, administrative and/or disciplinary measures, up to and including termination of employment, may be taken. If, however, it is determined that the allegations against you are unfounded, you will be reintegrated into the workplace.

For the duration of this investigation, you are not to present yourself at the workplace or to contact any PHAC employee, individuals with whom you collaborate for the purpose of your work at PHAC, and any external clients or stakeholders until you receive authorization to do so. Your electronic access card and all computer related accounts, both at work and remotely, have been deactivated.

During the course of your absence from the workplace, any new facts or circumstances which may come to light could result in management revisiting this decision, and the following may be further considered: a review for cause of your reliability status; an administrative suspension; or, a return to the workplace.

If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Scientific Director General, at [redacted].

Please note that the Employee Assistance Program is available to assist you and your family at any time and can be reached at 1-800-268-7708. This free, confidential service is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Respectfully,

[redacted]
Vice-President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

cc: Departmental Security Officer, Executive
    Director Security Management Division, Ottawa
July 5, 2019

Dr. Keding Cheng
Biolist
National Microbiology Lab
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, MB
R3E 3R2

Dear Dr. Cheng,

As you are aware, a fact-finding process, for which you were interviewed on February 15, 2019, was conducted to assess potential contraventions of policies in the course of your scientific work at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). Based on the results of the fact-finding, I have determined that an administrative investigation is now required to fully understand the concerns identified and their impact on the organization. The following allegations, and any others that may come to light during the course of the investigation, form the basis for the administrative investigation:

- That you or Restricted Visitors under your supervision inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons, including, but not limited to, inappropriately sharing passwords, sharing login information, using personal computer accounts to send Government of Canada information, and storing and sharing data on USB keys;
- That you failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of your scientific collaborations;
- That Restricted Visitors under your supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace; and,
- That you failed to abide by security policies regarding Restricted Visitors.

The above noted allegations will be examined in relation to possible contraventions of Government of Canada policy in the following areas, among others:

- Government IT Security policies and standards, such as the Information Technology Security Directive for Heath Canada (HC) and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard for HC/PHAC, and the Secure Use of Portable Storage Devices and Media Standard for HC/PHAC;
- TBS Policy on Government Security and several of its Standards, such as the Standard on Security Screening, the Operational Standard on Physical Security, the Directive on Departmental Security Management, and the PHAC Visiting Official Statement of Agreement;
- Intellectual Property Policy; and,
- The PHAC Values and Ethics Code.

The NML is known around the world for its scientific excellence. By working with public health partners in Canada and abroad, the NML advances science to support public health. The work that you perform for the NML and by extension, the Government of Canada, is extremely important. In this context, the above noted allegations must be taken seriously given the potential for negative impact on the organization and its accomplishments.

Based on the allegations noted above, an analysis was conducted in accordance with existing practices and based on jurisprudence to determine whether you should remain in the workplace during the time period of the investigation. This analysis concluded that your presence in the workplace represents a reasonably serious risk to the legitimate concerns of PHAC, which could be detrimental to the reputation of the organization. As such, pending the outcome of this investigation, you are to remain home with pay effective end of day today, July 5, 2019. This will allow you time to prepare for and participate in the impending administrative investigation. You are reminded that you continue to be bound by the PHAC Values and Ethics Code and related conflict of interest obligations.
It is management's intention that this investigative process be thorough and expeditious. You will be consulted in the near future by an investigator who will schedule an interview with you. You are expected to cooperate fully with the investigation process. You may be accompanied by a union representative or another support person of your choice during your meetings with the investigator, provided that their presence does not place them in a conflict of interest situation and provided that they have been approved by the investigator. Please refer to your collective agreement regarding your right to representation, as applicable. It is your responsibility to respond to the questions posed to you and not that of your representative or support person.

During the investigative process, and before management renders a final decision, you will be afforded an opportunity to present any clarifications or disputing circumstances that you feel have not been addressed in the course of the investigation.

You are expected to keep all aspects pertaining to this investigation strictly confidential. It is our expectation that you will not advise anyone that this investigation is going on, and that you will keep confidential all information and not discuss the matters with anyone other than your union representative or support person. If further you expect you not to ask individuals if they have participated in this process, nor to speak to any individuals who may participate in this process about the contents of their discussions with the investigator. Your failure to maintain confidentiality or to comply with these expectations could subject you to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.

Should it be determined that the allegations against you are founded, administrative and/or disciplinary measures, up to and including termination of employment, may be taken. If, however, it is determined that the allegations against you are unfounded, you will be reintegrated into the workplace.

For the duration of this investigation, you are not to present yourself at the workplace or to contact any PHAC employee, individuals with whom you collaborate for the purpose of your work at PHAC, and any external clients or stakeholders until you receive authorization to do so. Your electronic access card and all computer related accounts, both at work and remotely, have been deactivated.

During the course of your absence from the workplace, any new facts or circumstances which may come to light could result in management revisiting this decision, and the following may be further considered: a review for cause of your reliability status; an administrative suspension; or, a return to the workplace.

If you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] Scientific Director General, at [Redacted].

Please note that the Employee Assistance Program is available to assist you and your family at any time and can be reached at 1-800-258-7708. This free, confidential service is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Respectfully,

[Redacted]
Vice-President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

cc: [Redacted] Departmental Security Officer
    A/Executive Director of Labour Relations
National Security Management Division

Public Health Agency of Canada - Agence de la santé publique du Canada

Presidia Security Consulting
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Report date: February 5, 2020
National Security Management Division

Public Health Agency of Canada - Agence de la santé publique du Canada

A. SUBJECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION

The National Security Management Division (NSMD's) Investigations Unit was mandated by the Vice-President, Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control (IDPC) Branch to conduct an administrative investigation into allegations involving Dr. Xiangguo Qiu. This was in relation to breaches of several policies including the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) policies, Government IT Security policies, TBS Policy on Government Security and several of its standards, the Public Servants Invention Act, Intellectual Property policy and PHAC Values and Ethics Code.

B. MANDATING AUTHORITY FOR THIS INVESTIGATION

[Name]
Vice-President
Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario

C. RESPONDENT

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu
D. BACKGROUND OF ALLEGATIONS

On December 21, 2018, NSMD contracted Presidia Security Consulting to conduct a fact-finding investigation into allegations involving Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, a Public Health Agency of Canada employee, appeared as a listed inventor on a Chinese Patent that may contain scientific information produced at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Furthermore, it was alleged Dr. Xiangguo Qiu shared the scientific data without the authority of the Public Health Agency of Canada. As a result of the fact-finding report, dated 7 March 2019, additional allegations were revealed and an Administrative Investigation was ordered (Ref: INV2019-01).

E. INVESTIGATIVE OBJECTIVES

In accordance with the Terms of Reference regarding the Administrative Investigation involving Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, this investigation seeks to establish all relevant facts relating to the following:

a. That the Respondent failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of the Respondent's scientific collaborations;

b. That the Respondent or the Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision, inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons including, but not limited to, using personal computer accounts to share data and information, and by storing and sharing data using unauthorized USB keys;

c. That Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace;

d. That the Respondent failed to report security breaches;

e. That the Respondent acted in a manner that may have infringed on rights granted by the Crown to a third party under a license agreement; and

f. That the Respondent has been named in a patent outside of Canada without seeking prior approval.

The above noted allegations will be examined in relation to possible contraventions of the Government of Canada policy in the following areas, among others:
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g. Government IT Security policies and standards, such as the Information Technology Security Directive for Health Canada (HC) and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard for HC/PHAC, and the Secure Use of Portable Storage Devices and Media Standard for HC/PHAC;
h. TBS Policy on Government Security and several of its Standards, such as the Standard on Security Screening, the Operational Standard on Physical Security, and the Directive on Departmental Security Management;
i. The Public Servants Invention Act;
j. The Intellectual Property Policy; and
k. The PHAC standards including the Values and Ethics Code and the PHAC Visiting Official Statement of Agreement.

F. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The scope of this investigation consisted of:

- The contractor will need to visit the National Capital Region National Security Management Division office in Ottawa for face to face event briefings;
- Contractor travel to PHAC facilities located at 391 York Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba;
- Conduct interviews to gain an in-depth understanding of the noted events; and
- Provide an administrative investigation report for the noted events.

Persons Interviewed:

- Former Director, Security Operations, CSCHAH
- Senior Labour Relations Advisor, Toronto
- Director, IT Security, Ottawa
- IT Security, Ottawa
- PHAC, Chief Science Officer, Ottawa
- Director, Business Office (Intellectual Property Management), CSCHAH
- Scientific Director General, CSCHAH
The methodology for this investigation included the examination of the allegations, collecting the facts and reaching a conclusion using the following:

- Interviews of PHAC employees;
- Information contained in the fact-finding report;
- Review of available policies and procedures; and
- Analysis of findings.

Presidia Security Consulting in cooperation with NSMD conducted the administrative investigative process between July 8, 2019 and present.

G. INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUND

During the course of this investigation, a total of twenty-seven (27) interviews were conducted, all of which had information pertinent to the mandate of this investigation. The complete and detailed summaries of those interviews are attached to this report at Annex A. In addition, a considerable amount of research was conducted in relation to applicable PHAC and other
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governmental policies.

H. ANALYSIS

Based on the foregoing information (Investigative Background), the following analysis is provided:

Allegation #1: That the Respondent failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of her scientific collaborations:

- Regarding research, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated a Material Transfer Agreement is required for sending some material (research) to another institution. Most of the time there is an MTA, but in some situations, she will discuss with her supervisor and has sent antibodies out without an MTA;

- Regarding the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated they do tests on products (food and drug). If it passes their tests, it moves to their FDA for approval. They also do research with molecules with a pseudo-virus (they are only level 2) to see if they can inhibit the Ebola virus. They approached Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and sent her the small molecules (most do not work) to test. Sometimes she does not obtain a Collaboration Agreement unless it is a bigger project. It can take a long time to get the agreement; so sometimes between scientists, they just do the work. It could take a year or longer to obtain an Agreement. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she has sent the Institute antibodies, a small amount without an MTA but she did so with the approval of [REDACTED] and later [REDACTED]. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu has collaborated with Individual #4 at the China Institute;

- Also regarding the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu has collaborated with them but has only sent them antibodies once;

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Public Health Agency of Canada - Age

Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) and later Chief, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, CSCHAH

that was with the approval of both

She did not obtain a CRA or MTA because she has never been given clear instruction, although she admitted to having CRAs and MTAs when she is involved in larger projects;

- Regarding not having a CRA with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she attempted to obtain a CRA but it went to the IP office and is still there, she stated she pushed for it and she can only push so much;

- Initially, the IP office stated; “the Office of Intellectual Property Management & Business Development (OIPMBD) does not have any record of a CRA with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. OIPMBD has no record of a request to initiate a CRA. OIPMBD has no records of exchanges, no draft CRA and no documentation relating to this (including any correspondence from Dr. Qiu that would substantiate her claim that she “pushed the IP Office for a CRA”);

- As a result of learning that Dr. Xiangguo sent CRA requests through a request was sent to provide any email correspondence that could confirm that she received a CRA request from Dr. Xiangguo and forwarded the request to the IP office. On December 17, 2019 provided email confirmation that on December 5, 2016 Dr. Xiangguo did in fact submit a CRA to collaborate with the Institute of Materia Medica, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. Consequently, was asked to clarify this information to which she replied (Annex 7 B ii refers) that; “upon further review we do have a record of the proposed ‘Cooperation Research Agreement’; however, in our records the third party is identified as Institutt of Materia Medica (IMM) not Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. This could be a coding issue on our end. Nonetheless, we previously disclosed that this file was in abeyance/still ‘under review’. In addition, there is further correspondence on this file that demonstrates legal services was consulted.
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Following a review on 01-May-2019, OIPMBD was unable to find any further correspondence from Dr. Xiangguo Qiu regarding this matter. As a consequence, the CRA is now considered ‘Abandoned’. The agreement was not signed. We are not aware of a MTA and no IP was disclosed to the OIPMBD’.

- When asked about her knowledge of Individual 18, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated he is a scientist at Shandong University. She met him at a conference in China and he asked to be a visiting scientist. She co-published a paper with him regarding antibodies from a horse; the antibodies were tested at the CSCHAH without a Collaborative Agreement. The work started with [redacted] with no CRA and she took it over with her name and others on the paper, including [redacted], CSCHAH.

- When asked about her relationship with MAPBio, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she co-published three papers regarding an antibody compound (it is made by MAPBio). There was no CRA as it is US funded (Defense Threat Reduction Agency) and she has a support letter from [redacted] investigator was not able to confirm the letter’s existence at the interview). The agreement is between MAPBio and the UoM, the funding goes through the UoM. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu emphasized the fact that Defyrus is ineffective and that MAPBio has a new cocktail;

- Regarding ZMAPP, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu knows it was licensed by Defyrus and sub-licensed by MAPBio. It was effective for one species (Zaire); there are about seven species of Ebola virus. She then collaborated with MAPBio and DTRA, funded through the UoM on a better cocktail (she finished what [redacted] started). She stated that since it was external funding a CRA is not required. She did have a Letter of Support from NML. She intends to meet with management at NML to determine when she needs a CRA/MTA;

- Work started with MAPBio around 2016 and was completed around the end of July 2018. Another company developed the antibody and it was tested at NML on
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animal models over a two-year period on guinea pigs, ferrets and monkeys; DTRA funded this and the animals were paid for through the UoM. There was one study on ferrets, several guinea pig studies and two monkey studies. Her team only did part of the overall work on the antibody and the result was a pan filo that was good for three species of Ebola (the most serious species). Now her lab at NML is trying to develop an antibody that will improve on what is now available with the hope of covering all Ebola species. MAPPbio’s new cocktail is MBP134, it is potentially better than ZMAPP and when discussing the possibility of a conflict of interest, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated no one told her she could not do the work. As a scientist, you try to improve what is available and she does not see a problem with that. Even though she worked on ZMAPP and on MBP134, no one from management ever said anything to her; they approved the project;

- During an initial interview with [Scientific Director General CSCHAH] he advised investigators that he had no knowledge of work that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu collaborated on with MAPPbio but he would not be surprised. He further stated that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu has been involved in many great projects without the transparency of her supervisors, which they are now finding about. In a subsequent interview, when asked specifically about the MBP 134 cocktail that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu worked on with MAPPbio, he stated he had no knowledge of her involvement but he was aware of MAPPbio as an entity and he presumed there was some scientific interaction in the past;

- [Scientific Director General CSCHAH] was then shown the Project Setup and the Annual report (documents internal to the NML) that includes MAPPbio as a collaborator and he stated that due to the volume of work in his office and the fact that he had this document 2 years ago, he has no memory of these documents, although he has seen them. He further stated he had no idea on the level of collaboration with MAPPbio. When presented the email on the MAPPbio press release, he stated that he had no direct knowledge of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu’s collaboration; however, she advised him of an impending news release about MBP134 and he forwarded it to Ottawa to provide context to his boss because this is a communications issue. When asked if he was concerned of any IP issues with the news release: [INSERT REDACTED TEXT]
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Scientific Director General, CSCHAH stated it would be an issue now and there would be red flags but it was not a concern back in January 2019, as management was focused on other aspects of the lab;

During an interview with Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH, she advised her most significant concerns with Dr. Xiangguo Qiu is how she circumvents the IP office and her relationship with MAPBio. MAPBio is a subcontractor while DeFyrus is the licensee. If Dr. Xiangguo Qiu helps MAPBio create a new treatment excluding DeFyrus, it would create an issue. She also stated there were three papers published that had no CRA in relation to MAPBio (the three papers published were in relation to experimental results produced by Dr. Xiangguo Qiu's work with MAPBio);

Business Office Officer #2 (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH advised there has been discussion in the IP office regarding Dr. Xiangguo Qiu working on the cocktail that led to ZMAPP and now is working with MAPBio on a more effective cocktail; she wondered why would you improve what was licensed to DeFyrus;

Regarding the article reference Ad5-EBOV being tested, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated it was tested for the Beijing Institute of biotechnology. She believes she obtained a letter of support, to do the testing, in 2015. No Letter of Support was found to corroborate her statement;

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated a MTA and CRA is good in theory and practice, but it takes too long, more than 6 months, she reiterated scientists need to do what scientists need to do;

Prior to her leave pending the outcome of the administrative investigation, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she had not seen policy documents related to IP or SIP and did not have orientation on her arrival at NML. Scientific Director General, CSCHAH stated in his response to supplementary questions (Annex 7 C it refers) that he actively communicates various PHAC policies to all staff, especially through the use of “This Week @ the NML” email newsletter. This email newsletter provides information or training sessions to employees and covers topics including...
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scientific integrity, values and ethics and IP among others. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu admitted to receiving many emails but she is very busy and does not have time to read them all;

- After Dr. Xiangguo Qiu's departure from the NML in July, 2019 was tasked to determine the number of projects Dr. Xiangguo was involved in. When interviewed, [REDACTED] stated that she was very surprised by the scope, breadth and number of projects that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu was involved in. [REDACTED] further stated that some projects required CRAs and MTA's but did not have them and although Dr. Xiangguo Qiu runs a tight ship, management was not always aware of her projects;

- When shown the list of 44 projects, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated a few of the projects are funded internally and management knows about them. Some of the projects have been done at the lab and there are no collaborations yet. She agrees there are projects that management know nothing about but no one has told her she has to tell them everything, she does tell them about the bigger projects;

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu is aware there is a conflict of interest policy but does not know the details. She was not aware she should declare when doing a collaboration;

- When asked about sending licensed antibodies anywhere else, other than to China to the National Food and Drug Agency without a CRA or MTA, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she has sent a very small amount to the UK for testing and to the United States;

- She stated she sent the licensed antibodies to Thomas Jefferson University. [REDACTED] started the work. She sent the antibodies in 2017 so they could continue their work and she discussed this with [REDACTED] who informed her if she trusted the person, it was fine. When the university requested the hybridomas, she advised the IP office; she was adamant that they were not promised the hybridomas;
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- Dr. Xianguo Qiu stated that she met with [redacted] in June 2019 after receiving an email from [redacted] about collaborations needing to be well documented. She indicates that in this meeting, she was informed that: “whenever she wants to send small amounts of antibodies outside of the NML, she is simply to inform either [redacted] or [redacted]. Furthermore, she stated she was told by [redacted] that “when just sharing small amounts of reagents (e.g., Abs, plasmids) and no big dollars involved, then just let [redacted] and [redacted] know”. Finally, she stated that [redacted] told her “we will work out something to best fit the situations”.

- When [redacted] was asked to clarify what he had said to Dr. Xianguo Qiu during the meeting on June 19, 2019 he replied in an email (Annex 7 e refers), that; “It is conceivable to me that I would indicate to Dr. Qiu when presented with an issue that needed to be managed, that we would manage it on a case-by-case basis”. [redacted] further stated that; “I can’t fully confirm the accuracy of the statements, but yes, I believe that we would have offered support to help manage such situations”.

Finding Allegations #1

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff and Dr. Xianguo Qiu in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Xianguo Qiu violated the following policies:

- There are numerous violations of the Public Health Agency of Canada Intellectual Property Policy, Section 3.5 Collaborative Agreements states: When the PHAC and an external party such as a university, province, territory or other institution undertake collaborative research, they enter into a Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA) or related agreement. Many interviews with PHAC staff and with Dr. Xianguo Qiu determined she failed to obtain a CRA even at times when she admittedly knew a CRA should have been in place;

- There are numerous violations of the Public Health Agency of Canada Intellectual Property Policy, Section 3.7 Material Transfer that defines the responsibilities of having a Material Transfer Agreement for items that include cell lines,
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monoclonal antibodies, diagnostic kits, mechanical devices and various other research materials produced in the PHAC's laboratories. Several interviewees and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu herself admitted to sending out monoclonal antibodies on at least three occasions without a MTA; and

• Further investigation is required to determine if Dr. Xiangguo Qiu proceeded with a collaboration against legal advice IAW an email (dated December 19, 2019) from [REDACTED] Investigators have determined that Institut of Materia Medica (IMM) is located at the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (Annex 5 h refers).

There are mitigating factors to be considered regarding this allegation:

• The Scientific Integrity Policy, section 7.6.1. (Annex 4 cc refers) states: the organization will encourage and facilitate domestic and international research or scientific collaborations and partnerships between its researchers and scientists and the external research and development communities in universities and colleges; provincial, territorial or indigenous governments; industry and business; and civil society. While this Policy encourages collaborations, it does not do so at the risk of Intellectual Property. However, there is a perceived lack of clarity as to exactly when a CRA is required during a collaboration and this should be considered as a mitigating factor in this particular allegation;

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated in many cases, she was simply carrying on the work started by [REDACTED] and at times with the knowledge of either [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED]. This included her work with MAPPBio and the transferring of monoclonal antibodies to various locations including Thomas Jefferson University. While her supervisors may have been aware of her scientific activities, it could not be verified. Regardless, it does not negate Dr. Xiangguo Qiu's responsibility and obligation to obtain a CRA or MTA when required in accordance with the Public Health Agency of Canada Intellectual Property Policy; and

• Based on the answers from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] regarding their meeting with Dr. Qiu, it is conceivable she did in fact have permission to provide small
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amounts of antibodies to “trusted” people/organizations. However, it is important to note that this meeting occurred in June 2019 and she had been providing antibodies without an MTA for at least two years prior to this meeting.

Allegation #2: That the Respondent or the Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision, inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons including, but not limited to, using personal computer accounts to share data and information, and by storing and sharing data using unauthorized USB keys:

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu admits sending several emails to [Research Associate #1, CSCHAH] Gmail account instead of his corporate email account. She stated she did not know she should not be sending PHAC email to [Research Associate #1, CSCHAH] Gmail account, no one has ever expressed concern and no one has informed her not to use Gmail [censored]. Sometimes is not in his office, as he sits in the library, so he prefers receiving emails at his Gmail account because it is more convenient for him. She did not read the policy regarding Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard until she was suspended;

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she does not believe she uses her personal Gmail/Yahoo account regarding work. When shown an email where this occurred, she stated she hit a “reply all” to an email while she was travelling and that is how it occurred. When shown another email where she sent a PHAC related work email from her corporate account to her Gmail account and then again sent the PHAC related work email from her corporate account to her Yahoo account, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated there must be a reason but she does not know why she did it;

- Advised investigators that she has told Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and other Special Pathogen staff not to use Gmail multiple times over the years, as the emails are not ATIP-able; however, in a subsequent interview she stated she was not absolutely certain she advised Dr. Xiangguo Qiu;

- An interview of a Restricted Visitor managed by Dr. Xiangguo Qiu revealed that the majority of written communication between the RV and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu
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regarding work was accomplished through personal instead of corporate email accounts;

- An analysis of emails provided by HC Corporate Security contained numerous examples of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu receiving and sending corporate emails from either her Gmail or Yahoo accounts to various personnel (Annex 3 D ii refers); and

- It was confirmed that the IT Infrastructure User Agreement was accepted electronically, on computer login, on several occasions (14 times between 2016-2018 and 6 times in 2019), by Dr. Xiangguo Qiu acknowledging her responsibility for reading and understanding all HC/PHAC IT Security policies and standards. During the interview, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she is very busy with science and does not have time to read all the emails she receives on a daily basis

Findings Allegations #2

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff, Restricted Visitors and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the following policies:

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the Directive on Email Management, issued on October 16, 2013 by the Director General and Chief Information Officer, Information Management Senior Official, HC/PHAC, which states “Do not use third party email services to conduct government business, or use an automated agent to forward email to an external email address”;

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard, Appendix B states emails containing HC/PHAC business or attachments sent via personal email accounts are not permitted. Using third party email services (e.g., Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo, etc.) to conduct government business, or using an automated agent to forward HC/PHAC email to an external address violates GC/TBS policies or HC/PHAC policies/standards; and
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- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, on several occasions, electronically acknowledged her responsibility to read and understand all HC/PHAC IT Security policies and standards; however, she knowingly violated those policies and procedures through her use of Gmail and Yahoo accounts to send and receive work related emails.

**Allegation #3:** That Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace.

Research Associate #2, CSCHAH (CSCHAH research associate – term employee) advised investigators that generally, RVs are not always properly escorted while working in labs associated to Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Dr. Keding Cheng;

- During an interview with Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2) and Restricted Visitor #3, CSCHAH, both under the supervision of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, they stated the attempt to remove vials on October 12, 2018 was due to the fact Individual 2 was taking the 250ml tubes to the UoM and NML shipping may not have been opened. There were 6-8 tubes in one or two bags. They were not permitted to remove them by security and returned the tubes to the Lab. While the RVs were signed into and out of NML on October 12, 2018 by Dr. Keding Cheng, both RVs work for Dr. Xiangguo Qiu; and

Restricted Visitor #4, CSCHAH who is an RV and works for Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, admitted to being left alone in the lab and was counselled for going to the NML Security office unescorted.

**Findings: Allegation #3**

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff, Restricted Visitors and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the following policies:

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the PHAC Visiting Official Statement of Agreement, whereas being the Responsible Authority; she did not ensure the visiting officials were escorted at all times by HC/PHAC officials while on HC/PHAC premises.
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contrary to para. 6(a); and

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the PHAC Physical Security Standard, Section 7.5.4 Visitor Access, which states it is the responsibility of the employee to ensure the visitor must be accompanied at all times by an authorized PHAC employee.

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu advised that she frequently had Dr. Keding Cheng supervise RVs that she was the official and responsible host for, as they often worked in his lab. It was simply not feasible for her to supervise them in all cases. Regardless, she filled out the paperwork to bring the RVs to work at the lab and as the official host; she is ultimately responsible for the actions of her RVs. In fact, a lack of proper supervision of RVs for whom she was the official host was the main contributing factor for the attempted removal of test tubes from NML.

Allegation #4: That the Respondent failed to report security breaches.

Finding Allegation #4: Investigators found no information to substantiate this allegation.

Allegation #5: That the Respondent acted in a manner that may have infringed on rights granted by the Crown to a third party under a license agreement:

[Blank space for director's signature]

Advised that regarding Thomas Jefferson University, the monoclonal antibodies shipped by Dr. Xiangguo Qiu are proprietary, licensed and should not have been shipped. Thomas Jefferson University did not wish to pay for hybridomas and they became angry as they stated they were promised antibodies and hybridomas. When Thomas Jefferson University requested more, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu gave IP the request;

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated when asked how many times she sent antibodies outside of NML without a MTA, she could not remember how many times but admitted it was more than once. She later stated she sent small amounts to the UK, China (National Food and Drug) and to the United States;

- She stated she sent the licensed antibodies to Thomas Jefferson University; started the work. She sent the antibodies in 2017 so they could continue
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Chief, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, CSCHAH

their work and she discussed this with [REDACTED] who informed her if she trusted the person, it was fine. When the university requested the hybridomas, she stated they were not promised the hybridomas and she advised the IP office when the university requested them; and

To reiterate an earlier statement, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated that she met with [REDACTED] in June 2019 after receiving an email from Executive Director NML, CSCHAH about collaborations needing to be well documented. She indicates that in this meeting she was informed that; whenever she wants to send small amounts of antibodies outside of the NML, she is simply to inform either

Furthermore, she stated she was told by [REDACTED] that “when just sharing small amounts of reagents (e.g. Abs, plasmids) and no big dollars involved, then just let [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] know”. Finally, she stated that Scientific Director General, CSCHAH told her “we will work out something to best fit the situations”. Investigators found based on the balance of probabilities, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu was in fact provided this direction by senior NML supervisors/staff.

Findings Allegation #5:

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu violated the following policies:

Public Health Agency of Canada Intellectual Property Policy, Section 3.7 Material Transfer that defines the responsibilities of having a Material Transfer Agreement for items that include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, diagnostic kits, mechanical devices and various other research materials produced in the PHAC’s laboratories. Several interviewees and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu herself admitted to sending out monoclonal antibodies on at least three occasions without a MTA;

Public Health Agency of Canada Intellectual Property Policy, Section 4
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Responsibilities where PHAC employees are to be aware of the present policy and are responsible for respecting the IP rights of the Crown and of third parties. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu had a responsibility to follow policy regarding obtaining an MTA when shipping the antibodies to Thomas Jefferson University. These were a licensed product (intellectual property of the Crown) and even with permission to ship small quantities to "trusted" people/institutions, she had an obligation to know exactly what these antibodies would be used for and sending them with an MTA; doing less places the IP at risk.

The Scientific Integrity Policy, section 7.6.1. states; the organization will encourage and facilitate domestic and international research or scientific collaborations and partnerships between its researchers and scientists and the external research and development communities in universities and colleges; provincial, territorial or indigenous governments; industry and business; and civil society.

While this Policy encourages collaborations, it does not do so at the risk of Intellectual Property. There is a lack of clarity as to exactly when a CRA is required during a collaboration; however, the need for a Material Transfer Agreement is clear and was violated on several occasions by Dr. Xiangguo Qiu.

**Allegation #6:** That the Respondent had been named in a patent outside of Canada without seeking prior approval:

- Regarding the first Chinese patent (Annex 5.1 refers) and the fact her name is listed as an inventor; Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she did not know about the document (patent) and they did not have permission to put her name on the patent. She reviewed the patent in Chinese and admitted some of the work was in fact done at NML. She agrees there should have been a Collaborative Agreement but the paperwork takes too long and between the scientists the work gets done;

- Regarding the first Chinese patent, being named as an author without her knowledge made her angry and she believes it was not patentable; the data was too weak. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she would have let them know this and not
allow her name to be used had she been aware. She has not taken any steps to remove her name from the patent because the PHAC letter stated the fact-finding investigation was confidential and she is awaiting this investigation to be completed before she takes any action;

- Dr. Xiangguo Qiu discussed the difference of obtaining a patent in China (where a company will do it, there is no IP office and the funding agency encourages scientists to patent) compared to the Canadian process. Regarding the second Chinese patent ("Marburg" virus), (Annex 5 M refers), she recently conducted her own internet search to find out if any other patent had her name on it and found her name on the Marburg patent 2-3 weeks ago. She only did minimum work on this project (2-3 hours work on two occasions) and the project was so small she did not obtain a CRA; however, in the future she will follow the CRA process. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu pointed out that the Marburg virus project was not patentable and holds no commercial value. Management at NML was not aware of the work she conducted on the two Chinese projects that were later patented, as they were not big projects;

- On the first Chinese patent, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu commented that work with Technician #1, CSCHAH Chinese Food and Drug Control Institute. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu’s staff screened small molecules at NML and only one showed potential. Technician #1, CSCHAH would inform Individual 4 of the results. Individual 4 filed a patent but the data was weak and at this point, she did not feel it was a patent of any value. There are no agreements signed and any correspondence was achieved through email. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu stated she never received any type of compensation or reward. They co-published papers together but that was it. In total, only 4-5 hours of work was done on this experiment by her staff;

- China is trying to patent as much as possible. When applying for a grant in China; they want to know how many patents you will produce, how many grad students you will have and how many publications you will have – very different from Canada;
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• when shown the Marburg Monkey Virus Patent, stated that his level of concern is super low on this as it is a diagnostic test that is not an advancement where you would seek Patent. It is a routine method in detection and if this occurred in Canada, it would just be published so others could just use it;

PHAC, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens
Director, CSCHAH stated that the Monkey Marburg Virus was, in his opinion, a diagnostic approach and it is usually published, very rarely patented. Although it’s an important procedure, it would appear to be more appropriate to just publish the work; and

PHAC, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens, Project Manager, CSCHAH stated that scientists’ names are not just thrown on a Patent and it would be unusual to not have the knowledge that your name is on the Patent. When reviewing the second Patent (Monkey Marburg Virus) she stated she was unaware of this patent and she finds it very surprising that someone would patent this research, as she does not see what is novel about it as it is a methodology to detect the virus.

Findings Allegation #6

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that this is inconclusive:

• While work was conducted at the NML without consideration for a CRA in regards to the scientific data found in the two Chinese patents, there is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Xiangguo Qiu approved or had knowledge that her name would be used in the patent; and

• Interviews conducted suggest that China has a far less rigorous standard when it comes to patents; in fact, senior PHAC managers stated that in the cases of the two patents in question, neither of them would have been patented in Canada.
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PREPARED BY:

Mike Amirault
Senior Security Consultant
Presidia Security Consulting

[Signature] Date 25 February 2020

REVIEWED BY:

Gilles Santerre
Principle
Presidia Security Consulting

[Signature] Date 5 February 2020
National Security Management Division

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REVIEWED BY:

Departmental Security Officer, Executive Director Security Management Division, Ottawa

Date 5 February 2020

ACCEPTED BY:

[Redacted]
Chief Security Officer
Assistant Deputy Minister – Corporate Services Branch PHAC, Ottawa

Date 5 June 2020

Response from the Mandating Authority:

APPROVED BY:

☐ I concur with the findings
☐ I do not concur with the findings

[Redacted]
Vice-President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch Ottawa

Date 6 Feb 2020

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Presidia Security Consulting

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Report date: February 5, 2020
A. SUBJECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION

The National Security Management Division (NSMD's) Investigations Unit was mandated by the Vice-President, Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control (IDPC) Branch to conduct an administrative investigation into allegations involving Dr. Keding Cheng. This investigation is in relation to breaches of several policies including; Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) policies, Government IT Security policies, TBS Policy on Government Security and several of its standards, Intellectual Property policy and PHAC Values and Ethics Code.

B. MANDATING AUTHORITY FOR THIS INVESTIGATION

[Redacted]

Vice-President
Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario

C. RESPONDENT

Dr. Keding Cheng
D. BACKGROUND OF ALLEGATIONS

On December 21, 2018, NSMD contracted Presidia Security Consulting to conduct a fact-finding investigation into allegations involving Dr. Keding Cheng. It was alleged that Dr. Cheng, a Public Health Agency of Canada employee, received a package at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) marked “kitchen utensils” from China that actually contained mouse protein (May 2018). In addition, it was alleged Dr. Keding Cheng breached security policies in relation to students under his supervision, who attempted to improperly remove laboratory materials from the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) (October 12 and October 31, 2018).

Furthermore, Dr. Keding Cheng was responsible for creating a security incident by entering an incorrect pass code when he entered the CSCHAH, a code that belonged to someone else. As a result of the fact-finding report, dated 7 March 2019, additional allegations were revealed and an Administrative Investigation was ordered (Ref: INV2019-02).

E. INVESTIGATIVE OBJECTIVES

In accordance with the Terms of Reference regarding the Administrative Investigation involving Dr. Keding Cheng, this investigation seeks to establish all relevant facts relating to the following:

a. That the Respondent or the Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons, including, but not limited to, inappropriately sharing passwords, sharing login information, using personal computer accounts to send Government of Canada information, and storing and sharing data on USB keys;

b. That the Respondent failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of the Respondent’s scientific collaborations;

c. That Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace;

d. That the Respondent failed to abide by security policies regarding Restricted Visitors;
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e. Contravention of Government IT Security policies and standards, such as the Information Technology Security Directive for Health Canada (HC) and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard for HC/PHAC, and the Secure Use of Portable Storage Devices and Media Standard for HC/PHAC;
f. Contravention of TBS Policy on Government Security and several of its Standards, such as the Standard on Security Screening, the Operational Standard on Physical Security, and the Directive on Departmental Security Management;
g. Contravention of Intellectual Property Policy; and
h. Contravention PHAC standards including the Values and Ethics Code and the PHAC Visiting Official Statement of Agreement.

F. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The scope of this investigation consisted of:

- The contractor will need to visit the National Capital Region National Security Management Division office in Ottawa for face to face event(s) briefing;
- The contractor will need to travel to Winnipeg, Manitoba to visit our PHAC facilities located at 391 York Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba;
- Conduct interviews to gain an in depth understanding of the noted events; and
- Provide an investigative report for the noted events.

Persons Interviewed:

- Former Director, Security Operations, CSCHAH
- Director, BioRisk, CSCHAH
- Commissioner #1, CSCHAH
- Commissioner #2, CSCHAH
- Commissioner, Shift Supervisor, CSCHAH
- Research Associate #2, CSCHAH
- Senior Technician WIV (Individual 2)
- Restricted Visitor #4, CSCHAH
- Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH
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- Restricted Visitor #3, CSCHAH
- Director, IT Security, Ottawa
- IT Security, Ottawa
- Director, Business Office (Intellectual Property Management), CSCHAH
- Executive Director NML, CSCHAH
- Business Office Officer #2 (Intellectual Property Management), CSCHAH
- PHAC, Zoonotic Disease and Special Pathogens Director, CSCHAH
- Chief, Zoonotic Disease and Special Pathogens Division, CSCHAH
- Scientific Director General, CSCHAH
- PHAC, Director of Scientific Informatics Services, CSCHAH
- Business Office Officer #1 (Intellectual Property Management), CSCHAH
- Director, Science Technology Cores and Services, CSCHAH
- Manager, Application Development / Database and Data Administration, CSCHAH
- Former Director, Science Technology Cores and Services, CSCHAH
- Team Lead, Scientific Informatics Services, CSCHAH
- Dr. Keding Cheng (PHAC, Biologist)

The methodology for this investigation included the examination of the allegations, collecting the facts and reaching a conclusion through the use of:

- Interviews of PHAC employees;
- Information contained in the fact-finding report;
- Review of available policies and procedures; and
- Analysis of findings.

Presidia Security Consulting in cooperation with NSMD conducted the administrative investigative process between July 8, 2019 and present.
G. INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUND

During the course of this investigation, interviews were conducted with twenty-four individuals who had information pertinent to the mandate of this investigation. The complete and detailed summaries of those interviews are attached to this report at Annex A. In addition, a considerable amount of research was conducted in relation to applicable PHAC and other governmental policies. Based on the foregoing information, the following analysis is provided:

II. ANALYSIS

Based on the foregoing information (Investigative Background), the following analysis is provided:

Allegation #1: That the Respondent or the Restricted Visitors under the Respondent’s supervision inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons, including, but not limited to, inappropriately sharing passwords, sharing login information, using personal computer accounts to send Government of Canada information, and storing and sharing data on USB keys:

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THE SCIENTIFIC NETWORK

- During an interview with [redacted] (RV), February 14, 2019 she stated that she could not access the computers in the lab, as she has no login credentials. Dr. Keding Cheng will use his login to give her access to a computer and let her send experimental data to him. She can access her Gmail from the computer in the lab to send him that data;

- During an interview with Dr. Keding Cheng, February 15, 2019 he stated [redacted] (RV) will save data in a folder and she sends it to him using Gmail. He frequently uses his Gmail account; sometimes she sends information to him through his work account (Canada.ca). [redacted] (RV) logs into her Gmail from the Science Network computer and sends data to him once he logs in and gives her access. He uses Gmail at home and has a Science Network computer with Web Office at home;

- During subsequent interviews with Dr. Keding Cheng on September 18, 2019 and...
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December 11, 2019, he recalled that during his interview in February, it was discussed with [Manager Security Operations, Western Canada] in attendance that he could not allow RVs access to the Science Network. Since that initial interview, he continued to allow [RV] to have Science Network access on a frequent basis because he had no other choice. In fact, [RV] informed Dr. Keding Cheng after her interview that she was not permitted access to the Science Network but he informed her work needs to be done. While Dr. Keding Cheng stated it is more convenient to allow RVs on the Science Network, he now will no longer allow it;

- When he let [ ] onto the Science Network, he used his credentials to sign in to allow her access to software; she has to be able to finish her job. He agrees the Visiting Official Statement of Agreement (VOSA) states this is not permitted but she only has access to the data and only has access to her own projects;

- Dr. Keding Cheng stated that he has never provided [ ] his credentials, he signs in to provide her access to the tools to enable her to do her work under his supervision and that he has never approached his supervisor for assistance at any time to find a solution to avoid allowing a RV access to the Science Network. He said the bottom line is he did not see the risk and there is no damage plus he (Dr. Cheng) is very busy; he believes he has no other choice other than to allow his RV access to the Science Network. He believes that it is about raw data, there is nothing classified and there is no risk;

- During the course of this investigation, four emails found in Dr. Keding Cheng’s corporate email account from [ ] Gmail account were sent to TEL technologies Canada for independent forensic analysis to determine the origins of the emails. All of the emails in question were from the forensic image of [ ] in the default location where Outlook stores its OST email files. These emails were examined using two forensic tools, MailExaminer and Vound;

- The analysis determined that available details, which could be found within the header information, indicates on the balance of probabilities that the emails from [ ] Gmail account were sent to Dr. Keding Cheng’s corporate email and that all traffic was from within the GC infrastructure. TEL technologies reports are at Annex 2. d.i.i; and
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- This analysis also confirmed, as stated by Dr. Keding Cheng, that he allowed Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH to access the Scientific Network even after his initial interview during the fact-finding stage.

USE OF PERSONAL EMAILS

- Dr. Keding Cheng stated he is aware that the policy states that the use of personal email accounts such as Gmail is prohibited but he stated that the RVs need to do the work. He further admitted that his RV utilized Gmail and that he frequently corresponded using his personal Gmail. He further stated that he often sends email from his corporate account to his personal Gmail account and he does so for convenience. If he uses his corporate account from home he must enter two layers of passwords, so Gmail is more convenient and he admits it is a bad habit.

- During interviews with Restricted Visitor #2, on September 16, 2019 and December 10, 2019, she was adamant that she has told Dr. Keding Cheng and others not to use Gmail multiple times over the years, as the emails are not ATIP-able. Although she thought she had sent these warnings via email, her later searches of her email system failed to find any such transmissions but she believes the email was sent some time ago. Dr. Keding Cheng is also adamant that he was never informed by Restricted Visitor #2, and it should also be noted that during a search of Dr. Keding Cheng’s email, no such email was found; and

- A review of Dr. Keding Cheng’s corporate emails identified numerous occasions where corporate emails are sent to and from his personal Gmail account. In fact, all four emails analyzed by TTEL technologies mentioned those sent by Restricted Visitor #2, were sent to both Dr. Keding Cheng’s corporate and personal email.

UNACCEPTABLE USE OF USB DRIVES

- Dr. Keding Cheng recognizes that the RV Visitors Agreement forbids the use of USBs by RVs; however, he has allowed his RV to utilize the encrypted USB assigned to him; it is common practice in the lab to share the encrypted USB and the password. He stated it was his mistake but he wanted Restricted Visitor #2, (RV) to work efficiently and productively, he thinks he may be too passionate.
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- Dr. Keding Cheng admitted that the “bit password” is displayed openly for one of the computers, as he sometimes forgets the password. He understands the policy related to leaving his BIT password written on the Corporate Network computer, it was a mistake;

- Among numerous IT devices seized by PHAC security for examination that were used by Dr. Keding Cheng at both his lab and home (PHCA assets), a non-white listed terabyte hard drive was found in his lab connected to a Dell Venue 3830 desktop computer (Asset tag number 5009392) that was plugged into the science network;

- In his rebuttal, Dr. Keding Cheng stated [redacted] permitted him to use the non-white-listed 1TB HD connected to the Science Network. He stated that he purchased the 1TB HD with NML money from the Prion Group and he took it with him to the monoclonal group. During the December 2019 interview, Dr. Keding Cheng said in April or May 2019 he had asked [redacted] to check his computer because it was slow or not working at all. [redacted] told Dr. Keding Cheng to unplug the 1TB HD and then the black screen went away and the computer worked. Dr. Cheng believes that he should have known it was not white listed but later agreed that [redacted] would never have known it was not white-listed. Dr. Cheng further admitted he never asked for permission to connect it to the Science Network. In an interview with [redacted], he stated he does not have the authority to authorize non-white listed USB or hard drives and that a business case is required. He was unaware that the hard drive was not white-listed on June 18, 2019 when he assisted Dr. Keding Cheng with his computer that would not boot up;

- Based on the facts gleaned from IT Security’s report and analysis on the VERBATIM 1TB hard drive, on the balance of probabilities it can be determined that the VERBATIM 1TB hard drive was used outside of existing IT policies. IT Security was able to find that a number of the data files found on the VERBATIM 1TB hard drive existed on other computers (known in this case to be GC computers and at least two unknown computers), as well as on network drives and another 1TB external hard drive. IT Security will continue to analyze the drive to determine if some files have been sent/saved to other locations, this will take additional time and a more extensive analysis to determine. For additional details, see CASE ITS-2019-002 Scope 4 - IT Security TB hard Drive details.
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at Annex 2 e; and

- It was confirmed through IT Security that Acceptable Use Policy is a periodic pop-up, which appears on all users screens during log-ins to the PHAC Networks. It was established that on 17 occasions between 18 July 2016 and 20 June 2019, Dr. Keding Cheng acknowledged his responsibility for reading and understanding all HC/PHAC IT Security policies and standards. The actual Acceptable Use Policy Popup and the audit log are attached to this Report as Annex 3.a. When confronted in the final interview on December 11, 2019 about the Acceptable Use Pop Up, Dr. Keding Cheng stated that he did recall seeing the Acceptable Use Policy Pop-ups.

Finding Allegation #1:

Given the totality of the information provided by an RV, PHAC staff and by Dr. Keding Cheng in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Keding Cheng has violated the following policies/directives:

- Dr. Keding Cheng violated the Directive on Email Management, issued on October 16, 2013 by the Director General and Chief Information Officer, Information Management Senior Official, HC/PHAC, which states "Do not use third party email services to conduct government business, or use an automated agent to forward email to an external email address";

- Dr. Keding Cheng, on several occasions, electronically acknowledged his responsibility to read and understand all HC/PHAC IT Security policies and standards; however, he knowingly violated those policies and procedures through his use of Gmail to send and receive work related emails;

- Dr. Keding Cheng violated the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard as follows:
  - Section 5.2. Unacceptable Use states that you cannot connect personal devices to GC networks or devices, or use personal devices to store, process, or transmit GC information;
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- Section 7, Accountabilities and Responsibilities states authorized users will refrain from connecting personal devices to GC networks or devices or using personal devices to store, process, or transmit GC information; and

- Appendix B states emails containing HC/PHAC business or attachments sent via personal email accounts are not permitted. Using third party email services (e.g., Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo, etc.) to conduct government business, or using an automated agent to forward HC/PHAC email to an external address violates GC/TBS policies or HC/PHAC policies/standards.

- Dr. Keding Cheng violated the PHAC Physical Security Standard, Section 7.5.4 Visitor Access, which states it is the responsibility of the employee to ensure the visitor does not have access to PHAC IT equipment.

**Allegation #2:** That the Respondent failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of the Respondent's scientific collaborations:

- During an interview with Dr. Keding Cheng on February 15, 2019, a discussion took place regarding his work with the CDC in China. He stated there is a special type of tick carrying a virus with a high death rate in his home province, South Korea and Japan. The CDC Director General came to NML and he (Dr. Keding Cheng) agreed he would collaborate with the CDC. There is no formal documentation yet and it has been going on since 2017. He stated that the Chief technical director from CDC China came to the CSCHFAI for 3-4 months last year (left in Sept) and they talked about a sequence and started work on a sequence. Dr. Keding Cheng was working on the protein part of it. CDC China cannot transfer the virus but he hopes to develop antibodies and do the trial here on animals (Dr. Xiangguo Qiu's lab will likely develop a pseudo-virus) so he can develop the antibodies. There is no collaboration agreement yet but he admits that usually the collaboration agreement is first, then the collaboration begins;
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(Industrial Property Management) CSCHAH

Both CSCHAH stated that they were not aware of any Agreements involving Dr. Keding Cheng working with CDC China on a Tick virus project and that there are no CRAs or MTAs in place;

Scientific Director General, CSCHAH and
Executive Director NML, CSCHAH

Subsequent independent interviews with confirmed that all were unaware of any collaboration between Dr. Keding Cheng and CDC in China concerning the Tick virus. In fact, stated if Dr. Keding Cheng was working outside of his scope of work, it would be to further his own scientific interest;

During a subsequent interview with Dr. Keding Cheng on September 18, 2019 regarding the Tick virus project, he reiterated his earlier statement and added that the chief technician was and when she departed in September 2018, the project was on hold. He stated that the sequence came from the internet, there was no physical material. He did not submit for a CRA, as it was not a close collaboration because “we” (NML) can do this independently and there is no point to do a CRA. He went on to state if there is a collaboration in the future, there will be a CRA but “we” are not there yet. Dr. Keding Cheng stated he has not advised his new supervisor yet, as it is only an exploratory project and was placed on hold when departed. He related that his supervisors attended a round table discussion and later a presentation was given by in the NML theatre regarding the Tick virus. He admits this project would be outside his scope of work but it is out of self-interest; it is his hometown and he wants to help by developing a vaccine or antibody. Without Restricted Visitors, he doubts he will ever be able to do the project;

During subsequent interviews, both and recalled the visit to NML by but that they were adamant that at no time were they aware or did they approve of any collaborations; and

In his final interview on December 11, 2019 Dr. Keding Cheng admitted he became involved with the Tick Virus out of self-interest. A visiting scientist from China came to NML for training; the Tick Virus was just part of her training opportunity. Some very preliminary sequencing work on the Tick Virus was done and

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Dr. Keding Cheng was hoping there would be a benefit to science at some point. He stated that the Tick Project was outside his scope but it was exploratory only; it was idea based and he believes that they were not at the CRA stage yet. Dr. Keding Cheng stated that any further research testing would have to be done by Dr. Xiangguo Qiu or [redacted] who should obtain the CRA if the project would have proceeded any further.

Finding Allegation #2:

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff and Dr. Keding Cheng in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Keding Cheng violated the following policies:

- Public Health Agency of Canada Intellectual Property Policy, Section 3.5 Collaborative Agreements states: When the PHAC and an external party such as a university, province, territory or other institution undertake collaborative research; they enter into a Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA) or related agreement; and

The Scientific Integrity Policy, section 7.6.1, states: the organization will encourage and facilitate domestic and international research or scientific collaborations and partnerships between its researchers and scientists and the external research and development communities in universities and colleges; provincial, territorial or indigenous governments; industry and business; and civil society.

While this Policy encourages collaborations, it does not do so at the risk of Intellectual Property. However, a mitigating factor exists as there is a lack of clarity as to exactly when a CRA is required during a collaboration and this is causing confusion among scientists.

Allegation #3: That Restricted Visitors under the Respondent's supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace:

In October 2018, there were two incidents involving RVs attempting to remove items from NML without proper approval. The two incidents are detailed below:

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On 12 October 2018 at 1741 hrs, a restricted visitor, approached the X-ray Commissaire and handed him two clear plastic sealed bags containing ten test tubes with green lids in each bag, indicating that the vials would be brought to the University of Manitoba Laboratory. Commissaire #2, CSCHAH, advised the visitor that he was not permitted to remove laboratory materials through the entry/exit area and must be taken to shipping and receiving. The RVs were accompanied by two other RVs and a visiting student with Secret with limitations clearance. The RVs returned the test tubes to the lab. The RVs were unescorted at the time of this incident. The DSO briefing for this incident is attached as Annex 4.e.; and

On 31 October 2018 at 1738 hrs, Dr. Keding Cheng and RV #2 approached the X-ray area carrying two empty Styrofoam containers. They were informed that laboratory materials were not permitted to leave the property through the entry/exit area and must be taken to shipping and receiving. Dr. Keding Cheng returned the empty containers to the recycling area, this is seen on video and as outlined in the DSO briefing for this incident is attached at Annex 4.e.

During an interview at 1115 hrs, February 14, 2019, RV #2 (RV) advised she recalls trying to remove a Styrofoam container from the NML on October 31, 2019 to store her clothes. Dr. Keding Cheng was with her and the container was empty but security informed her that she could not remove it, so Dr. Keding Cheng took it back. She had obtained the Styrofoam container from the recycling area;

During an interview with Dr. Keding Cheng, he stated he was with RV #2 when they retrieved the Styrofoam container from the recycling area within NML. He took the container back to the recycling area and received a warning from security. When advised that the security report and security footage confirmed there were two Styrofoam containers and not one, he was genuinely surprised and was insistent there was only one container. When advised it was prohibited to remove Styrofoam containers from NML, he remained insistent there was only one container, it came from the recycling area of NML, and he did not know of any policy prohibiting such removal;
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- During an interview with Dr. Keding Cheng at 0856 hrs, February 15, 2019 with regards to the removal of test tubes by unescorted RVs, he stated he did not know of students removing materials from the lab. In a subsequent interview on December 11, 2019 Dr. Keding Cheng stated he later learned the test tubes came from Dr. Xiangguo Qiu's lab and the RV had an urgent need for the test tubes at the University of Manitoba because they work almost every weekend. Dr. Keding Cheng stated that [REDACTED] who accompanied the RVs can sign RVs out. There is a list where a limited number of people can sign RVs in but anyone can sign RVs out; and

- Dr. Keding Cheng agrees that on the October 12, 2018, he signed RVs in and it was probably just by chance that he signed them out. He agrees that by signing the RVs into the lab, he assumes responsibility.

Finding Allegation #3

Given the totality of the information provided in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Keding Cheng violated the following policy:

- The XRAY SOP V6 is located on the Public Drive for everyone to read. Section 6.1 prohibits the removal of laboratory materials including empty Styrofoam containers through the reception area and they must be taken to shipping and receiving. Dr. Keding Cheng has a responsibility to read all applicable policies.

Allegation #4: That the Respondent failed to abide by security policies regarding Restricted Visitors:

Former Director, Security Operations CSCHAH

- During an interview with [REDACTED] on February 7, 2019, she stated the security culture at NML is affected by personalities combined with the historical lack of adherence to security practices. She advised that it is unlikely RVs are briefed on anything and someone other than the original host will sign out a RV, as there is no policy;
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During an interview with [REDACTED] on February 13, 2019, he stated that was aware RVs are not always properly escorted;

During an interview on February 14, 2019, [REDACTED] (RV) advised investigators that a few days earlier, he was with [REDACTED] (RV) unescorted looking for [REDACTED] to sign them out as people on the list that were able to sign them out of NML were not at the lab. He further stated that on January 27, 2019 that he had been left on his own in the lab unescorted; and

During an interview with Dr. Keding Cheng on February 15, 2019, he admitted to leaving RVs in the lab not being properly supervised/escorted; it is built on trust. He follows them everyday for months and then gives them freedom; it is a balance.

Finding Allegation #4

Given the totality of the information provided by PHAC staff, NML security (commissionaires), RVs and Dr. Keding Cheng in relation to this allegation, the investigators have found that Dr. Keding Cheng violated the following policy/directives/standards:

- PHAC Visiting Official Statement of Agreement, whereas the Responsible Authority, Dr. Keding Cheng did not ensure the visiting official shall be escorted at all times by HC/PHAC officials while on HC/PHAC premises contrary to para. 6(a);

- Dr. Keding Cheng violated the PHAC Physical Security Standard, Section 7.5.4 Visitor Access, which states it is the responsibility of the employee to ensure the visitor must be accompanied at all times by an authorized PHAC employee.

Discussion

On January 30, 2019, investigators were provided information by [REDACTED] on an incident that occurred in

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May, 2018 where a package was received at the CSCHAH labelled ("kitchen utensils") that actually contained vials of mouse protein addressed to Dr. Keding Cheng. While not a specific allegation, there were concerns raised as to how this situation unfolded.

- During an interview on February 12, 2019, advised a package was received labelled "kitchen utensils" at the lab. Safety and Environmental Services (SES) was contacted by shipping, and the package was seized and XRAY showed it contained vials with an unknown substance. The vials were subsequently tested and found to be mouse protein;

- Advised investigators that Dr. Keding Cheng was contacted and he said he was unaware it was coming. Stated it was not an unusual occurrence due to the fact that brokers will mislabel a package to make things easier. The sender wanted them back but they were seized. Dr. Keding Cheng was advised and received one on one training on shipping expectations;

- During an interview on February 15, 2019 Dr. Keding Cheng stated it was his first-time receiving materials from China. He informed the scientist (Individual 22) Chongqing Medical University) if she ever sent materials; there was a shipping process that must be followed. He did not know this was coming ("kitchen utensils"), it was addressed to him at the UoM. He knows Professor (Individual 22) through his (Dr. Keding Cheng's) publication and he contacted him. He was not collaborating with her then or now. She sent it out of the blue, he could not believe it. It wasn't infectious, it was a protein gel and the entire incident made him very angry;

- During a subsequent interview on December 11, 2019 Dr. Keding Cheng was further questioned on the incident regarding the kitchen utensils. He stated he met (Individual 22) while on vacation in China and has never collaborated with her; however, during his aforementioned vacation, she informed him she was starting a hepatitis study and Dr. Keding Cheng informed her that the lab at NML was also doing a similar study. They discussed a model where the protein might be changed and stated that Dr. Keding Cheng may be able to help her and he told her to...
National Security Management Division

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follow procedure if she sent him anything. sent him the package “out of the blue”. He told her it was bad and she had better send a letter to explain;

- On September 24, 2019 stated that trust was lost with Dr. Keding Cheng and that was why he was moved around between departments. When asked about the incident involving the shipment of “kitchen utensils” stated he believes the plan was to have them sent to the UoM and bring them into the NML. Dr. Keding Cheng, who has an adjunct professor appointment at the Department of Anatomy at UoM, informed that someone must have found his address online and sent him the package to his address at the UoM. The problem had with that explanation is the package labelled “kitchen utensils” was not sent to the Department of Anatomy and in publications and other locations; Keding always puts his address as his department in the UoM and NML; and

believes if a person was attempting to skirt the system; that is how you could do it. He suggested we look at the packaging address to see the issue. He believes Keding is capable of bending the rules; it was difficult to find a place for him to work in-synch with other individuals.

While this incident does not specifically fall within any specific allegation found within this report, investigators were asked to look into the matter and interviews were conducted to ascertain how this could occur. While it is without doubt that shipping and receiving at NML receive mislabeled packages frequently that are sent by brokers in such a manner to bypass stringent Canada Customs regulations, it does not negate the fact that there is a high probability that Dr. Keding Cheng was not being totally honest in his recollection of events.

Dr. Keding Cheng advised that he received the “kitchen utensils” out of the blue from but never mentioned the fact that Dr. Keding Cheng and had met while he was on vacation in China and discussed the fact that and the lab at NML were conducting similar experiments as he did when asked by investigators during this investigation.
Further, when his supervisor asked him about the "kitchen utensils", Dr. Keding Cheng informed him that someone must have found his address online and sent him the package to his address at the UoM.

Based on the balance of probabilities, given the differences in his explanations and based on the lack of trust that Dr. Keding Cheng's former supervisor had in him, it is likely that Dr. Keding Cheng was less than honest concerning the circumstances of this incident. Subsequently, it calls into question his honesty and integrity, which is a breach of PHAC Values and Ethics policy (Annex 3 bb refers) and the Scientific Integrity Policy (Annex 3 cc refers).
National Security Management Division
Public Health Agency of Canada - Agence de la santé publique du Canada

PREPARED BY:
Mike Amirault
Senior Security Consultant
Presidia Security Consulting

Date: 5 February 2020

REVIEWED BY:
Gilles Santerre
Principle
Presidia Security Consulting

Date: 5 February 2020

REVIEWED BY:
Departmental Security Officer,
Executive Director Security
Management Division, Ottawa

Date: 5 February 2020
National Security Management Division

Public Health Agency of Canada - Agence de la santé publique du Canada

ACCEPTED BY:

Chief Security Officer
Assistant Deputy Minister – Corporate Services Branch

Date Feb 5, 2020

Response from the Mandating Authority:

APPROVED BY:

☑ I concur with the findings
☐ I do not concur with the findings

Vice-President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch

Date Feb 6, 2020
Dear Dr. Qiu:

Re: Administrative Investigation Report

I am writing to invite you to meet with me regarding the findings of the Administrative Investigation that was initiated in relation to the following allegations:

1. That you failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of your scientific collaborations;
2. That you, or the Restricted Visitors under your supervision, inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons including, but not limited to, using personal computer accounts to share data and information, and by storing and sharing data using unauthorized USB keys;
3. That Restricted Visitors under your supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace;
4. That you failed to report security breaches;
5. That you acted in a manner that may have infringed on rights granted by the Crown to a third party under a license agreement; and
6. That you have been named in a patent outside of Canada without seeking prior approval.

You will find enclosed a copy of the Administrative Investigation Report. It has been reviewed by our Privacy Management Directorate to ensure that any information protected by the Privacy Act has been removed. Notwithstanding, these documents are confidential, contain personal information and are considered protected. As such, you have a duty to ensure that these documents remain confidential and that they are not disseminated or disclosed to others who are not entitled to the information (i.e. other than your union representative, legal counsel).

The findings of the Administrative Investigation, which I have accepted, are included within the report. Prior to management rendering a decision in regard to the implementation of any disciplinary, administrative and/or corrective measures related to the above-noted allegations, you are invited to present any clarifications or extenuating circumstances that you feel have not been addressed in the course of the investigation at a meeting that will be held on March 11, 2020 at 1:00 PM CST at the Public Health Agency of Canada's Regional Office located at 391 York Street, Winnipeg. During this meeting, you have the right to be accompanied by your union representative. I will be accompanied by [redacted] Labour Relations Advisor and will also be present on behalf of the Chief Security Officer (CSO) to take note of what you have to present.

Please note that your presence at this meeting is mandatory as the information you provide is integral in determining whether a disciplinary and/or administrative measure may be imposed at
a later date, up to and including termination of employment for disciplinary reasons and/or due to a revocation of your reliability status. Please come to the meeting fully prepared to discuss the facts you wish to present. Should you fail to attend this meeting without a valid reason, a decision will be made based on the information in our possession.

I understand the stressful nature of these circumstances. Please note that the Employee Assistance Program is available to assist you at any time. They can be reached at 1(800)268-7708.

Respectfully,

[REDACTED]
Vice President, Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada
Dr. Keding Cheng

Dear Dr. Cheng:

Re: Administrative Investigation Report

I am writing to invite you to meet with me regarding the findings of the Administrative Investigation that was initiated in relation to the following allegations:

1. That you, or the Restricted Visitors under your supervision, inappropriately disseminated, facilitated or authorized the dissemination of scientific data and other information to unauthorized persons, including, but not limited to, inappropriately sharing passwords, sharing login information, using personal computer accounts to send Government of Canada information, and storing and sharing data on USB keys;

2. That you failed to protect Government of Canada property and information in the course of your scientific collaborations;

3. That Restricted Visitors under your supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the workplace; and

4. That you failed to abide by security policies regarding Restricted Visitors.

You will find enclosed a copy of the Administrative Investigation Report. It has been reviewed by our Privacy Management Directorate to ensure that any information protected by the Privacy Act has been removed. Notwithstanding, these documents are confidential, contain personal information and are considered protected. As such, you have a duty to ensure that these documents remain confidential and that they are not disseminated or disclosed to others who are not entitled to the information (i.e. other than your union representative, legal counsel).

The findings of the Administrative Investigation, which I have accepted, are included within the report. Prior to management rendering a decision in regard to the implementation of any disciplinary, administrative and/or corrective measures related to the above-noted allegations, you are invited to present any clarifications or extenuating circumstances that you feel have not been addressed in the course of the investigation at a meeting that will be held on March 11, 2020 at 3:00 PM CST at the Public Health Agency of Canada's Regional Office located at 391 York Street, Winnipeg. During this meeting, you have the right to be accompanied by your union representative. I will be accompanied by [Name of person], Labour Relations Advisor, [Name of organization], and [Name of person], Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg. I will also be present on behalf of the Chief Security Officer (CSO) to take note of what you have to present.

Please note that your presence at this meeting is mandatory as the information you provide is integral in determining whether a disciplinary and/or administrative measure may be imposed at a later date, up to and including termination of employment for disciplinary reasons and/or due to a revocation of your reliability status. Please come to the meeting fully prepared to discuss the facts you wish to present. Should you fail to attend this meeting without a valid reason, a decision will be made based on the information in our possession.
I understand the stressful nature of these circumstances. Please note that the Employee Assistance Program is available to assist you at any time. They can be reached at 1(800)288-7708.

Respectfully,

[Vice President, Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Branch, Public Health Agency of Canada]
Executive Director, Security and Departmental Security Officer  
Public Health Agency of Canada  
51 Chardon Driveway, Tunney’s Pasture  
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0K9

RE:  *CSIS Act Security Assessment of Ms. Xiangguo QIU*

Dear [Name]

1. The following is further to a security screening investigation reopened for cause on June 10, 2019, for a security assessment in relation to a Secret clearance for Ms. Xiangguo QIU, born in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). *(P)*

2. In accordance with s.15 of the *CSIS Act*, the Service has performed a preliminary security screening investigation which included further investigations of Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) documentation and a subject interview. At this time, further investigative measures are ongoing and thus should the Service acquire any additional relevant information, an updated security assessment may be provided at a later date. *(S)*

3. Pursuant to s.13 of the *CSIS Act* and s.7, appendix D of the Standard on Security Screening (SSS) under the Policy on Government Security (PGS), the following information was uncovered regarding Ms. QIU’s reliability as it relates to loyalty because of her features of character. *(S)*

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*(U) Unclassified, *(P)* Protected B, *(P)/MUWS* Information in this paragraph may be used by officials of your agency for additional discussions with the subject. *(C)* Confidential, *(S)* Secret, *(S)/CEO* Secret/Canadian Eyes Only.
4. The information below relates to Ms. QIU’s ability to safeguard proprietary government information in relation to the execution of her research at the PHAC National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, MB². This is further to previous information provided by PHAC following an administrative investigation regarding the security practices of Ms. QIU and other individuals at the NML. (S)

Service Information

5. According to online information, Ms. QIU was listed as a co-author on an NML research paper which included other individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China. Online information states AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has offensive Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) capabilities. As per China’s key national research and development (R&D) priorities for 2017 – 2022, the PRC seeks to support national defence research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications. (S)

6. An e-mail chain provided by PHAC to the Service reveals that between December 13, 2017 and January 9, 2018, Ms. QIU advised an incoming Chinese research student to apply for a visitor visa as opposed to a work permit in order to enter Canada. Ms. QIU stated that it would take quite some time for the student to get a work permit and since the student would not be doing much in the laboratory it would be better to simply apply for a visitor visa. (S)

Security Screening Interview

7. On March 19, 2020, during Ms. QIU’s security screening interview with the Service, information was discussed at length regarding the security practices at the NML and her awareness surrounding such activities. Although Ms. QIU did appear emotionally affected by PHAC’s administrative investigation, she reiterated throughout that prior to this investigation she was unaware of the proper policies and procedures that needed to be followed when it comes to the security of PHAC information and materials. (P/MUWS)

8. Ms. QIU admitted to not having read the disclaimer that comes up when she signs into her work computers. Although stating this was her own fault, she added that she was not the

² Refer to the Globe and Mail article “Spy agency warns Canada’s COVID-19 researchers to look out for hacking threats” published on March 21, 2020 (https://www.infonews.gc.ca/ps-sp/en/2020-03-21/226625032). This article references the dangers of threat actors gaining access to key ongoing medical research and quotes Ms. QIU’s former colleague employed by the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) who she inherited various projects from at the NML.
only one to do this and that PHAC management should have trained her properly and enforced this if they thought it was so important. Ms. QIU also admitted that due to being so busy with her work, if they were not mandatory she would not read PHAC e-mails regarding Information Technology (IT) policies and procedures. Ms. QIU further described how when travelling, she would often access Web Office and her work e-mail account but sometimes copy or reply from her personal e-mail account as things would not always work correctly. In regards to her Adjunct Professorship at the University of Manitoba (UoM) and a possible conflict of interest with her work at PHAC, Ms. QIU stated that prior to the administrative investigation, nobody at UoM or PHAC made her aware that it was required to declare this. In terms of research students who are Restricted Visitors (RV) being left unsupervised at the NML, Ms. QIU explained that she did not know about the breaches until the administrative investigation and now understands the importance of why this should not have happened. When asked if within her laboratory, she has ever assigned someone to escort an RV that did not have the authority to do so, Ms. QIU responded, “No...my lab is quite a big lab... I tried to make sure, but again, things happen.”

(P//MUWS)

9. In response to the stress of PHAC’s administrative investigation, Ms. QIU stated, “Before I saw, was given, the documents...policy. I wasn’t aware, I never got the proper training. I always tried my best to follow the policy. I don’t think I made any terrible mistakes. I always tried to be a good employee and follow the policies and instructions as long as I was made aware. But I wasn’t aware, I wasn’t properly trained...for sure the mistakes they found on me, I’m not alone, for sure there’s a lot of people doing the same thing. To blame myself, I didn’t do anything.” (P//MUWS)

10. When the investigator explained that he knew from PHAC’s administrative report that Ms. QIU was aware that she needed to sign Collaborative Research Agreements (CRAs) and Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) for various research practices, Ms. QIU did not take responsibility for her security violations and instead blamed PHAC for not being clear as to what was required of her and when. Ms. QIU also explained that it was a time burden; “You want to maintain a good relationship with your collaborators. If for all your collaborations you do the paperwork first, PHAC is quite slow, is really really slow, and as are universities also. That’s why all of a sudden you don’t want to do the paperwork, keep this kind of paperwork...a lot of scientists, the reason you don’t want to do it, the reason is it’s too long. It’s not practical.”

(P//MUWS)

11. Ms. QIU then explained that often for small antibody shipments to and from the NML there was no paperwork and it was based on trust between collaborators, however supervisors were always made verbally aware of the details of these shipments. Ms. QIU does not think there needs to be paperwork completed for small amounts of material transfers, given that they “…can’t do anything bad. It’s only enough for you to do 1 or 2 or 3 experiments and then it’s
gone.” However, when questioned as to whether there were ever any collaborations or tests she had run with individuals outside of PHAC where she didn’t receive permission or get approval from her managers, Ms. QIU stated, “For the very informal collaborations…for some, I don’t have permission…for some, like that, I didn’t talk to the senior management. At the time, again, I didn’t know exactly when I should and I’m expected to do so because a lot of people doing these things similar to what I was doing.” When it was therefore stated by the interviewer that there were instances where the NML Director would not have known what she was working on or who she was working with, Ms. QIU responded, “Right, yeah. Possibly yeah…so basically if I think there’s something important or there’s potential, I would go to them to let them know how we are going to deal with this.” The investigator furthered “But not in every instance?” and Ms. QIU responded indicating that was correct. (P//MUWS)

12. Ms. QIU also discussed her job functions which deal with medical research regarding “fatal viruses” and was subsequently asked why she thinks she requires a security clearance for her job. She responded, “That’s a really good question.” Ms. QIU thinks it is to protect information but is just a job requirement to hold a Secret level clearance. Ms. QIU was asked by the interviewer what she would do if someone pressured her in order to gain sensitive information. Ms. QIU responded that she would say, “No” and would report the incident to her direct supervisor and Director, but added, “I don’t have access to any classified information.” (P//MUWS)

13. Ms. QIU stated that she really just does scientific work. When explained by the investigator that this work could be used for nefarious purposes such as biological weapons, Ms. QIU responded, “That’s true…I know that, I just didn’t make that connection.” She later stated that she’s never seen bad intentions and the research she does is just for treatments and actually cannot be used for bioweapons. She mentioned, however, that she would not collaborate with other researchers if she knew that they were going to try and use her work for these purposes. The investigator explained that even so, treatments could be patented and controlled for restrictive or other nefarious purposes and Ms. QIU responded, “It’s never crossed my mind to think this way…scientists just think about how to work hard to get more work done and to help save lives…we [scientists] help each other to advance science…”. Ms. QIU was asked if she thinks it is important to ensure that a collaborator has the same good intentions that she does before entering into a collaboration and how she would go about in ensuring this and she answered, “I never think this deep, just thinking more science and its benefit to humans, to the world…for this, I never thought a lot.” Ms. QIU stated that her collaborators were “probably doing the work to advance science for good…for the possibility to save lives. That’s all we think about as scientists.” (P//MUWS)

14. In regards to her loyalty to Canada, Ms. QIU stated that she considers herself Canadian but grew up in China and still has family there and therefore has a connection to it. However,
when the media refers to her as a “Chinese scientist” she does not feel good about it. When further questioned as to what she would do if she were approached by the Chinese government to conduct exclusive research for the betterment of Chinese people, Ms. QIU responded, “Well, it depends on what they asked me to do, it’s just like collaboration.” She explained that if the research would not have an effect on or damage Canada then she would say yes because collaboration is common practice.

When asked if she had ever pledged allegiance to anything other than when she became a Canadian citizen, Ms. QIU responded, “I think when I started working with PHAC NML, you need to do something like that, similar, I forgot…you say your work with Canada, something, I don’t remember, some sort of thing.” (P//MUWS)

15. Ms. QIU mentioned that she has never interacted with anybody she suspected of representing a foreign intelligence service. She took over a project from [REDACTED] at which point she became aware that one of her collaborators had associations to the Academy of Military Medical Science (AMMS). She has no more information on AMMS and any possible Chinese military connections. (P//MUWS)

16. When asked if she has ever counselled someone to commit immigration fraud, Ms. QIU simply responded, “No.” (P//MUWS)

Service Assessment

17. The Service does not have a reason to suggest that Ms. QIU would willingly cooperate with a foreign power knowing that harm would come to Canada. We do assess, however, that because of certain features of character – such as an overriding faith in the good intentions of other scientists, and a clear desire to avoid rules or procedures that could slow her down – that Ms. QIU is susceptible to influence by a foreign state that could result in information or materials leaving the laboratory that could harm national security or the health of individuals. (S)

18. An example of this vulnerability is Ms. QIU’s interview response to the hypothetical situation of conducting exclusive research for the betterment of all Chinese people on behalf of the Chinese government. It is possible, even likely, that Ms. QIU’s general impule to assist is based on a belief in the power of science to help humanity. But Ms. QIU’s extensive relationship with China, both personal and professional, combined with China’s clear track record of leveraging members of the Chinese diaspora to acquire intellectual property in order to advance national interests, makes Ms. QIU particularly vulnerable to influence should that relationship not be carefully understood and managed. (S)
19. When asked directly why she thought that a security clearance was required for her job, Ms. QIU responded in a way that indicates she does not truly appreciate or understand the high-level of information or materials she deals with and believes that holding a security clearance is simply an administrative requirement. It is clear that Ms. QIU loves her work and wants her research to benefit all humans. The Service assessments, however, that Ms. QIU does not truly grasp the importance of protecting sensitive information, whether classified or not, and may therefore put important Crown information and materials at risk. This is of particular concern given the sensitivity and danger of many of the materials present at the NML. (S)

20. Due to the administrative investigation performed by PHAC, it appears that Ms. QIU is now more conscious of the security-related policies and procedures required to be followed in the execution of her job functions at the NML. However, despite this awareness, the Service assesses that should Ms. QIU re-gain access to the NML, there is a strong possibility that she will continue to violate policies and procedures when they do not suit her immediate needs. She believes that she is not the only scientist who does not read or follow policies and procedures and that it is still PHAC’s fault that she was not made more aware of what was expected of her in this regard. Thus, the Service assesses that in the context of what Ms. QIU may deem as timely collaborative research, she may still give precedence to science over security. (S)

21. Through Ms. QIU’s collaborations with various scientists in Canada and abroad, the Service wishes to highlight the very real potential that PHAC proprietary and sensitive research conducted by Ms. QIU could end up being passed to foreign threat actors and used for nefarious purposes. Given the extremely high-level economic and public safety consequences of such a situation, it is therefore of utmost importance that security-related policies and procedures are strictly followed and thought be given as to the recipients of Ms. QIU’s research. During her interview, Ms. QIU repeatedly mentioned that she has never thought deeply about the possible bad uses of her research or the malicious intent of collaborators against Canada. This clear lack of consideration of the possible adverse connections of others and the highly dangerous consequences of her research ending up in the wrong hands is a serious vulnerability. (S)

22. The Service also notes that in her security interview Ms. QIU stated that she has never counselled someone to commit “immigration fraud”. An email chain was previously provided by PHAC, however, wherein Ms. QIU was observed advising a foreign research student to circumvent Canadian immigration laws in order to obtain a visa in a more timely fashion. While it is possible that Ms. QIU may not have thought of her advice as fraud, it is clear from this exchange that she was aware of the rules and, despite the student’s uncertainties, advised the student to disregard them. Ms. QIU chose not to expand on her answer despite being given the opportunity by the Service interviewer. This lack of respect for immigration rules, and her lack
of candour about it during the interview, may indicate that Ms. QIU was not fully truthful throughout her security screening interview on other topics. (S)

23. The Service’s preliminary assessment, therefore, is that should Ms. QIU be reinstated at the NML, because of her features of character, she may disclose, be induced to disclose or cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, classified information. (S)

24. In accordance with s.9, appendix D of the SSS, departments assign authority at an appropriate level to grant a security clearance. The authority to deny, revoke or suspend clearances rests with your deputy head or equivalent. However, the Service requests that you inform us of the final decision. Please complete the Notification of Security Clearance Form (Form 4195c; available at www.csis-sers.gc.ca) and return it to the mailing address provided (ATTN: Security Screening, Client Liaison). Should you wish to discuss this assessment, please contact Client Liaison at [REDACTED] to schedule a meeting. (C)

Yours sincerely,

Chief
Security Screening Branch
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ATTACHMENTS ARE SHARED WITH YOUR DEPARTMENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF YOUR ASSESSMENT AND MAY NOT BE RECLASSIFIED, DISCLOSED OR OTHERWISE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF CSIS. IF YOU LEARN THAT THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY DISCLOSED OR DISSEMINATED, OR IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ABIDE BY THE CAVEATS IN THIS DOCUMENT, INFORM CSIS IMMEDIATELY. CSIS OBJECTS TO THE DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION BEFORE A COURT, PERSON OR BODY WITH JURISDICTION TO COMPUL ITS PRODUCTION. CSIS MAY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS PURSUANT TO THE CANADA EVIDENCE ACT OR OTHER LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE INFORMATION FROM DISCLOSURE. AS SUCH, YOU MUST CONSULT CSIS IF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS ARE INITIATED, INCLUDING AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW. THIS DOCUMENT MAYconstitute a record that is subject to exemptions under the federal access to information act or privacy act, or applicable provincial or territorial legislation. If a request for access under these acts is
MADE, THE RECEIVING AGENCY MUST CONSULT CSIS IN RELATION TO APPLYING THE AVAILABLE EXEMPTIONS.
Executive Director, Security and Departmental Security Officer  
Public Health Agency of Canada  
51 Chardon Driveway, Tunney’s Pasture  
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0K9

RE: CSIS Act Security Assessment of Mr. Keding CHENG

Dear [Redacted],

1. The following is further to a security screening investigation reopened for cause on June 10, 2019, for a security assessment in relation to a Secret clearance for Mr. Keding CHENG, born [Redacted] People’s Republic of China (PRC). (P)

2. In accordance with s.15 of the CSIS Act, the Service has performed a preliminary security screening investigation which included a review of Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) documentation and a subject interview. At this time, further investigative measures are ongoing and thus should the Service acquire any additional relevant information, an updated security assessment may be provided at a later date. (S)

3. Pursuant to s.13 of the CSIS Act and s.7, appendix D of the Standard on Security Screening (SSS) under the Policy on Government Security (PGS), the following information was uncovered regarding Mr. CHENG’s reliability as it relates to loyalty because of his features of character. (S)

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1(U) Unclassified, (P) Protected B, (P/MUWS) Information in this paragraph may be used by officials of your agency for additional discussions with the subject, (C) Confidential, (S) Secret, (S/CEO) Secret/Canadian Eyes Only.
4. The information below relates to Mr. CHENG’s ability to safeguard proprietary government information in relation to the execution of his duties at the PHAC National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, MB\(^2\). This is further to previous information provided by PHAC following an administrative investigation regarding the security practices of Mr. CHENG and other individuals at the NML. (S)

**Service Information**

5. According to online information, Mr. CHENG was listed as a co-author on an NML research paper which included other individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China. Online information states AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has offensive Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) capabilities. As per China’s key national research and development (R&D) priorities for 2017 – 2022, the PRC seeks to support national defence research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications. (S)

6. An e-mail chain provided by PHAC to the Service reveals that on January 8, 2018, Mr. CHENG’s wife, Ms. Qiu, sought his concurrence on advising an incoming Chinese research student to apply for a visitor visa as opposed to a work permit in order to enter Canada. Ms. Qiu had previously mentioned to the student that it would take quite some time for them to get a work permit and since they would not be doing much in the laboratory it would be better to simply apply for a visitor visa. (S)

**Security Screening Interview**

7. On March 20, 2020, during Mr. CHENG’s security screening interview with the Service, information was discussed at length regarding the security practices at the NML and his awareness surrounding such activities. (P//MUWS)

8. Mr. CHENG explained in detail his involvement in various security breaches at the NML previously reported in PHAC’s administrative investigation. Mr. CHENG thought that the circumstances surrounding two (2) incidents, in which Restricted Visitors (RVs) attempted to remove Government of Canada (GoC) property from the laboratory, were misjudged by PHAC. Mr. CHENG also described an incident in which a shipment of biological samples from China,

\(^2\) Refer to the Globe and Mail article “Spy agency warns Canada’s COVID-19 researchers to look out for hacking threats” published on March 21, 2020 (https://www.infomedia.gc.ca/ps-asp/en/2020/03/21/226625032). This article references the dangers of threat actors gaining access to key ongoing medical research.
addressed to him at the University of Manitoba (UoM) and labeled as “kitchen utensils”, was received at the NML. He explained that he had visited a foreign researcher while in China and agreed to collaborate with her on a project but stated that all of the rules regarding shipping and Collaborative Research Agreements (CRAs) would need to be followed. Mr. CHENG did not make anyone at the NML aware of this collaboration because at the time he thought it was just “random talk” between the researcher and himself. Mr. CHENG believes the materials shipped were low-risk biological materials and it was the Chinese shipping broker who purposely labelled them incorrectly in order to bypass rules and paperwork. Mr. CHENG did not think it was fair that PHAC included this incident in the administrative investigation as it could have been resolved by open communication. (P//MUWS)

9. Mr. CHENG stated that RVs only have access to Level 2 [i.e. general] laboratories and must be escorted at all times. Despite this awareness, Mr. CHENG admitted to having left RVs alone at times to do data processing on the electronic “science network”. Mr. CHENG would log into this network using his credentials and then allow RVs to sign into their personal Gmail accounts. When leaving RVs unescorted, he would tell them, “Look, stay here, do your work, I’ll be right back. Don’t go anywhere.” The interviewer asked Mr. CHENG what made him leave RVs unescorted, despite knowing the rules. Mr. CHENG responded, “I trust them; they already have a security check…they are very honest, they never make trouble.” Mr. CHENG furthered, “They follow the rules very well. The first day they come to NML, I told them clearly…don’t make trouble by yourself. Safety #1…you see the kind of rule you don’t have internet access, I don’t think this is a good rule. But I try to make them safe by logging in by myself…make sure they are safe, they do good work, that’s it.” Mr. CHENG explained that when RVs come to the NML, they meet with PHAC security, fill out the appropriate security screening forms, get trained and then are supervised by him for several months to make sure they are okay. Mr. CHENG reiterated that he knows there is proprietary PHAC data on the scientific network but that he explicitly states to RVs, “You process the data, you do not own the data. Anything we obtain here belongs to Public Health Agency of Canada.” (P//MUWS)

10. Mr. CHENG feels that sometimes there is a conflict between productivity, security and safety. He thinks that the repetitive work RVs perform does not require constant supervision and doing so hinders his own productivity. According to Mr. CHENG, the policies at the NML limit productivity and the restrictions on RVs are “too tough”. He stated, “She’s [an RV] doing the work all day. Should I stay with her all the day? There’s no point. She just keeps doing same program. She just finishes and then writes down the results. I know she’s doing exactly the same thing the whole day. Should I stay with her? You are affecting my productivity…if I stay with her all time. So you have to judge by the situation.” When asked directly if he reported to his supervisor every instance that an RV was left alone, Mr. CHENG responded, “No. We don’t have the procedure. But I think nothing happened, I trust the visitor, they did good job.” Mr.
CHENG mentioned, “I did not think I did anything big wrong. It’s just I’m too open. I’m too, like, passionate.” (P/MUWS)

11. It was explained to Mr. CHENG that RVs could potentially be pressured or influenced by foreign actors to obtain and remove PHAC proprietary information, materials and data. Mr. CHENG responded, “Exactly, I totally realize this, that’s why at the beginning I won’t let them do anything by themselves. After I felt fully confident that they can do the work, they are trustworthy, then I can, I don’t mind... I can relax. But until that, I still closely watching them, but they never made trouble.” When referring to his research data, Mr. CHENG stated, “It’s nothing secret, it’s just scientific research.” He did ultimately explain that he knows his data is GoC proprietary information and despite his feelings, Mr. CHENG repeatedly stated that he now understands that RVs must be supervised at all times and he will follow the security-related rules from now on. (P/MUWS)

12. At another job he later held at the NML, Mr. CHENG felt like his laboratory did not receive proper credit for its work. He stated, “It’s very sad... I feel like what happened here? But in my heart, I feel very proud because it’s real Canadian test... I improved the method... so I was very proud of that, but you know, who cares?” Furthermore, after Mr. CHENG’s wife, Ms. Qiu, became famous for her scientific research, Mr. CHENG felt his colleagues at PHAC tried to block his progress by putting up barriers and refusing him learning opportunities. He felt his career was limited and it took him approximately one year to adjust to this situation. Mr. CHENG explained that despite being bullied in the workplace, ultimately PHAC helped him switch jobs and it was a great place for him and Ms. Qiu to work. Mr. CHENG noted, “I survived. Why? Science is there. I did good work, I feel proud as a Canadian... I’ve been bullied, I’ve been wrongly accused, I’ve been probably kind of stabbed in my back, but I keep going because I trust the government.” (P/MUWS)

13. Although he was born in China and lived there for many years, Mr. CHENG stated that he is very proud to be a Canadian. When asked if his current situation at PHAC has affected his feelings toward Canada or the Canadian government, Mr. CHENG responded that he feels disappointed in the media for spreading misinformation. He
stated, “If you read the National Post regarding our story… a lot of Canadians they still think we are Chinese. If you read the comments from National Post, I was so frustrated. We are real Canadians, for many years and then some people even say, hey, although they are Canadians, they are still Chinese… I feel kind of sad.”

14. When questioned if he has ever been asked for a favour by a foreign government official, Mr. CHENG responded, “No, I have no connection with foreign officials. I’m just a biologist.” Mr. CHENG stated that he does not know anybody connected to the Chinese military or affiliated research institutes connected to the Chinese military or PRC intelligence or police services. (P//MUWS)

15. When asked if he has ever counselled someone to commit immigration fraud or if any of his students have ever asked him how to circumvent immigration into Canada, Mr. CHENG responded in the negative. (P//MUWS)

Service Assessment

16. The Service does not have a reason to suggest that Mr. CHENG would willingly cooperate with a foreign power acting against the interests of Canada. We do assess, however, that because of certain features of character – such as an overriding faith in the good intentions of foreign researchers, a clear desire to avoid rules that could hinder his productivity, and feelings of sadness and resentment regarding past negative workplace experiences – that Mr. CHENG is susceptible to influence by a foreign state that could result in information or materials leaving the laboratory that could harm national security or the health of individuals. (S)

17. Due to the administrative investigation performed by PHAC, it appears that Mr. CHENG is now more aware of the seriousness of not following security practices in the execution of his job functions at the NML. However, despite this awareness, the Service assesses that should Mr. CHENG re-gain access to the NML, there is a strong possibility that he will continue to violate policies and procedures when they limit his productivity. In terms of escorting and supervising RVs at all times, Mr. CHENG still does not appear to completely agree with existing PHAC rules and may continue to place a higher trust in RVs than in security policies and procedures. Furthermore, we assess that Mr. CHENG may still grant RVs electronic access to the scientific network on his login credentials in order to complete basic tasks that he feels do not require strict supervision. This may lead to potential unauthorized access and/or sharing of PHAC proprietary information. (S)
18. Because of Mr. CHENG's collaborations with various scientists in Canada and abroad, the Service wishes to highlight the very real potential that PHAC proprietary and sensitive research conducted by the NML could end up being passed to foreign threat actors and used for nefarious purposes. Given the extremely high-level economic and public safety consequences of such a situation, it is therefore of upmost importance that security-related policies and procedures are strictly followed and thought be given as to the recipients of NML research. (S)

19. Mr. CHENG's description of past negative experiences with various colleagues at PHAC also presents a concern that he may harbour resentment towards the agency. Though he stated that as a whole he deems PHAC to be a great place to work and it is simply certain individuals who have caused him strife, it is apparent that Mr. CHENG still feels sadness regarding the way he was treated at times in the workplace. Research strongly suggests that persistent feelings of job stagnation or strong resentment towards one's superiors make an employee more susceptible to influence by threat actors, even unwittingly. We assess that Mr. CHENG's long-standing unhappiness and frustration at work, combined with his access to sensitive materials and reticence in respecting workplace rules, are vulnerabilities that make him a useful target for foreign intelligence agencies. (S)

20. The Service also notes that in his security interview Mr. CHENG stated that he has never counselled someone to commit "immigration fraud". PHAC previously provided an email chain, however, in which Mr. CHENG's wife, Ms. Qiu, was observed asking Mr. CHENG if advising a foreign research student to circumvent Canadian immigration laws in order to obtain a visa in a more timely fashion was acceptable. Though Mr. CHENG's response was not provided, it is very possible that he may have advised Ms. Qiu it was alright to do so. While it is possible that Mr. CHENG may have not have thought of this situation as an instance of potential fraud, he chose not to expand on his answer despite being given the opportunity by the Service interviewer. This lack of candour during the interview may indicate that Mr. CHENG was not fully truthful throughout his security screening interview on other topics. (S)

21. The Service's preliminary assessment, therefore, is that should Mr. CHENG be reinstated at the NML, because of his features of character, he may disclose, be induced to disclose or cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, classified information. (S)

22. In accordance with s.9, appendix D of the SSS, departments assign authority at an appropriate level to grant a security clearance. The authority to deny, revoke or suspend clearances rests with your deputy head or equivalent. However, the Service requests that you inform us of the final decision. Please complete the Notification of Security Clearance Form (Form 4195e; available at www.csis-scrs.gc.ca) and return it to the mailing address provided
(ATTN: Security Screening, Client Liaison). Should you wish to discuss this assessment, please contact Client Liaison at [redacted] to schedule a meeting. (C)

Yours sincerely,

Chief
Security Screening Branch
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

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SECRET/CEO

June 30, 2020

SSRN: 650083691
Your File: 094312

Executive Director, Security and Departmental Security Officer
Public Health Agency of Canada
51 Chardon Driveway, Tunney’s Pasture
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0K9

RE: CSIS Act Security Assessment of Ms. Xiangguo QIU

Dear [Name]

1. The following is further to a security screening investigation reopened for cause on June 10, 2019, for a security assessment in relation to a Secret clearance for Ms. Xiangguo QIU, born [DOB] People’s Republic of China (PRC). (P)

2. In accordance with s.15 of the CSIS Act, the Service has performed a security screening investigation which included [Redacted], a review of Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) documentation, [Redacted] and further investigation including two subject interviews. Further to the Service’s preliminary security assessment which was provided to you on April 9, 2020, this updated security assessment contains newly discovered information since that time. (S)

3. Pursuant to s.13 of the CSIS Act and s.7, appendix D of the Standard on Security Screening (SSS) under the Policy on Government Security (PGS), the following information was uncovered which strongly calls into question Ms. QIU’s loyalty to Canada and her reliability as it relates to loyalty. (S)

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1(U) Unclassified, (P) Protected B, (P/MUWS) Information in this paragraph may be used by officials of your agency for additional discussions with the subject. (C) Confidential, (S) Secret, (S/CEO) Secret/Canadian Eyes Only.
4. Overall, the information below relates to Ms. QIU’s close and clandestine relationships with a variety of entities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is a known security threat to Canada; Ms. QIU’s complete lack of candour regarding her relationship with those institutions; and her reckless judgement regarding decisions that could have impacted public safety and the interests of Canada. (S)

Service Information

PRC Talent Programs & Associated Entities

5. Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU was associated to multiple “talent programs” administered and funded by various PRC entities. Service information reveals that these programs aim to boost China’s national technological capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property (IP). (S)

6. Service information indicates that the most prominent PRC talent recruitment program is the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP). Its goal is to recruit ethnic Chinese experts from Western universities, research centers and private companies to boost China’s national capabilities in science and technology and to move China forward as an “innovative” nation. According to open source information, the TTP, along with other national level talent programs, were subsumed by the “National High-end Foreign Experts Recruitment Plan” (NHFERP) in 2019. The primary purpose of the NHFERP is to “serve major national [PRC] strategic needs”, with specific attention on gaining foreign scientist support in “cultivating and developing strategic emerging industries”. Guidance from the PRC’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) indicates that the plan’s goals are to recruit foreign experts who undertake cutting-edge research, and those who have the potential to achieve major breakthroughs in key and core technological fields. Biotechnology research and development is specifically noted in the NHFERP as an area which needs to be strengthened. The PRC’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016 – 2020) commits to the implementation of its Made in China 2025 (MC2025) action plan, which identifies biotechnology as a strategic priority area for innovation and development. Specifically, the MC2025 plan commits China to “develop new medical products using chemicals and biotechnology to address critical diseases, including antibody drugs, antibody coupling drugs, new structural proteins, polypeptide drugs, and new vaccines”. (C//CEO)
Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU presented at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) on March 31, 2017. On WIV’s official website online, each of the presenters have their own pages with pictures that correspond to the document and the dates of the presentation. No such page exists for Ms. QIU’s presentation. According to information available to the Service, Ms. QIU was approved by PHAC for travel to Beijing between March 24, 2017 and April 8, 2017 to present at the 1st International Symposium of Joint Prevention & Control of Imported Zoonotic Diseases. The Service is not aware of any PHAC-approved travel for Ms. QIU to Wuhan during this period. (S)

Application Form for the State “Thousand Talent” Project (Talent for short term innovative project- Key laboratory)

8. Ms. QIU was officially approved by PHAC to travel between September 20 and October 1, 2017 to provide training at WIV. Ms. QIU’s application for the TTP was discussed with WIV employees senior scientist, and senior technician, during this period. Service investigation reveals that the institute [WIV]’s leaders believe Ms. QIU’s application to the TTP is “very important for our institute [WIV]’s future development”. (S)

9. Service information states that in addition to generous PRC program benefits, TTP participants are not required to reside in China full-time or give up their employment at non-PRC institutions; this facilitates dual income for researchers and ongoing access for China. According to open source information, one category of the TTP is the “Innovative Talents (Short Term)” program, which targets scientists returning or coming to the PRC for at least two months every year and for at least three consecutive years with stable employers and clear work objectives.
Service investigation has uncovered a TTP Application that declares Ms. QIU as the applicant and WIV as the declaring entity. The TTP Application also states that “Professor QIU’s work term in our institute [WIV] is from 2019 03 to 2022 03. She will work for the Wuhan Virology Institute for at least two months every year”. (S/CEO)

10. According to open sources, applications for the TTP are submitted by the host institution rather than the candidate. Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU began the TTP Application process in the beginning in October 2017.

Between October 2017 and January 2018, when the application was submitted to WIV’s Human Resources (HR) department, Ms. QIU collaborated on the application with [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)]
11. According to Service information, TTP participants are given up to 5,000,000 RMB (approximately $1,000,000 CAD) in research subsidies. Participants may also enjoy preferential PRC tax and visa treatment, housing subsidies, and prioritized medical care in China.

In relation to the above-noted TTP application, Service investigation reveals that during the employment period, WIV agrees to provide science and research start-up funding of no less than “1,500,000”, and an annual salary of no less than “200,000” (currencies not indicated). This agreement also indicates that the candidate must carry out work pertaining to the laboratory and team building, agreeing that all ownership of scientific research results obtained by the candidate belong to WIV while conducting research at its laboratory.

(//CEO)

12. According to Service information, the PRC also has similar provincial and municipal level talent programs for recruiting overseas talents within their jurisdictions. Ms. QIU was involved in preparing applications for other PRC talent programs and related plans with various PRC entities including the CAS Kunming Institute of Zoology (KIZ) and Hebei Medical University (HBU). (S)

**CAS 2019 Annual International Talent Plan / President’s International Fellowship Initiative**

13. Service investigation reveals that the Director of the BSL-3 lab at KIZ told Ms. QIU in an email that she should apply for the “2019 Annual International Talent Program” / “Chinese Academy of Sciences President’s International Fellowship Initiative” (CAS ITP). Specifically, it was stated that Ms. QIU should apply for the “Outstanding International Scholar” category. Information regarding this category indicates that the funding period is one to two weeks and that the funding standard is 50,000 RMB per week (approximately $10,000 CAD).

Ms. QIU sent an email with her CV, passport, an abstract and a partly filled out CAS ITP Application to an employee at KIZ to
complete on her behalf. In Ms. QIU’s CAS ITP Application, it was indicated that Ms. QIU would visit KIZ in April 2019. Her daily schedule of specialist activities would include “activities of actual academic exchanges, consultations, research guidance, exploration of talent fostering, and partnership of scientific research”, as well as training. (S)

**Hebei Medical University High Caliber Talent Bringing-in Agreement**

14. Service investigation has revealed the existence of an employment agreement, ultimately unfinalized at the time, between Hebei Medical University (HBU) and Ms. QIU for work between July 2018 and June 2022. Ms. QIU would be expected to work onsite at HBU for two months per year and continue to lead the work of the task group members when offsite.

This HBU Agreement stipulates that Ms. QIU would receive compensation, funding, and accommodation in the PRC, for assisting HBU in managing and developing their lab, building a team, and conducting innovative scientific research. Ms. QIU would be provided with funding of 6,000,000 RMB (approximately $1,200,000 CAD) for science and research. Ms. QIU’s compensation would be 75,000 RMB/month (approximately $15,000 CAD/month) based on actual months worked at HBU’s laboratory, and an additional 150,000 RMB/year (approximately $30,000 CAD/year) for leading laboratory operations when offsite. (S)

**Activities with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)**

15. Service investigation reveals that as part of her enrolment in the TTP with WIV, Ms. QIU committed to various work arrangements\(^2\) including but not limited to building the PRC’s “biosecurity platform for new and potent infectious disease research... in order to reach the top level domestically [within China] and achieve leading status internationally in the area of BSL4 virus research”. Ms. QIU is referred to by WIV as “the only highly experienced Chinese expert available internationally, who is still fighting on the front lines in a P4 laboratory”. The TTP Application specifies that all results and intellectual property generated from the TTP contract would belong to the “Declaring Entity” [WIV]. Other options to select were “My Current Employer” [NML – PHAC] or “Myself” [Xiangguo Qiu]. (S)

16. The TTP application further specifies that Ms. QIU will provide biosecurity training classes to WIV one or two times per year in order to help perfect WIV’s BSL-4 operating procedures. Separately, Service investigation reveals that in July 2018, Ms. QIU received an invitation from WIV to

2 “work arrangements” referred to are assessed to be deliverables under the TTP.
present for approximately thirty individuals at a biosafety workshop in October 2018, at WIV’s expense. Ms. QIU accepted, however according to travel expenses reported to PHAC, this workshop was not reported amongst other conferences that Ms. QIU did report attending in the PRC, such as the 8th International Symposium on Emerging Viral Disease in Wuhan. The Service is not aware of PHAC being informed of this workshop by Ms. QIU. Following the dates of this workshop in October 2018, and WIV Director began inquiring into materials to procure in order to build up WIV laboratories’ biosecurity, to which Ms. QIU, amongst others, provided advice. Ms. QIU also accepted an invitation from WIV employees, including to become a member of the “International Advisory Committee for Wuhan P4 Laboratory” Ms. QIU was previously invited to act as a member of this committee in September 2018. (S)

17. Another stated work arrangement is that Ms. QIU “…will build a team to start a series of research topics using China’s disease source as advantage…” and that WIV “…will provide sufficient scientific, research, and office conditions, which includes research expenses, instruments and equipment, research assistants, etc. to guarantee the normal operation of [Ms. QIU’s] scientific and research work”. Service information reveals that was hired by PHAC, via the University of Manitoba (UoM), in February 2018, to work under Ms. QIU as a visiting researcher. According to may have been the first researcher from the PRC to come to Canada that Ms. QIU directly facilitated herself. In discussions in 2017 with and other WIV employees regarding Ms. QIU’s TTP application, asked a WIV HR representative when an appropriate time to complete the first draft of Ms. QIU’s TTP Application would be so he could prepare for his work arrangements. The WIV HR representative responded “…by December” applied for and received a Secret security clearance in December 2017. Service investigation reveals that continued to be involved in Ms. QIU’s WIV TTP application as of late January 2018. Identified that the document was ready subject to signature. According to PHAC’s administrative report as part of their previous administrative investigation into Ms. QIU’s activities, reportedly tried to remove vials from the NML without authorization on October 12, 2018. (S)
18. Service investigation reveals that under the section of the TTP Application titled “Reasons for recommendation (necessity for bringing in the applicant and his/her substantive contribution, etc.)”, WIV indicates that “[Ms. QIU] joining us will significantly improve our research and management levels in the areas of potent infectious diseases and biosecurity, it’s beneficial for our strengthening of international cooperation, and importing the P4 virus research resources from abroad”. This statement follows another by WIV indicating that “there have been huge obstacles in importing the resources and research personnel related to the P4 laboratories”. From June – July 2018 via e-mail, Ms. QIU discussed with WIV employees, including Vice-Director / Senior Scientist, WIV (Individual 1) CC’d, the shipping of EBOV and NiV (likely “Ebola virus” and “Nipah virus”), BSL-4 pathogens, from the NML to WIV. In some e-mails, Ms. QIU writes that a formal agreement between PHAC and WIV to authorize the transfer is not necessary as “no one owns the IP” and “hope there is another way around”. On October 18, 2018, a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) was provided by WIV regarding Ebola and Henipah viruses amongst others. Ms. QIU travelled to Wuhan / WIV on October 19, 2018, the day after receiving the MTA. PHAC appears to have approved this shipment on November 2, 2018 with the pathogens then being sent on March 31, 2019. A Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) article published in open sources on June 14, 2020 revealed that based on information obtained via an ATIP request, this shipment to WIV contained fifteen virus strains. (S)

19. Service investigation reveals an application form, from June 2018, was signed by Ms. QIU for a “Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Advanced Customer Cultivation Project” with WIV (herein referred to as “WIV Project 1”). This project aims to “cultivate national high-level biosafety talents, to output significant scientific and technological breakthroughs and achievements, and to promote the scientific and technological support capabilities for biosafety and public health”.

8 of 23
Ms. QIU and [Redacted] as working on mRNA vaccine construction. WIV Project 1 included a budget of 1,500,000 RMB (approximately $300,000 CAD) and was to take place from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2021. One objective of this project was to establish mouse-adapted and guinea pig-adapted Ebola viruses (EBOV), with the aim of rescuing both adapted viruses through reverse genetics for study / production of mRNA vaccines. Another objective of WIV Project 1 was to help WIV set up procedures and protocols for animal research activities. Under the application’s section of “Review opinions of applicant’s organization”, it states:

VIII. Review opinions of applicant’s organization

We are in the process of applying for the official permit to transfer BSL-4 pathogens from Canada to China. To avoid confusing the leaders, it’s better not to let National Microbiology Laboratory know about this project. And since there will be no budget transfer for China to Canada, it’s not so necessary to have the opinion from National Microbiology Laboratory.
Of the fifteen viruses mentioned in the CBC article published in open sources on June 14, 2020, at least five virus strains from the March 31, 2019 BSL-4 pathogen shipment from the NML to WIV were referenced in WIV Project 1. According to information available to the Service, PHAC was not aware of this project. The desire on the part of WIV Project 1 members to keep this project secret from the NML suggests that the PHAC-approved transfer of BSL-4 pathogens to WIV contained strains that – unbeknownst to PHAC and the NML – were to be used in WIV Project 1. (S)

20. [Redacted], another expected outcome of WIV Project 1 was to publish four to six high impact peer review articles. In January 2019, Ms. QIU accepted an invitation by [Redacted] to become an Editorial Board member of *Virologica Sinica*, the official journal of the *Chinese Society for Microbiology*. Ms. QIU had previously submitted an article to this journal in 2017 and upon publication, it became copyright property of WIV. (S)

21. [Redacted], in the spring of 2019, Ms. QIU, [Redacted] and other WIV employees were approved by a Chinese evaluation committee to conduct a “CAS High-end User Nurturing Project” at WIV (herein referred to as “WIV Project 2”). Ms. QIU was listed as being in charge of “Overall Planning”, with [Redacted] handling “Project Design” and [Redacted] performing “Animal Infection”. WIV Project 2 included a budget of 250,000 RMB/year (approximately $50,000 CAD) and was to take place from June 2019 to May 2021. [Redacted] planned to use reverse genetics in order to create synthetic virus strains. This was to assess cross-species infection and pathogenic risks of bat filoviruses for future vaccine development purposes, which suggests that gain-of-function (GOF) studies were possibly to take place. According to open sources, GOF studies are comprised of research conducted to improve the ability of a pathogen to cause disease in order to help define the fundamental nature of human-pathogen interactions. These studies contain various biosafety and biosecurity risks, and the US government paused funding on GOF research with potential pandemic pathogens in 2014. In 2015, [Redacted] was involved in GOF experiments with US researchers as part of a study that created a hybrid version of a bat coronavirus; one related to the virus that caused Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which could jump directly from bats to humans. The international scientific community raised concerns as to whether or not it should allow laboratory research that increased the virulence, ease of spread or host range of dangerous pathogens. Some scientists disapproved of the study, noting that it was a “new, non-natural risk” and “provided little benefit and reveals little about the risk that the wild virus in bats poses to humans”. However, this study was allowed to continue, under review, by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). (S)
PRC Military Associations

22. Open sources state that as per China’s key national research and development (R&D) priorities for 2017 – 2022, the PRC seeks to support national defence research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications. Ms. QIU was listed online as a co-author on an NML research paper which included other individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China. AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC and is comprised of eighteen units, eleven of which are specialized research institutes responsible for the health service tasks of the PLA. These tasks include the development of military biotechnologies, biological counter-terrorism and the prevention and control of major diseases.

23. Under the “Employer’s Opinion” section of her TTP Application, it states that “[Ms. QIU] is very eager to promote the development of biosecurity industry in our country [PRC]. She has deep cooperation relations with the Academy of Military Medical Sciences”. It also states that Ms. QIU has been a visiting professor at the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB) of AMMS since April 2016.

24. Service investigation reveals that on CVs destined for Chinese audiences, Ms. QIU listed the following employment experiences among her credentials:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Research Scientist</td>
<td>Wuhan Institute of Virology</td>
<td>October 2018</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Professor</td>
<td>Hebei Medical University</td>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Research Fellow</td>
<td>National Institutes for Food and Drug Control (China)</td>
<td>January 2017</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Professor</td>
<td>Beijing Institute of Biotechnology</td>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Service has noted that the above-referenced PRC-based employment experiences have been omitted on Ms. QIU’s CVs that were destined for Canadian audiences, such as the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and in her 2018 and 2019 application for promotion at PHAC.
25. **Service investigation reveals that** when providing edits on a research paper by one of her visiting students from the PRC, Microsoft User “Xiangguo Qiu” highlighted “Institute of Military Veterinary, Academy of Military Medical Sciences” and made the comment, “Can you take off this affiliation?” on June 20, 2019. The version of this paper submitted to the scientific journal *Viruses* on June 24, 2019 did not include a reference to AMMS. (S)

26. **Service investigation reveals that** Ms. QIU was nominated for an “international cooperation award” circa 2016 by [Restrictive](#) from AMMS. In regards to Ms. QIU’s collaborations highlighted in this nomination, it is stated that she “…cooperated in a timely manner with experts from AMMS” including [Restrictive](#) and experts from other organizations such as [Restrictive](#) from the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The nomination also indicates that Ms. QIU “…used Canada’s Level 4 Biosafety Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens…and achieved brilliant results”. This included a 2013 visit wherein [Restrictive](#) and his team came to the NML, after which Ms. QIU “…consulted with the leaders and experts of both China and Canada on matters related to cooperation, and provided the Chinese side with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of convenience for China”. Service information indicates that Ms. QIU is also known as [Restrictive](#). (S)

27. **Service investigation** indicates additional collaborators mentioned in this “international cooperation award” nomination as individuals from Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Inc. [Restrictive](#) **Service investigation reveals** an airline ticket receipt for Ms. QIU, for travel to Beijing in April 2018, booked by an e-mail address associated to CanSino Biotechnology Inc.
28. **Chief of AMMS Research Institute (Chief 1)** is pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform and is noted as a Chief at an AMMS research institute. This research institute is engaged in military medicine, clinical medicine and biological high technology.

29. **Major General, PLA / Top Virologist, AMMS (Chief 2)** is pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform, is a Major General, is noted as the top virologist at AMMS and is China's chief biological weapons defense expert engaged in research related to biosafety, bio-defence and bio-terrorism.

30. **Major General, PLA / Top Virologist, AMMS (Chief 2)**

31. **Service investigation reveals that CAS works closely with the PLA to acquire Western technologies.** Service investigation reveals that **Ms. QIU and [REDACTED] have worked together on multiple research projects and papers since 2012. (S//CEO, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) / Chinese CDC (Individual 17))**

**Service investigation reveals that a post-doctoral student of Ms. QIU at the University of Manitoba (UoM) working with CHENG Keding, is a research assistant at AMMS' Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB). According to open sources, the BIB is a research institute engaged in the study of biological high technology in the PLA.**

**Service investigation reveals that [REDACTED] was brought to UoM as a visiting scientist by Ms. QIU on a scholarship reportedly paid through the Chinese embassy in Canada.**

**Service information indicates that [REDACTED] holds a**
Chinese Public Affairs passport. Service information also reveals that [Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH] indicated her residence as being [Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH] which is Ms. QIU and CHENG Keding’s second property. Open sources depict PLA attire and indicate her mentor as being [Major General, PLA / Top Virologist at AMMS, BIB (Chief 2)] conducting laboratory work in Security Screening Interviews

Interview 1

32. Ms. QIU was previously interviewed by the Service on March 19, 2020 in relation to her Secret clearance (herein referred to as “Interview 1”). As noted in our initial security assessment, during this interview Ms. QIU discussed matters related to security practices at the NML, knowledge of PRC military and intelligence associates, scientific collaboration with foreign researchers and her own loyalty to Canada vs. China. (P//MUWS)

33. In relation to security practices at the NML, during Interview 1, Ms. QIU did not take responsibility for her security violations and instead blamed PHAC for not being clear as to what was required of her and when. She stated, “I never got the proper training... I always tried my best to follow the policy. I don’t think I made any terrible mistakes... for sure the mistakes they found on me, I’m not alone...to blame myself, I didn’t do anything.” As a scientist who works with “fatal viruses”, when asked why she thinks she requires a security clearance for her employment, Ms. QIU responded, “That’s a really good question.” She thought it was to protect information but was simply a job requirement. (P//MUWS)

34. Ms. QIU stated that she was only aware of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) after taking over a project from her predecessor at the NML wherein one collaborator had AMMS associations. Ms. QIU indicated that she had no more information on AMMS or any possible Chinese military connections. Ms. QIU routinely stated that she did not previously think about the fact that her scientific research could be used by foreign entities for nefarious purposes such as biological weapons development and stated that her collaborators were “probably doing the work to advance science for good... for the possibility to save lives. That’s all we think about as scientists.” (P//MUWS)

35. In Interview 1, Ms. QIU was directly questioned as to what she would do if she were approached by the Chinese government to conduct exclusive research for the betterment of Chinese people. Ms. QIU responded, “Well, it depends on what they asked me to do, it’s just like collaboration.” She explained that if the research would not have an effect on or damage Canada then she would say yes because collaboration is common practice. [When questioned if there were instances where the NML Director would not have known what she was working on or who she was working with, Ms. QIU responded, “Right, yeah. Possibly yeah... so basically if I]
think there’s something important or there’s potential, I would go to them to let them know how we are going to deal with this.” The investigator furthur “But not in every instance?” and Ms. QIU responded indicating that was correct. (P//MUWS)

Interview 2

36. On June 19, 2020, a second security interview was conducted with Ms. QIU (herein referred to as “Interview 2”). During this interview, Ms. QIU was questioned thoroughly on her finances, knowledge of Chinese individuals and institutions with military associations, and awareness of and involvement in PRC-sponsored talent programs and associated research activities. At the interviewer’s discretion, Ms. QIU was presented with documentation which was obtained by the Service. (P//MUWS)

37. At the beginning of Interview 2, Ms. QIU was provided a recap of what was discussed during Interview 1 and the definitions of what it means to be truthful and fulsome in responses as part of the security clearance process was explained again. She was presented with the opportunity to clarify or change any responses from Interview 1, to which she responded that previously she did not know, but now believes, that her eldest son provided her and her husband, CHENG Keding, with money collected from renting rooms in the past year to individuals in their second home; Ms. QIU explained that her son, who lives in Toronto, ON, manages the rental property remotely and her husband sometimes helps with maintenance. When asked, Ms. QIU could not give an estimate of the amount of money they had received from their son. Further, Ms. QIU claimed not to know any of the past or current tenants residing at their residence and when questioned specifically if anybody she or her husband had worked with at PHAC or the University of Manitoba (UoM) had ever rented rooms at she repeatedly stated, “I don’t think so.” When asked if there was anything else, in any capacity, that she wanted to clarify, change, add or revisit in relation to her answers from Interview 1, Ms. QIU responded in the negative. (P//MUWS)

38. During Interview 2, Ms. QIU initially stated that she had no other bank accounts besides two joint Canadian accounts with her husband. However, later on, when pressed for information and presented with a name possibly relating to conflicting banking information, Ms. QIU admitted, “Okay, I have an account in China...but I just put 1000 RMB in that account, that’s it.” When asked the name of the bank associated to this account, she responded, “What’s the bank, umm, I think it’s China Commercial Bank...I think so.” Ms. QIU initially stated she has only held this account for one year but then corrected herself stating maybe more than one year, maybe two years; she was unsure. She stated her only purpose for opening this account was for simple day-to-day transactions for when she was traveling within
China and she mentioned her husband was aware of this account. Ms. QIU stated nobody else has access to this Chinese account. (P//MUWS)

39. When asked directly if all of the collaborations she has worked on over the years were approved by or done with the knowledge of PHAC, after a pause, Ms. QIU responded, “Umm, yes.” Similar to Interview 1, Ms. QIU stated that for some small experiments in the exploratory stages, PHAC was not made aware. However, Ms. QIU, aside from the small experiments she did not seek approval for from PHAC, stated that PHAC would have records of everything. She confirmed that she has never intentionally withheld anything from PHAC, including any records or work ever done with anybody outside of PHAC, and when queried as to if she has ever signed any agreement with anybody or any entity related to research work that has not been made known to PHAC, she replied, “No, I don’t think so.” Ms. QIU was later questioned specifically on her work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), and when asked if there were any agreements or projects between them besides PHAC-approved training, she simply responded, “No.” (P//MUWS)

40. When questioned about being nominated for or offered awards by any other governments, research centres or universities, Ms. QIU stated, after much thinking, “You know, people from China, they umm tried, tried to nominate me [for] an award, that’s one, and uh, I didn’t get it.” Ms. QIU somewhat explained that it was an international medical collaboration award in 2016 or 2017 with her nominator being [REDACTED]. This award, however, was intended for scientists born outside of China so Ms. QIU did not qualify. Ms. QIU stated that she made the Executive Director of the NML aware of this award at the time and stated that he signed the nominating documents. Ms. QIU confirmed that besides the document NML had to sign, she had never received any other documentation, notification or filled out any application related to this award. (P//MUWS)

41. Ms. QIU initially denied knowing of or working with anyone that has been involved in military research or that is connected to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC or any military research institutes. Ms. QIU simply responded “no” when asked if she herself has ever worked for any Chinese military institute, either paid or unpaid, as a visiting scholar, visiting researcher or adjunct professor. Later on, Ms. QIU was reminded that in Interview 1 she had mentioned [REDACTED] had collaborated with AMMS. She was therefore questioned again if she knew anyone else besides [REDACTED], affiliated to AMMS, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) or any other military medical institutes in China, to which she responded, “No.” When asked again if she herself has ever held any position in any capacity with any military medical institutes she responded in the negative. (P//MUWS)

42. The interviewer then mentioned the name [REDACTED] and asked if Ms. QIU knew of this individual. Ms. QIU admitted that [REDACTED] was “probably one of the nominators”. When asked who works for, Ms. QIU stated, “She works for antibody
development, I think, I don’t know a lot about her work.” After further questioning, long pauses and stumped words, Ms. QIU revealed that works for the Institute of Medical Science. Ms. QIU described her relationship with and stated they have never met or spoken in any capacity. Immediately afterwards, the interviewer mentioned the name. When asked what relationship, if any, Ms. QIU has with she stated they simply worked together on the Ad-5 Ebola vaccine with the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB) and mentioned, “…she probably has some position there or something.” Ms. QIU then revealed that she is aware that is the Director of the BIB. (P//MUWS)

43. Following this, the interviewer provided open source pictures of and in full PLA uniform and asked if Ms. QIU recognized either of the individuals. Ms. QIU was able to identify both individuals by name, stating “Yeah, I think I saw their picture, yeah.” The interviewer highlighted that is a Major General in the PLA and is a senior researcher at AMMS. Ms. QIU claimed not to know much about and stated never having worked directly with. She again stated that she has never met either of them in person. Ms. QIU was unsure as to why would nominate her for an award as they have never had direct collaboration. After being told is involved in bioweapons research and this is publically available knowledge, Ms. QIU responded, “She is?...I wasn’t aware, I didn’t know.” Ms. QIU claimed she did not research background previously and was dismissive when asked if she thinks her collaborations with other institutions, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), have assisted in advancing the capabilities of the PLA. When asked directly if she thinks it would be important to do some background checks on who she collaborates with in regards to deadly pathogens and related research, Ms. QIU responded, “Well I dunno, I guess. Before I never thought about it.” (P//MUWS)

44. After the interviewer explained in detail to Ms. QIU the major threat posed to the security of Canada by activities emanating from PRC military, intelligence and security organizations and associated threat actors, Ms. QIU was given another opportunity to reveal anyone she may know of connected to these types of entities. After pausing for over a minute, Ms. QIU was pressed further and eventually mentioned her post-doctoral student from the BIB, Ms. QIU claimed not to know much about collaborators or anybody she has worked with, including when asked if was a Restricted Visitor (RV) at PHAC, confirmed, but did not provide much further information. Ms. QIU was then again questioned on any other nominations that she may have been a part of in relation to any Chinese researchers or institutions. Ms. QIU quietly admitted to being nominated for a “foreign academician” award last year by and a few other individuals. She mentioned that she withdrew “because of my situation” (i.e. being escorted from the NML) but stated that she had also been nominated for this same award in the past. When asked why she did not disclose these award nominations or volunteer any of her affiliations, associations or connections to outside entities other than PHAC in either of her
security interviews, Ms. QIU responded that it was not in her mind and she did not know it was related or think it was relevant. Ms. QIU was then asked one final time if there were any other awards, recognition, programs, memberships, or anything else that she was ever nominated for, or that she has sought, with any foreign institute. Ms. QIU, after pausing a while, responded, “I don’t think so.” (P//MUWS)

45. The interviewer discussed with Ms. QIU her relationship and collaboration with WIV. Ms. QIU described that in 2017, on one of her trips to China for a conference, she was invited by the Vice-Director of WIV, [REDACTED] to visit the laboratory. Ms. QIU accepted and went for “...half a day, on the way back to Beijing.” Ms. QIU explained that WIV had initially asked her to come twice annually to provide training, which she discussed with PHAC. Ms. QIU explained that she only went there once for this purpose, in autumn of 2017. When asked if Ms. QIU has communicated or maintained a relationship with [REDACTED] since then, she stated that [REDACTED] invited her back to WIV for a “2018 international emerging virus conference” Ms. QIU later revealed that WIV had asked her to come work for them but she turned them down. [REDACTED] Ms. QIU did not want to work there full-time or part-time. Ms. QIU repeatedly responded in the negative when asked if there are or have even been any work or project agreements that exist between her and WIV besides the PHAC-approved training. (P//MUWS)

46. Ms. QIU also described how after WIV got certified (i.e. got their BSL-4 certification), she acted simply as a messenger to help transfer viruses to them from the NML. Ms. QIU passed the information along to the Chief of Special Pathogens at the NML and was involved in the back and forth communication and preparation of documents with WIV. Conversations regarding a virus shipment first took place in summer of 2018 in Beijing, China between Ms. QIU and the Director of WIV, [REDACTED]. When asked directly multiple times if she and employees at WIV had ever discussed trying to “find another way” to get the virus samples routed to the PRC, Ms. QIU responded in the negative, but ultimately added, “I don’t remember.” (P//MUWS)

47. The interviewer questioned Ms. QIU on her knowledge of Chinese talent programs, including the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP) specifically. Ms. QIU was hesitant in responding, but somewhat described that in 2017/2018 a WIV employee, either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] (Ms. QIU could not remember), had “mentioned” the TTP to her. However, Ms. QIU was not qualified and did not want to take part. When asked why she did not previously disclose this offer to the interviewer despite their detailed conversation regarding WIV, Ms. QIU explained that she knew from a friend that there were age limits to the TTP and therefore she never really looked at it seriously. She explained why she never made anyone at PHAC aware of this offer, stating “I never really applied...nothing happened...I never really planned to go...I should disclose that to anyone?...I said no.” Even outside of PHAC personnel, Ms. QIU responded that she had never discussed this offer with anybody. Other than the offer
from WIV, when asked directly by the interviewer, “Has anybody ever suggested or asked you to apply for a talents program in China?” Ms. QIU immediately responded, “No.” (P/MUWS)

48. Ms. QIU was then presented with a “hypothetical situation” wherein she was offered a position at a Chinese institute under the TTP. It was explained that the talents program agreement may state that anything Ms. QIU might produce in relation to her work under this agreement would belong to or be owned by the Chinese institute, such as WIV, rather than PHAC and would be obfuscated from PHAC. To this, Ms. QIU responded, “It basically [does] not apply to me, and, uh, I never agreed... I said no...”. When asked outright if she has ever applied in any capacity for the TTP, has filled out or received an application for a talents program, or been notified that she was nominated for a talents program, Ms. QIU continually quickly responded, “No.” After further discussion, the interviewer gave Ms. QIU one final opportunity to adjust her statements related to any talent program applications that she may have been involved in, in any way whatsoever. When asked if there was anything else she wished to mention, Ms. QIU responded “I don’t think so.” (P/MUWS)

49. Ms. QIU was ultimately presented incrementally with various Chinese talent program applications and agreements filled out in her name. This included the “Application Form for the State “Thousand Talent” Project” (TTP Application), the “CAS 2019 Annual International Talent Plan / President’s International Fellowship Initiative” (CAS ITP) and the “Hebei Medical University High Caliber Talent Bringing-in Agreement” (HBU Agreement). Despite the interviewer reading out various portions of each agreement and indicating their direct inconsistencies with Ms. QIU’s previous interview answers, Ms. QIU denied knowing about these applications. Her story somewhat varied throughout this portion of the interview, but she continually stated that she had nothing to do with filling out any applications herself, was not aware that some applications were considered talent programs, was not sure why she was listed as holding certain positions at Chinese institutions including AMMS, and that nothing in relation to these applications was ever completed or finalized. Ms. QIU stated outright at one point that she had never received any of the talent program applications, stating, “No, I didn’t receive [them], no.” When continually pressed, certain details came out contrary to her position of “not knowing” about these applications or associated communications, projects and activities. This included her stating that she did not make PHAC aware as she did not think they were real positions or offers and she did not remember if she signed any of the applications or agreements. Throughout this entire section of the interview, Ms. QIU was presented with multiple opportunities to refute, clarify, change or add to her previous statements, but did not do so in a concise manner. Of note, Ms. QIU stated explicitly that she had never received any e-mails about the status of any applications and in regards to he was not aware of Ms. QIU’s TTP Application before he came to Canada. Ms. QIU stated that she and had no communication about her TTP Application prior to him coming to Canada. (P/MUWS)
50. In regards to any of her past business work or travel in China, Ms. QIU stated that PHAC was always made aware and she has always disclosed everything, including any activities conducted with WIV. When questioned on her work with private companies, Ms. QIU mentioned CanSino (i.e. CanSino Biotechnology Inc.), which was part of the Ad-5 Ebola vaccine that was linked with [Redacted] and the BIB. Ms. QIU stated that she has never worked with CanSino directly, other than conducting animal experiments at the NML. Ms. QIU is confident that there are full records at PHAC and UoM for this work. When asked directly, multiple times, if any private company, including CanSino, or any other research institution, has ever paid her travel to China, compensated her for any of her research work, or provided any remuneration of any kind for anything at all, after numerous pauses, Ms. QIU responded, “I don’t think so” and “I don’t remember”. Ms. QIU stated that she has never accepted any travel reimbursements from any private company, entity or individual and has never “double-dipped” at PHAC’s expense. (P/MUWS)

51. When questioned as to what her plans are should PHAC not reinstate her at the NML, Ms. QIU responded, “I don’t know, I never thought about it because I always think I’m going back to work soon.” She furthered, “I’m thinking, I believe I will go back to the work...” Ms. QIU explained that she feels bad for the students as “...they are waiting for me to come back...so much projects I need to publish.” She stated, “To be honest, I never ever thought I would be in this situation at all. Never.” Similar to what was stated in Interview 1, Ms. QIU still feels that she was not made aware of PHAC’s security policies and procedures, never got the proper training, was always trying to follow the rules and did not do anything intentionally wrong. At the end of Interview 2, when presented with one final opportunity to add or discuss anything at all that may be useful to the Service’s investigation into her security clearance or PHAC’s future decision regarding her employment, Ms. QIU offered nothing and responded “Really, you know better than me...” (P/MUWS)

Service Assessment

52. **Loyalty**: Further to our previous security assessment provided on April 9, 2020, the Service now assesses that Ms. QIU developed deep, cooperative relationships with a variety of People’s Republic of China (PRC) institutions and has intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC Government, and herself, without regard for the implications to her employer or to Canada’s interests. It is clear that Ms. QIU not only failed to inform her employer of these activities but made efforts to conceal her projects with PRC institutions. The Service further assesses that because of her extensive knowledge of the harmful effects of dangerous pathogens on human health, Ms. QIU should have been aware of the possibility that her efforts to engage clandestinely with the PRC in these research areas could harm Canadian interests or international security. The Service therefore assesses that Ms. QIU has engaged, may engage or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act (Section 2(a)). (S)
53. **Reliability as it relates to loyalty:** The Service assesses that Ms. QIU repeatedly lied in her security screening interviews about the extent of her work with institutions of the PRC Government and refused to admit to any involvement in various PRC programs, even when documents were put before her. Despite being given every opportunity in her interviews to provide a truthful version of her association with PRC entities, Ms. QIU continued to make blanket denials, feign ignorance, or tell outright lies. Even when confronted by the interviewer and being told that she was not being forthright, and that this lack of candour could have an effect on her security clearance and career, Ms. QIU declined to be truthful. Overall, the Service assesses that Ms. QIU’s answers to a multitude of interview questions were simply not credible, which reflects adversely on her personal trustworthiness and therefore her basic reliability, the primary building block of a security clearance. (S)

54. The Service also assesses that Ms. QIU was reckless in her dealings with various PRC entities, particularly in her lack of respect for proper scientific protocols regarding the transfer of pathogens and in working with institutions whose goals have potentially lethal military applications that are manifestly not in the interests of Canada or its citizens. Ms. QIU also gave access to the NML to at least two employees of a PRC institution whose work is not aligned with Canadian interests, and consistently asserted that she had very limited knowledge of these institutions’ mandates, despite an abundance of evidence that she was actually working with or for them. The Service therefore assesses that because of adverse features of character – dishonesty, reckless judgement and lack of respect for accepted rules and norms – Ms. QIU has acted, may act and may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada. We also assess that she has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information. (S)

55. Finally, the Service assesses that should Ms. QIU be reinstated at the NML, Canada’s national security and the health of individuals may be put into jeopardy as there is no indication, based on our extensive research and interviews of her, that she would change her behavior in any respect. We assess that despite her enormous scientific knowledge and contributions, her behavior is incompatible with holding a Government of Canada security clearance. (S)

56. In accordance with s.9, appendix D of the SSS, departments assign authority at an appropriate level to grant a security clearance. The authority to deny, revoke or suspend clearances rests with your deputy head or equivalent. However, the Service requests that you inform us of the final decision. Please complete the Notification of Security Clearance Form (Form 4195e; available at www.csis-srs.gc.ca) and return it to the mailing address provided (ATTN: Security Screening, Client Liaison). Should you wish to discuss this assessment, please contact Client Liaison at [redacted] to schedule a meeting. (C)
Yours sincerely,

Chief
Security Screening Branch
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

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SECRET/CEO

July 7, 2020

SSRN: 560100406
Your File: 101358

Executive Director, Security and Departmental Security Officer
Public Health Agency of Canada
51 Chardon Driveway, Tunney’s Pasture
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0K9

RE: CSIS Act Security Assessment of Mr. Keding CHENG

Dear [REDACTED],

1. The following is further to a security screening investigation reopened for cause on June 10, 2019, for a security assessment in relation to a Secret clearance for Mr. Keding CHENG, born [REDACTED], People’s Republic of China (PRC). (P)¹

2. In accordance with s.15 of the CSIS Act, the Service has performed a security screening investigation which included [REDACTED] a review of Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) documentation, [REDACTED] and further investigation including two subject interviews. Further to the Service’s preliminary security assessment which was provided to you on April 9, 2020, this updated security assessment contains newly discovered information since that time. (S)

3. Pursuant to s.13 of the CSIS Act and s.7, appendix D of the Standard on Security Screening (SSS) under the Policy on Government Security (PGS), the following information was uncovered which calls into question Mr. CHENG’s reliability as it relates to loyalty. (S)

¹(U) Unclassified, (P) Protected B, (P//MUWS) Information in this paragraph may be used by officials of your agency for additional discussions with the subject, (C) Confidential, (S) Secret, (S//CEO) Secret/Canadian Eyes Only.
4. Overall, the information below relates to: Mr. CHENG’s close personal and professional relationship with QIU Xiangguo and his awareness of her clandestine activities with a variety of individuals and entities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is a known security threat to Canada; and Mr. CHENG’s lack of candour regarding his own activities and knowledge of QIU Xiangguo’s activities and the individuals and entities connected therein. (S)

Service Information

5. Service investigation reveals that Mr. CHENG was aware of QIU Xiangguo’s applications to PRC-sponsored “talent programs”, as well as her associations to PRC military institutes and related individuals. For detailed information on QIU Xiangguo’s activities as assessed by the Service, please refer to her updated security assessment provided to your agency on June 30, 2020 (amended copy provided on July 2, 2020) which highlights the following:

- PRC Talent Programs and Associated Entities:
  - QIU Xiangguo was an applicant to and very likely a participant in the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP) (herein referred to as “QIU’s TTP Application”) via the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), and other talent programs and related plans with various PRC entities including Hebei Medical University (HBU) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Kunming Institute of Zoology (KIZ).

- Activities with WIV:
  - As part of her enrolment in the TTP, QIU Xiangguo committed to various work arrangements with WIV and was involved in CAS research projects and known to PHAC.

- PRC Military Associations:
  - QIU Xiangguo was deeply involved with the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China, part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC, through various research collaborations, award nominations and as a visiting professor at the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB). (S/CEO)

PRC Talent Programs

6. Service investigation reveals that Mr. CHENG himself was involved in an application for a PRC-sponsored “talent program”. Service information reveals that these programs aim to boost

2 “work arrangements” referred to are assessed to be deliverables under the TTP.
China’s national technological capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property (IP). (S//CEO)

7. The PRC’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016 – 2020) commits to the implementation of its Made in China 2025 (MC2025) action plan, which identifies biotechnology as a strategic priority area for innovation and development. Specifically, the MC2025 plan commits China to “develop new medical products using chemicals and biotechnology to address critical diseases, including antibody drugs, antibody coupling drugs, new structural proteins, polypeptide drugs, and new vaccines”. (C//CEO)

Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province Application Form

8. According to Service information, in addition to national level talent programs, the PRC also has provincial and municipal level talent programs for recruiting overseas talents within their jurisdictions. Service investigation reveals an application form from 2013 for the “Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province” (herein referred to as “Henan Talent Program”) for applicant “Cheng Keding”. Mr. CHENG was requesting 3,600,000 RMB (approximately $720,000 CAD) in funding for a project that would have taken place from January 2014 to December 2018. Service investigation further indicates that in order to be eligible to apply for the Henan Talent Program, the applicant must “passionately love the socialist motherland [PRC]”. Other criteria include being a citizen of the PRC. It is unclear as to whether or not Mr. CHENG ever completed or submitted this Henan Talent Program application. (S)

Mr. CHENG’s Awareness of QIU Xiangguo’s PRC Talent Program Activities

9. Service information indicates that the most prominent PRC talent recruitment program is the TTP. Its goal is to recruit ethnic Chinese experts from Western universities, research centers and private companies to boost China’s national capabilities in science and technology and to move China forward as an “innovative” nation. According to open source information, the TTP, along with other national level talent programs, were subsumed by the “National High-end Foreign Experts Recruitment Plan” (NHFERP) in 2019. The primary purpose of the NHFERP is to “serve major national [PRC] strategic needs”, with specific attention on gaining foreign scientist support in “cultivating and developing strategic emerging industries”. Guidance from the PRC’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) indicates that the plan’s goals are to recruit foreign experts who undertake cutting-edge research, and those who have the potential to achieve major breakthroughs in key and core technological fields. Biotechnology research and
development (R&D) is specifically noted in the NHFERP as an area which needs to be strengthened. (S//CEO)

10. Information collected during the Service’s investigation indicates that Dr. CHENG was aware of QIU Xiangguo’s applications to PRC-sponsored "talent programs" including the TTP application that specified that all results and intellectual property generated would belong to the "Declaring Entity" [WIV].

Mr. CHENG was also listed as the emergency contact for QIU Xiangguo on her “2019 Annual International Talent Program” / “Chinese Academy of Sciences President’s International Fellowship Initiative” (CAS ITP) application. (S)

PRC Military Associations

11. Open sources state that as per China’s key national R&D priorities for 2017 – 2022, the PRC seeks to support national defence research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications. Mr. CHENG was listed online as a co-author on an NML research paper which included individuals linked to AMMS in China. AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC and is comprised of eighteen units, eleven of which are specialized research institutes responsible for the health service tasks of the PLA. These tasks include the development of military biotechnologies, biological counter-terrorism and the prevention and control of major diseases. AMMS has offensive Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) capabilities

12. Service investigation reveals that QIU Xiangguo was nominated for an “international cooperation award" circa 2016 by Chief of AMMS Research Institute (Chief 1). On this nomination
form, Mr. CHENG is listed as an “expert” who is familiar with QIU Xiangguo’s academic achievements. In regards to QIU Xiangguo’s collaborations highlighted in this nomination, it is stated that she “…cooperated in a timely manner with experts from AMMS” including and experts from other organizations such as from the Institute of Microbiology, CAS. Service information indicates that is also known as (S).

13. is pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform and is noted as a Chief at an AMMS research institute. This research institute is engaged in military medicine, clinical medicine and biological high technology.

14. is pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform, is a Major General, is noted as the top virologist at AMMS and is China’s chief biological weapons defense expert engaged in research related to biosafety, bio-defence and bio-terrorism.

15. Service information reveals that CAS works closely with the PLA to acquire Western technologies. Open source information reveals that in 2018, Mr. CHENG and were listed together, amongst others including QIU Xiangguo, on two research papers. (S//CEO)
Service investigation reveals that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH was a Restricted Visitor (RV) at PHAC. According to open sources, the BIB is a research institute engaged in the study of biological high technology in the PLA. Service investigation reveals that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH was brought to UoM as a visiting scientist by QIU Xiangguo on a scholarship reportedly paid through the Chinese embassy in Canada. Service information indicates that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH holds a Chinese Public Affairs passport, which is primarily reserved for civil servants and staff of public institutions. Service information also reveals that indicated her residence as being which is Mr. CHENG and QIU Xiangguo’s second property. Open sources depict conducting laboratory work in PLA attire and indicate her mentor as being Major General, PLA / Top Virologist, AMMS (Chief 2)

Security Screening Interviews

Interview 1

17. Mr. CHENG was previously interviewed by the Service on March 20, 2020 in relation to his Secret clearance (herein referred to as “Interview 1”). As noted in our initial security assessment, during this interview Mr. CHENG discussed matters related to security practices at the NML, knowledge of PRC military and intelligence associates and his own loyalty to Canada. (P//MUWS)

18. During Interview 1, Mr. CHENG admitted to having left restricted visitors (RVs) alone at the NML and given them access to the electronic “science network” using his login credentials. Mr. CHENG stated, “I did not think I did anything big wrong. It’s just I’m too open. I’m too, like, passionate.” He did ultimately explain that he knows his data is Government of Canada (GoC) proprietary information and he will follow the security-related rules from now on. Of note, Mr. CHENG denied having any working relationships with or knowledge of anyone connected to the Chinese military, including any of his students, stating, “Not at all…you can check my students’ background.” (P//MUWS)
Interview 2

19. On June 19, 2020, a second security interview was conducted with Mr. CHENG (herein referred to as “Interview 2”). During this interview, Mr. CHENG was questioned on his awareness of and involvement in PRC-sponsored talent programs, knowledge of Chinese individuals and institutions with military associations, and personal finances. He was also questioned on his knowledge of QIU Xiangguo’s activities related to these same topics.

20. In regards to PRC-sponsored talent programs, Mr. CHENG was initially asked to explain what he knows about them. He answered that he does not know much about these programs and has only heard of them, including the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP), through media reporting. Mr. CHENG stated, “Before that, I never worked with anybody with, you know, money or whatever. I really don’t know.” Mr. CHENG stated he has never applied to be part of a talent program in China and indicated that he would not meet the standard to qualify. He mentioned that it would be difficult as a public [GoC] employee to take part in these programs because of, amongst other things, a duty to serve Canadians (P/MUWS).

21. When presented with the specific name “Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province”, Mr. CHENG quickly responded, “No no no I’ve never heard of it...no I was never involved with that. Nobody asked me to apply and I never tried to apply because I’m just a biologist...no I never did that, I never thought I should do that.” When questioned further as to if he ever recalled applying to this program, even if his application was unsuccessful, Mr. CHENG firmly and repeatedly responded in the negative. When the interviewer ultimately revealed that the Service had information indicating that Mr. CHENG had filled out a 2013 application to the “Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province”, Mr. CHENG’s tone changed drastically and he answered, “Really?...I really can’t remember because I did not take that seriously. I really don’t think that I meet that standard. They probably gave me a form and I just probably randomly view[ed] it...but I don’t think that I was serious regarding that.” Mr. CHENG was then able to describe how he had acquired this application form, including the name of the individual who had provided it to him, but revealed that he did not remember all of the specifics as nothing came out of it. (P/MUWS)

22. When asked directly if he knows of anybody involved in a talent program in China, including any colleagues, friends or family members, after pausing, Mr. CHENG answered, “Nobody telling me like ‘I’m Thousand Talents’, I really don’t know. No.” In regard to his wife, QIU Xiangguo, when asked specifically if she is a member of a talent program in China, Mr. CHENG responded, “She probably knows that [of the TTP] because, you know, a lot of media exposure...we all heard from media but neither of them [us] are applying for Thousand Talents.
Program...”. He furthered that if his wife was a member of the TTP, she would tell him. However, Mr. CHENG then explicitly took a moment and stated, “No no no I should say this. I should think clear. My wife did not apply and my wife was not a Thousand Talent Program [member] at all.” He clarified that she was also not a member of any other talent programs and neither himself nor QIU Xiangguo were interested in applying to these types of programs. Mr. CHENG then confirmed that if an employee of PHAC were part of a talent program they would have to declare it, however he did not think PHAC would provide a letter of recommendation for the TTP in any capacity due to the program’s requirements. In discussing events in the media regarding academic and research programs, Mr. CHENG stated, “I think when you apply for some program, you have to be transparent and sincere.” (P//MUWS)

23. Mr. CHENG was asked about his knowledge of PHAC’s relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). He answered that QIU Xiangguo went to provide PHAC-approved training at WIV circa 2017/2018. Mr. CHENG furthered that QIU Xiangguo’s relationship with WIV is “mainly training” and they have no current contact. As per his knowledge of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Mr. CHENG stated that, other than a research paper he was listed on as a co-author (which was presented to him in Interview 1) he does not know “anything at all about this institute” and had never previously heard of it. He confirmed that he has never met anybody from AMMS and stated, “I have no knowledge of this institute or the people there.” When asked if QIU Xiangguo has ever collaborated with AMMS, Mr. CHENG responded in the negative, other than describing her collaboration for the previously mentioned research paper. (P//MUWS)

24. Other information discussed included Mr. CHENG and QIU Xiangguo’s second home at wherein Mr. CHENG revealed that although their son in Toronto manages the property, Mr. CHENG himself does basic maintenance and interacts with some of the tenants living there. Mr. CHENG also stated in Interview 2 that he does not think his wife receives any money from any sources overseas and all of her payments were approved by PHAC. At the end of the interview, when given a final opportunity to inform the interviewer of anything else that Mr. CHENG may have remembered since Interview 1 and wished to share, Mr. CHENG responded in the negative and stated, “We are loyal Canadians...please trust us.” (P//MUWS)

Service Assessment

25. The Service assesses that Mr. CHENG was not truthful in his security screening interviews. This includes his varying responses in Interview 2 as to the extent of his knowledge of PRC-sponsored talent programs. Although it is unclear to the Service whether or not Mr. CHENG submitted an application to a talent program, the Service assesses that he did at the very least consider doing so. His initial Interview 2 responses, indicating that he was only aware of
these programs’ existence through open media, and his statements denying that he had ever thought about applying to these types of programs or that he had even heard of the Henan Talent Program specifically, contradicts information from the Service investigation. It also contradicts some of his own answers in which he said he would not merit consideration by talent programs because he did not meet the qualification standards. Although it is possible that Mr. CHENG simply forgot about his partially-filled out talent program application from 2013, it is unlikely that he would have forgotten this program entirely or whether he had considered applying to any talent program whatsoever. (S)

26. Service investigation indicates that Mr. CHENG was aware of QIU Xiangguo’s applications to PRC-sponsored ‘talent programs’. Although alternative interpretations exist for the information collected by the Service investigation, the more likely scenario is that Mr. CHENG was aware. This would indicate that his answer in Interview 2 stating that, to his knowledge, QIU Xiangguo has never applied to any talent programs, is almost certainly untruthful. (S)

27. Mr. CHENG’s listing on QIU Xiangguo’s nomination form for the “international cooperation award” has an “expert” familiar with her academic achievements indicates that he would presumably be aware of the accomplishments and individuals referenced within. This document details many of QIU Xiangguo’s relationships with AMMS and associated individuals and military entities. The Service is aware that Ms. QIU was a Visiting Professor at the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB) since 2016. Together, these refute the claims from Mr. CHENG in Interview 2 that he had no previous knowledge of AMMS or any associated persons prior to Interview 1. Furthermore, Mr. CHENG worked directly at PHAC with the BIB, who is connected to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC. Of note, also listed her Canadian address as Mr. CHENG and QIU Xiangguo’s second property, which Mr. CHENG mentioned in Interview 2 he himself helps maintain for tenants. Given that was also a post-doctoral student of Mr. CHENG’s spouse, we therefore assess that Mr. CHENG was almost certainly aware of a PLA institution whose research applications include boosting the PRC’s military capabilities, including biological weapons. (S)

28. Mr. CHENG and QIU Xiangguo have been married for many years, share similar scientific careers and gave very similar interview responses regarding their financial holdings and situations. Given this close familial and working relationship, we assess that it is very likely Mr. CHENG was aware of his wife’s
applications to PRC talent programs. Though Mr. CHENG may not have been privy to all of the
details of QIU Xiangguo’s relationships with various Chinese entities and individuals of
concern, the Service assesses that Mr. CHENG cannot credibly claim complete ignorance of
these activities as he did in his security interviews. During Interview 2, initially Mr. CHENG
claimed little knowledge on various topics but upon further questioning would provide more
intricate details. Despite being given ample opportunities to provide truthful statements to the
interviewers regarding topics of concern relating to his security clearance, the Service assesses
that Mr. CHENG failed to tell the truth in areas where he most needed to. Overall, Mr.
CHENG’s responses were simply not credible, which reflects adversely on his personal
trustworthiness and therefore his basic reliability, the primary building block of a security
clearance. (S)

29. Should Mr. CHENG be reinstated at the NML, because of his features of character and
association with persons or groups considered a security threat, the Service assesses that he may
act or may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada; or may
disclose or may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way,
sensitive information. (S)

30. In accordance with s.9, appendix D of the SSS, departments assign authority at an
appropriate level to grant a security clearance. The authority to deny, revoke or suspend
clearances rests with your deputy head or equivalent. However, the Service requests that you
inform us of the final decision. Please complete the Notification of Security Clearance Form
(Form 4195e; available at www.csis-scrs.gc.ca) and return it to the mailing address provided
(ATTN: Security Screening, Client Liaison). Should you wish to discuss this assessment, please
contact Client Liaison at [redacted] to schedule a meeting. (C)

Yours sincerely,

Chief
Security Screening Branch
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ATTACHMENTS ARE SHARED WITH YOUR
DEPARTMENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF YOUR ASSESSMENT AND MAY NOT BE
RECLASSIFIED, DISCLOSED OR OTHERWISE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE
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20 August 2020

Dr. Xiangguo QIU

Notification of Security Status suspension pending a Review for Cause

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch
Health Canada
70 Columbine Driveway
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K9

Dr. Qiu,

In accordance with the Treasury Board Policy on Government Security and the Standard on Security Screening, you are hereby notified that your Government of Canada security status is suspended immediately, pending a Review for Cause.

This is a reassessment of your reliability status and/or secret security clearance previously granted. Maintaining a valid security status or clearance is a condition of employment. This review could result in administrative action up to and including the revocation of your reliability status and/or secret security clearance, which would lead to the administrative termination of your employment. In accordance with the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening, this suspension is without pay.

As you are aware, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted an Administrative Investigation, which concluded that you breached or violated certain security policies and guidelines. In parallel, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) performed a security assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CSIS Act and the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening under the Policy on Government Security. The CSIS assessment, coupled with the findings of the Administrative Investigation, are significant enough to warrant a Review for Cause owing to concerns about reliability, loyalty to Canada and reliability as it relates to loyalty, as understood in the Standard on Security Screening. Among our serious concerns are your dealings with government agencies and government research programs of another country about which you have not been transparent with PHAC.

Canada
As a result, you are requested to attend an interview on August 26, 2020, at 9:00 AM where you will be given the opportunity to respond to these concerns. Please confirm your availability to participate in this interview to the interviewer of record, identified below, by 4:00 PM (EST) August 24, 2020. If you are not available on this date, please provide an alternate date and time. Please arrive for this in person interview at 391 York Ave., Winnipeg 30 minutes prior to your interview in order to afford time to be met by a security representative who will also ensure that safety protocols for COVID are in place. You are encouraged to bring a non-medical facemask for this interview.

Should you choose not to accept this invitation to an interview, our final recommendations and decision will be based on the information at hand.

You may be accompanied by a union representative, or another person of your choosing, who is not implicated or involved in this case and who has a valid GC Secret security clearance. This individual may be present only to support you as needed, but they may not represent your case, nor speak for you. The accompanying individual must be identified to the interviewer of record, by 4:00 PM (EST) August 24, 2020 and must be prepared to present acceptable identification at the time of the interview. Furthermore, they will be asked to sign a statement of understanding of their role in the interview and confidentiality obligations.

For the duration of the period that your security status is suspended, you are prohibited from accessing information, assets or facilities of the Agency. You are reminded that you are not to present yourself at the workplace or to contact any employee of the Agency, individuals with whom you collaborated for the purpose of your work at the Agency, and any external clients or stakeholders until you receive authorization to do so. You must also advise the undersigned before accepting employment elsewhere in the Public Service. Additionally, you are expected to keep all aspects pertaining to the administrative investigation and the Review for Cause process strictly confidential and not discuss the matters with anyone other than your union representative or support person.

While this interview and the Review for Cause are considered private and confidential, if further adverse information becomes known it may be disclosed to law enforcement authorities (e.g., police of jurisdiction) or a legislated authority for further actions.
If you require any clarification of this process, you may contact the interviewer of record,

Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

Respectfully,

Digitally signed by

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch / Chief Security Officer for Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada

CC: Departmental Security Officer, Executive Director
    Security Management Division, Ottawa
20 August 2020

Dr. Keding CHENG

Notification of Security Status suspension pending a Review for Cause

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch
Health Canada
70 Columbine Driveway
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K9

Dr. Cheng,

In accordance with the Treasury Board Policy on Government Security and the Standard on Security Screening, you are hereby notified that your Government of Canada security status is suspended immediately, pending a Review for Cause.

This is a reassessment of your reliability status and/or secret security clearance previously granted. Maintaining a valid security status or clearance is a condition of employment. This review could result in administrative action up to and including the revocation of your reliability status and/or secret security clearance, which would lead to the administrative termination of your employment. In accordance with the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening, this suspension is without pay.

As you are aware, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted an Administrative Investigation, which concluded that you breached or violated certain security policies and guidelines. In parallel, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) performed a security assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CSIS Act and the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening under the Policy on Government Security. The CSIS assessment, coupled with the findings of the Administrative Investigation, are significant enough to warrant a Review for Cause owing to concerns about reliability, and reliability as it relates to loyalty, as understood in the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening. Among our serious concerns are your close personal and professional relationship with Xiangguo Qiu, and your
awareness and lack of candour regarding your own activities and those of Xiangguo Qiu with individuals and entities of a foreign government.

As a result, you are requested to attend an interview on August 26, 2020, at 1:00 PM where you will be given the opportunity to respond to these concerns. Please confirm your availability to participate in this interview to the interviewer of record, identified below, by 4:00 PM (EST) August 24, 2020. If you are not available on this date, please provide an alternate date and time. Please arrive for this in person interview at 391 York Ave., Winnipeg 30 minutes prior to your interview in order to afford time to be met by a security representative who will also ensure that safety protocols for COVID are in place. You are encouraged to bring a non-medical facemask for this interview. Should you choose not to accept this invitation to an interview, our final recommendations and decision will be based on the information at hand.

You may be accompanied by a union representative, or another person of your choosing, who is not implicated or involved in this case and who has a valid GC Secret security clearance. This individual may be present only to support you as needed, but they may not represent your case, nor speak for you. The accompanying individual must be identified to the interviewer of record, by 4:00 PM (EST) August 24, 2020 and must be prepared to present acceptable identification at the time of the interview. Furthermore, they will be asked to sign a statement of understanding of their role in the interview and confidentiality obligations.

For the duration of the period that your security status is suspended, you are prohibited from accessing information, assets or facilities of the Agency. You are reminded that you are not to present yourself at the workplace or to contact any employee of the Agency, individuals with whom you collaborated for the purpose of your work at the Agency, and any external clients or stakeholders until you receive authorization to do so. You must also advise the undersigned before accepting employment elsewhere in the Public Service. Additionally, you are expected to keep all aspects pertaining to the administrative investigation and the Review for Cause process strictly confidential and not discuss the matters with anyone other than your union representative or support person.

While this interview and the Review for Cause are considered private and confidential, if further adverse information becomes known it may be disclosed to law enforcement authorities (e.g., police of jurisdiction) or a legislated authority for further actions.
If you require any clarification of this process, you may contact the interviewer of record, Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa.

Respectfully,

[Redacted]

Digitally signed by

[Redacted]

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch /
Chief Security Officer for Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada

CC: Departmental Security Officer, Executive Director Security Management Division, Ottawa
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu

September 29, 2020

Subject: Grievance #38489

Dear Dr. Qiu,

This is in response to the above-noted grievance, presented on August 5, 2020, in which you allege that the investigative and disciplinary processes, which began on February 15, 2019, were in violation of the collective agreement and that you were not afforded procedural fairness. You further alleged that you were the victim of discrimination.

I have carefully reviewed all relevant information in relation to this matter. As well, I have considered the arguments both you and your union representative of the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, presented at the final level grievance hearing, which took place on August 28, 2020.

At the grievance hearing, it was argued that:

• procedural fairness was not respected due to the length of time taken to conduct the fact-finding and administrative investigation, as well as the disciplinary process (18 months). In support of this position, referred to the R v. Jordan case, which provides for a defendant in a criminal case to be tried within 18 months of being charged with a crime;

• you fully cooperated in the processes, and answered questions openly and honestly. However, the Investigator, Presidia, unnecessarily conducted multiple interviews, asking the same questions over and over;

• you were treated differently and more severely than other employees because you are Chinese. You were asked specific and personal questions regarding your connections to China as a result of racial profiling. You indicated that your connections to China are work-related, like other scientists, and that you are a loyal Canadian citizen; and,

• you have suffered damage to your reputation as a published scientist due to questions surrounding your removal from the workplace, and your inability to continue your work. You also indicated that you have suffered both emotionally and financially.

Regarding procedural fairness, I recognize that this has been a difficult situation for you and your family. I thank you for your patience and professionalism. Although this process has taken longer than anticipated, my intent from the outset was to complete it as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Regarding the administrative investigation, it was my intent to come to a decision shortly following the meeting on March 11, 2020. However, the discovery of material new information meant that the process could not be concluded at that time.

It is important to note that the R v. Jordan case is applicable only in criminal cases. It does not apply to the labour relations context. Nonetheless, I have examined your arguments on the length of the
process. The allegations that were investigated were significant and complex, and as new information emerged, further consultation and investigation was required. As a result, multiple interviews with you and witnesses occurred to fully evaluate new information. Therefore, I find that the time required to complete the investigation was reasonable in the circumstances, and given that you received full salary and benefits throughout this period, there was no prejudice to you.

With respect to your allegation of discrimination, I can assure you that the employer acted only according to the information that was brought to its attention, and your ethnicity was never a factor in determining the course of action. In the absence of any evidence to support your allegations, I find that the decision to move forward with an investigation, and the nature of questioning during the investigation was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

During the grievance hearing, you described the significant emotional toll that you and your family have experienced as result of this process. I understand this and sympathize with the feelings that you expressed. However, these actions were necessary in light of the serious nature of the allegations. A thorough analysis in accordance with existing practice and jurisprudence was conducted to determine whether you could remain at work during the investigation. Consideration was also given to your personal circumstances and your contributions to the Public Health Agency of Canada. A determination was made to provide you with full salary and benefits during the administrative investigation period; therefore, your allegation that you suffered financial damages is not supported.

Further, regarding your allegation that you suffered damage to your reputation as a result of being absent from the workplace, I can understand your frustration, and your interest in returning to your work. However, I can find no evidence to support the allegation.

In light of the foregoing, I find that the arguments provided in support of your grievance are not supported. Consequently, your grievance is denied and your request for corrective action will not be forthcoming.

I would like to remind you that the Employee Assistance Program is available to you should you feel the need for their support. They can be reached at 1-800-268-7708.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Vice President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

c.c. Labour Relations
Dr. Keding Cheng

September 29, 2020

Subject: Grievance #38490

Dear Dr. Cheng,

This is in response to the above-noted grievance, presented on August 5, 2020, in which you allege that the investigation and disciplinary processes, which began on February 15, 2019, were in violation of the collective agreement and that you were not afforded procedural fairness. You further alleged that you were the victim of discrimination.

I have carefully reviewed all relevant information in relation to this matter. As well, I have considered the arguments both you and your union representative, [redacted] of the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, presented at the final level grievance hearing, which took place on August 28, 2020.

At the grievance hearing, it was argued that:

- procedural fairness was not respected due to the length of time taken to conduct the fact-finding and administrative investigation, as well as the disciplinary process (18 months). In support of this position, [redacted] referred to the *R v. Jordan* case, which provides for a defendant in a criminal case to be tried within 18 months of being charged with a crime;
- you fully cooperated in the processes, and answered questions openly and honestly. However, the Investigator, Precidia, unnecessarily conducted multiple interviews, asking the same questions over and over;
- you were treated differently and more severely than other employees because you are Chinese, and because of your marital circumstances. You were asked specific and personal questions regarding your connections to China as a result of racial profiling. You indicated that your connections to China are work-related, like other scientists, and that you are a loyal Canadian citizen; and,
- you have suffered both emotionally and financially.

Regarding procedural fairness, I recognize that this has been a difficult situation for you and your family. I thank you for your patience and professionalism. Although this process has taken longer than anticipated, my intent from the outset was to complete it as quickly and thoroughly as possible.

Regarding the administrative investigation, it was my intent to come to a decision shortly following the meeting on March 11, 2020. However, the discovery of material new information meant that the process could not be concluded at that time.

It is important to note that the *R v. Jordan* case is applicable only in criminal cases. It does not apply to the labour relations context. Nonetheless, I have examined your arguments on the length of the process. The allegations that were investigated were significant and complex, and as new information emerged, further consultation and investigation was required. As a result, multiple interviews with you and witnesses occurred to fully evaluate new information. Therefore, I find that the time required to
complete the investigation was reasonable in the circumstances, and given that you received full salary and benefits throughout this period, there was no prejudice to you.

With respect to your allegation of discrimination, I can assure you that the employer acted only according to the information that was brought to its attention, and your ethnicity was never a factor in determining the course of action. In the absence of any evidence to support your allegations, I find that the decision to move forward with an investigation, and the nature of questioning during the investigation was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances. I also find that your family status did not impact the administrative process in which you were involved as the allegations against you were distinct to your own actions.

During the grievance hearing, you described the significant emotional toll that you and your family have experienced as result of this process. I understand this and sympathize with the feelings that you expressed. However, these actions were necessary in light of the serious nature of the allegations. A thorough analysis in accordance with existing practice and jurisprudence was conducted to determine whether you could remain at work during the investigation. Consideration was also given to your personal circumstances and your contributions to the Public Health Agency of Canada. A determination was made to provide you with full salary and benefits during the administrative investigation period; therefore, your allegation that you suffered financial damages is not supported.

In light of the foregoing, I find that the arguments provided in support of your grievance are not supported. Consequently, your grievance is denied and your request for corrective action will not be forthcoming.

I would like to remind you that the Employee Assistance Program is available to you should you feel the need for their support. They can be reached at 1-800-268-7708.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Vice President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

cc. Labour Relations
19 October 2020

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu

Review for Cause Report

[Redacted]
Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada
70 Columbine Driveway
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K9

Dr. Qiu,

Enclosed please find a copy of the Review for Cause (RfC) Report, which sets out details gathered for the review process.

Prior to a decision being rendered on your eligibility to hold a reliability status and/or secret security clearance, you are invited to provide any clarifications or information that you feel have not been addressed in the report by end of day October 27, 2020. You are asked to provide these comments in writing to [Redacted]. Any submission received within the allotted timeframe will be taken into consideration before concluding the RfC process. If your comments are not received within the allotted timeframe, you will be deemed to be in agreement with the contents of the report and a decision will be based on the information at hand.

Maintaining a valid security status or clearance is a condition of employment. This RfC could result in administrative action up to and including the revocation of your reliability status and/or secret security clearance, which would lead to the administrative termination of your employment.

You are expected to keep all aspects pertaining to this RfC, including the existence and the contents of the attached report, strictly confidential. It is our expectation that you will keep confidential all information covered during your meeting with the employees from the National Security Management Division (NSMD) and that you will not share with anyone other than your union representative or legal counsel, the existence and content of the attached report. In addition, you are not to speak to any individuals who may participate or have participated in this process about the contents of their discussions with the staff of NSMD. You are reminded that your failure to maintain confidentiality or to comply with these expectations could subject you to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.
Please note that the Employee Assistance Program is available to assist you at any time. They can be reached at 1-(800) 268-7708.

Respectfully,

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch /  
Chief Security Officer for the Public Health Agency of Canada

Date          Signature

cc:  
Executive Director, National Security  
Management Division, Corporate Services  
Branch, Deputy Chief Security Officer, PHAC,  
Ottawa

Att.
Report on Review for Cause of Security Status

Dr. Xiangguo QIU

RFC-2020-001

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA
OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Report date: October 19, 2020
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I. PREAMBLE

1. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted a Review for Cause security process to assess Reliability, Loyalty and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty, as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS). The Review for Cause process is triggered by adverse information and is an assessment of an employee's continued ability to hold a security status and/or clearance with the federal government of Canada and takes into consideration information collected during the fact finding, administrative investigation, security interviews, security application and other security assessments.

2. This Review for Cause was initiated as a result of adverse information communicated to PHAC by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) through secure means.

II. BACKGROUND

3. This Review for Cause applies to Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, who occupies the following position and whose tasks and access are summarised as follows:

a) Job Title:

   Head, Vaccines and Antivirals  
   Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division  
   National Microbiology Laboratories  
   Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch  
   Public Health Agency of Canada

b) Duties and Access prior to suspension:

   i. Conducts research related to infectious diseases, toxins and pathogens defined in the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) and associated regulations.

   ii. Has had full access to all laboratories on the National Microbiology Laboratories (NML) campus in Winnipeg.

   iii. Has had unescorted access to all laboratories at NML, which are designated in accordance with material defined in the HPTA.
iv. Has had access to PHAC internal drives, as defined in the PHAC Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard.

4. PHAC conducted a **Security Administrative Investigation** in 2019, which determined that a number of PHAC policies had been breached. The Administrative Investigation Report\(^1\) was provided to Dr. QIU to allow her an opportunity to review and comment. Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC’s Deputy Chief Security Officer provided the Administrative Investigation Report to CSIS, which in turn conducted a security assessment.

5. CSIS performed a **Security Assessment** pursuant to section 13 of the **CSIS Act** and the TBS SSS under the **TBS Policy on Government Security**. This assessment included a review of the Administrative Investigation Report and a forensic analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. QIU. On 30 June 2020, CSIS also provided a written briefing summarizing the two interviews conducted with Dr. QIU on 19 March 2020 & 19 June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns.

6. Subsequently, PHAC conducted further analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. QIU in the course of her duties at NML.

III. ADVERSE INFORMATION

7. As a result of the new information included in the **CSIS Security Assessment** and forensic analysis of the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s government assets, PHAC launched a **Review for Cause** to assess the security risk posed to the organization by activities involving Dr. QIU.

8. The adverse information focused on three (3) areas of security concern, domestic and abroad. Specifically, concerns were raised with respect to Dr. QIU regarding:
   a) Sharing Sensitive Information and Assets
   b) Applications to External Talent Programs
   c) Association with Foreign Organizations

9. **On 26 August 2020**, [Redacted] (Senior Advisor, Security Screening) accompanied by [Redacted] (Manager, Security Screening - WPG) conducted a Review for Cause security interview with Dr. QIU at the PHAC office at 391 York Street, Winnipeg, MB.

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Sharing Sensitive Information and Assets

10. With respect to sharing sensitive information, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. QIU used both her corporate and personal email accounts to conduct government business with PHAC Employees and Restricted Visitors that use Gmail accounts to communicate with her. For example:

a) Dr. QIU admits to sending several emails to [REDACTED] Research Associate, CSCHAH, Gmail account instead of his corporate email account.

b) An interview of a Restricted Visitor managed by Dr. QIU found that the majority of written communication between the Restricted Visitor and Dr. QIU regarding work of a scientific nature, was accomplished through personal email accounts instead of her corporate email account.

c) The analysis of emails collected by PHAC Corporate Security contained numerous examples of Dr. QIU receiving and sending emails related to her work at NML from either her Gmail or Yahoo accounts to various PHAC employees.

11. With respect to sharing sensitive assets, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. QIU shipped materials outside of the NML without approval. For example:

a) Dr. QIU shipped antibodies outside of NML without authorization and/or a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA). [REDACTED], Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH, advised that the monoclonal antibodies shipped by Dr. QIU are proprietary, licensed and should not have been shipped.

b) When asked how many times Dr. QIU sent antibodies outside of NML without an MTA, Dr. QIU stated that she could not remember how many times but acknowledged it was more than once.

c) In one instance, Dr. QIU did state that she had sent antibodies to the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control without an MTA.

d) When asked if she sent licensed antibodies to any other country other than China without a Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA) or MTA, Dr. QIU stated that she sent a very small amount of antibodies to the United Kingdom and the United States for testing.
12. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU has circumvented GC policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information and assets as it pertains to Dr. QIU exchanging emails and planning collaborations with persons outside of PHAC. More specifically, Dr. QIU associated with foreign institutions and transferred information and materials outside Canada that belong to PHAC.

13. With respect to sharing of sensitive information, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

   a) When people send emails to her, she pays no attention to the manner of transmittal.

   b) Dr. QIU has never read the terms and conditions that pop up upon logging into her computer. Whenever she starts her computer, she simply clicks “Yes” and has never read the acknowledgement.

   c) She is certainly not the only one: “everyone does it”. Dr. QIU also states that she is a scientist and too busy to bother with that.

14. With respect to sharing sensitive assets, it should be noted that shipments of viruses, pathogens, antibodies, etc. require approval through a PHAC MTA. The agreements are stipulated in the PHAC Intellectual Property Policy, which is in place to ensure that these types of shipments are performed securely and designated to a pre-approved recipient organization.

15. Regarding sensitive assets, during the security interview, when questioned about shipping materials, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

   a) Any transfer of viruses, pathogens, antibodies, etc. that were of substance, were covered under an MTA.

   b) In the past, it was up to the scientist to determine whether an MTA was required and that management would agree with that.

16. When questioned about one instance where the actual transfer took place some months prior to the MTA being finalized, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

   a) This is common practice at the NML.

   b) Decisions on the need for MTAs and Intellectual Property Designation are at the discretion of the individual scientist, or group of scientists.
c) At times, the Intellectual Property Office is not consulted due to the time it takes to obtain authorization.

**Applications to External Talent Programs**

17. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU collaborated with agencies of another country and was untruthful in responding to allegations that she has committed, on several occasions, to applying to foreign talent programs.

18. PHAC collected information from the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s devices and network drive activities. The data found the following:

a) Dr. QIU has applied to (and/or attempted to apply to) various talent programs in the past years and has collaborated with agencies of another country (i.e. Wuhan Institute of Virology or WIV), without PHAC authorization, in areas that are military in nature. For example, documents stored on Dr. QIU’s network drive accounts contained applications for more than one collaboration with organizations that are linked to a foreign government. Specifically, Dr. QIU applied to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP).

b) Dr. QIU has stored applications to TPP in the electronic content of her devices.

c) Dr. QIU was applying to assist PRC for the stated purpose of: "building the biosecurity platform for new and potential infectious disease research, in order to reach top levels domestically and achieve leading status internationally".

d) Dr. QIU indicated in her TTP applications that she is a Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University.

e) In one research paper, in “tracked changes”, Dr. QIU made a request to have her affiliation with the Institute of Military Veterinary, as subsidiary of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, removed from the document.

19. During the course of the forensic examination, several applications to the TTP were discovered within the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s GC devices and network activities. This analysis found that Dr. QIU listed the following qualifications in biographical sections of her applications to the TTP:

a) Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University (this activity is listed on her Curriculum Vitae from July 2018);
b) Visiting Research Fellow at the National Institute for Food and Drug Control (China) from January 2017;

c) Visiting Research Scientist at the WIV from October 2018;

d) Visiting Researcher for the National Institute for Food And Drug Control, China;

e) Visiting Professor for the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences;

f) Lead on the initiative “Chinese Academy of Science High End Nurturing Project” from May 2019 to June 2021.

20. With respect to applying to external talent programs, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

a) she herself never filled out an application;

b) any and all applications were filled out by others;

c) her information and photograph were inserted without her knowledge.

21. In one case, after being presented with evidence from her electronic accounts, Dr. QIU acknowledged that she knew about the application but maintained that she herself had no part in applying.

22. Dr. QIU denied listing the credentials identified in Paragraph 19 above, in the biographical component of her applications to the TTP. However, when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged knowing about the TTP. Dr. QIU stated that she considered the biographical details to be a list of collaborations that she performed with these institutions and did not require disclosure to PHAC.

23. When asked about tracked changes in her application for TTP, Dr. QIU maintained that this was done by a student on her behalf.
Association with Foreign Organizations

24. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU has had numerous contacts with agencies of another country and was untruthful in interviews conducted by CSIS in describing her relationship with government agencies of another country.

25. PHAC collected information from the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s devices and network drive activities. The following was discovered:

a) Email exchanges found that during Dr. QIU’s PHAC-approved trip to Wuhan, China in September/October 2017, Dr. QIU discussed her application to the TTP with Vice-Director / Senior Scientist, WIV (Individual 1) of WIV and Restricted Visitor Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2) of WIV.

b) Email exchanges found that Dr. QIU received an invitation from the WIV to present to a group of 30 individuals at a biosafety workshop at WIV’s expense in October 2018. This workshop was not on the list of conferences attended by Dr. QIU declared in her PHAC-approved travel.

c) Email exchanges between Dr. QIU and the Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ BSL-3 lab (part of the Kunming Institute of Zoology (KIZ) in Wuhan, China) found Dr. QIU was being told that she should apply for the 2019 Annual International Talent Program (ITP) / Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) President’s International Fellowship Initiative.

d) Dr. QIU subsequently sent an email with her CV, an image of her Passport, an abstract for the initiative and a partially completed CAS ITP Application to an employee at KIZ in order for the employee to complete the application on her behalf. In the application, it was indicated that Dr. QIU would visit KIZ in 2019.

e) An application was filled by Dr. QIU for the Hebei Medical University High-Caliber Talent Bringing-In Agreement.

26. With respect to collaborating with foreign entities, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

a) With regard to the September/October 2017 PHAC-approved trip to Beijing/Shanghai, PHAC was aware of her personal travel during the approved trip. Dr. QIU stated she had taken a side trip to Wuhan to provide training but did not elaborate.

i. Dr. QIU later acknowledged that the trip to Wuhan from Beijing was paid for by the Wuhan Institute of Virology (airfare, hotel, meals) and that PHAC was not aware.
ii. Dr. QIU was invited by [Vice-Director / Senior Scientist, WIV (Individual 1)] to visit a lab in Wuhan but explained that PHAC was not made aware of this invitation. She accepted to stop at the lab on her return trip to Beijing.

b) With regards to a personal trip taken to Beijing, China in April 2018, Dr. QIU stated that she had gone to China to visit family but also stopped at a lab to test a virus for University of Manitoba on behalf of Beijing Institute of Biotechnology. Initially, Dr. QIU indicated that the trip was a personal trip (vacation) but when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged to being financially compensated for all expenses related to her trip to China and back to Canada by Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Incorporated.

c) With respect to the October 2018 trip to Wuhan, China, Dr. QIU stated that she had travelled to China on a personal vacation but when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged that the trip was paid for by WIV for a training session she delivered on biosafety. Dr. QIU also acknowledged to meeting with the Director of WIV during this trip.

d) With respect to collaborating on scientific research with foreign entities, Dr. QIU acknowledged co-authoring a research paper with the Chinese military when she replaced [Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCAH)] at the NML.

i. When confronted about her association with a foreign entity that co-authored the research paper, Dr. QIU stated not knowing the person other than by name.

ii. When presented with a photo of the individual, Dr. QIU did recognize the officer in uniform as the co-author. The officer in the photograph is a serving officer in the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), an organization linked to People’s Liberation Army of China.

iii. Dr. QIU also acknowledged that there was no CRA or MTA associated with this particular project.
19 October 2020

Dr. Keding CHENG

Review for Cause Report

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada
70 Columbine Driveway
Ottawa, Ontario  K1A 0K9

Dr. CHENG,

Enclosed please find a copy of the Review for Cause (RFC) Report, which sets out details gathered for the review process.

Prior to a decision being rendered on your eligibility to hold a reliability status and/or secret security clearance, you are invited to provide any clarifications or information that you feel have not been addressed in the report by end of day October 27, 2020. You are asked to provide these comments in writing to Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa at:...

Any submission received within the allotted timeframe will be taken into consideration before concluding the RFC process. If your comments are not received within the allotted timeframe, you will be deemed to be in agreement with the contents of the report and a decision will be based on the information at hand.

Maintaining a valid security status or clearance is a condition of employment. This RFC could result in administrative action up to and including the revocation of your reliability status and/or secret security clearance, which would lead to the administrative termination of your employment.

You are expected to keep all aspects pertaining to this RFC, including the existence and the contents of the attached report, strictly confidential. It is our expectation that you will keep confidential all information covered during your meeting with the employees from the National Security Management Division (NSMD) and that you will not share with anyone other than your union representative or legal counsel, the existence and content of the attached report. In addition, you are not to speak to any individuals who may participate or have participated in this process about the contents of their discussions with the staff of NSMD. You are reminded that your failure to maintain confidentiality or
to comply with these expectations could subject you to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.

Please note that the Employee Assistance Program is available to assist you at any time. They can be reached at 1-(800) 268-7708.

Respectfully,

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch / Chief Security Officer for the Public Health Agency of Canada

Date

Signature

cc: Executive Director, National Security Management Division, Corporate Services Branch, Deputy Chief Security Officer, PHAC, Ottawa

Att.

Report on Review for Cause of Security Status

Dr. Keding CHENG

RFC-2020-002

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA
OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Report date: October 19, 2020

CAN.PHAC.0001.0012
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I. PREAMBLE

1. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted a Review for Cause security process to assess Reliability and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty, as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS). The Review for Cause process is triggered by adverse information and is an assessment of an employee’s continued ability to hold a security status and/or clearance with the federal government of Canada and takes into consideration information collected during the fact finding, administrative investigation, security interviews, security application and other security assessments.

2. This Review for Cause was initiated as a result of adverse information communicated to PHAC by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) through secure means.

II. BACKGROUND

3. This Review for Cause applies to Dr. Keding CHENG, who occupies the following position and whose tasks and access are summarised as follows:

a) Job Title:

Biologist, Proteomics and Mass Spectrometry
Science Technology Core and Services Division
National Microbiology Laboratories (NML)
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

b) Duties and Access prior to suspension:

i. Conducts research related to infectious diseases, toxins and pathogens defined in the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) and associated regulations.

ii. Has had access to laboratories on the NML campus in Winnipeg.

iii. Has had unescorted access to Level 2 laboratories at NML.

iv. Has had access to PHAC internal drives, as defined in the PHAC Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard.
4. PHAC conducted a Security Administrative Investigation in 2019, which determined that a number of PHAC policies and the Government of Canada (GC) Policy on Government Security had been breached. The Administrative Investigation Report\(^1\) was provided to Dr. CHENG to allow him an opportunity to review and comment. Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC’s Deputy Chief Security Officer provided the Administrative Investigation Report to CSIS, which in turn conducted a security assessment.

5. CSIS performed a Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CSIS Act and the TBS SSS under the TBS Policy on Government Security. This assessment included a review of the Administrative Investigation Report and a forensic analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. CHENG. On 07 July 2020, CSIS also provided a written briefing summarizing the two interviews conducted with Dr. CHENG on 20 March 2020 & 19 June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns.

6. Subsequently, PHAC conducted further analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. CHENG as a PHAC employee, in the course of his duties at NML.

III. ADVERSE INFORMATION

7. As a result of the new information included in the CSIS Security Assessment and forensic analysis of the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s government assets, PHAC launched a Review for Cause to assess the security risk posed to the organization by activities involving Dr. CHENG.

8. The adverse information focused on three (3) areas of security concern. Specifically, concerns were raised with respect to Dr. CHENG regarding:
   a) Sharing Sensitive Information
   b) Unauthorized Access to NML
   c) Unauthorized Collaboration with External Entities

9. On 26 August 2020, [Redacted] (Senior Advisor, Security Screening) and [Redacted] (Manager, Security Operations Western Canada, Winnipeg) accompanied by [Redacted] (Manager, Security Screening – WPG) conducted a Review for Cause security interview with Dr. CHENG at the PHAC office at 391 York Street, Winnipeg, MB.

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Sharing Sensitive Information

10. With respect to sharing of sensitive information, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG used his personal email accounts and unauthorized external drives to conduct government business. For example:

a) Dr. CHENG stated that he asked Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] to save data in a folder and send it to Dr. CHENG using Gmail. Dr. CHENG frequently used his own personal Gmail account to send and receive work-related information.

b) Dr. CHENG used his personal Gmail to communicate with staff and Restricted Visitors on work-related information out of convenience despite having a Science Network computer with Web Office at home, assigned to him by PHAC.

c) Dr. CHENG acknowledged that his Restricted Visitors utilized Gmail to send and receive information of a scientific nature to him. Dr. CHENG also frequently corresponded using his personal Gmail account. He acknowledged using Gmail out of convenience because when he used his corporate account from home he was required to enter passwords.

d) A review of Dr. CHENG’s corporate work emails identified numerous occasions where corporate work emails were sent to and from his personal Gmail account.

e) Dr. CHENG shared his assigned encrypted USB device with a Restricted Visitor and provided the password to unlock the device.

f) Dr. CHENG acknowledged leaving the “bit password” displayed openly on a Corporate Network computer.

g) An examination of IT devices seized by PHAC uncovered a non-white listed terabyte hard drive in the lab that was connected to Dr. CHENG’s desktop computer, which was connected to the Scientific Network.

11. With respect to sharing of scientific data and research, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG provided Restricted Visitors access to the Scientific Network through a computer in the Laboratory. For example:

a) Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] stated that she could not access the computers in the lab, as she had no login credentials. Dr. CHENG would use his login to give her access to a computer and let her send experimental data to him.
b) Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] logged into her Gmail from the Science Network computer and sent data to him once he logged in and gave her access.

c) Dr. CHENG continued to allow Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] to have Science Network access on a frequent basis because according to him, he had no other choice.

d) According to Dr. CHENG, he let Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] onto the Science Network using his credentials to sign in to allow her access to the software; she needed to be able to finish her research work. He acknowledged that the Visiting Official Statement of Agreement directs that this was not permitted.

e) Dr. CHENG stated that he never approached his supervisor for assistance at any time to find a solution to avoid a Restricted Visitor being provided access to the Science Network. He said the bottom line is he did not see the risk and there is no damage.

12. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. CHENG has circumvented GC policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information as it pertains to assisting his spouse, Dr. Xiangguo QIU (Head of Vaccines and Antivirals at NML) in communications with foreign entities and in applications to foreign-sponsored talent programs.

13. With respect to sharing of sensitive information, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) The use of outside email for data transfer happened and was fairly prevalent.

b) The Restricted Visitors, students, researchers, etc… have no other means by which to share information.

c) According to him, the use of external means, is an accepted method at the NML.

d) Dr. CHENG: “logged into the computer and allowed them (Restricted Visitors) to use GMAIL”.

e) According to Dr. CHENG: “Visitors when they come here, they have no way of communicating. They can’t use China email. PHAC won’t give them an email. They are stuck there. So, I log into the computer and let them use Gmail.”

f) When pressed about assisting his spouse to communicate with foreign entities and organizations outside of PHAC, Dr. CHENG acknowledged that he did so on many occasions. He acknowledged that he assisted Dr. QIU in applications to foreign talent programs where he shared and amended these documents through email exchanges.
Unauthorized Access to NML

14. With respect to unauthorized access to NML, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG allowed Restricted Visitors to work in the laboratories unescorted and on at least two occasions did not prevent the unauthorized removal of laboratory materials from the NML.

a) In one instance, Restricted Visitor [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)] attempted to leave the NML with 10 tubes in two bags that he explained were destined for the University of Manitoba Laboratory, on the evening of 12 October 2018. He was accompanied by two other Restricted Visitors and a student with a secret clearance. The three Restricted Visitors were unescorted at the time they attempted to pass by the X-Ray commissionaire at the building’s reception area. The items were promptly returned to the laboratory by a Restricted Visitor [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)] because he did not need an escort to come and go from the NML facilities.

b) On another occasion, Dr. CHENG and Restricted Visitor [Restricted Visitor #3, CSCHAH] attempted to leave the NML with two Styrofoam containers on the evening of 31 October 2018. Dr. CHENG stated that the two containers were empty but the Commissionaire insisted that they not leave the premises. The items were promptly returned to the laboratory by Dr. CHENG.

c) Dr. CHENG acknowledged that: “by signing the Restricted Visitors into the lab, he assumes responsibility” and that: “leaving Restricted Visitors in the lab not being properly supervised / escorted; it is built on trust”.

15. With respect to allowing Restricted Visitors unescorted access to NML, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG acknowledged the following:

a) On a routine basis, Restricted Visitors were left in the NML without oversight or a security escort. There have been several instances of unescorted access at the NML.

b) Dr. CHENG routinely received Restricted Visitors, students and such. At the outset, he advised them of the rules. He provided them his cellular phone number and went about his business, working alone in his own area.

c) Dr. CHENG placed trust in the staff and visitors, but made a choice to focus on what he considered to constitute the areas of more concern and left the areas he considered of less concern to others.
16. With respect to allowing visitors to remove GC assets from a laboratory, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) He was not involved in the attempted removal and return of the vials in question, while records indicate that Dr. CHENG signed out the Restricted Visitor involved in this incident.

b) The Restricted Visitor was planning to take the vials out of his area of the laboratory in order to work over the weekend. When Restricted Visitors arrived at the security checkpoint, they were turned back and the vials were returned to the laboratory.

c) There may have been two other individuals with the Restricted Visitor.

d) This incident occurred late on a Friday afternoon, when the NML shipping/receiving was closed.

Unauthorized Collaboration with External Entities

17. With respect to collaborating with external entities, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG knowingly failed to obtain approval and authorisation for Collaborative Research Agreements (CRA).

a) In one case, Dr. CHENG did not disclose to his superiors or seek approval for a joint research project he conducted with a Chinese scientist over multiple years.

i. Dr. CHENG collaborated with a Director General of China’s Centre for Disease Control for three years, where research was conducted at the NML on a type of virus and its antidote. Management at NML were not aware of this project.

ii. According to [Scientific Director General, CSCHAH] at the time of the investigation): “if Dr. Keding CHENG was working outside of his scope of work, it would be to further his own scientific interest”.

iii. Dr. CHENG stated that the project (ongoing since 2017) was not worthy of a CRA because it was only an “exploratory project”. So he did not advise his supervisor. He also stated that the project: “would be outside his scope of work but it is out of self-interest” because it was linked to his hometown in China.

18. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. CHENG has willingly assisted Dr. QIU in collaborating with agencies of another country and has committed, on several occasions, to assisting his spouse Dr. QIU in applying to foreign talent programs.
19. PHAC collected information from the electronic content of Dr. CHENG's devices and network drive accounts. The data found that Dr. CHENG did not fill out an application for any talent program but rather assisted others in doing so.

20. With respect to collaborating with external entities, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) He welcomes any opportunity to collaborate with fellow scientists and is fully aware of external talent programs where subject matter experts are strongly sought out by science-based organizations to work on special projects.

b) He denied collaborating on research with any member of a foreign entity, until evidence was presented to him, at which time he recanted the denial and acknowledged his collaboration.

   i. Dr. CHENG acknowledged to working: "as a second author" on a paper with [redacted] of the Chinese Academy of Science (a known part of China's military branch), who also works for the Chinese Centre for Disease Control.

   ii. Dr. CHENG also acknowledged to collaborating with the Chinese Academy of Science and the Beijing Institute of Biology. According to him, the level of his collaboration has been at-arm’s-length.

21. With respect to applying to talent programs, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) He began an application with "Yellow River", which he believes to have been a talent program, though not specifically tied to the "Thousand Talents Program" (TTP) promoted by the Peoples’ Republic of China.

b) Dr. CHENG described the TTP in general, as a job application, like any other job application. It is to him a matter of "putting bread and butter on the table".

c) Dr. CHENG was able to accurately detail many aspects of the program; requirements, cost coverages, deliverables, etc... The level of detail indicates intricate knowledge of the process and the requirements of the program(s).

d) In one case, Dr. CHENG acknowledged to knowing about an application completed by his spouse, Dr. Xiangguo QIU; Head of Vaccines and Antivirals at NML. The
acknowledgement came only after being told of the evidence found in the electronic content of his files.

e) When pressed about assisting other people with applying to talent programs, Dr. CHENG denied doing so until shown evidence of him assisting his spouse (Dr. QIU) with an application. He then acknowledged that he did "help her many times" on applications.
Thank you for the response Qiu

I will be providing this to management for the next steps.

Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

Good evening Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

Please let me express my sincere gratitude to you and PHAC administration for the opportunity and consideration on the clarifications of the report. Please check attached for my comments.

The investigation has lasted for more than twenty months since the fact-finding time, and it’s certainly a new and deep learning process for me. Being a research scientist that almost pays no attention to politics, I have dedicated almost all my time to the beauty of science through hardworking and national and international collaborations, no TV watching, no time to take vacations. It was only during the investigation interview that I started to know some new words for me, such as “NATO”, “Spy”, and “espionage”. Before the investigation, I had spent all my time enjoying my achievement and trying to achieve more. I certainly owed my success to Canada, the most peaceful and multicultural country in the world, and I really felt proud as a Canadian. Thinking back, what happened in the past were purely due to the lacking of proper training, the misunderstanding and ignorance of the policies of PHAC that I should have spent more time to learn and ask. I sincerely hope you understand my situation.
I do wholeheartedly hope to have another opportunity to correct the inadvertent mistakes and continue to serve Canadians with my knowledge and expertise, especially in the current fight against COVID-19. Real action is more important than just words. Please believe me. I am confident that I can contribute to Canada.

Sincerely,

Xiangguo Qiu
Report on Review for Cause of Security Status

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu

NRC-2020-001

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA
OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Report dated: October 19, 2020
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Please note:

Current address of Xiangguo Qiu:

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[Redacted]
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The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted a Review for Change security process to assess Reliability, Loyalty and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty, as set out in the Treasury Board Standards (TBS) Policy on Government Security and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (S25). The Review for Change process is triggered by adverse information and is an assessment of an employee's continued ability to hold a security status and/or clearance with the federal government of Canada and take into consideration information collected during the fact-finding, administrative investigation, security interviews, security application and other security assessments.

This Review for Change was initiated as a result of adverse information communicated in PHAC by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) through secure means.

Background

This Review for Change applies to Dr. Khang Vuong, who occupies the following positions with the Agency and possession security clearance as follows:

- **Job Title**
  - Head, Vaccines and Antibiotics, National Microbiology Laboratories, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada

- **Duties and Access Prior to Suspension**
  - Conduct research related to bacterial, viral and mycobacterial infections in the human pathogens and notover the HPTA limit as assessment or pathogen.
  - Has had access to laboratories on the National Microbiology Laboratories (NML) campus in Winnipeg.
  - Has had unrestricted access to all laboratories at NML, which are designated in accordance with material defined in the HPTA.
1. PHAC conducted a Security Administration Investigation in 2019, which determined that a number of PHAC policies had been breached. The Administrative Investigation Report was provided to Dr. Qiu to allow her an opportunity to review and comment. Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC's Deputy Chief Security Officer provided the Administrative Investigation Report to CSIS, which in turn conducted a security assessment.

2. CSIS performed a Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CBSA Act and the TBS SSA under the TBS Policy on Government Security. This assessment included a review of the Administrative Investigation Report and a forensic analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. Qiu. On 30 June 2020, CSIS also provided a written briefing summarizing the two interviews conducted with Dr. Qiu on 19 March 2020 and 19 June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns.

3. Subsequently, PHAC conducted further analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. Qiu in the course of her duties at NML.

1. ADVERSE INFORMATION

2. As a result of the new information included in the CSIS Security Assessment and forensic analysis of the electronic content of Dr. Qiu's government assets, PHAC launched a Review for Cause to assess the security risk posed to the organization by activities involving Dr. Qiu.

3. The adverse information focused on three (3) areas of security concern, domestic and abroad:
   a. Sharing Sensitive Information and Assets
   b. Applications to External Talent Programs
   c. Association with Foreign Organizations

9. On 26 August 2020, [REDACTED] (Senior Advisor, Security Screening) and [REDACTED] (Manager, Security Screening) conducted a Review for Cause security interview with Dr. Qiu at the PHAC office at 391 York Street, Winnipeg, MB.
Comments on the Review for Cause Report

Sharing Sensitive Information and Assets

10. With respect to sharing sensitive information, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. Qiu used both her corporate and personal email accounts to conduct government business with PHAC Employee and Restricted Visitors that use Gmail account to communicate with her. For example:

a) Dr. QIU admits to sending several emails to [REDACTED] Gmail account instead of his corporate email account.

Comments: First of all, I wasn't aware of the email policy until July of 2019 due to the lack of proper training. Second, [REDACTED] was hired by my external funding via UM for the first year or two and he was working on UM site. So we had to communicate with his Gmail account for that period. There were several emails sent to his Gmail account after he moved to NML site and then he was given a corporate email account. Due to the default setup of the email system, his Gmail account was in the corporate system and the email went to his Gmail automatically when I typed his name. All the communications with [REDACTED] were research based experimental data processing and there was no sensitive information there.

b) An interview of a Restricted Visitor managed by Dr. QIU found that the majority of written communication between the Restricted Visitor and Dr. QIU regarding work of a scientific nature, was accomplished through personal email accounts instead of her corporate email account.

Comments: This is not true. There must be some errors/misunderstandings during the interview. I didn't communicate with any restricted visitors for work with my personal email accounts. In case there was one, it definitely an accident due to my busy schedule. I will follow the policy strictly in the future if there was an error.

c) The analysis of emails collected by PHAC Corporate Security contained numerous examples of Dr. QIU receiving and sending emails related to her work at NML from either her Gmail or Yahoo accounts to various PHAC employees.

Comments: Yes, those cases happened once or twice when I was on travel duty and my colleagues wanted to make sure I would receive the email they sent by sending to both my work email and personal email. Again, those communications are research based and there was no sensitive information there. I will follow the policy strictly in the future.

11. With respect to sharing sensitive assets, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. Qiu shipped materials outside of the NML without approval. For example:

a) Dr. QIU shipped antibodies outside of NML without authorization and /or a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) [REDACTED] Director Business Office (Intellectual Property Management) CSCHAH advised that the monoclonal antibodies shipped by DR. QIU are proprietary, licensed and should not have been shipped.

Comments: I knew there were policies regarding the MTA even though I had got neither training nor chances to read the policies. I did not know or read the IP policies until July of 2019 during the
investigation when I requested them. Even though, I had established numerous MTAs/CRA’s based on common sense and scientific principles during my work at NML for big projects which involved larger amounts of antibody shipments. For very small amount of research-related Ab shipment, I had permission from my supervisors (either Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) or

Chief, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, CSCHAH

b) When asked how many times Dr. QIU sent antibodies outside of NML without an MTA, DR. QIU stated she could not remember how many times but acknowledged it was more than once.

Comments: That’s true. Sharing small amount of reagents is very common among collaborators and I had permissions from my direct supervisors for those shipments.

c) In one instance, Dr. QIU did state that she sent antibodies to the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control without an MTA.

Comments: Yes, but I got permission of my supervisor, [Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) or Chief, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, CSCHAH] at that time, for some exploratory experiments.

d) When asked if she sent licensed antibodies to any other country other than China without a Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA) or MTA, Dr. QIU stated that she sent a very small amount of antibodies to the United Kingdom and the United States for testing.

Comments: I had permission from my supervisors (either Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) or

Chief, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, CSCHAH) for some exploratory tests. Later on when one collaborator requested bigger amount or the hybridoma clones, I refused before MTA was done.

12. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU has circumvented GC policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information and assets as it pertains to Dr. QIU exchanging emails and planning collaborations with persons outside of PHAC. More specifically, Dr. QIU associated with foreign institutions and transferred information and materials outside Canada that belong to PHAC.

Comments: This is not accurate. I have tried my best to follow the GC policies and guidelines during all the years of doing research in PHAC. However, I wasn’t provided any formal training and wasn’t aware of the details of the policies/guidelines regarding what information/material is sensitive or not. As a result, for example, I sent several emails to [e-mail]’s GMail account and received and sent a few emails from my personal email account when I was on travel duty; I sent small amount of antibodies to trusted collaborators without MTAs although I had my direct supervisors’ permission for the shipments. For most of the collaborations, [e-mail] had set up the projects and I just continued to finish up when he left NML in 2016. I wasn’t aware that I need to disclose my visiting professorship to PHAC. Even [Scientific Director General, CSCHAH] stated (during his interview of administrative investigation on September 19, 2019) that he was not aware of the requirements to submit a Conflict Interest Declaration when becoming an adjunct professor. These were all research-based collaborations and communications for the advancement of science and mutual interests of both NML and the potential collaborators.

13. With respect to sharing of sensitive information, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

a) When people send emails to her, she pays no attention to the manner of transmittal.
Comments: This is not accurate. I don’t recall I said anything like that. I did pay serious attention to my emails. I had hundreds of emails every day, and I have tried my best to handle them.

b) Dr. QIU has never read the terms and conditions that pop up upon logging into her computer. Whenever she starts her computer, she simply clicks “Yes” and has never read the acknowledgement.

Comments: This is true and was a mistake due to my busy schedules. I shouldn’t have done that and I have read the IT agreement carefully now and will not do it again.

c) She is certainly not the only one: “everyone does it”. Dr. Qiu also states that she is a scientist and too busy to bother with that.

Comments: This is not accurate. What I meant is that I am certainly not the only one, and a lot of people do it. However, I should have read the agreement before clicking “yes”. I feel sorry for that and I guarantee this won’t happen again.

14. With respect to sharing sensitive assets, it should be noted that shipments of viruses, pathogens, antibodies, etc. require approval through a PHAC MTA. The agreements are stipulated in the PHAC Intellectual Property Policy, which is in place to ensure that these types of shipments are performed securely and designated to a pre-approved recipient organization.

Comments: I knew MTAs are important and I have obtained numerous MTAs myself in the past for solid projects. For the small amount of research-based antibody shipments for exploratory tests without MTA in place, I did have permission from my Supervisors.

15. Regarding sensitive assets, during the security interview, when questioned about the shipping materials, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

a) Any transfer of viruses, pathogens, antibodies, etc. that were of substance, were covered under an MTA.

Comments: I don’t recall that I was asked about this question but I can see the statement was from the IP policy (I was provided the IP policy in July of 2019 and read it).

b) In the past, it was up to the scientist to determine whether an MTA was required and management would agree with that.

Comments: This is not true and I didn’t say that. What I said was about CRAs, not MTAs: decisions on the need for CRAs in the past are at the discretion of scientists due to the complexity of the science, and in fact I wasn’t clear about the guidelines on CRAs. I made the decision based on both common sense (practicality) and scientific principles. Research fails all the time and most of the time the collaborations were just for the production of a research paper. It is hard and not practical to get CRAs done for every project before solid work with visions, especially at the exploratory stage. Therefore, practically and scientifically, most scientists just test the ideas without CRA being done. If the idea fails, then just move on to other projects; if it works, then start a CRA. This is very common in any research lab. Management would agree with it. Actually, Scientific Director General, CSCHAH stated during his interview of the administrative investigation on August 6, 2019: "Scientists may explore ideas with partners they already know without a CRA, there is no universal..."
pivot point or starting point for a CRA. Testing for diagnostic and reference occurs all the time from
the trusted network through partners to do the testing without a CRA”.

16. When questioned about one instance where the actual transfer took place some months prior to the
MTA being finalized, Dr. Qiu indicated the following:

a) This is common practice at the NML.

Comments: This is not true. I don’t recall I was asked this question and don’t remember about the
instance. And I never said this is common practice at the NML. However, during the interview of
administrative investigation I did say that in theory MTAs are good for collaboration, but in common
practice most scientists are sharing small amount of exploratory-phase reagents with no big dollar value
without MTAs based on trust and common interest.

b) Decisions on the need for MTAs and Intellectual Property Designation are at the discretion of the
individual scientist, or group of scientists.

Comments: This is not true and I didn’t say this. What I said is as explained earlier: decisions on
the need for CRAs in the past were at the discretion of scientists due to the complexity of the
science and there wasn’t clear guideline on CRAs. Research fails all the time and most of the
time the collaborations just produce a research paper. It is hard and not practical to get CRAs
done for every project before the solid work starts, especially in the exploratory stage.
Therefore, practically and scientifically most scientists just test the ideas without CRA being
done. If the idea fails, then just move on to other ideas; if it works, then start the CRA with solid
data and vision. As for MTAs, during the interview of administrative investigation I did say that
in theory MTAs are good for collaboration, but in common practice most scientists are sharing
small amount of exploratory-phase reagents with no big dollar value without MTAs based on
trust and common interest. This was the common practice, and perhaps this was a part of the overall
systemic issues in PHAC where scientists do not properly follow all policies correctly. However, now that
I am fully aware of all the policies, I will ensure to abide by these policies properly and not resort to
common practice.

c) At times, the Intellectual Property Office is not consulted due to the time it takes to obtain
authorization.

Comments: It is true that MTA could take months or years to finish based on my experience.

Applications to External Talent Programs

17. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. Qiu collaborated with Agencies of another country
and was untruthful in responding to allegations that she has committed, on several occasions, to applying
to foreign talent programs.

Comments: This is not true. There were misunderstandings during the interview. I was asked if I got any
recognitions in China and I answered no as I wasn’t aware that the CSIS officer was asking about the
application of talented program(s) at first. I did not treat those applications as recognitions or “talent”
programs. I just treated them as normal short-term job applications.
18. PHAC collected information from the electronic content of DR. QIU’s devices and network drive activities. The data found the following:

a) Dr. QIU has applied to (and/or attempted to apply to) various talent programs in the past years and has collaborated with agencies of another country (i.e. Wuhan Institute of Virology or WIV), without PHAC authorization, in areas that are military in nature. For example, documents stored on Dr. QIU’s network drive accounts contained applications for more than one collaboration with organizations that are linked to a foreign government. Specifically, Dr. QIU applied to the people’s Republic of China (PRC) “Thousands Talent Program” (TPP).

Comments: This is not accurate. My collaboration with Wuhan was approved. Wuhan Institute of Virology is not military in nature based on my observations. It is purely a research institute for the advancement of science. “Thousands Talent Program” (TPP) was just a translation by foreign countries, and my understanding was that it was just a hiring plan for some experts. My collaborators had asked me if they could apply for short-term TPP on my behalf on China side, I agreed for them to apply. However, the application was rejected as the short term TPP was stopped and I didn’t get into the program. I thought this short term program would benefit both NML and WIV because I could stay in both NML and WIV for close collaborations. I wasn’t aware there are any policies/guidelines in PHAC regarding this, and no one has ever told me that one should get authorization for applying a TPP program as a job opportunity and win-win collaboration.

b) Dr. Qiu has stored applications to TPP in the electronic content of her device.

Comments: I did store applications to TPP in the electronic content of my device as I wasn’t aware of anything wrong regarding these applications, and I never tried to hide it. I thought it was one kind of collaboration (short term TPP) that I would ask for approval if it went through. However, none of the applications went through. In another word, I never got into any TPP program and I did not know I need to disclose for just applying a job (no one has ever told me to).

c) Dr. QIU was applying to assist PRC for the stated purpose of: “building the biosecurity platform for new and potential infectious disease research, in order to reach top levels domestically and achieve leading status internationally”.

Comments: I have not seen this statement before and I don’t know where this statement came from.

d) Dr. Qiu indicated in her TPP applications that she is a Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University.

Comments: Yes, I did have this honorary and nil-pay position.

e) In one research paper, in “tracked changes”, Dr. Qiu made a request to have her affiliation with the Institute of Military Veterinary, as subsidiary of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, removed from the document.

Comments: This is not true. The affiliation with the Institute of Military Veterinary that I requested to remove was for a student who was the first author since he was just a student there for training, not a military staff. It was not for me. I was never affiliated with that institute.
19. During the course of the forensic examination, several applications to the TTP were discovered within the electronic content of Dr. Qiu's GC devices and networks activities. This analysis found that Dr. Qiu listed the following qualifications in biographical sections of her application to the TTP:

a) Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University (this activity is listed on her curriculum Vitae from July 2018);

Comments: This is true. It's an honorary position and no payment is involved.

b) Visiting Research Fellow at the National Institute for Food and Drug Control (China) from January 2017;

Comments: This is true. It's an honorary position and the nil-pay term is over already.

c) Visiting Research Scientist at the WIV from Oct 2018;

Comments: This is true. It's an honorary position and no payment is involved.

d) Visiting Researcher for the National Institute for Food and Drug Control, China;

Comments: Again this is true. It's an honorary position and the nil-pay term is over already.

e) Visiting Professor for Beijing Institute of Biotechnology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences;

Comments: This is true. It's an honorary position and the nil-pay term is over already.

f) lead on the initiative "Chinese Academy of Science High End Nurturing Project" from May 2019 to June 2021.

Comments: My collaborators there used my name to apply their internal grant. I wasn't involved with any actual work there.

20. With respect to applying to external talent programs, during the security interview, Dr. Qiu indicated the following:

a) she herself never filled out an application;

b) any and all applications were filled out by others;

c) her information and photograph were inserted without her knowledge.

Comments: This is not correct. I did browse the application, and knew that my information (and photograph) were used for the applications of short-term TTP as a normal short-term job application and potential collaboration between NML and WIV. I saw nothing wrong with the application and I wasn't aware I need to disclose to PHAC about the application. I would have asked for approval from PHAC if the application had been successful.

21. In one case, after being presented with evidence from her electronic accounts, Dr. Qiu acknowledged that she knew about the application but maintained that she herself has no part in applying.

Comments: I did not see the evidence physically in the interview.

22. Dr. Qiu denied listing the credentials identified in Paragraph 19 above, in the biographical component of her applications to the TTP. However, when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. Qiu acknowledged knowing about the TTP. Dr. Qiu stated that she considered the biographical details to
be a list of collaborations that she performed with these institutions and did not require disclosure to PHAC.

**Comments:** This is not accurate. What I said was that the term was over already for visiting professor at Beijing Institute of Biotechnology and National Institute for Food and Drug Control. I did discuss about the visiting professorship with Scientific Director General. CSCHAH and I told them that some institutes in China would like to offer me visiting professorship and was told that it's OK as long as no payment was involved. I wasn't aware that I needed to disclose this information at that time. Even Scientific Director General, CSCHAH stated (during his interview of administrative investigation on September 19, 2019) that he is not aware of requirements to submit a Conflict Interest Declaration when becoming an adjunct professor.

23. When asked about tracked changes in her application for TTP, Dr. Qiu maintained that was done by a student on her behalf.

**Comments:** I don't recall that I was asked this question, and don't remember the details about the application. The application for TTP was done by a student on my behalf. I forwarded it to my husband for word checking.

**Association with Foreign Organizations**

24. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU has had numerous contacts with agencies of another country and was untruthful in interviews conducted by CSIS in describing her relationship with government agencies of another country.

**Comments:** This is not true. I did my best to answer the questions truthfully during the interviews. However, there were some misunderstandings during the interview due to the language barrier. For example, I did not realize that application of "Thousands Talent Program" (TPP) was a kind of recognition at the beginning, but the interview officer insisted on it. Therefore, this is a pure misunderstanding of the words used to describe TPP. I am just a pure scientist who has a passion on science. I am a proud Canadian and had contacts with many scientists all over the world on behalf of a Canadian, and I paid more attention to their ability to do science and collaborations, but did not care much about where they are from. All levels of management knew I have a lot collaborations including scientists from USA, UK, and China but no one had ever raised concern about which country I should collaborate and which I should not before the investigation. I owed my achievement to Canada, and all the works have been published in high profile journals with PHAC/NML as the place for the credits, and I never tried to hide anything. My understanding is that PHAC encourages both national and international collaborations for better health and living of Canadians. In fact, my collaborations have brought a lot of benefit to Canada.

25. PHAC collected information from the electronic content of Dr. QIU's device and network drive activities. The following was discovered:

a) Email exchanges found that during Dr. QIU's PHAC-approved trip to Wuhan, China in September/October 2017, Dr. QIU discussed her application to the TTP with [Vice-Director / Senior Scientist, WIV (Individual 1)] and [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)].

**Comment:** Sorry I don't remember this.
b) Email exchanges found that Dr. QIU received an invitation from the WIV to present to a group of 30 individuals at a biosafety workshop at WIV’s expense in October 2018. This workshop was not on the list of conferences attended by Dr. QIU declared in her approved travel.

Comments: The invitation came much later than my travel approval for the conference and the time for presentation fell during the conference in Wuhan. So I did the presentation but forgot to amend my travel activity which I should have done it. I will never do it again.

c) Email exchanges between Dr. QIU and the Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ BSL-3 lab (part of the Kunming Institute of Zoology (KIZ) in Wuhan, China) found Dr. Qiu was being told that she should apply for the 2019 Annual International Talent Program (ITP)/Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) president's International Fellowship Initiative.

Comments: This is true, but it was a good institute for future collaborations with NML.

d) Dr. QIU subsequently sent an email with her CV, an image of her Passport, an abstract for the initiative and a partially completed CAS ITP Application to an employee at KIZ in order for the employee to complete the application on her behalf. In the application, it was indicated that Dr. QIU would visit KIZ in 2019.

Comments: I did apply this initiative and the plan was that I would visit KIZ if the application got approved and I would ask PHAC to approve the travel. This is a normal process. However, the application was rejected. I would have asked for approval from PHAC if the application had been successful.

e) An application was filed by Dr. QIU for the Hebei Medical University High-Caliber Talent Bringing-In Agreement.

Comments: The application was filled by people from Hebei Medical University and there was a collaboration agreement which I turned down later as I am afraid of not being able to meet the requirements and decided to hold an adjunct appointment only as I did with University of Manitoba. Anyway the paper work for the adjunct position wasn't finalized before the investigation as I never signed and returned the contract (see pages 15-16). I did talk to [Scientific Director, General, CSCHAH] and [PHAC, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Director, CSCHAH] about it and was told it was OK as long as I don’t receive payment.

26. With respect to collaborating with foreign entities, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated the following:

a) With regard to the September/October 2017 PHAC-approved trip to Beijing/Shanghai, PHAC was aware of her personal travel during the approved trip. Dr. Qiu stated she had taken a side trip to Wuhan to provide training but did not elaborate.

i. Dr. Qiu later acknowledged that the trip to Wuhan from Beijing was paid for by the Wuhan Institute of Virology (airfare, hotel, meals) and that PHAC was not aware.

Comments: This is not accurate. The travel happened in the approved trip in March of 2017 for two conferences in Beijing and Shanghai in the same trip, not September/October 2017. After the Beijing meeting, I went to the second meeting in Shanghai and met [Scientific Director, General, CSCHAH] at the conference. She invited me to visit their Lab on my way back to Beijing and I accepted. The trip was just a visit and no training was provided. I did talk to management and [Scientific Director, General, CSCHAH] about this side visit when I was back to NML and this led to the training trip in September/October of 2017 which was also approved by PHAC.
ii. Dr. QIU was invited by [name] to visit a lab in Wuhan but explained that PHAC was not made aware of this invitation. She accepted to stop at the lab on her return trip to Beijing.

Comments: This is not accurate. I did talk to management when I was back to NML and this led to the training trip in September/October of 2017 which was also approved by PHAC.

b) With regards to a personal trip taken to Beijing, China in April 2018, Dr. Qiu stated that she had gone to China to visit family but also stopped at a lab to test a virus for University of Manitoba on behalf of Beijing Institute of Biotechnology. Initially Dr. QIU indicated that the trip was a personal trip (vacation) but when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged to being financially compensated for all expenses related to her trip to China and back to Canada by Tianjin Cansino Biotechnology Incorporated.

Comments: This side trip was for the discussion of their vaccine in Cansino. No virus was tested for University of Manitoba on behalf of Beijing Institute of Biotechnology. Tianjin Cansino Biotechnology incorporated just paid for the airfare of the trip. I should have made PHAC aware of this trip and I won’t do it again.

c) With respect to the October 2018 trip to Wuhan, China, Dr. QIU stated that she had traveled to China on a personal vacation but when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged that the trip was paid for by WIV for a training session she delivered on Biosafety. Dr. Qiu also acknowledged to meeting with the Director of WIV during the trip.

Comments: The statement on this part was totally wrong. First, this trip was a pure business trip (three conferences held in Wuhan, Shanghai and Beijing in October 2018, respectively) approved by PHAC. The international fare was paid by PHAC and the conference organizer paid the local fare, hotel and meals which were also approved by PHAC. The biosafety presentation invitation came after the approval of the conferences but the timing fell on the same period of the conference in Wuhan. I am sorry that I forget to amend the travel to include the part of biosafety seminar and get approval prior to the training. WIV offered to pay the cost for Wuhan part but I told them the conference would cover the expense. I believe they split the cost in the end. There was one-day gap between the conferences in Wuhan and Shanghai so I met some scientists from WIV including the director for discussion of further collaborations. This was approved by PHAC for the travel itinerary and I thought this would enhance the quality and efficiency of my trip.

d) With respect to collaborating scientific research with foreign entities, Dr. QIU acknowledged co-authoring a research paper with the Chinese military when she replaced [name] as [position] at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH)

i. When confronted about her association with a foreign entity that co-authored the research paper, Dr. Qiu stated not knowing the person other than by name.

Comments: True. I knew of the person by name via internet and her research papers online. The collaboration was directly set up with Beijing Mabworks Inc. by [name] I didn’t know the scientist's group from Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences was involved in the project until the submission of the research paper (the scientist’s name was put on the paper by collaborator of Beijing Mabworks Inc.) at the end stage of the collaboration.
ii. When presented with a photo of the individual, Dr. QIU did recognize the officer in uniform as the co-author. The officer in the photograph is a serving officer in the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), an organization linked to People’s Liberation Army of China.

Comments: True, I knew of the person by name via media but I never met this scientist in person.

iii. Dr. QIU also acknowledged that there was no CRA or MTA associated with this particular project.

Comments: This project was set up when [redacted] was the chief, so he was in charge for the project and he was the last and corresponding author on the paper. [redacted] even mentioned this collaboration in his interview with National Post on July 17, 2019.

Former Chief at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH)
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu  
National Microbiology Laboratory  
1015 Arlington Street  
Winnipeg, MB R3E5R2

Dear Dr. Qiu

I am pleased to offer you a nil-salaried appointment to Hebei Medical University as Adjunct Professor in the Department of Medical Microbiology. Your appointment will be for the period beginning on July 1, 2019 and ending on June 30, 2021.

Your appointment is governed by the by-laws, rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and practices of Hebei Medical University in effect from July 1, 2019 and ending on June 30, 2021, including those related to research and/or scholarly activity.

As an Adjunct Professor, you will be expected to fulfill the following duties:

- Participating in the formulation and execution of graduate studies policy in the department/unit.
- Participating in teaching sessions within graduate courses
- Providing advice on the choice of thesis/practicum topic for graduate students at a standard consistent with the philosophy and practice of the department/unit.
- Maintaining a high level of research during the appointment, and,
- Acknowledging your affiliation with the sponsoring department/unit at Hebei Medical University in all publications and scholarly works resulting from the Adjunct appointment.

The terms and conditions stated in this letter constitute the only obligations to be undertaken by the University in respect of this appointment.

If you are willing to accept this appointment, please sign one copy of this letter and retain the other copy for your files.

If you have any further questions or require additional assistance, please do not hesitate to contact Director of the International Office, Hebei Medical University (Individual 20).

We are glad you are considering this opportunity and look forward to your participation in the Hebei Medical University. I extend to you a very warm welcome.

Sincerely,
I accept this offer of appointment dated 20 December 2018 on the terms and conditions specified in this letter. I understand that the terms and conditions of my appointment as stated in this letter are the only obligations of Hebei Medical University to me with respect to this appointment.

__________________________
Signature

__________________________
Date
Good morning Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

It has been five weeks since I sent you my comments, and more than three months since my salary was stopped. My family has reached an extremely difficult financial situation. Could you please give me the update on your side?

Thanks,

Keding Cheng,

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 26, 2020, at 2:59 PM, Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa wrote:

Thank you Keding

I will review your feedback and share it with the security teams as necessary (need-to-know). You will have a departmental response as soon as all needing to know and having decision-making capacity have had their collective input.

Good morning Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

From: keding.cheng@hc-sc.gc.ca
Sent: 2020-10-26 11:53 AM
To: (HC/SC) Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa
Subject: comments on the report
Please help me convey my sincere gratitude to PHAC management for giving me the opportunity and consideration on the clarifications of the report. And thank you for your time and effort. Attached are my comments, and please check.

Each round of investigation is a learning process for me. Over the past 20 months I have been repeatedly reading PHAC policies and guidelines I requested, and thinking deeply about those mistakes I have made. Some guidelines are the first time for me to read in detail.

For a passion of science and a personal character of being straightforward but easygoing and proud of my expertise in some areas, I tried to offer help to everyone at NML, including colleagues and restricted visitors. Due to this, some inadvertent mistakes have been made. For example, using personal email for data transfer, and leaving restricted visitors alone and to rescue other labs occasionally. Although I paid close attention to lab security and safety to start with, these mistakes should not have been made. On the other hand, as I told you in the last interview, I am a proud Canadian, and I am a strong defender of Canadian values, not even being afraid of some “informal leaders” who have violated some rules. Although some mistakes have already been corrected after the fact finding, I certainly should have done a better job. I sincerely hope you understand my points.

I do sincerely wish to have another opportunity to show my actions with a new face and continue to serve Canadians with my knowledge and expertise, especially in the current fight against COVID-19. I think my colleagues are still waiting for me to crack some technical difficulties during their daily work. Please give me another chance to be a proud Canadian again.

Sincerely,

Keding Cheng

Tel: [number]
Comments By Keding Cheng

Report on Review for Cause of Security Status

Dr. Keding CHENG

RFC 2020-002

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Report Date: October 19, 2020
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Please note:

Current address of Keding Cheng:
1. **PREAMBLE**

1. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted a Review for Cause security process to assess Reliability and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty, as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS). The Review for Cause process is triggered by adverse information and is an assessment of an employee's continued ability to hold a security status and/or clearance with the federal government of Canada and takes into consideration information collected during the fact finding, administrative investigation, security interviews, security application and other security assessments.

2. This Review for Cause was initiated as a result of adverse information communicated to PHAC by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) through secure means.

**BACKGROUND**

3. This Review for Cause applies to Dr. King-Ying CHEUNG, who occupies the following position and whose tasks and access are summarized as follows:

   **Job Title:**
   
   Biologist,Proteomics and Mass Spectrometry  
   Science Technology,Core and Services Division  
   National Microbiology Laboratory (NML)  
   Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch  
   Public Health Agency of Canada

Comments: My current position was a biologist in Monoclonal Antibody section since year 2016, recommended by my supervisor to fight emerging pathogens such as COVID-19. Before this I was in Prion section from year 2010 to 2016, and I had created a nation-wide method for sCJD diagnosis, first ante-mortem method in Canada. Prion section still needs my technical help in urgent situations on protein purification process. I did stay in Proteomics and Mass spectrometry section from year 2006 to 2010.
Duties and Access prior to suspension

i. Conducts research related to infectious diseases, toxins and pathogens defined in the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) and associated regulations.

ii. Has had access to laboratories on the NML campus in Winnipeg.

iii. Has had unescorted access to Level 2 laboratories at NML.

iv. Has had access to PHAC internal drives, as defined in the PHAC Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Networks Standard.

Comments: All PHAC internal drives are differently coded for different sections, and I can only have access to my own section, not any other sections unless I apply the access with management approval.
4. PHAC conducted a Security Administrative Investigation in 2019, which determined that a number of PHAC policies and the Government of Canada (GC) Policy on Government Security had been breached. The Administrative Investigation Report was provided to Dr. CHENG to allow him an opportunity to review and comment. Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC's Deputy Chief Security Officer provided the Administrative Investigation Report to CSIS, which in turn conducted a security assessment.

5. CSIS performed a Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CSIS Act and the TBS SSS under the TBS Policy on Government Security. This assessment included a review of the Administrative Investigation Report and a forensic analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. CHENG. On 07 July 2020, CSIS also provided a written briefing summarising the two interviews conducted with Dr. CHENG on 20 March 2020 & 19 June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns.

6. Subsequently, PHAC conducted further analysis of the electronic content of GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. CHENG as a PHAC employee, in the course of his duties at NML.

III. ADVERSE INFORMATION

7. As a result of the new information included in the CSIS Security Assessment and forensic analysis of the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s government assets, PHAC launched a Review for Cause to assess the security risk posed to the organization by activities involving Dr. CHENG.

8. The adverse information focused on three (3) areas of security concern. Specifically, concerns were raised with respect to Dr. CHENG regarding:
   a) Sharing Sensitive Information
   b) Unauthorized Access to NML
   c) Unauthorized Collaboration with External Entities

9. On 26 August 2020, [redacted] (Senior Advisor, Security Screening) and [redacted] (Manager, Security Screening – WPG) conducted a Review for Cause security interview with Dr. CHENG at the PHAC office at 391 York Street, Winnipeg, MB.

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Sharing Sensitive Information

10. With respect to sharing of sensitive information, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG used his personal Gmail accounts and unauthorized external drives to conduct government business. For example:

a) Dr. CHENG stated that he asked Restricted Visitor #2, CSCAH to save data in a folder and send it to Dr. CHENG using Gmail. Dr. CHENG frequently used his own personal Gmail account to send and receive work-related information.

Comment: Although it is a mistake, the Gmail communications are mainly for raw data transfer and processing, not for sensitive information. Nobody told me that experimental data are sensitive information. PHAC IT policy even allows non-sensitive information to be stored in a cloud-based storage place. The experimental data were all for the excellence of science and publications at NML. When [redacted] was leaving, our IT security manager even actively suggested me to give [redacted] some protocols that were related to our projects, and in the Visiting Official Statement Agreement, it was clear that the data can be shared. How can she share these stuff without an email access or USB?

b) Dr. CHENG used his personal Gmail to communicate with staff and Restricted Visitors on work-related information out of convenience despite having a Science Network computer with Web Office at home, assigned to him by PHAC

Comment: Again, the Gmail communications are bad habit, but mainly for raw data transfer and processing between me and the visiting scientist, not for sensitive information. My own work-related information, especially personal information, are still communicated through corporate network and Web Office.

c) Dr. CHENG acknowledged that his Restricted Visitors utilized Gmail to send and receive information of a scientific nature to him. Dr. CHENG also frequently corresponded using his personal Gmail account. He acknowledged using Gmail out of convenience because when he used his corporate account from home he was required to enter passwords.

Comment: It's true, and again the Gmail communications are mainly for raw data transfer and processing between me and the visiting scientist, not for sensitive information. Also some data are too big in size or not accessible through corporate network because all the software for database search and the related results were all in Science network. They are very big (gigabit size) to be transferred through corporate network.
d) A review of Dr. CHENG’s corporate work emails identified numerous occasions where corporate work emails were sent to and from his personal Gmail account.

Comment: It’s true and it is a mistake based on PHAC IT policy Again, the Gmail communications are mainly for raw data transfer and processing due to the nature of the projects and related big size on raw data. I have promised to ADM that I will never do this again.

e) Dr. CHENG shared his assigned encrypted USB device with a Restricted Visitor and provided the password to unlock the device.

Comment: The restricted visitors were once given an USB to use a few years ago, but later the policy was changed without notice. How can he/she save/transfer raw data in gigabit size without an USB?

f) Dr. CHENG acknowledged leaving the “bit password” displayed openly on a Corporate Network computer.

Comment: It was a mistake, but there was a second layer of password to log in to the computer, and nobody logged in on that computer except me on those few days. The mistake was quickly corrected even before fact-finding.

g) An examination of IT devices seized by PHAC uncovered a non-white listed terabyte hard drive in the lab that was connected to Dr. CHENG’s desktop computer, which was connected to the Scientific Network.

Comment: It’s true, but the IT people should have known this and warned me if it was not appropriate. It was the IT people who transferred and reinstalled the computer for me from another room, including the hard drive. The hard drive was mainly used for data storage due to the nature of my work with gigabit size data collected every day.
11. With respect to sharing of scientific data and research, during the course of the 
Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG provided Restricted Visitors 
access to the Scientific Network through a computer in the Laboratory. For example: 

a) Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] stated that she could not access the computers in the lab 
as she had no login credentials. Dr. CHENG would use his login to give her access to a 
computer and let her send experimental data to him. 

Comment: That's true. She had the access to Science Network under my close supervision, 
but she has no access or right to those drives because those drive are coded. Please help me 
to ask the related PHAC people: you allow the visiting scientist to come to PHAC for 
training and doing a research project for mutual interests, but you do not let him/her use 
internet, you do not give him/her an email account, how can he/she be notified for medical 
checkup to work in PHAC safely? and how can you notify them for bio-safety training to 
work in a lab safely? Where do they collect and store their gigabit size data? 

By the way, PHAC IT Security Standard on "acceptable use of electronic devices and 
networks standard" (Version 2.0, 2018) does allow storing/transferring non-classified data 
in a cloud-based storage place. Here is the quoted policy: "Please note that only non- 
sensitive information may be transferred to, or stored on external cloud-based sites" 
(quoted from item 5.1.2, Web 2.0 Tools and Social Media, on page 8). So you can store 
your non-sensitive data in a cloud-based storage place, but by what method?

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b) Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] logged into her Gmail from the Science Network 
computer and sent data to him once he logged in and gave her access. 

Comment: That's true. It's a mistake and I will never do it again, but it's for scientific 
research only with cloud-based data processing already (server in England) under my 
supervision.

c) Dr. CHENG continued to allow Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] to have Science 
Network access on a frequent basis because according to him, he had no other choice.

Comment: That's true. It's a mistake based on PHAC policy, but it's for scientific 
research only under my supervision to make sure it's safe and work to be done.
d) According to Dr. CHENG, he let Restricted Visitor [redacted] onto the Science Network using his credentials to sign in to allow her access to the software; she needed to be able to finish her research work. He acknowledged that the Visiting Official Statement of Agreement directs that this was not permitted.

Comment: Let's make this clearer: I used my credentials to sign in and open the software, and she used the software to process the data under my supervision. The Visiting Official Statement does indicate that the scientific data can be shared, but how could she do this without an email or USB? It does suggest using a standalone computer to process data, but this is not realistic for my projects involving software server search engine centered in England through internet.

e) Dr. CHENG stated that he never approached his supervisor for assistance at any time to find a solution to avoid a Restricted Visitor being provided access to the Science Network. He said the bottom line is he did not see the risk and there is no damage.

Comment: That's true. My supervisor went to the lab many times, and I thought he knew my projects and what the visitor was doing in front of a computer, but he never inquired the using the network by the restricted visitors since using computer and network to store and process data is a very necessary and common thing in the lab to run my projects.

By the way, our IT people indicated that external collaborators, at times, have access to the Science Network and there are approximately 60 external users. They need proper clearances. So if external collaborators can have access to Science Networks, why not restricted visitors who already had reliability security status and was physically working at NML under close supervision? This is very confusing.

12. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. CHENG has circumvented GC policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information as it pertains to assisting his spouse, Dr. Xiangguo QIU (Head of Vaccines and Antivirals at NML) in communications with foreign entities and in applications to foreign-sponsored talent programs.

Comment: This is not accurate. I did not circumvent GC policies, but did help my wife to apply for some jobs by polishing/correcting the application. I never had direct communication with foreign entities. These activities are for the bread-and-butter of our family. I was not aware of any sensitive information involved. Applying a job is very common among our Canadians.
13. With respect to sharing of sensitive information, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) The use of outside email for data transfer happened and was fairly prevalent.

Comment: That's true. Here are examples from my earlier supervisor. See how many people using personal emails on the snapshots on the next two pages. Some users are lab chief and/or high rank research scientist.

To help us stay connected at ASMS, I suggest we use Kik. Kik is a free app for BB, iPhone, and Android that will allow us to instant message (IM) better than email for chatting.

Send me a message if you are game.
mass spectrometry and proteomics meeting this Wednesday at 10 AM in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Email</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Science Technology Cores and Services Division, CSCHAH</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Scientist #1, CSCHAH</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHAC Employee #1, CSCHAH</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PhD Student #1, CSCHAH</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technician #2, CSCHAH</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former PHAC Employee, Winnipeg</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<td>Technical Staff #1, CSCHAH</td>
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<td>Biologist, CSCHAH</td>
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<td>Technical Staff #2, CSCHAH</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2011 12:20 PM
b) The Restricted Visitors, students, researchers, etc... have no other means by which to share information.

Comments: That's true. They did not have codes for internal drives on Science Networks. Again, the Visiting Official Statement does indicate that the scientific data can be shared, but how could the data be shared without an email or USB?

c) According to him, the use of external means, is an accepted method at the NML.

Comments: That's true. Please check the snapshots on previous pages. It's a real fact.

d) Dr. CHENG: "logged into the computer and allowed them (Restricted Visitors) to use GMAIL."

Comments: Yes, but again, I will not do this again and will ask the management on how to find an appropriate way, but this is for data transfer/processing only by the visitors, not for communications on personal and sensitive information.

c) According to Dr. CHENG: "Visitors when they come here, they have no way of communicating. They can't use China email, PHAC won't give them an email. They are stuck there. So, I log into the computer and let them use Gmail."

Comments: That's true. Again, this is for data transfer/processing under my supervision only. My intention was purely for work to be done safely and efficiently.

f) When pressed about assisting his spouse to communicate with foreign entities and organizations outside of PHAC, Dr. CHENG acknowledged that he did so on many occasions. He acknowledged that he assisted Dr. QIU in applications to foreign talent programs where he shared and amended these documents through email exchanges.

Comments: That's true. Again, this is for bread and butter of my family.

By the way, I have worked in NML for 14 years, and nobody has indicated which is sensitive information, and which is not. In an interview to our former Scientific Director General [redacted] by Science Magazine last year, he said "There is nothing highly secret there (NML), and all the work gets published in the open literature," and he also said "I don't know what anyone would hope to gain by spying." This was also my understanding when I started my work at NML under his leadership many years ago. We
worked hard for the beauty of science and the mandate of PHAC for better health of all Canadians.

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Unauthorized Access to NML

14. With respect to unauthorized access to NML, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG allowed Restricted Visitors to work in the laboratories unescorted and on at least two occasions did not prevent the unauthorized removal of laboratory materials from the NML.

a) In one instance, Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] attempted to leave the NML with 10 tubes in two bags that he explained were destined for the University of Manitoba Laboratory, on the evening of 12 October 2018. He was accompanied by two other Restricted Visitors and a student with a secret clearance. The three Restricted Visitors were unescorted at the time they attempted to pass by the X-Ray commissioner at the building's reception area. The items were promptly returned to the laboratory by [REDACTED] because he did not need an escort to come and go from the NML facilities.

Comments: This is not accurate. I was not [REDACTED] supervisor and was not involved with his Oct 12 case at all. It was on Feb fact-finding that I found the case. On Oct 12, 2018, [REDACTED] was with one restricted visitor [REDACTED], not two others, and a student called [REDACTED] who had the security clearance and was allowed to escort them out (please check the daily sign-out records). They did not attempt to pass by (absolutely impossible since they had to show their IDs), but politely showed the security staff with their IDs.

[REDACTED] told me clearly that he openly told the security staff that he needed the unopened, sealed, and sterilized tubes urgently for the weekend work in the University lab, but the security staff refused, so [REDACTED] the only guy who had the security clearance, brought the tubes back to Dr Qiu’s lab, leaving the restricted visitors at the security (X-ray machine) waiting for [REDACTED] to come back. In the meantime, I went out to go home, and saw [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at the X-ray machine, so I signed them out, without knowing what had happened before. Please check the video recording to confirm the truth. By the way, I do know that taking non-hazardous stuff through the gate did happen for other lab employees at NML in an urgent situation once for a while. For example, a few years ago I saw one student [REDACTED] take methanol (4 litter bottle) through the gate, and when we have product show, lot
of people take free sample materials (tubes, racks...) from the vendors (Fisher, VWR, Invitrogen...) through the gate. We just show security that there is no risk.

b) On another occasion, Dr. CHENG and Restricted Visitor [REDACTED] attempted to leave the NML with two Styrofoam containers on the evening of 31 October 2018. Dr. CHENG stated that the two containers were empty but the Commissioner insisted that they not leave the premises. The items were promptly returned to the laboratory by Dr. CHENG.

Comments: This is not accurate either. I took the Styrofoam boxes from the recycling bin in the hallway, not the lab, with my acknowledgement, on our way home (I was escorting her and another visitor) on Oct 31, 2018. Since everyone can remove stuff from recycling bin, and she asked me whether she could take one Styrofoam box for storage. I told her to leave the box open and let the security staff check it, so we politely let the security check the box at the X-ray machine. Unfortunately the security did not allow her to take the non-hazardous box out, so I put the box back to the recycling bin, not the lab. Please check the camera recording for the truth. It was during the fact finding that I started to know that you can take anything from the recycling except Styrofoam box.

c) Dr. CHENG acknowledged that: “by signing the Restricted Visitors into the lab, he assumes responsibility” and that: “leaving Restricted Visitors in the lab not being properly supervised / escorted; it is built on trust”.

Comments: This is true, and I did take the responsibility seriously. I did trust the visitors after serious training on them. They are as trustworthy as many NML staff. The reason I left them not being escorted occasionally was due to an emergency situation to rescue other labs based on my expertise. This “left-alone” problem had already been corrected after fact-finding, and I never left her alone since then.

15. With respect to allowing Restricted Visitors unescorted access to NML, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG acknowledged the following:

a) On a routine basis, Restricted Visitors were left in the NML without oversight or a security escort. There have been several instances of unescorted access at the NML.
Comments: This is not true. There was never a routine basis to leave them alone unless they wanted to go to bathroom. Leaving them alone in the lab only happened on an urgent basis to rescue other labs occasionally.

There are many visitors in NML everyday and I was not responsible for all of them.

b) Dr. CHENG routinely received Restricted Visitors, students and such. At the outset, he advised them of the rules. He provided them his cellular phone number and went about his business, working alone in his own area.

Comments: This is not accurate. I provided my cellular phone number for the lab that only needed my urgent help and expertise in emergent situations to rescue them, not for the visitors. Please call Lab Manager, Cschah, lab manager, Tel [redacted] in Prion Group where the urgent help was provided by me. She was the one I gave my cellular phone number. Visitors rarely worked alone. They sat side-by-side with me routinely and they do not need my cellular phone number in the lab where I watched them almost all the time.

c) Dr. CHENG placed trust in the staff and visitors, but made a choice to focus on what he considered to constitute the areas of more concern and left the areas he considered of less concern to others.

Comments: This is not accurate either. I only left the visitors not being escorted occasionally in an emergency situation to rescue other labs, and this “left-alone” problem had already been corrected after fact-finding, and I never left them alone since then.

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16. With respect to allowing visitors to remove GC assets from a laboratory, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) He was not involved in the attempted removal and return of the vials in question, while records indicate that Dr. CHENG signed out the Restricted Visitor involved in this incident.
Comments: This has been explained earlier. I did sign the restricted visitors out, but I did not know what had happened before this. Nobody told me until the fact-finding time. Please check the video camera records for the truth.

b) The Restricted Visitor was planning to take the vials out of his area of the laboratory in order to work over the weekend. When Restricted Visitors arrived at the security checkpoint, they were turned back and the vials were returned to the laboratory.

Comments: This is true. As explained earlier, the restricted visitor [REDACTED] showed the non-hazardous vials (unopened packages of centrifuge tubes) to the security politely, indicating an urgent use over the weekend, and the shipping and receiving door (normal place to bring stuff out) was already closed on that Friday evening, but unfortunately he was refused by the security, and [REDACTED] took the vials back to the lab.

c) There may have been two other individuals with the Restricted Visitor.

Comments: This is true. Like I explained earlier, [REDACTED], the student with security clearance and was allowed to escort restricted visitors out, and [REDACTED] another visitor, were with [REDACTED] who brought the sterilized unopened tubes for weekend use.

d) This incident occurred late on a Friday afternoon, when the NML shipping/receiving was closed.

Comments: This is true, as explained earlier. That's why [REDACTED] brought the tubes with him through the security check, hoping to be allowed in an emergency situation.
Unauthorized Collaboration with External Entities

17. With respect to collaborating with external entities, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG knowingly failed to obtain approval and authorisation for Collaborative Research Agreements (CRA).

a) In one case, Dr. CHENG did not disclose to his superiors or seek approval for a joint research project he conducted with a Chinese scientist over multiple years.

i. Dr. CHENG collaborated with [Individual 24], Director General of China's Centre for Disease Control for three years, where research was conducted at the NML on a type of virus and its antidote. Management at NML were not aware of this project.

Comments: This is not true. [Individual 25] from Henan provincial CDC, not China CDC, came here to give a talk and discuss the project in July 2017. My earlier supervisor, [Individual 24] and my supervisor at that time, [Individual 24] together with many scientists, were all notified for the talk and next-day round table meeting in the main board room. Later we invited [Individual 24] to have lunch together with the visiting team from

Henan Provincial CDC (Individual 25)

After [Individual 25] visit, his chief technician, [Restricted Visitor #5, CSCHAH] did some exploratory experiment in NML in the summer 2018. Then the work was stopped due the lack of manpower and other more prioritized projects. So this exploratory work was only do for a few months, not multiple years.
ii. According to [Redacted], Scientific Director General, CSCHAH at the time of the investigation: “if Dr. Keding CHENG was working outside of his scope of work, it would be to further his own scientific interest”.

iii. Dr. CHENG stated that the project (ongoing since 2017) was not worthy of a CRA because it was only an “exploratory project”. So he did not advise his supervisor. He also stated that the project: “would be outside his scope of work but it is out of self-interest” because it was linked to his hometown in China.

Comments: These comment are not accurate. This virus was also found in USA several years ago, and it was out of mutual interests of Canada and my hometown in China to deal with emerging pathogens. I did not submit for a CRA because China side couldn’t send the virus to start a solid collaboration. Since it was not a close collaboration any more, and “we” (NML) can also do the project independently through collaborations with USA, as suggested and promised by [Redacted] at NML to get the virus from USA, there was no point to do a CRA with China side at this exploratory stage because nothing was solid. If there is a collaboration in the future, there will be a CRA but “we” are not there yet, and in case there is a CRA to be done, it will be done by [Redacted] for Dr Qiu,
not me, since I am not a PI, and I have no capacity to handle the virus in our lab. The virus has to be handled in high containment lab.

18. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. CHENG has willingly assisted Dr. QIU in collaborating with agencies of another country and has committed, on several occasions, to assisting his spouse Dr. QIU in applying to foreign talent programs.

Comments: Again this is for bread and butter of my family. I helped her for spelling and word check on several applications, but I was never involved with her collaborations with agencies of another country. I am just a biologist, not a PI.

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19. PHAC collected information from the electronic content of Dr. CHENG's devices and network drive accounts. The data found that Dr. CHENG did not fill out an application for any talent program but rather assisted others in doing so.

Comments: True. This proved that what I just said was true.

20. With respect to collaborating with external entities, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) He welcomes any opportunity to collaborate with fellow scientists and is fully aware of external talent programs where subject matter experts are strongly sought out by science-based organizations to work on special projects.

Comments: This is not accurate. I welcome any opportunities to collaborate with fellow scientists at NML, not outsiders. This was what my supervisor told me. I did not dig much about external talent programs, and again helping my wife to apply a job is for the bread and butter of my family was regarded as a normal thing for me.
Dr. CHEUNG acknowledged to working: "as a second author" on a paper with [redacted] of the Chinese Academy of Science (a known part of China's military branch), who also works for the Chinese Centre for Disease Control.

Comments: This is not accurate. My understanding was that the Chinese Academy of Science is like NRC in Canada, NIH in USA, or MRC in England. [individual 17] was a world-famous scientist, and he was invited by NML to give a talk several years ago on behalf the Chinese Academy of Science and China CDC. He intended to collaborate with NML through [redacted] and started a project with [redacted] on Ebola virus. I was not the principle investigator of the project that was related to the later openly-published paper, and only did some experiment without knowing that the experiment was related to collaborations with China. I was not the second author in the paper either (please double check). When [redacted] left NML, Dr Qiu carried on the project. The result of this openly collaborated project was also posted on the wall of the hallway near Dr Qiu’s lab, and everybody knows. It’s for the beauty of science with open mind and transparency. So far there have been several publications involving several scientists/staff member at NML on this project over several years.

Dr. CHEUNG also acknowledged to collaborating with the Chinese Academy of Science and the Beijing Institute of Biology. According to him, the level of his collaboration has been at-arm’s-length.

Comments: This is not true. I never collaborated with Chinese Academy of Science and the Beijing Institute of Biology. Putting me in the author list did not mean I collaborate with them. It only meant I contributed to the project within NML. I don’t know where the sentence of “his collaboration has been at-arm’s-length” came from. I was a biologist, not a research scientist, I knew my duty, and when I was asked to do some experiment at NML to help people out, I will do it. This did not mean I collaborated with China. I am not in a rank to do direct external collaborations. They have to be through my supervisor or some other PIs in NML. This is what I did for the virus project with my home province.
21. With respect to applying to talent programs, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated the following:

a) He began an application with “Yellow River”, which he believes to have been a talent program, though not specifically tied to the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP) promoted by the Peoples’ Republic of China.

Comments: This is true. “Yellow River” program is for hiring some professors in Henan province, nothing to do with TTP. By the way, I checked my emails repeatedly recently, and I did not find any record of applying for “Yellow River”. It might be some proposals long time ago, but I never really did the application in the end.

b) Dr. CHENG described the TTP in general, as a job application, like any other job application. It is to him a matter of “putting bread and butter on the table”.

Comments: This is true. I have also applied more than ten jobs in Canadian government sectors such as Health Canada and Agriculture Canada.

c) Dr. CHENG was able to accurately detail many aspects of the program requirements, cost coverages, deliverables, etc... The level of detail indicates intricate knowledge of the process and the requirements of the program(s).

Comments: This is true. The information could be found easily from internet several years ago, but the program has already been stopped due to foreign complaints recently.

d) In one case, Dr. CHENG acknowledged to knowing about an application completed by his spouse, Dr. Xiangguo QIU, Head of Vaccines and Antivirals at NML. The acknowledgement came only after being told of the evidence found in the electronic content of his files.

Comments: This is true. The information I was given at the beginning was very confusing. It had been a while, and even now I couldn’t remember exactly what I did. Applying for job opportunities within Canada and overseas was quite frequent for me in recent years. During the investigation, I was told about the evidence, but I was not shown the evidence physically at the meeting, and even now I can’t recall what it was.
c) When pressed about assisting other people with applying to talent programs, Dr. CHENG denied doing so until shown evidence of him assisting his spouse (Dr. QIU) with an application. He then acknowledged that he did "help her many times" on applications.

Comments: This is not accurate. When I was asked whether I applied the talent programs, I denied stubbornly because I never did it, but when I was asked whether I helped other people or not, I suddenly realized the confusion and the key part of the question, and immediately admitted that I did help my wife several times for job applications (witnessed by my union representative).
Report on Review for Cause of Security Status

Dr. Xiangguo QIU

RFC-2020-001

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Report date: 30 November 2020
I. PREAMBLE

1. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted a Review for Cause to assess Reliability, Loyalty and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty, as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS). The Review for Cause process is triggered by adverse information and is an assessment of an employee’s continued ability to hold a security status and/or clearance with the Government of Canada and takes into consideration information collected during the fact finding, Administrative Investigation, security interviews, and other security assessments.

2. This Review for Cause was initiated as a result of adverse information communicated to PHAC by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

3. Note that the following terms are used throughout this report:
   a) “Foreign State” or “Foreign Country” means the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC).
   b) “Foreign Entity (ies)” means a member/representative of the PRC government departments and/or military (People’s Liberation Army).
   c) “Foreign Organizations” means Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB), Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Inc. (CanSino), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Kunming Institute of Zoology (KIZ), Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Chinese CDC).
   d) “Foreign Talent Programs” means the PRC-sponsored Thousand Talents Program (TTP).

II. BACKGROUND

4. At the time that the Review for Cause was initiated, Dr. Xiangguo QIU was the Head, Vaccines and Antivirals within the Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). Dr. QIU conducted research related to infectious diseases, toxins and pathogens defined in the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) and associated regulations. Dr. QIU held a clearance under the HPTA through the Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations enforced by PHAC. This clearance was suspended at the commencement of the Review for Cause. As part of her duties, Dr. QIU had full access to all laboratories on the NML campus in Winnipeg, including those designated in accordance with material defined in the HPTA, and access to PHAC internal drives.

5. PHAC commenced an Administrative Investigation in June 2019. Due to the nature of the allegations, Dr. QIU was advised that she could not be in the workplace and that she was to stay at home but would continue to receive pay. The Administrative Investigation was completed in February 2020 and determined that a number of PHAC policies had been breached. Specifically, it was found that Dr. QIU breached the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Network Standard and the Directive on Email Management. It was also found...
that Dr. QIU shipped materials outside of the NML without approval, in violation of the
PHAC Intellectual Property Policy. The Administrative Investigation Report\(^1\) was provided to
Dr. QIU to allow her an opportunity to review and comment.

6. Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC’s Deputy Chief
Security Officer (DCSO) provided the Administrative Investigation Report to CSIS, which
conducted a security assessment that is consistent with their mandate. On 09 April 2020, CSIS
provided PHAC with an initial assessment that raised concerns about Dr. QIU’s honesty and
the risk that this presented to PHAC. Specifically, CSIS indicated that Dr. QIU is susceptible
to influence by a Foreign Source that could result in information or materials leaving the lab
that could harm Canada and Canadians. Furthermore, CSIS advised that Dr. QIU may put
Crown information and materials at risk, may disclose, be induced to disclose or cause to be
disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information and that Dr. QIU was not fully
truthful throughout the screening interview. (S)

7. CSIS subsequently performed an additional Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the
CSIS Act and the TBS SSS under the TBS Policy on Government Security. This assessment
included a review of the Administrative Investigation Report and further investigations

On 30 June 2020, CSIS provided a written briefing summarizing the
two interviews conducted with Dr. QIU on 19 March 2020 & 19 June 2020. This classified
briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security
concerns.

8. PHAC then conducted further analysis of the electronic content of the GC devices and
network accounts assigned to Dr. QIU in the course of her duties at NML.

III. ADVERSE INFORMATION

9. As a result of the new information included in the second CSIS Security Assessment and the
forensic analysis of the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s government assets, PHAC launched a
Review for Cause to assess the security risk posed to the organization by activities involving
Dr. QIU.

10. The adverse information focused on three (3) areas of security concern. Specifically, concerns
were raised with respect to Dr. QIU regarding the sharing of sensitive information and assets,
applications to External Talent Programs and association with Foreign Organizations.

11. On 20 August 2020, Dr. QIU was informed of the adverse information, that her Reliability Status had been suspended and that an interview would be held on 26 August 2020 to discuss the security areas of concern. On 21 August 2020, Dr. Qiu was advised that due to the ongoing Review for Cause, that she was being suspended without pay, pending the outcome of the review of adverse information.

12. On 26 August 2020 [Senior Advisor, Security Screening], and [Manager, Security Screening - WPG] conducted a Review for Cause security interview with Dr. QIU at the PHAC office at 391 York Street, Winnipeg, MB. This security interview was audio recorded. The audio recording and transcripts of the interview have been retained.

Sharing Sensitive Information

13. During the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that in contravention of the Directive on Email Management, issued 16 October 2013 and the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Network Standard, Dr. QIU used both her corporate and personal email accounts to conduct government business with PHAC employees and Restricted Visitors who then used Gmail accounts to communicate with her. Investigators discovered that the majority of written communication between one particular Restricted Visitor and Dr. QIU, (work of a scientific nature), was conducted through personal email accounts instead of corporate email accounts.

14. During the security interview, Dr. QIU stated that she is very busy with science and does not have time to read all the emails she receives on a daily basis. Dr. QIU stated that when people send emails to her, she pays no attention to the manner of transmittal. Despite having electronically acknowledged that she read and understood PHAC policies, Dr. QIU maintains that she has never read the terms and conditions that pop up upon logging into her computer.

15. During the CSIS interview, with respect to the security practices at NML, Dr. QIU did not take responsibility for her security violations and instead blamed PHAC for not being clear as to what was required of her and when. She stated that she never got the proper training, that she always tried her best to follow the policy and that she did not think she made terrible mistakes.

Dr. QIU - Response to Review for Cause report

Regarding allegations that she used corporate and personal email accounts to conduct government business, Dr. QIU states that she “wasn’t aware of the email policy until July of 2019 due to the lack of proper training” and that she sent emails to [Research Associate #1, CSHCH] due to the “default setup of the email system .... the email went to his Gmail automatically” when she typed his name. Dr. QIU states that she did not “communicate with any restricted visitors for work” through her personal email accounts. Dr. QIU admitted however that she was
receiving and sending emails related to her work at NML from either her Gmail or Yahoo accounts to various PHAC employees.

**Sharing Sensitive Assets**

16. During the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. QIU shipped materials outside of the NML without approval, in violation of the *PHAC Intellectual Property Policy, Section 3.7 Material Transfer*, which is in place to ensure that these types of shipments are performed securely and designated to a pre-approved recipient organization. Dr. QIU further admitted to collaborating with the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control and sending that organization antibodies once. When questioned about collaborative work she carried out with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Dr. QIU advised that she had initiated a request for a Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA) through the Intellectual Property (IP) office. While the IP office did not have evidence of such a request from Dr. QIU, they did have a request from Dr. QIU to collaborate with the Institute of Materia Medica, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. This demonstrates that Dr. QIU did initiate CRAs from time to time, and so implies a familiarity with the requirement for a CRA.

17. Dr. QIU stated that she had sent antibodies to the China National Institute for Food and Drug Control without a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA). When asked if she sent licensed antibodies to any other country other than China without a CRA or an MTA, Dr. QIU stated that she sent a very small amount of antibodies to the United Kingdom and the United States for testing. Dr. QIU further advised that sometimes she does not obtain a collaborative agreement unless it is a bigger project. She advised that it can take a year or longer to obtain an agreement, so sometimes between scientists, “*they just do the work*”. The criteria to establish a need for MTAs is clear and was violated on several occasions by Dr. QIU.

18. With regard to the CSIS Security Assessment dated 30 June 2020, at paragraph 54, the Service assesses that Ms. QIU was reckless in her dealings with various PRC entities, particularly in her lack of respect for proper scientific protocols regarding the transfer of pathogens and in working with institutions whose goals have potentially lethal military applications that are manifestly not in the interests of Canada or its citizens. Ms. QIU also gave access to the NML to at least two employees of a PRC institution whose work is not aligned with Canadian interests, and consistently asserted that she had very limited knowledge of these institutions’ mandates, despite an abundance of evidence that she was actually working with or for them. (S)

**Dr. QIU - Response to Review for Cause report**

Regarding allegations that she shared sensitive information and assets, Dr. QIU now asserts that the information “*is not accurate*” and according to her, she tried her best to follow GC policies throughout her years at PHAC. Dr. QIU states that she was not “*provided any formal*
training and wasn’t aware of the details of the policies/guidelines regarding what information / material is sensitive or not”. Dr. QIU states that she “knew there were policies regarding the MTA even though I had got neither training nor chances to read the policies” and that she “had established numerous MTAs/CRAs based on common sense and scientific principles during my work at NML”.

Dr. QIU also states that she had permission from her supervisors “for very small amount of research-related Ab shipment”, and when “sharing small amount of reagents”, and “for some exploratory experiments and exploratory tests”.

Dr. QIU also states that she both refused certain work until an MTA was completed and admitted having “sent small amount of antibodies to trusted collaborators without MTAs”.

Dr. QIU further stated that she “knew MTAs are important and I have obtained numerous MTAs myself in the past for solid projects”. Dr. QIU also states that she shipped smaller amounts of material without an MTA because she felt she had the permission to do so from her supervisors.

Dr. QIU now states that she did not recall her statements regarding the IP Policy and she refutes the claim that it is up to the scientist to determine whether an MTA was required. Dr. QIU states that this is the case for CRAs and not MTAs. However, she then states that she “made the decision based on both common sense (practicality) and scientific principles”. Dr. QIU also states that it is “hard and not practical to get CRAs done for every project” and that “most scientists just test the ideas without CRA being done”.

Despite clearly saying during her review for cause interview that transfers are done without MTAs, in her response to the review for cause report, Dr. QIU now refutes that she said transfers are done without MTAs “is common practice at the NML” but rather that “most scientists are sharing small amount of exploratory-phase reagents with no big dollar value without MTAs”.

Dr. QIU also refutes her original statement that decisions on the need for MTAs and Intellectual Property Designation are at the discretion of the individual scientist. Dr. QIU indicated that “decisions on the need for CRAs in the past were at the discretion of scientists due to the complexity of the science and there wasn’t clear guideline on CRAs”. Dr. QIU reiterated her previous statement that MTAs could take months or years to finish.

19. Notwithstanding Dr. QIU’s assertions to the contrary, given the totality of the information provided, investigators have found that on the balance of probabilities, Dr. QIU circumvented Government of Canada (GC) policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information and assets as it pertains to her exchanging emails and her lack of rigour in
ensuring MTAs and CRAs were in place. Dr. QIU continually attempts to nuance or change her explanations throughout the various processes. She has demonstrated a knowledge of the requirements for an MTA and a CRA and has applied the policy in an inconsistent manner or has indicated that the policy interferes with science, takes too long and is not necessary.

20. PHAC Investigators assess that Dr. QIU does not recognize that as a PHAC employee, she is responsible to protect GC information and assets. Dr. QIU disregarded security policies and minimized her role in the application of security measures at NML. Investigators conclude that Dr. QIU’s statements of being unaware, confused and lacking training are not credible for someone in her position as a lead scientist at a nationally-recognized laboratory. Dr. QIU has, after 17 years with PHAC in a leadership role, had ample opportunity to read and understand her obligations as it pertains to protecting PHAC IP and sensitive GC information.

21. Dr. QIU is not being transparent or forthcoming in her statements. These actions were careless and dangerous because she chose to ignore the employer’s processes for the safe transfer of dangerous materials. Dr. QIU has demonstrated disdain for the rules and has indicated no willingness to change her behaviour and comply with policies moving forward. These actions call into question her trustworthiness in safeguarding GC information and assets.

Applications to External Talent Programs

22. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU collaborated with agencies of another country and was untruthful in responding to allegations that she has committed, on several occasions, to applying to foreign talent programs.

23. At paragraph 5 of the CSIS Security Assessment dated 30 June 2020, the Service states that

Ms. QIU was associated to multiple “talent programs” administered and funded by various PRC [People’s Republic of China] entities. Service information reveals that these programs aim to boost China’s national technological capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property (IP). (S)

24. Paragraph 7 of the CSIS Security Assessment finds that

Ms. QIU presented at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) on: “Combating Ebola Virus Infection: the Development and Use of Ebola Monoclonal Antibodies and Vaccines” on March 31, 2017. On WIV’s official website online, each of the presenters have their own pages with pictures
that correspond to the document and the dates of presentation. No such page exists for Ms.
QIU’s presentation. According to information available to the Service, Ms. QIU was approved
by PHAC for travel to Beijing between March 24, 2017 and April 8, 2017 to present at the 1st
International Symposium of Joint Prevention & Control of Imported Zoonotic Diseases. The
Service is not aware of any PHAC-approved travel for Ms. QIU to Wuhan during this period.
(S)

25. Paragraph 9 of the CSIS Security Assessment outlines that in addition to generous PRC
program benefits, TTP [Thousand Talents Program] participants are not required to reside in
China full-time or give up their employment at non-PRC institutions; this facilitates dual
income for researchers and ongoing access to China. According to open source information,
one category of the TTP is the “Innovative Talents (Short Term)” program, which targets
scientists returning or coming to the PRC for at least two months every year and for at least
three consecutive years with stable employers and clear work objectives.

Service investigation has uncovered a TTP Application that

declares Ms. QIU as the applicant and WIV as the declaring entity. The TTP Application also
states that “Professor QIU’s work term in our institute [WIV] is from 2019 03 to 2022 03. She
will work for the Wuhan Virology Institute for at least two months every year”. (S//CEO)

26. At paragraph 13 of the CSIS Security Assessment, the Service states that [REDACTED] the Director of the BSL-3 lab at KIZ told
Ms. QIU in an email that she should apply for the “2019 Annual International Talent
Program” / “Chinese Academy of Sciences President’s International Fellowship Initiative”
(CAS ITP). Specifically, it was stated that Ms. QIU should apply for the “Outstanding
International Scholar” category. Information regarding this category indicates that the funding
standard is 50,000 RMB per week (approximately $10,000 CAD). [REDACTED] Ms. QIU sent an email with her CV, passport, an abstract and a partly filled out CAS
ITP Application to an employee at KIZ to complete on her behalf. In Ms. QIU’s CAS ITP
Application, it was indicated that Ms. QIU would visit KIZ in April 2019. Her daily schedule
of specialist activities would include “activities of actual academic exchanges, consultations,
research guidance, exploration of talent fostering, and partnership of scientific research”, as
well as training. (S)

27. The Service goes on to outline at paragraph 14 of the CSIS Security Assessment, that

Service investigation has revealed the existence of an employment agreement, ultimately unfinalized at the
time, between Hebei Medical University (HBU) and Ms. QIU for work between July 2018 and June 2022.

[REDACTED] Ms. QIU would be expected to work
onsite at HBU for two months per year and continue to lead the work of the task group
This HBU Agreement stipulates that Ms. QIU would receive compensation, funding, and accommodation in the PRC, for assisting HBU in managing and developing their lab, building a team, and conducting innovative scientific research. Ms. QIU would be provided with funding of 6,000,000 RMB (approximately $1,200,000 CAD) for science and research. Ms. QIU’s compensation would be 75,000 RMB/month (approximately $15,000 CAD/month) based on actual months worked at HBU’s laboratory, and an additional 150,000 RMB/year (approximately $30,000 CAD/year) for leading laboratory operations when offsite.

28. Paragraph 15 of the CSIS Security Assessment identifies that Ms. QIU was a student as part of her enrolment in the TTP with WIV, Ms. QIU committed to various work arrangements [2] including but not limited to building the PRC’s “biosecurity platform for new and potent infectious disease research…in order to reach the top level domestically [within China] and achieve leading status internationally in the area of BSL4 virus research”. Ms. QIU is referred to by WIV as “the only highly experienced Chinese expert available internationally, who is still fighting on the front lines in a P4 laboratory”. The TTP Application specifies that all results and intellectual property generated from the TTP contract would belong to the “Declaring Entity” [WIV]. Other options to select were “My Current Employer” [NML-PHAC] or “Myself” [Xiangguo Qiu].

29. Further at paragraph 16, the Service indicates that Ms. QIU will provide biosecurity training classes to WIV one or two times per year in order to help perfect WIV’s BSL-4 operating procedures. Separately, Service investigation reveals that in July 2018, Ms. QIU received an invitation from WIV to present to approximately thirty individuals at a biosafety workshop in October 2018 at WIV’s expense. Ms. QIU accepted, however according to travel expenses reported to PHAC, this workshop was not reported amongst other conferences that Ms. QIU did report attending in the PRC, such as the 8th International Symposium on Emerging Viral Disease in Wuhan. The Service in not aware of PHAC being informed of this workshop by Ms. QIU. Following the dates of this workshop in October 2018 and WIV Director began inquiring into materials to procure in order to build up WIV laboratories’ biosecurity, to which Ms. QIU, amongst others, provided advice. Ms. QIU also accepted an invitation from WIV employees, including to become a member of the “International Advisory Committee for Wuhan P4 Laboratory”. Ms. QIU was previously invited to act as a member of this committee in September 2018.
30. Paragraph 17 of the CSIS Security Assessment indicates that another stated work arrangement is that Ms. QIU “… will build a team to start a series of research topics using China’s disease source as advantage…” and that WIV “… will provide sufficient scientific, research, and office conditions, which includes research expenses, instruments and equipment, research assistants, etc. to guarantee the normal operation of [Ms. QIU’s] scientific and research work”. Service information reveals that was hired by PHAC, via the University of Manitoba (UoM), in February 2018, to work under Ms. QIU as a visiting researcher. According to the Service’s investigation, may have been the first researcher from the PRC to come to Canada that Ms. QIU directly facilitated herself. In discussions with and other WIV employees regarding Ms. QIU’s TTP application, asked a WIV HR representative when an appropriate time to complete the first draft of Ms. QIU’s TTP Application would be so he could prepare for his work arrangement. The WIV HR representative responded “… by December”.

Service investigation reveals that [Individual 2] continued to be involved in Ms. QIU’s WIV TTP application as of late January 2018. [Individual 2] identified that the document was ready subject to signature.

31. It is further indicated at paragraph 18 of the CSIS Security Assessment that under the section of the TTP Application titled “Reasons for recommendation (necessity for bringing in the applicant and his/her substantive contribution, etc.)”, WIV indicates that “[Ms. QIU] joining us will significantly improve our research and management levels in the areas of potent infectious diseases and biosecurity, it’s beneficial for our strengthening of international cooperation, and importing the P4 virus research resources from abroad”. This statement follows another by WIV indicating that “there have been huge obstacles in importing the resources and research personnel related to the P4 Laboratories” from June – July 2018 via e-mail, Ms. QIU discussed with WIV employees, including the shipping of EBOV and NiV (likely “Ebola virus” and “Nipah virus”), BSL-4 pathogens, from the NML to WIV. In some e-mails, Ms. QIU writes that a formal agreement between PHAC and WIV to authorize the transfer is not necessary as “no one owns the IP” and “hope there is another way around”. On October 18, 2018, an MTA was provided by WIV regarding Ebola and Henipah viruses amongst others. Ms. QIU travelled to Wuhan / WIV on October 19, 2018, the day after receiving the MTA. PHAC appears to have approved this shipment on November 2, 2018 with the pathogens then being sent on March 31, 2019. A Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) article published in open sources on June 14, 2020 revealed that based on information obtained via an ATIP request, this shipment to WIV contained fifteen virus strains. (S)
32. Finally at paragraph 19 of the CSIS Security Assessment, the Service states that a Service investigation reveals an application form, from June 2018, was signed by Ms. QIU [redacted] for a “Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Advanced Customer Cultivation Project” with WIV (herein referred to as “WIV Project 1”). This project aims to “cultivate national high-level biosafety talents, to output significant scientific and technological breakthroughs and achievements, and to promote the scientific and technological support capabilities for biosafety and publish health.” Ms. QIU and [redacted] were both listed as project designers and managers, and [redacted] as working on mRNA vaccine construction. WIV Project 1 included a budget of 1,500,000 RMB (approximately $300,000 CAD) and was to take place from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2021. (S)

33. With respect to applying to external talent programs, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated that she herself never filled out an application, that any and all applications were filled out by others and finally that her information and photograph were inserted without her knowledge.

34. In one case, after being presented with evidence from her electronic accounts, Dr. QIU acknowledged that she knew about the application but maintained that she herself had no part in applying. These are not credible explanations as investigators know this to be untrue based on the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s e-mail exchanges on this topic with individuals of PRC. When asked about tracked changes in her application for TTP, Dr. QIU maintained that this was done by a student on her behalf.

35. When her husband Dr. Keding CHENG was interviewed [redacted] he acknowledged knowing about an application completed by his spouse, Dr. QIU. The acknowledgement came only after being told of the evidence found in the electronic content of his files. When pressed by investigators about assisting other people with applying to talent programs, Dr. CHENG denied doing so until offered evidence of him assisting his spouse (Dr. QIU) with an application. He then acknowledged that he did ‘help her many times’ on applications.

Response to Review for Cause report

With regard to allegations that she applied to external talent programs without the express permission of PHAC, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Dr. QIU states that the information “is not accurate” and that her “collaboration with Wuhan was approved”.

Dr. QIU acknowledges having applied to the Thousand Talents Program (TTP) but that “the application was rejected as the short term TTP was stopped and I didn’t get into the program”. Dr. QIU asserts that she was not aware that she had to ask for permission to apply to such a program, acknowledges that she “did store applications to TTP in the electronic content of my device” but states that there was no need to disclose the information because she

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was not accepted in the TTP. Dr. QIU acknowledges holding the position of “Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University”.

Regarding allegations that she listed qualifications unknown to PHAC in her applications, Dr. QIU acknowledges all of the qualifications she has written in the biographical sections of her application. While she has indicated that these academic qualifications are accurate, Dr. QIU states that she “wasn’t involved with any actual work” related to the Chinese Academy of Science High End Nurturing Project.

36. During the course of the forensic examination, as noted, several applications to the TTP were discovered within the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s GC devices under her network account. Additionally, this analysis found that Dr. QIU listed the following qualifications in biographical sections of her applications to the TTP, job applications and in her resume:

a) Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University (this activity is listed on her Curriculum Vitae from July 2018);
   b) Visiting Research Fellow at the National Institute for Food and Drug Control (China) from January 2017;
   c) Visiting Research Scientist at the WIV from October 2018;

37. CSIS has noted that the PRC-based employment experiences have been omitted on Dr. QIU’s CVs that were destined for Canadian audiences, such as the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and in her 2018 and 2019 application for promotion at PHAC. This indicates that Dr. QIU was taking measures to hide affiliations with foreign entities in her communications with Canadian entities as well as her employer. (S)

38. During the security interview, Dr. QIU denied listing the credentials identified in the biographical component of her colleague’s application to the TTP. However, when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged knowing about the TTP. Dr. QIU stated that she considered the biographical details to be a list of collaborations that she performed with these institutions and did not require disclosure to PHAC.

Response to Review for Cause report

Regarding allegations that she did not fully disclose her biographical details to PHAC, Dr. QIU states that the information “is not accurate” and that what she said was that “the term was over already for visiting professor” at the two institutes in China. Dr. QIU then states that she informed her supervisors that “some institutes in China would like to offer me visiting professorship and was told that it’s OK as long as no payment was involved” and that she was not aware that she should disclose such information.
Regarding allegations that she tried to cover up her affiliations with outside agencies, Dr. QIU states that she did not recall this part of the interview and that “The application for TTP was done by a student on my behalf. I forwarded it to my husband for word checking.”

39. The analysis reveals that Dr. QIU had applied to foreign talent programs and did concede that she has claimed all qualifications listed in the biographical sections of her applications. Although Dr. QIU states that she was not the author of the applications nor has she contributed supporting documents to an application, this is inconsistent with the evidence and her own statements. Dr. QIU acknowledges having forwarded her applications to her husband, Dr. CHENG via email for review. As noted at paragraph 35 above, Dr. CHENG however admits to having done more than review her applications, rather he had assisted in her applying many times. This demonstrates that Dr. QIU’s explanation is not credible.

40. With regard to collaboration with agencies and government agencies of another country, Dr. QIU was evasive in responding honestly and truthfully until presented with the facts and evidence. Dr. QIU co-authored a paper on which one of the other co-authors is a serving officer in the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), an organization linked to People’s Liberation Army of China. Dr. QIU asserts not knowing this officer other than by name. She did however recognize the officer in uniform when presented with her photograph. Further collaborations were found through the sponsoring of Visiting Scientists and Research Scientists for the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology that have been employed in the University of Manitoba, or through them in the NML in Winnipeg, MB. In one entry from her electronic content, in “track changes”, Dr. QIU made a request to have her colleague’s affiliation with the Institute of Military Veterinary, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, removed from the paper. This was a direct attempt to disassociate herself and the student in her charge from an outside organization.

41. Investigators assess that Dr. QIU did knowingly apply to foreign talent programs and attempted to disassociate herself from these. Even if one believes that others applied on her behalf, Dr. QIU forwarded at least one application to her husband to review on her behalf so she did nothing to stop the application process.

42. Additional information collected from the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s devices revealed Dr. QIU is not being truthful. Dr. QIU applied to various talent programs in the past years and has collaborated with agencies of another country, without proper authorization, in areas that are military in nature (China). The People’s Republic of China has such a venture called: “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP). Applications to this program were found in the electronic content of Dr. QIU’s devices. Despite the fact that several of these applications were discovered during forensic searches, Dr. QIU maintains that she herself never filled out
an application. She maintains that any and all applications were filled out by others and her information and photograph simply inserted, all without her knowledge.

43. Dr. QIU continues to deny having applied to the Thousand Talents Program despite evidence that would indicate she was applying to assist that country in building the biosecurity platform for new and potential infectious disease research. Dr. QIU indicates that others have filled out applications for her, without her knowledge. However she then admitted to knowing about the application but continues to maintain that she herself had no part in applying. Based on forensic evidence from her network accounts, Dr. QIU did send partially completed applications to her husband and others for review. This demonstrates a lack of transparency and honesty with PHAC.

44. Dr. QIU was in contact with foreign entities (both in Canada and while travelling inside China), did make arrangements with various foreign initiatives (Thousand Talents Program) without the express permission of PHAC and foreign entities provided funding for Dr. QIU to travel to Wuhan while in China.

**Association with Foreign Organizations**

45. The CSIS Security Assessment confirmed that Dr. QIU had numerous contacts with agencies of another country and was untruthful in interviews conducted by CSIS in describing her relationship with government agencies of another country.

46. At paragraph 22 of the CSIS Security Assessment, the Service indicates that open sources state that as per China’s key national and development (R&D) priorities for 2017 – 2022, the PRC seeks to support national defence research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications. Ms. QIU was listed online as a co-author on an NML research paper which included other individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China. AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC and is comprised of eighteen units, eleven of which are specialized research institutes responsible for the health service tasks of the PLA. These tasks include the development of military biotechnologies, biological counter-terrorism and the prevention and control of major diseases.

47. Further, at paragraph 26, the Service states that Dr. QIU was nominated for an “international cooperation award” circa 2016 by the Chief of AMMS Research Institute (Chief 1) from AMMS. In regards to Ms. QIU’s collaborations highlighted in this nomination, it is stated that she “…cooperated in a timely manner with experts from AMMS” including and experts from other organizations such as the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) / Chinese CDC (Individual 17).
Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The nomination also indicates that Ms. QIU “...used Canada’s Level 4 Biosecurity Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens...and achieved brilliant results”. This included a 2013 visit wherein and his team came to the NML, after which Ms. QIU “...consulted with the leaders and experts in both China and Canada on matters related to cooperation, and provided the Chinese side with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of convenience for China”. Service information indicates that is also know as Individual 17 (S).

48. The Service outlines at paragraph 27 of the CSIS Security Assessment that indicates additional collaborators mentioned in this “international cooperation award” nomination as individuals from Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Inc. an airline ticket receipt for Ms. QIU, for travel to Beijing in April 2018, booked by an e-mail address associated to CanSino Biotechnology Inc.

49. At paragraph 28 of the Security Assessment, CSIS notes that is pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform and is noted as a Chief at an AMMS research institute. This research institute is engaged in military medicine, clinical medicine and biological high technology.

50. Further at paragraph 29, is pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform and is a Major General, is noted as the top virologist in AMMS and is China’s chief biological weapons defense expert engaged in research related to biosafety, bio-defence and bio-terrorism.

51. Service information reveals that CAS works closely with
the PLA to acquire Western technologies. Service investigation reveals that
Ms. QIU and [REDACTED] have worked together on multiple research projects and papers since 2012. (S/CEO)

52. Finally, at paragraph 31 of the Security Assessment, CSIS indicates that [REDACTED], a post-doctoral student of Ms. QIU at the University of Manitoba (UoM) working with CHENG Keding, is a research assistant at AMMS’ Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB). According to open sources, the BIB is a research institute engaged in the study of biological high technology in the PLA. Service investigation reveals that [REDACTED] was brought to the UoM as a visiting scientist by Ms. QIU [REDACTED] on a scholarship reportedly paid through the Chinese embassy in Canada. Service information indicates that [REDACTED] holds a Chinese Public Affairs passport. Service information also reveals that [REDACTED] indicated her residence as being [REDACTED] which is Ms. QIU and CHENG Keding’s second property. Open sources depict [REDACTED] conducting laboratory work in PLA attire and indicate her mentor as being [REDACTED].

53. With respect to collaborating with foreign entities, during the security interview, Dr. QIU indicated that PHAC had approved the September/October 2017 trip to Beijing/Shanghai and that PHAC was aware of her personal travel during the approved trip. Dr. QIU stated she had taken a side trip to Wuhan to provide training but did not elaborate. Dr. QIU then stated that the trip to Wuhan from Beijing was paid for by the Wuhan Institute of Virology (airfare, hotel, meals) and that PHAC was not aware, contradicting her previous statements. Dr. QIU was invited by [REDACTED] to visit a lab in Wuhan but explained that PHAC was not made aware of this invitation. She accepted to stop at the lab on her return trip to Beijing.

54. With regard to a personal trip taken to Beijing, China in April 2018, Dr. QIU stated that she had gone to China to visit family but also stopped at a lab to test a virus for University of Manitoba on behalf of Beijing Institute of Biotechnology. Initially, Dr. QIU indicated that the trip was a personal trip (vacation) but when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged to being financially compensated for all expenses related to her trip to China and back to Canada by Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Incorporated.

55. With respect to the October 2018 trip to Wuhan, China, Dr. QIU stated that she had travelled to China on a personal vacation but when presented with the evidence from her network drives, Dr. QIU acknowledged that the trip was paid for by WIV for a training session she delivered on biosafety. Dr. QIU also acknowledged to meeting with the Director of WIV during this trip.

56. With respect to collaborating on scientific research with foreign entities, Dr. QIU acknowledged co-authoring a research paper with a member of the Chinese military when she replaced [REDACTED] at the NML.
57. When questioned about her association with a foreign entity that co-authored the research paper, Dr. QIU stated not knowing the person other than by name. When presented with a photo of the individual, Dr. QIU did recognize the officer in uniform as the co-author. It should be noted that the officer in the photograph is a serving officer in the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), an organization linked to People’s Liberation Army of China. Dr. QIU also acknowledged that there was no CRA or MTA associated with this particular project.

**Response to Review for Cause report**

Regarding allegations that she has collaborated with foreign entities, Dr. QIU states that the information regarding her travel to China “is not accurate” but acknowledges “the second meeting in Shanghai and met [redacted] at the conference” and to visiting the lab in Wuhan. Dr. QIU states that the trip “was just a visit and no training was provided” and that she informed her supervisor of the trip. Dr. QIU further acknowledges that “Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Incorporated just paid for the air fare of the trip”.

Dr. QIU then states that the trip to China in October 2018 was “a business trip (three conferences held in Wuhan, Shanghai and Beijing ...) approved by PHAC” and that “there was one-day gap between the conferences in Wuhan and Shanghai so I met some scientists from WIV including the director for discussion of further collaborations.”

Dr. QIU further acknowledges authoring a research paper with a member of the Chinese military, which she knows by name only, but denies knowing her co-author’s position in the army. Dr. QIU states that this project was originally the responsibility of her supervisor.

Regarding allegations that she had numerous contacts with agencies of another country, Dr. QIU states that the information “is not true” and that “there were some misunderstandings during the interview due to the language barrier”. Dr. QIU states that she “had contacts with many scientists all over the world on behalf of a Canadian, and I paid more attention to their ability to do science and collaborations, but did not care much about where they are from”.

Dr. QIU states that she did not recall her communications with the Director of WIV and Restricted Visitors on the subject of TTP. Dr. QIU acknowledges having received an invitation from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) to present to a group of 30 individuals at a biosafety workshop and conducting the activity. But states that she forgot to amend her travel claim. Dr. QIU acknowledges the email exchanges between herself and the Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences but states that it “was a good institute for future collaborations with NML”. Dr. QIU also acknowledges applying for the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) president’s International Fellowship Initiative and “the plan was that I would visit KIZ”. Dr. QIU acknowledges applying for the Hebei Medical University High-Caliber Talent Bringing-In Agreement and informing her supervisors of the application but that the
process was stopped due to the PHAC Administrative Investigation.

58. Investigators assess that Dr. QIU communicated with foreign entities during her trips to China. The evidence obtained from interviews and the information collected from the electronic content of her devices reveal that this is indeed the case. As a subject matter expert with access to sensitive information and dangerous materials, Dr. QIU presents a realistic and credible threat to Canada’s economic security when conducting repeated and clandestine meetings with foreign entities.

59. With regard to foreign entities providing funding for travel, in original statements Dr. QIU stated that PHAC was aware of her personal travel during a departmentally approved trip to Beijing/Shanghai in 2017. If this is the case, Dr. QIU’s travel authorization form did not reflect this as she later stated that she should have amended her travel claim to show the extra expenses. Dr. QIU indicated she had taken a side trip to Wuhan to provide training. In this interview, she did admit however that the trip to Wuhan from Beijing was paid for by the Wuhan Institute of Virology (airfare, hotel, meals) and that the department was not in fact aware. With regards to contact with foreign entities, as a result of providing the aforementioned training, Dr. QIU was funded by CanSino Technologies, which is an affiliate of the Chinese Academy of Science; an affiliate of the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology and an arm of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, of the People’s Liberation Army.

60. With regard to making arrangements with various organizations without the express permission of PHAC, Dr. QIU denied being a Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University, however she still listed this activity on her Curriculum Vitae from July 2018. This is evidenced by information collected from the electronic content of her devices. In this case, she is either being untruthful in her assertions that she is not a Visiting Professor at Hebei Medical University or she has been untruthful in listing this on her CVs and applications.

61. When questioned in previous interviews, Dr. QIU initially denied - but now after being presented with evidence - acknowledges being a Visiting Research Fellow at the National Institutes for Food and Drug Control (China) from January 2017. As well, Dr. QIU now admits to being a Visiting Research Scientist at the Wuhan Institute of Virology from October 2018. However, Dr. QIU continues to deny that she led the initiative “Chinese Academy of Science High End Nurturing Project” that would have taken place from June 2019 to May 2021 despite having indicated this project in her own correspondence.

62. Investigators assess that Dr. QIU only acknowledges filling applications when confronted with the evidence and exploits weaknesses in the PHAC processes where trust is placed on her in her position as lead scientist on dozens of research projects. Dr. QIU demonstrates a lack of transparency and is very selective in her disclosures to PHAC with regards to her professional accreditations abroad. Dr. QIU reveals her dishonesty when denying that she
provided training at the WIV and instead only contributed to a workshop where 30 participants were present. It takes time and forethought to plan a presentation on biosafety to fellow-scientists and therefore had to have been pre-planned.

63. Investigators conclude that Dr. QIU was not forthcoming in her activities and collaborations with individuals from agencies and government agencies of another country, namely members of the People’s Republic of China, and attempted to hide this fact. Investigators also conclude that Dr. QIU knowingly communicated with an organization linked to a foreign state – with known ties to its military – and did not notify PHAC of her change in personal circumstances; namely the persistent contact with individuals who solicited her. Dr. QIU states also that she does not care where her fellow-scientists come from. Dr. QIU’s actions reflect those of an individual who is careless with information and assets in her custody.

64. Despite Dr. QIU’s claim that she was misunderstood during interviews, the evidence obtained through the information collected from the electronic content of her devices reveals that this is not supported. She is capable of conducting her day-to-day business in English. Investigators assess that Dr. QIU is very capable of communicating in the English language and has done so for decades. The language requirements for the position of Head, Vaccines and Antivirals are English Essential. Dr. QIU had to demonstrate this level of competency prior to her posting and during her work at NML.

IV. OVERALL ANALYSIS

65. Dr. QIU signed her Security Screening Certificate and Briefing Form on 04 March 2013 attesting that she read and understood her obligations to the Government of Canada. Dr. QIU signed a Letter of Offer attesting that she understands and will comply with the terms and conditions of employment. All employees must ensure their actions and decisions uphold the public sector values and conform to the high ethical standards expressed in the Health Canada and Public Health Agency of Canada Values and Ethics Code.

66. Dr. QIU is a medical doctor from Tianjin, China, who came to Canada for graduate studies in 1996. Currently Head of the Vaccine Development and Antiviral Therapies section in the Special Pathogens Program at the lab, Dr. QIU’s primary field is immunology. Her research focuses on vaccine development, post-exposure therapeutics and rapid diagnostics of viruses like Ebola. Due to the sensitive nature of work conducted with toxins and pathogens in the laboratories, the credible threat of dangerous materials being surreptitiously released in the public domain and the serious consequences of such a release, the position held by Dr. QIU was classified as having a need to hold a Secret Security Clearance with the GC.
67. The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, Canada is the country’s highest security lab and the country’s only Biosafety Level 4 facility authorized to handle such deadly pathogens as Ebola. Contained within the NML is the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH), which is the first facility in the world to combine laboratories for human and animal disease research at the highest level of biocontainment. It provides a unique environment for human and animal infectious disease research. It has a highly-regarded international reputation. The facility contains Canada's only Containment Level 4 (CL4) laboratories, which provide the capability to work safely with the most dangerous human and animal diseases and pathogens.

68. Canada’s NML is known around the world for its scientific excellence. The NML works with public health partners in Canada and abroad to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. The main functions of the NML are: research, lab-based surveillance, emergency preparedness and response and specialized services to identify diseases other labs may not be able to detect or diagnose. PHAC laboratories provide diagnostic services generally unavailable elsewhere in the country and support laboratory services at front-line provincial labs. They also engage in applied and discovery research to improve diagnostics, develop therapeutics and vaccines, and increase understanding of infectious diseases and their proliferation.

69. With regard to the overall analysis of the entirety of the Administrative Investigation, CSIS Security Assessment, and Security Interview, there were frequent inconsistencies in Dr. QIU’s statements as they relate to breaches of PHAC policies. Also, Dr. QIU deflected her links to foreign entities that have had unauthorized access to sensitive information and assets. And when provided with irrefutable forensic evidence to challenge her claims, Dr. QIU often feigned lack of memory and rebutted allegations of improper conduct. To this day, despite several interviews and the initiation of several investigative processes where Dr. QIU faces serious consequences, she refuses to acknowledge the seriousness of her actions on PHAC.

70. Because of her lack of acceptance of her responsibility, her continued selective compliance with departmental and government polices and directives put in place with the express purpose of safeguarding sensitive GC information and assets, her lack of transparency in her collaborative relationships with foreign entities, and her willingness to collaborate with these entities, it is likely that Dr. QIU would continue to violate PHAC policies and continue to associate with foreign entities should she return to work at PHAC. The recurring pattern of questionable judgement, taking shortcuts in communicating and an unwillingness to accept responsibility demonstrated by Dr. QIU leads investigators to believe that, despite assertions
to the contrary, there exists an unwillingness or inability on the part of Dr. QIU to adequately safeguard GC and PHAC information and assets, thus making her a security threat to PHAC.

71. As an employee of the Government of Canada with access to the only Level 4 laboratory in the country, as an insider possessing a vast amount of knowledge, access and technical competence, Dr. QIU represents a very serious and credible danger to the Government of Canada as a whole and in particular at facilities considered high-security due to the potential for theft of dangerous materials attractive to terrorist and foreign entities that conduct espionage to infiltrate and damage the economic security of Canada.

**Determination of Security Status**

72. Decisions about an individual's security status or clearance are based on information gathered during the security screening process. Decision making involves evaluating the sensitivity of the position and the work environment in which the duties will be performed; evaluating the risks associated with making the appointment or issuing a contract, or with giving the individual access to sensitive information, assets, or facilities; and a judgment of whether such risks are acceptable. The decision must be based on an adequate amount of verifiable information to ensure that it is fair, objective and defensible. The final decision is the responsibility of the departmental deputy head or delegated official.

**Reliability**

73. The *Standard on Security Screening* defines “Reliability Status” as the minimum standard of security screening for positions requiring unsupervised access to Government of Canada protected information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for reliability status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the employer's interests. Security screening for reliability status can include enhanced inquiries, verifications and assessments when duties involve or directly support security and intelligence functions.

74. Security screening for reliability status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the employer's interests. In determining reliability, the question to be answered is whether the individual can be trusted to safeguard information, assets and facilities, and be relied upon not to abuse the trust that might be accorded and to perform the assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on and not pose a security risk to the Government of Canada. In other words, is there reasonable cause to believe that the individual may steal or misuse valuables, exploit assets and information, fail to safeguard information and assets entrusted to him or her, or exhibit behaviour that would reflect negatively on his or her reliability?
75. When assessed against these criteria, Dr. QIU’s actions have raised serious concerns in the area of honestly, trustworthiness and integrity. When given the opportunity to explain her actions, Dr. QIU has revealed a lack of honesty, truthfulness, acceptance and remorse. Dr. QIU has never acknowledged that she is accountable for her actions and responsible for correcting them. Dr. QIU has not been open about the information she has shared with investigators, does not appear willing to resolve doubt surrounding her actions and shows an inability to follow PHAC policies and an unwillingness to correct her reckless behaviour. Dr. QIU’s personal circumstances and behaviour are of security significance because they cause a vulnerability to pressure or improper influence, which may cause Dr. QIU to commit a security breach. Dr. QIU’s reliability remains of grave concern due to breaches in security and an unwillingness to correct her behaviour.

76. Dr. QIU has been afforded ample opportunities to be truthful and trustworthy but continues to make blanket denials, feign ignorance and at times provide explanations that are inconsistent with the evidence gathered. During each interview, Dr. QIU provided half-truths, deflected transgressions and withheld a wholesome response when asked to tell her full story. It was assessed that Dr. QIU’s responses were not credible and that this adversely reflects on her trustworthiness and therefore her reliability. It is believed that Dr. QIU represents a significant risk that PHAC could not mitigate using administrative or physical security measures. Dr. QIU’s features of character, specifically her behaviour, lack of candour, lack of transparency, deflection of blame and dishonesty raise serious security concerns and call into question Dr. QIU’s reliability and trustworthiness.

77. Dr. QIU demonstrates dishonest behaviour and her actions bring into question her trustworthiness. At paragraph 53 of the CSIS Security Assessment, the Service assessed that Dr. QIU repeatedly lied in her security screening interviews about the extent of her work with institutions of the PRC Government and refused to admit to any involvement in various PRC programs, even when documents were put before her. Despite being given every opportunity in her interviews to provide a truthful version of her association with PRC entities, Ms. QIU continued to make blanket denials, feign ignorance, or tell outright lies. Even when confronted by the interviewer and being told that she was not being forthright, and that this lack of candour could have an effect on her security clearance and career, Ms. QIU declined to be truthful. Overall, the Service assesses that Ms. QIU’s answers to a multitude of interview questions were simply not credible, which reflects adversely on her personal trustworthiness and therefore her basic reliability, the primary building block of a security clearance. (S)

78. As a result of careful review and assessment, investigators weighed the adverse information and are in agreement with the CSIS assessment.
Loyalty and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada

79. The Standard on Security Screening defines “Loyalty to Canada” as a determination that an individual has not engaged, is not engaged, nor is likely to engage in activities that constitute a “threat to the security of Canada” as defined in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

80. The Standard on Security Screening outlines that a security clearance is the standard of security screening for all positions requiring access to Government of Canada classified information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for a security clearance appraises an individual’s loyalty to Canada and their reliability as it relates to that loyalty. In determining loyalty, the question to be answered is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual has engaged, is engaged, or may engage, in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and whether he or she has disclosed, may disclose or may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information.

81. When assessed against these criteria, Dr. QIU acknowledges her lack of judgement when it comes to the protection of GC proprietary information and assets, however she denies responsibility for her actions. Dr. QIU also insists that her actions were not intended to harm PHAC, however, given the number of years of experience at the NML, it is evident that she knowingly breached security measures. Due to Dr. QUI’s personal beliefs that scientists should make the decisions regarding MTAs and CRAs, her association with individuals from a country considered a security threat and visiting locations in a country that poses a security risk to Canada, it is believed that Dr. QIU has disclosed and may be induced to disclose in an unauthorized way, sensitive information, including Intellectual Property belonging to PHAC and the GC.

82. Investigators conclude that Dr. QIU’s Reliability as it relates to Loyalty remains of grave concern due to activities where sensitive information and assets were shared outside of PHAC. Dr. QIU has not been acting with the best interest of Canada in mind when applying to talent programs and collaborating with foreign entities that present a threat to the security of Canada. Dr. QIU cannot therefore be entrusted with the protection and safeguarding of GC assets and information.

83. In addition, to further demonstrate the threat posed by Dr. QIU, at paragraph 35 of the CSIS Security Assessment, the Service indicates that during their interview when Dr. QIU was directly questioned as to what she would do if she were approached by the Chinese government to conduct exclusive research for the betterment of Chinese people. Ms. QIU responded, “Well, it depends on what they asked me to do, it’s just like collaboration.” She explained that if the research would not have an effect on or damage Canada then she would
say yes because collaboration is common practice. When questioned if there were instances where the NML Director would not have known what she was working on or who she was working with, Ms. QIU responded, “Right, yeah. Possibly yeah... so basically if I think there’s something important or there’s potential, I would go to them to let them know how we are going to deal with this.” The [CSIS] investigator furthered “But not in every instance?” and Ms. QIU responded indicating that was correct. (P//MUWS)

84. In their Security Assessment, also at paragraph 54, CSIS therefore assesses that because of adverse features of character – dishonesty, reckless judgement and lack of respect for accepted rules and norms – Ms. QIU has acted, may act and may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada. PHAC investigators also assess that she has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information. Based on the review and analysis of the evidence, investigators weighed the adverse information provided by CSIS and are in agreement. (S)

85. In the case of Loyalty, investigators assess that Dr. QIU has been engaged in activities with foreign entities, both domestically and abroad, that mean harm to Canada. Dr. QIU’s repeated contacts with these entities and her engagement in promoting their cause demonstrates that she may engage, or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as that term is defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

86. Investigators conclude that Dr. QIU’s Loyalty remains of grave concern due to her direct contact with entities linked to a foreign state.

87. At paragraph 52 of the Security Assessment, CSIS states: Further to our previous security assessment provided on April 9, 2020, the Service assesses that Ms. QIU developed deep, cooperative relationships with a variety of People’s Republic of China (PRC) institutions and has intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC Government, and herself, without regard for the implications to her employer or to Canada’s interests. (S)

88. Finally, the Service assesses that should Ms. QIU be reinstated at the NML, Canada’s national security and the health of individuals may be put into jeopardy as there is no indication, based on our extensive research and interviews of her, that she would change her behaviour in any respect. We assess that despite her enormous scientific knowledge and contributions, her behaviour is incompatible with holding a Government of Canada security clearance. (S)
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

89. Recommendation are based on the adverse information uncovered and assessed with respect to the following:
   a) The nature and seriousness of the security breaches committed by Dr. QIU;
   b) The lack of honesty during the Administrative Investigaiton, Security Interviews, CSIS interviews and Review for Cause process;
   c) The absence of remorse, regret or acceptance of responsibility and the absence of corrective behaviour or rehabilitation;
   d) The very real potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress by an outside entity;
   e) The lack of openness about the information until evidence is presented; and
   f) The unlikely resolution of the situation on the part of Dr. QIU.

90. Information uncovered by investigators during the Review for Cause raises grave concerns as to Dr. QIU's Reliability, Loyalty and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada.

Recommendation 1 – Revocation of Reliability Status

91. Information collected reflects a recurring pattern of questionable judgment that may negatively affect the performance of duties and that may lead to an inability or unwillingness to safeguard sensitive information, assets or facilities. It is assessed that Dr. QIU can no longer be trusted and this poses such a security risk in the workplace that cannot be mitigated. In accordance with the Treasury Board Secretariat Standard on Security Screening and the findings above, it is therefore recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. QIU's Reliability Status.

Recommendation 2 – Revocation of Secret Security Clearance

92. Information collected reveals serious concerns with Dr. QIU, her Loyalty to Canada and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada as well as a very likely potential for negative influence and intimidation by a foreign entity that could harm Canada's interests or international security. In accordance with the Treasury Board Secretariat Standard on Security Screening and the findings above, it is further recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. QIU’s Secret Security Clearance.
PREPARED BY:

Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

Date: 14 Dec 2020

Senior Investigator, Ottawa

Date: December 14, 2020

Director, Security Screening, Contracting and Other Arrangements, Regional Security, and Investigations Ottawa.

Date: 14 Dec '20

REVIEWED BY:

Executive Director
National Security Management Division / Corporate Services Branch
Deputy Chief Security Officer for the Public Health Agency of Canada

Signature

Date: 14 Dec, 20
Appendix A:
Requirements of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), Standard on Security Screening (SSS)

Attachments: (2)
1) Administrative Investigation Report INV2019-1(PROTECTED B), dated 05 February 2020
2) CSIS Security Assessment (SECRET//CEO), File No. SSRN 650083691, dated 30 June 2020
APPENDIX A - REQUIREMENTS OF THE TREASURY BOARD SECRETARIAT (TBS), STANDARD ON SECURITY SCREENING (SSS)

TBS SSS, section 6.4 states:

“6.4.1 Individuals at all levels are responsible for: Accurately and truthfully providing the personal information and evidentiary documents required for security screening, providing consent to conduct that screening, and doing so in accordance with the required format and established time frames and update cycles.”

“6.4.2 Notifying the DSO or delegated official of the following:
  o 6.4.2.1. Any change in personal circumstances that may affect the security status or clearance they have been granted;
  o 6.4.2.2. Any persistent or unusual contact, and of any attempt by another individual to solicit or obtain access to sensitive information, assets or facility without proper authorization; and
  o 6.4.2.3. Any unusual behaviour of individuals that may present a security risk to the department or agency or government as a whole, (as described in Appendix F);”

“6.4.3 Performing their duties reliably and in compliance with the security status or clearance they are granted, the security obligations detailed on the security briefing form, and departmental security procedures.”

TBS SSS, Security Briefing Forms, Part B - Briefing Summary states:
If an individual fails to safeguard, releases without appropriate authority or uses information / assets for unauthorized purposes, such action may constitute a contravention of the Security of Information Act, the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act or other Acts of Parliament, a breach of the Government Security Policy or the Oath of Secrecy. These provisions apply both during and after service to the Government of Canada. Specific safeguards are identified in the Government Security Policy and Standards and in corresponding departmental or organizational policies which apply to classified and protected information/assets. These safeguards must be applied.

TBS SSS, Security Briefing Forms, Part C - Briefing Summary states:
I understand and agree to comply with the above statutory and administrative requirements.

TBS SSS, Appendix B, section 2 - Criteria for Determining Level of Security Screening and Access Permissions states:

Security screening requirements are based on criteria that reflect the following:
 a. The duties to be performed;
 b. The sensitivity of the information, assets or facilities to be accessed;
 c. The level of authority or control exercised by the position; and
 d. The degree of injury that could result from compromise of sensitive government information, assets or facilities to be accessed.
Report on Review for Cause of Security Status

Dr. Keding CHENG

RFC-2020-002

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA
OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Report date: 30 November 2020
I. PREAMBLE

1. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducted a Review for Cause to assess Reliability and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada, as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS). The Review for Cause process is triggered by adverse information and is an assessment of an employee’s continued ability to hold a security status and/or clearance with the Government of Canada (GC) and takes into consideration information collected during the fact finding, Administrative Investigation, security interviews and other security assessments.

2. This Review for Cause was initiated as a result of adverse information communicated to PHAC by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

3. Note that the following terms are used throughout this report:
   a) “Foreign State” or “Foreign Country” means the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC).
   b) “Foreign Entity (ies)” means a member/representative of the PRC government departments and/or military (People’s Liberation Army).
   c) “Foreign Organizations” means the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB), Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Inc. (CanSino), Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Chinese CDC).
   d) “Foreign Talent Programs” means the PRC-sponsored Thousand Talents Program (TTP).

II. BACKGROUND

4. At the time that the Review for Cause was initiated, Dr. Keding CHENG, was a Biologist for Monoclonal Antibodies within the Science Technology Core and Services Division at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). Dr. CHENG conducted research related to infectious diseases, toxins and pathogens defined in the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) and associated regulations. As part of his duties, Dr. CHENG had access to laboratories on the NML campus in Winnipeg, in particular the Level 2 laboratories at NML, and access to PHAC internal drives. Due to the sensitive nature of work conducted with pathogens and toxins in the laboratories, the credible threat of dangerous materials being surreptitiously released in the public domain and the serious consequences of such a release, the position held by Dr. CHENG was classified as having a need to hold a Secret Security Clearance with the GC.

5. PHAC commenced an Administrative Investigation in June 2019. Due to the nature of the allegations, Dr. CHENG was advised that he could not be in the workplace and that he was to stay at home but would continue to receive pay. The Administrative Investigation was completed in February 2020 and determined that a number of PHAC policies had been
breached. The Administrative Investigation Report\(^1\) was provided to Dr. CHENG to allow him an opportunity to review and comment.

6. Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC’s Deputy Chief Security Officer (DCSO) provided the Administrative Investigation Report to CSIS, which conducted a security assessment that is consistent with their mandate. On 09 April 2020, CSIS provided PHAC with an initial assessment that raised concerns about Dr. CHENG’s honesty and the risk that this presented to PHAC. Specifically, CSIS indicated that Dr. CHENG is susceptible to influence by a Foreign Source that could result in sensitive information or dangerous materials leaving the lab and harming Canada and Canadians. Furthermore, CSIS advised that Dr. CHENG may put Crown information and materials at risk, may disclose, be induced to disclose or cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information and that Dr. CHENG was not fully truthful throughout the screening interview. (S)

7. CSIS subsequently performed an additional Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the *CSIS Act* and the TBS SSS under the TBS Policy on Government Security. This assessment included a review of the Administrative Investigation Report and further investigations. On 07 July 2020, CSIS provided a written briefing summarizing the two interviews conducted with Dr. CHENG on 20 March 2020 & 19 June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns.

8. PHAC then conducted further analysis of the electronic content of the GC devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. CHENG in the course of his duties at NML.

III. ADVERSE INFORMATION

9. As a result of the new information included in the second CSIS Security Assessment and the forensic analysis of the electronic content of Dr. CHENG’s government assets, PHAC launched a Review for Cause to assess the security risk posed to the organization by activities involving Dr. CHENG.

10. The adverse information focused on three (3) areas of security concern. Specifically, concerns were raised with respect to Dr. CHENG regarding Sharing Sensitive Information, Unauthorized Access to NML and Unauthorized Collaboration with External Entities.

11. On 20 August 2020, Dr. CHENG was informed of the adverse information, that his Reliability Status had been suspended and that an interview would be held on 26 August 2020 to discuss

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the security areas of concern. On 21 August 2020, Dr. CHENG was advised that due to the ongoing Review for Cause, that he was being suspended without pay, pending the outcome of the review of adverse information.

12. On 26 August 2020, [redacted] (Senior Advisor, Security Screening) and [redacted] (Manager, Security Screening - WPG) conducted a security interview with Dr. CHENG at the PHAC office at 391 York Street, Winnipeg, MB. This security interview was audio recorded. The audio recording and transcripts of the interview have been retained.

Sharing Sensitive Information

13. During the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG contravened the Directive on Email Management, issued 16 October 2013 and the Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Network Standard. Dr. CHENG used his personal email accounts and unauthorized external drives to conduct government business. Dr. CHENG used his personal Gmail to communicate with staff and Restricted Visitors on work-related information out of convenience, despite having a Science Network computer with Web Office at home, assigned to him by PHAC.

14. During the first CSIS interview as outlined at paragraph 18 of the CSIS Security Assessment, Dr. CHENG admitted to having left restricted visitors (RVs) alone at the NML and given them access to the electronic ‘science network’ using his login credentials. An examination of IT devices seized by PHAC uncovered a non-white listed terabyte hard drive in the lab that was connected to Dr. CHENG’s desktop computer, which was connected to the Scientific Network. Dr. CHENG stated “I did not think I did anything big wrong. It’s just I’m too open. I’m too, like passionate”. He did ultimately explain that he knows his data is Government of Canada (GC) proprietary information and he will follow security rules from now on. (S)

15. During the security interview, Dr. CHENG stated that the use of outside email for data transfer happened and was fairly prevalent and that Restricted Visitors, students, researchers, etc… have no other means by which to share information. According to Dr. CHENG, the use of external means, is an accepted method at the NML and “Visitors when they come here, they have no way of communicating. They can’t use China email. PHAC won’t give them an email. They are stuck there. So, I log into the computer and let them use Gmail.”

Response to Review for Cause report

Regarding allegations that he used corporate and personal email accounts to conduct government business, Dr. CHENG states that “Gmail communications are mainly for raw data transfer and processing, not for sensitive information” and that he sent emails to [redacted] because she cannot “share these stuff without an email access or USB”. Dr. CHENG
states that “Gmail communications are bad habit, but mainly for raw data transfer and processing between me and the visiting scientist”. Dr. CHENG acknowledges that he exchanged emails related to his work at NML from Gmail accounts to Restricted Visitors but then states that the “data are too big in size or not accessible through corporate network because all the software for database search and the related results were all in Science network”.

Dr. CHENG also admits providing a Restricted Visitor with a USB, leaving a bit password displayed openly and connecting an unauthorized external device to his desktop computer. Throughout, Dr. CHENG accepts some of the responsibility of the breaches but insists that his work was not sensitive in nature. Regarding allegations that he shared scientific data and research, Dr. CHENG acknowledged that Restricted Visitor had the access to Science Network under my close supervision, but she has no access or right to those drives” and that he allowed this Restricted Visitor to use his account in the Science Network and to log into her Gmail account from the Science Network. Dr. CHENG admits using his credentials to sign in and open the software for the Restricted Visitor and also acknowledges not informing his supervisor. This behaviour is indicative of someone who feels he is above the rules of an organization.

During the recorded security interview, Dr. CHENG stated he had not been trained in the process. But now in his written statement, Dr. CHENG acknowledges knowing the rules and not seeking approval for circumventing IT Security protocols to accommodate students and Restricted Visitors under his charge. Dr. CHENG is obstinate in his written statements and along with being untruthful during the recorded security interview, he was also untruthful in his interviews with CSIS.

16. Notwithstanding Dr. CHENG’s assertions to the contrary, given the totality of the information provided, investigators have found that Dr. CHENG circumvented Government of Canada (GC) policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information as it pertains to his exchanging emails and lack of rigour in limiting access to the Science Network. Upon being caught for breaching policies, Dr. CHENG stated that he would follow the rules from now on but then continued the practice of allowing access to his accounts to a Restricted Visitor, even after the fact finding.

17. Additionally, Dr. CHENG acknowledges that despite being reminded about the policy, when given the opportunity to modify his behaviour in order to comply with the policy, he has continued to work in violation of the Standard. Dr. CHENG is unwilling to appreciate the seriousness of his actions and the very real risk to PHAC, this even after the interviews with CSIS and the Review for Cause process.
18. It is further assessed that Dr. CHENG discounts the protocols around IT security and insists on sharing his IT credentials with unauthorized individuals. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG has provided unsanctioned individuals access to sensitive documents and scientific research belonging to PHAC without authorization.

19. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG’s statements of being unaware of IT protocols, confused about what he is allowed to do and lacking training are not credible for someone in his position, as an experienced scientist at a nationally-recognized laboratory. Even though Dr. CHENG is aware that his devices contained information indicating that he circulated sensitive information in violation of the PHAC protocols, he deflects the blame to PHAC. Investigators also conclude that Dr. CHENG has, after 14 years with PHAC in a role where he was responsible for the oversight of various projects and students, had ample opportunity to read and understand his obligations as it pertains to protecting sensitive GC information and assets.

Unauthorized Access to NML

20. With respect to unauthorized access to NML, during the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG allowed Restricted Visitors to work in the laboratories unescorted and on at least two occasions did not prevent the unauthorized removal of laboratory materials from the NML. In one instance, on the evening of 12 October 2018, Restricted Visitor [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)] attempted to leave the NML with 10 tubes in two bags that he explained were destined for the University of Manitoba Laboratory. [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)] was accompanied by two other Restricted Visitors and a student with a secret clearance. The three Restricted Visitors were unescorted at the time they attempted to pass by the X-Ray commissioner at the building’s reception area. The items were promptly returned to the laboratory by [Restricted Visitor #3, CSCHAH] because he did not need an escort to come and go from the NML facilities. Dr. CHENG indicated that he was not involved in the attempted removal and return of the vials 12 October 2018, while records indicate that Dr. CHENG signed out the Restricted Visitor involved in this incident.

21. On another occasion, Dr. CHENG and Restricted Visitor [Restricted Visitor #2, CSCHAH] attempted to leave the NML with two Styrofoam containers on the evening of 31 October 2018. Dr. CHENG stated that the two containers were empty but the Commissioner insisted that they not leave the premises. The items were promptly returned to the laboratory by Dr. CHENG and he acknowledged that: “by signing the Restricted Visitors into the lab, he assumes responsibility” and that: “leaving Restricted Visitors in the lab not being properly supervised / escorted; it is built on trust”.

22. During the security interview, Dr. CHENG acknowledged that, on a routine basis, Restricted Visitors were left in the NML without oversight or a security escort. Dr. CHENG routinely
received Restricted Visitors and students. At the outset, he advised them of the rules. He provided them his cellular phone number and went about his business, working alone in his own area. Despite Agency policies and procedures outlining how Restricted Visitors and students were to be handled, Dr. CHENG made his own choice to focus on what he considered to constitute the areas of more concern and left the areas he considered of less concern to others.

**Response to Review for Cause report**

Regarding allegations that he allowed unauthorized access and egress to NML, Dr. CHENG states that the information “is not accurate” and attempted to reframe some of the facts in the report. Dr. CHENG states that he “went out to go home, and saw [redacted] and [redacted] at the X-ray machine, so I signed them out, without knowing what had happened before” and that many people leave the NML with “free sample materials”. Dr. CHENG goes on to state that “I took the Styrofoam boxes from the recycling bin in the hallway” and after being denied exit, Dr. CHENG returned the box to the recycling bin and not the lab. Dr. CHENG’s story evolved from the Security Interview since now he is now (for the first time) providing a new explanation for the breach. Dr. CHENG also states that “The reason I left them not being escorted occasionally was due to an emergency situation to rescue other labs based on my expertise.”

Dr. CHENG states that the information “is not accurate” and “Leaving them [Restricted Visitors] alone in the lab only happened on an urgent basis to rescue other labs occasionally.”

Dr. CHENG also states that he “provided my cellular phone number for the lab that only needed my urgent help and expertise in emergent situations to rescue them, not for the visitors” and that he “only left the visitors not being escorted occasionally in an emergency situation to rescue other labs”.

**Investigators assessment:** This statement is the first time investigators learn of Dr. CHENG’s role in responding to emergencies at the NML and confirms that he left individuals in his charge alone in a Level 2 laboratory without escort. This is a poor attempt by Dr. CHENG to establish that he has used an urgency to circumvent policy. This written statement is new information that is contrary to the information Dr. CHENG provided during Administrative Investigation, the two CSIS interviews and the recorded Security Interview.

Dr. CHENG states that he “did sign the restricted visitors out, but I did not know what had happened before this” and that the Restricted Visitor needed to leave with the vials and indicated to the security guard that it was for “urgent use over the weekend”.

23. Investigators assess that Dr. CHENG is aware of several instances of unescorted access having taken place at NML and that despite Dr. CHENG’s claim that he was not aware of the attempted breaches, the evidence obtained reveals that this is not supported. Dr. CHENG
attempts to deflect the incidents by stating there have been other similar breaches and demonstrates that his version of the facts has evolved from not knowing of the breach to actually stating it happened in the past.

24. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG is fully aware of the protocols as they pertain to access to Level 2 laboratories at the NML and did allow unescorted access to Restricted Visitors. Dr. CHENG does not afford importance to PHAC policies but rather has decided that he will afford trust to the Restricted Visitors under his charge and will circumvent policy.

Unauthorized Collaboration with External Entities

25. During the course of the Administrative Investigation, it was found that Dr. CHENG knowingly failed to obtain approval and authorisation for Collaborative Research Agreements (CRA). In one case, Dr. CHENG did not disclose to his superiors or seek approval for a joint research project he conducted with a Chinese scientist over several months. Dr. CHENG collaborated with a Director General of China’s Centre for Disease Control for three years, where ad hoc research was conducted at the NML on a type of virus and its antidote. Management at NML were not aware of this project. Dr. CHENG stated that the project (ongoing since 2017) was not worthy of a CRA because it was only an “exploratory project”. So he did not advise his supervisor. He also stated that the project: “would be outside his scope of work but it is out of self-interest” because it was linked to his hometown in China.

26. During the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated that he welcomes any opportunity to collaborate with fellow scientists and is fully aware of external talent programs where subject matter experts are strongly sought out by science-based organizations to work on special projects. Dr. CHENG denied collaborating on research with any member of a foreign entity, until evidence was presented to him, at which time he recanted the denial and acknowledged his collaboration. Dr. CHENG acknowledged to working: “as a second author” on a paper with [Individual 24] of the Chinese Academy of Science (a known part of China’s military branch), who also works for the Chinese Centre for Disease Control. Dr. CHENG also admitted collaborating with the Chinese Academy of Science and the Beijing Institute of Biology. According to him, the level of his collaboration has been very limited.

27. With respect to applying to talent programs, during the security interview, Dr. CHENG indicated he began an application with “Yellow River”, which he believes to have been a talent program, though not specifically tied to the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP) promoted by the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC).

28. Dr. CHENG described the TTP in general, as a job application, like any other job application. It is to him a matter of “putting bread and butter on the table”. Dr. CHENG was able to
accurately detail many aspects of the program; requirements, cost coverages, deliverables, etc… The level of detail indicates intricate knowledge of the process and the requirements of the program(s).

Response to Review for Cause report

Regarding allegations that he failed to obtain approval for Collaborative Research Agreements, Dr. CHENG states that the information “is not true” and that it was in fact _______ not from Henan provincial CDC, not China CDC, came here to give a talk and discuss the project in July 2017”. Dr. CHENG also provided a photo taken the day of the visit and explained that [Individual 25] chief technician [Individual 25] did some exploratory experiment in NML in the summer 2018 … not multiple years”. Dr. CHENG then explains that he did not apply for a CRA for the project “because China side couldn’t send the virus to start a solid collaboration”.

Photo no. 1, from left to right: QIU, Keding CHENG.

Regarding allegations that he willingly assisted Dr. QIU in collaborating with agencies of another country, Dr. CHENG acknowledges that he “helped her [Dr. QIU] for spelling and word check on several applications, but I was never involved with her collaborations with agencies of another country”. With regard to the information from the electronic content, Dr. CHENG states that the information “is true”.

Regarding allegations that he collaborated with external entities, Dr. CHENG states that the information “is not accurate” as he only welcomes opportunities “to collaborate with fellow scientists at NML, not outsiders”. Dr. CHENG then states his understanding of the Chinese Academy of Science in China and that he “only did some experiment without knowing that the
experiment was related to collaborations with China”. Further to this, Dr. CHENG states that he has never collaborated with this organization or the Beijing Institute of Biology and he is unable “to do direct external collaborations”.

Investigators assessment: The acknowledgements made by Dr. CHENG are contrary to his earlier statements that he does not work with anyone outside of NML.

Regarding allegations that he applied to foreign talent programs, Dr. CHENG states that because his application to the ‘yellow river’ program was not completed he “never really did the application in the end”. Dr. CHENG states that the TTP “has already been stopped due to foreign complaints recently” and that “Applying for job opportunities within Canada and overseas was quite frequent for me in recent years.” Finally, Dr. CHENG states that he “was not shown the evidence physically” and that after being told of the TTP he “suddenly realized the confusion and the key part of the question, and immediately admitted that I did help my wife several times for job applications”.

29. During the CSIS interview, with respect to his close personal and professional relationship with his spouse (Dr. Xiangguo QIU), Dr. CHENG downplayed any role he played in his wife’s career development, research and/or collaboration with other scientists.

30. With regard to the CSIS Security Assessment dated 07 July 2020, at paragraph 5, the Service acknowledges that Mr. CHENG was aware of QIU Xiangguo’s applications to PRC-sponsored “talent programs”, as well as her associations to PRC military institutes and related individuals. Furthermore, Service investigation reveals that Mr. CHENG himself was involved in an application for a PRC-sponsored “talent program”. Service information reveals that these programs aim to boost China’s national technology capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property (IP). When pressed about assisting Dr. QIU (his spouse), Dr. CHENG acknowledged that he did so on many occasions. He acknowledged that he assisted Dr. QIU in applications to foreign talent programs where he shared and amended these documents through email exchanges. This change in Dr. CHENG’s response indicates that he lied in his interviews with CSIS and attempted to hide his work to help Dr. QIU during the Security Interview. His statements during the CSIS interviews (that he only heard about TTP through the media) are refuted by his own written statement to the Review for Cause report, that he assisted Dr. QIU on many applications. This is also contrary to his statements that it would be difficult for a public servant to apply to a talent program due to their duty to serve Canada. (S//CEO)

31. At paragraph 16 of the CSIS Security Assessment, CSIS states that a post-doctoral student of QIU Xiangguo at the University of Manitoba (UoM) working with Mr. CHENG, is a research assistant at AMMS’ Beijing

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Institute of Biotechnology (BIB) was a Restricted Visitor (RV) at PHAC. According to open sources, the BIB is a research institute engaged in the study of biological high technology in the PLA. Service investigation reveals that was brought to the University of Michigan (UoM) as a visiting scientist by QIU Xiangguo on a scholarship reportedly paid through the Chinese embassy in Canada. Public Affairs passport, which is primarily reserved for civil servants and staff of public institutions. Service investigation also reveals that held a Chinese Public Affairs passport, which is Mr. CHENG and QIU Xiangguo’s second property. Open sources depict conducting laboratory work in PLA attire and indicate her mentor as being Major General, PLA / Top Virologist, AMMS (Chief 2).

32. At paragraph 20 of the CSIS Security Assessment, the Service indicates that in regards to PRC-sponsored talent programs, Mr. CHENG was initially asked to explain what he knows about them. He answered that he does not know much about these programs and has only heard of them, including the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP), through media reporting. Mr. CHENG stated, “Before that, I never worked with anybody with you know, money or whatever. I really don’t know.” Mr. CHENG stated he has never applied to be part of a talent program in China and indicated that he would not meet the standard to qualify. He mentioned that it would be difficult as a public GC employee to take part in these programs because of, amongst other things, a duty to serve Canadians (P//MUWS).

33. The Service goes on to outline at paragraph 21 of the CSIS Security Assessment that when Dr. CHENG was presented with the specific name ‘Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province, he quickly responded ‘No, no, no I’ve never heard of it… no I was never involved with that. Nobody asked me to apply and I never tried to apply because I’m just a biologist…no I never did that, I never thought I should do that.’ Dr. CHENG continued to deny ever having applied to the program until provided with evidence that he had filled out an application in 2013 for the ‘Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province. According to CSIS, Dr. CHENG’s tone changed dramatically and he responded ‘Really?.... I really can’t remember because I did not take that seriously.’ Dr. CHENG was then able to describe how he had acquired the application form, including the name of the individual who had provided it to him, but revealed that he did not remember all of the specifics as ‘nothing had come out of it.’ (P//MUWS).

34. Further at paragraph 22 in the Security Assessment, when asked directly if he knows of anybody involved in a talent program in China, including any colleagues, friends or family members, after pausing, Mr. CHENG answered, “Nobody telling me like ‘I’m Thousand Talents’. I really don’t know. No.” In regard to his wife, QIU Xiangguo, when asked specifically if she is a member of a talent program in China, Mr. CHENG responded, “She probably knows that [of the TTP] because, you know, a lot of media exposure…we all heard from media but neither of them [us] are applying for Thousand Talents Program…”. He
furthered that if his wife was a member of the TTP, she would tell him. However, Mr.
CHENG then explicitly took a moment and stated, "No, no, no. I should say this. I should
think clear. My wife did not apply and my wife was not a Thousand Talent Program
[member] at all." He clarified that she was also not a member of any other talent programs
and neither himself nor QIU Xiangguo were interested in applying to these types of programs.
Mr. CHENG then confirmed that if an employee of PHAC were part of a talent program they
would have to declare it, however he did not thing PHAC would provide a letter of
recommendation for the TTP in any capacity due to the program’s requirements. In discussing
events in the media regarding academic and research programs, Mr. CHENG stated, “I think
when you apply for some program, you have to be transparent and sincere.” (P//MUWS)

35. Investigators assess that regardless of Dr. CHENG’s statement of not taking part in formal
collaboration with a foreign state, he has invited foreign scientists to work at NML for months
without approval from PHAC. Dr. CHENG’s statement of not collaborating with outsiders is
contrary to his actions and his previous claims that research should be shared with the
scientific community in an open forum. Dr. CHENG was not truthful with CSIS interviewers
and withheld information from PHAC investigators. In his original statements, Dr. CHENG
denied any knowledge of talent programs or taking part in any collaboration. However, during
the Review for Cause process, he finally acknowledged being intimately aware of both. This
demonstrates a lack of honesty and puts into question the credibility of his verbal assurances
to protect Canada’s interests. Dr. CHENG communicated with foreign entities during their
visits to Canada and did collaborate on research papers with entities from this same foreign
state. The evidence obtained through the Administrative Investigation and security interviews
reveals that this is indeed the case.

36. With regard to applying to talent programs, investigators assess that Dr. CHENG stated
having begun an application with ‘Yellow River’, which he believes to have been a talent
program, though not specifically tied to the Thousand Talents Program (TTP). Dr. CHENG
described the TTP in general, as a job application, like any other job application. It is, to him,
not to be a consideration of loyalty, but of “putting bread and butter on the table”.
Investigators assess that though Dr. CHENG originally purported a lack of understanding of
the TTP in general, he was able to accurately detail many aspects of the program,
requirements, cost coverages, deliverables, etc… The level of detail indicates intricate
knowledge of the process and the requirements of the program(s).

37. Dr. CHENG’s devices revealed that he was untruthful during interviews. Evidence indicates
that although he never submitted an application for any talent program, he did start one in
2013 and he has assisted others in doing so. In one case, he did acknowledge to knowing
about the application for his spouse after being told of the evidence found in the electronic
content of his files. As evidenced by the electronic content of Dr. CHENG’s devices and
network accounts, it was not a student but Dr. CHENG who worked with Dr. QIU on
applications to the TTP. Dr. CHENG first denied knowing anything about the TTP when interviewed by CSIS. Then during the security interview, Dr. CHENG feigns ignorance until presented with evidence that he did help his spouse apply to the TTP, wherein he partially admits to part of the information, and then finally in his response to the Review for Cause report, Dr. CHENG in fact acknowledges assisting his spouse several times. This pattern of denial, partial acknowledgement and then once presented with evidence the reluctant acknowledgement, demonstrates a continued lack of transparency and honesty.

38. Investigators also assess that although Dr. CHENG states having little or nothing to do with CanSino Technologies and only knowing about the organization, which is an affiliate of the Chinese Academy of Science (an affiliate of the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology; an arm of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences) of the People’s Liberation Army, Dr. CHENG acknowledges dealing little in the area of collaboration, outside of publications. Dr. CHENG also acknowledges collaborating with the Chinese Academy of Science and the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology. The level of his collaboration with foreign organizations has been described by Dr. CHENG as very limited. This is contrary to evidence of Dr. CHENG hosting visits at the NML for international guests. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG was not forthcoming in his activities and collaborations with individuals from agencies and government agencies of another country, namely members of the PRC, and attempted to downplay the access to the NML site and network he has provided without authorization.

39. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG was not forthcoming in his activities and collaborations with individuals from agencies and government agencies of another country, namely members of the People’s Republic of China. Investigators also conclude that Dr. CHENG knowingly communicated with an organization linked to a foreign state – with known ties to its military. Dr. CHENG’s actions reflect those of an individual who is careless with information and assets in his custody and not forthcoming and truthful when questioned about these communications.

IV. OVERALL ANALYSIS

40. Dr. CHENG signed his Security Screening Certificate and Briefing Form 10 August 2016 attesting that he read and understood his obligations to the Government of Canada. Dr. CHENG signed a Letter of Offer attesting that he understands and will comply with the terms and conditions of employment. All employees must ensure their actions and decisions uphold the public sector values and conform to the high ethical standards expressed in the Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada Values and Ethics Code.

41. Canada’s NML is known around the world for its scientific excellence. The NML works with public health partners in Canada and abroad to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. The main functions of the NML are: research, lab-based surveillance, emergency preparedness and
response and specialized services to identify diseases other labs may not be able to detect or diagnose. PHAC laboratories provide diagnostic services generally unavailable elsewhere in the country and support laboratory services at front-line provincial labs. They also engage in applied and discovery research to improve diagnostics, develop therapeutics and vaccines, and increase understanding of infectious diseases and their proliferation.

42. As an employee of the Government of Canada with a vast amount of knowledge, access and technical competence, Dr. CHENG represents a very serious and credible security danger to the Government of Canada as a whole and in particular at facilities considered highly sensitive due to the potential for theft of dangerous materials attractive to terrorist and foreign entities that conduct espionage to infiltrate and damage the economic security of Canada. Canada is facing threats from foreign governments seeking to steal intellectual property and that could include state-funded research.

**Determination of Security Status**

43. Decisions about an individual's security status or clearance are based on information gathered during the security screening process. Decision making involves evaluating the sensitivity of the position and the work environment in which the duties will be performed; evaluating the risks associated with making the appointment or issuing a contract, or with giving the individual access to sensitive information, assets, or facilities; and a judgment of whether such risks are acceptable. The decision must be based on an adequate amount of verifiable information to ensure that it is fair, objective and defensible. The final decision is the responsibility of the departmental deputy head or delegated official.

**Reliability**

44. The *Standard on Security Screening* defines “Reliability Status” as the minimum standard of security screening for positions requiring unsupervised access to Government of Canada protected information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for reliability status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the employer's interests. Security screening for reliability status can include enhanced inquiries, verifications and assessments when duties involve or directly support security and intelligence functions.

45. Security screening for reliability status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the employer's interests. In determining reliability, the question to be answered is whether the individual can be trusted to safeguard information, assets and facilities, and be relied upon not to abuse the trust that might be accorded and to perform the assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on and not pose a security risk to the Government of Canada. In other words, is there reasonable cause to believe that the individual
may steal or misuse valuables, exploit assets and information, fail to safeguard information and assets entrusted to him or her, or exhibit behaviour that would reflect negatively on his or her reliability?

46. When assessed against these criteria, Dr. CHENG’s actions have demonstrated serious concerns in the area of honestly, trustworthiness and integrity. Notwithstanding Dr. CHENG’s assertions to the contrary, given the totality of the evidence, investigators have found that not only did Dr. CHENG circumvent Government of Canada (GC) policies and guidelines, but equally alarming is his lack of honesty, lack of acceptance of responsibility for his actions and his attempts to deflect blame. Upon being caught for breaching policies, Dr. CHENG stated that he would follow the rules from now on but then continued the practice of allowing access to his accounts to a Restricted Visitor, even after the fact finding. His statements are disingenuous and there is no reason to believe he would follow the rules any time in the future. These actions cannot be mitigated through training or awareness briefings, but rather are the reasons why Dr. CHENG has lost the trust of the department. He cannot be trusted to change his behaviour which therefore will continue to place at risk, GC assets, information and facilities.

47. There were frequent inconsistencies in Dr. CHENG’s statements with regard to breaches of PHAC policies. Also, Dr. CHENG deflected his links to foreign entities that have had unauthorized access to NML’s sensitive information and assets. And when provided with irrefutable forensic evidence to challenge his claims, Dr. CHENG often feigned lack of memory and rebutted allegations of improper conduct. To this day, despite several interviews and the initiation of several investigative processes where Dr. CHENG faces serious consequences, he refuses to acknowledge the seriousness of his actions on PHAC.

48. Because of his lack of acceptance of responsibility, continued selective compliance with departmental and government polices and directives put in place with the express purpose of safeguarding sensitive GC information and assets, his lack of transparency in his collaborative relationships with foreign entities, and his willingness to collaborate with these entities, it is likely that Dr. CHENG would continue to violate PHAC policies and continue to associate with foreign entities should he return to work at PHAC. The recurring pattern of questionable judgement, taking shortcuts in communicating and an unwillingness to accept responsibility demonstrated by Dr. CHENG leads investigators to believe that, despite assertions to the contrary, there exists an unwillingness or inability on the part of Dr. CHENG to adequately safeguard GC and PHAC information and assets, thus making him a security threat to PHAC.

49. Dr. CHENG has been afforded ample opportunities to be truthful and trustworthy but continues to make blanket denials, feign ignorance and at times provides explanations that are not supported by the evidence collected. During each interview, Dr. CHENG provided half-
truths and withheld a wholesome response when asked to tell his full story. It is assessed that Dr. CHENG’s responses were not credible and that this adversely reflects on his trustworthiness and therefore his reliability. It is believed that Dr. CHENG represents a significant security risk that PHAC could not mitigate using administrative or physical security measures.

50. During the course of the Review for Cause, it became evident that Dr. CHENG’s actions were reckless when providing access to NML networks and laboratories. Investigators identified inconsistencies in Dr. CHENG’s statements with regard to breaches of PHAC policies and observed deflection in his statements with regard to his links to foreign entities that have had unauthorized access to sensitive information. Dr. CHENG has not been acting with the best interest of Canada in mind.

51. When given the opportunity to explain his actions, Dr. CHENG has revealed a lack of honesty, truthfulness and acceptance. Dr. CHENG has acknowledged that he is accountable for his actions but refuses to be responsible for correcting them, despite many opportunities to do so. Dr. CHENG has not been open about the information and does not appear likely to resolve doubt surrounding his actions and shows an inability to follow PHAC policies and an unwillingness to correct his reckless behaviour. In fact, he facilitated access to both the NML and the PHAC network to unauthorized persons for reasons of convenience. Dr. CHENG’s personal circumstances and behaviour are of security significance because they introduce vulnerability to pressure or improper influence which may cause Dr. CHENG to continue to commit security breaches. Therefore Dr. CHENG’s Reliability remains of grave concern due to his lack of candour and honesty, breaches in security and an unwillingness to correct his behaviour.

Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada

52. The Standard on Security Screening identifies that when assessing Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada, personal beliefs, features of character, association with persons or groups considered a security threat, or family or other close ties to persons living in countries that pose a security risk to Canada, the individual has acted, is acting, may act or may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada; or the individual has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information.

53. The Standard on Security Screening outlines that a security clearance is the standard of security screening for all positions requiring access to Government of Canada classified information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for a security clearance appraises an individual’s loyalty to Canada and their reliability as it relates to that loyalty.
54. When assessed against these criteria, Dr. CHENG acknowledges his lack of judgement when it comes to the protection of sensitive information and access to the labs, but through his continued actions, demonstrates a lack of effort or willingness to correct this behaviour. Given the number of years of experience at the NML, it is evident that he knowingly breached security measures. Dr. CHENG insists that his actions were not intended to harm PHAC, however, he has also stated that he was “putting bread on his table”, thus demonstrating a choice to advance his own interests ahead of that of PHAC or Canada. Investigators also conclude that due to Dr. CHENG’s association with foreign visitors to NML and collaboration on research papers, he was in contact with foreign entities both with and without the express permission of PHAC.

55. Investigators assess that regardless of Dr. CHENG’s statement of not taking part in formal collaboration with a foreign state, he has invited foreign scientists to work at NML for months without approval from PHAC. Dr. CHENG’s statement of not collaborating with outsiders is contrary to his actions and his previous claims that research should be shared with the scientific community in an open forum. Dr. CHENG was not truthful with CSIS interviewers and withheld information from PHAC investigators. In his original statements, Dr. CHENG denied any knowledge of talent programs or taking part in any collaboration. However, during the Review for Cause process, he finally acknowledged being intimately aware of both. This demonstrates a lack of honesty and puts into question the credibility of his verbal assurances to protect Canada’s interests. Dr. CHENG communicated with foreign entities during their visits to Canada and did collaborate on research papers with entities from this foreign state.

56. CSIS states that should Dr. CHENG be reinstated at the NML, because of his personal beliefs, features of character and association with persons or groups considered a security threat, CSIS assesses that he may act or may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat the security of Canada; or may disclose or may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way sensitive information. (S)

57. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG’s Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada remains of grave concern. Based on the review and analysis of the evidence gathered during the fact finding, administrative investigation, the CSIS security Assessment and the Review for Cause, investigators weighed the adverse information provided by CSIS and are in agreement.

58. Dr. CHENG has been engaged in activities with foreign entities which are a known security threat to Canada. Dr. CHENG’s contacts with these entities indicate that he may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as that term is defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. Investigators conclude that Dr. CHENG’s
actions remain of grave concern due to his direct contact with entities linked to a foreign state and his lack of candour and transparency around these contacts. There is a distinct potential for negative influence, or coercion from a foreign entity.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

59. Recommendations are based on the totality of the adverse information uncovered and assessed with respect to the following:
   a) The nature and seriousness of the security breaches committed by Dr. CHENG;
   b) The lack of honesty, lack of candour and demonstrated pattern of denial, partial acknowledgement and then full acknowledgement only after evidence was presented during the Administrative Investigation, Security Interviews and Review for Cause process;
   c) The very real potential for coercion, influence or inducement from outside entities;
   d) The absence of any demonstrated corrective behaviour or rehabilitation; and
   e) The unlikely resolution of the situation on the part of Dr. CHENG.

60. Information uncovered by investigators during the Review for Cause raise serious security concerns as to Dr. CHENG’s Reliability to PHAC and his Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada.

Recommendation 1 – Revocation of Reliability Status

61. Information collected reflects a recurring pattern of questionable judgment that may negatively affect the performance of duties and that may lead to an inability or unwillingness to safeguard sensitive information, assets or facilities which cannot be satisfactorily mitigated. In accordance with the Treasury Board Secretariat Standard on Security Screening and the findings above, it is recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. CHENG’S Reliability Status.

Recommendation 2 – Revocation of Secret Security Clearance

62. Information collected reveals that Dr. CHENG has been engaged in activities with foreign entities that mean harm to Canada. Dr. CHENG’s contacts with these entities coupled with his lack of honesty, transparency and candour indicate that he may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as that term is defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. In accordance with the Treasury Board Secretariat Standard on Security Screening and the findings above, it is further recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. CHENG’S Secret Security Clearance.
PREPARED BY:
Senior Advisor, Security Screening, Ottawa

Signature Date

Senior Investigator, Ottawa

Signature Date

Director, Security Screening, Contracting and Other Arrangements, Regional Security, and Investigations Ottawa.

Signature Date

REVIEWED BY:
Executive Director
National Security Management Division / Corporate Services Branch
Deputy Chief Security Officer for the Public Health Agency of Canada

Signature Date
Appendix A:
Requirements of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), Standard on Security Screening (SSS)

Attachments: (2)
1) Administrative Investigation Report INV2019-2 (PROTECTED B), dated 05 February 2020
2) CSIS Security Assessment (SECRET//CEO), File No. SSRN 560100406, dated 07 July 2020

COPY
APPENDIX A - REQUIREMENTS OF THE TREASURY BOARD SECRETARIAT (TBS), STANDARD ON SECURITY SCREENING (SSS)

TBS SSS, section 6.4 states:

“6.4.1 Individuals at all levels are responsible for: Accurately and truthfully providing the personal information and evidentiary documents required for security screening, providing consent to conduct that screening, and doing so in accordance with the required format and established time frames and update cycles.”

“6.4.2 Notifying the DSO or delegated official of the following:
   o 6.4.2.1. Any change in personal circumstances that may affect the security status or clearance they have been granted;
   o 6.4.2.2. Any persistent or unusual contact, and of any attempt by another individual to solicit or obtain access to sensitive information, assets or facility without proper authorization; and
   o 6.4.2.3. Any unusual behaviour of individuals that may present a security risk to the department or agency or government as a whole, (as described in Appendix D);”

“6.4.3 Performing their duties reliably and in compliance with the security status or clearance they are granted, the security obligations detailed on the security briefing form, and departmental security procedures.”

TBS SSS, Security Briefing Forms, Part B – Briefing Summary states:

*If an individual fails to safeguard, releases without appropriate authority or uses information / assets for unauthorized purposes, such action may constitute a contravention of the Security of Information Act, the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act or other Acts of Parliament, a breach of the Government Security Policy or the Oath of Secrecy. These provisions apply both during and after service to the Government of Canada. Specific safeguards are identified in the Government Security Policy and Standards and in corresponding departmental or organizational policies which apply to classified and protected information/assets. These safeguards must be applied.*

TBS SSS, Security Briefing Forms, Part C – Briefing Summary states:

*I understand and agree to comply with the above statutory and administrative requirements.*

TBS SSS, Appendix B, section 2 - Criteria for Determining Level of Security Screening and Access Permissions states:

Security screening requirements are based on criteria that reflect the following:

a. The duties to be performed;

b. The sensitivity of the information, assets or facilities to be accessed;

c. The level of authority or control exercised by the position; and

d. The degree of injury that could result from compromise of sensitive government information, assets or facilities to be accessed.
SECRET//CEO

January 8, 2021

SSRN: 910100553
Your File: QIU-XI-19640517

Director General
Centre for Biosecurity
Health Canada
200 Eglantine Driveway, Tunney’s Pasture
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K9

RE: CSIS Act Security Assessment of Ms. Xiangguo QIU

Dear [Redacted],

1. The following is further to a security assessment provided to the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) on June 30, 2020 in relation to the L2 clearance for Ms. Xiangguo QIU, born in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This same security assessment is being provided to Health Canada as it relates to Mr. QIU’s Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) Access clearance. Please ensure that the appropriate program is informed. (P)

2. In accordance with s.15 of the CSIS Act, the Service performed a security screening investigation which included a review of Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) documentation, and further investigation including two subject interviews. Pursuant to s.13 of the CSIS Act the following information was uncovered which strongly calls into question Ms. QIU’s loyalty to Canada and her reliability as it relates to loyalty. (S)

3. Overall, the information below relates to: Ms. QIU’s close and clandestine relationships with a variety of entities of the PRC, which is a known security threat to Canada; Ms. QIU’s complete lack of candour regarding her relationship with those institutions; and her reckless judgement regarding decisions that could have impacted public safety and the interests of Canada. (S)

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1(U) Unclassified. (P) Protected B. (P/MUWS) Information in this paragraph may be used by officials of your agency for additional discussions with the subject. (C) Confidential. (S) Secret. (S/CEO) Secret/Canadian Eyes Only.
Service Information

PRC Talent Programs & Associated Entities

4. Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU was associated to multiple “talent programs” administered and funded by various PRC entities. Service information reveals that these programs aim to boost China’s national technological capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property (IP). (S)

5. Service information indicates that the most prominent PRC talent recruitment program is the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP). Its goal is to recruit ethnic Chinese experts from Western universities, research centers and private companies to boost China’s national capabilities in science and technology and to move China forward as an “innovative” nation. According to open source information, the TTP, along with other national level talent programs, were subsumed by the “National High-end Foreign Experts Recruitment Plan” (NHFERP) in 2019. The primary purpose of the NHFERP is to “serve major national [PRC] strategic needs”, with specific attention on gaining foreign scientist support in “cultivating and developing strategic emerging industries”. Guidance from the PRC’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) indicates that the plan’s goals are to recruit foreign experts who undertake cutting-edge research, and those who have the potential to achieve major breakthroughs in key and core technological fields. Biotechnology research and development is specifically noted in the NHFERP as an area which needs to be strengthened. The PRC’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016 – 2020) commits to the implementation of its Made in China 2025 (MC2025) action plan, which identifies biotechnology as a strategic priority area for innovation and development. Specifically, the MC2025 plan commits China to “develop new medical products using chemicals and biotechnology to address critical diseases, including antibody drugs, antibody coupling drugs, new structural proteins, polypeptide drugs, and new vaccines”. (C/CEO)

6. Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU presented at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) on “Combating Ebola Virus Infection: the Development and Use of Ebola Monoclonal Antibodies and Vaccines” on March 31, 2017. On WIV’s official website online, each of the presenters have their own pages with pictures that
correspond to the document and the dates of presentation. No such page exists for Ms. QIU’s presentation. According to information available to the Service, Ms. QIU was approved by PHAC for travel to Beijing between March 24, 2017 and April 8, 2017 to present at the 1st International Symposium of Joint Prevention & Control of Imported Zoonotic Diseases. The Service is not aware of any PHAC-approved travel for Ms. QIU to Wuhan during this period. (S)

Application Form for the State “Thousand Talent” Project (Talent for short term innovative project- Key laboratory)

7. Ms. QIU was officially approved by PHAC to travel between September 20 and October 1, 2017 to provide training at WIV. Ms. QIU’s application for the TTP was discussed with WIV employees, senior scientist, and senior technician, during this period. Service investigation reveals that the institute [WIV]’s leaders believe Ms. QIU’s application to the TTP is “very important for our institute [WIV]’s future development”. (S)

8. Service information states that in addition to generous PRC program benefits, TTP participants are not required to reside in China full-time or give up their employment at non-PRC institutions; this facilitates dual income for researchers and ongoing access for China. According to open source information, one category of the TTP is the “Innovative Talents (Short Term)” program, which targets scientists returning or coming to the PRC for at least two months every year and for at least three consecutive years with stable employers and clear work objectives.

Service investigation has uncovered a TTP Application that declares Ms. QIU as the applicant and WIV as the declaring entity. The TTP Application also states that “Professor QIU’s work term in our institute [WIV] is from 2019 03 to 2022 03. She will work for the Wuhan Virology Institute for at least two months every year”. (S//CEO)

9. According to open sources, applications for the TTP are submitted by the host institution rather than the candidate. Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU began the TTP Application process in the beginning in October 2017.

Between October 2017 and January 2018, when the application was submitted to WIV’s Human Resources (HR) department, Ms. QIU collaborated on the application with [Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)]
10. According to Service information, TTP participants are given up to 5,000,000 RMB (approximately $1,000,000 CAD) in research subsidies. Participants may also enjoy preferential PRC tax and visa treatment, housing subsidies, and prioritized medical care in China.

In relation to the above-noted TTP application, Service investigation reveals that during the employment period, WIV agrees to provide science and research start-up funding of no less than “1,500,000”, and an annual salary of no less than “200,000” (currencies not indicated). This agreement also indicates that the candidate must carry out work pertaining to the laboratory and team building, agreeing that all ownership of scientific research results obtained by the candidate belong to WIV while conducting research at its laboratory.

(S//CEO)

11. According to Service information, the PRC also has similar provincial and municipal level talent programs for recruiting overseas talents within their jurisdictions. Ms. QIU was involved in preparing applications for other
PRC talent programs and related plans with various PRC entities including the CAS Kunming Institute of Zoology (KIZ) and Hebei Medical University (HBU). (S)

**CAS 2019 Annual International Talent Plan / President’s International Fellowship Initiative**

12. Service investigation reveals that the Director of the BSL-3 lab at KIZ told Ms. QIU in an email that she should apply for the “2019 Annual International Talent Program” / “Chinese Academy of Sciences President’s International Fellowship Initiative” (CAS ITP). Specifically, it was stated that Ms. QIU should apply for the “Outstanding International Scholar” category. Information regarding this category indicates that the funding period is one to two weeks and that the funding standard is 50,000 RMB per week (approximately $10,000 CAD).

Ms. QIU sent an email with her CV, passport, an abstract and a partly filled out CAS ITP Application to an employee at KIZ to complete on her behalf. In Ms. QIU’s CAS ITP Application, it was indicated that Ms. QIU would visit KIZ in April 2019. Her daily schedule of specialist activities would include “activities of actual academic exchanges, consultations, research guidance, exploration of talent fostering, and partnership of scientific research”, as well as training. (S)

**Hebei Medical University High Caliber Talent Bringing-in Agreement**

13. Service investigation has revealed the existence of an employment agreement, ultimately unfinalized at the time, between Hebei Medical University (HBU) and Ms. QIU for work between July 2018 and June 2022. Ms. QIU would be expected to work onsite at HBU for two months per year and continue to lead the work of the task group members when offsite.

This HBU Agreement stipulates that Ms. QIU would receive compensation, funding, and accommodation in the PRC, for assisting HBU in managing and developing their lab, building a team, and conducting innovative scientific research. Ms. QIU would be provided with funding of
6,000,000 RMB (approximately $1,200,000 CAD) for science and research. Ms. QIU’s compensation would be 75,000 RMB/month (approximately $15,000 CAD/month) based on actual months worked at HBU’s laboratory, and an additional 150,000 RMB/year (approximately $30,000 CAD/year) for leading laboratory operations when onsite. (S)

**Activities with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)**

14. **Service investigation reveals that** as part of her enrolment in the TTP with WIV, Ms. QIU committed to various work arrangements² including but not limited to building the PRC’s “bioscience platform for new and potent infectious disease research...in order to reach the top level domestically [within China] and achieve leading status internationally in the area of BSL4 virus research”. Ms. QIU is referred to by WIV as “the only highly experienced Chinese expert available internationally, who is still fighting on the front lines in a P4 laboratory”. The TTP Application specifies that all results and intellectual property generated from the TTP contract would belong to the “Declaring Entity” [WIV]. Other options to select were “My Current Employer” [NML – PHAC] or “Myself” [Xiangguo Qiu]. (S)

15. **The TTP application further specifies** that Ms. QIU will provide bioscience training classes to WIV one or two times per year in order to help perfect WIV’s BSL-4 operating procedures. **Separately, Service investigation reveals** that in July 2018, Ms. QIU received an invitation from WIV to present for approximately thirty individuals at a biosafety workshop in October 2018, at WIV’s expense. Ms. QIU accepted, however according to travel expenses reported to PHAC, this workshop was not reported amongst other conferences that Ms. QIU did report attending in the PRC, such as the *8th International Symposium on Emerging Viral Disease in Wuhan*. The Service is not aware of PHAC being informed of this workshop by Ms. QIU. Following the dates of this workshop in October 2018, **Director, WIV (Individual 1)** began inquiring into materials to procure in order to build up WIV laboratory bioscience, to which Ms. QIU, amongst others, provided advice. **Director, WIV (Individual 2)** Ms. QIU also accepted an invitation from WIV employees, including **Director, WIV (Individual 3)**, to become a member of the “International Advisory Committee for Wuhan P4 Laboratory”. **Director, WIV (Individual 4)** Ms. QIU was previously invited to act as a member of this committee in September 2018. (S)

16. **Another stated work arrangement is that Ms. QIU “...will build a team to start a series of research topics using China’s disease source as advantage...” and that WIV “…will provide sufficient scientific, research, and office conditions, which includes research expenses, instruments and equipment, research assistants, etc. to guarantee the normal operation of [Ms. QIU’s] scientific and research work”. Service information reveals that **Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)** was hired by PHAC, via the University of Manitoba (UoM), in February 2018 to work under Ms. QIU as a visiting researcher. According to **Senior Technician, WIV (Individual 2)** may have been the first researcher from the PRC to come to Canada that Ms. QIU directly facilitated

² “work arrangements” referred to are assessed to be deliverables under the TTP.
herself. In discussions in 2017 with Vice-Director / Senior Scientist, WIV and other WIV employees regarding Ms. QIU’s TTP application, [Individual 2] asked a WIV HR representative when an appropriate time to complete the first draft of Ms. QIU’s TTP Application would be so he could prepare for his work arrangements. The WIV HR representative responded “…by December”, [Individual 2] applied for and received a Secret security clearance in December 2017. Service investigation reveals that [Individual 2] continued to be involved in Ms. QIU’s WIV TTP application as of late January 2018. [Individual 2] identified that the document was ready subject to signature.

According to PHAC’s administrative report as part of their previous administrative investigation into Ms. QIU’s activities, [Individual 2] reportedly tried to remove vials from the NML without authorization on October 12, 2018. (S)

17. Service investigation reveals that under the section of the TTP Application titled “Reasons for recommendation (necessity for bringing in the applicant and his/her substantive contribution, etc.)”, WIV indicates that “[Ms. QIU] joining us will significantly improve our research and management levels in the areas of potent infectious diseases and biosecurity, it’s beneficial for our strengthening of international cooperation, and importing the P4 virus research resources from abroad”. This statement follows another by WIV indicating that “there have been huge obstacles in importing the resources and research personnel related to the P4 laboratories”. From June – July 2018 via e-mail, Ms. QIU discussed with WIV employees, including CC’d, the shipping of EBOV and NiV (likely “Ebola virus” and “Nipah virus”), BSL-4 pathogens, from the NML to WIV. In some e-mails, Ms. QIU writes that a formal agreement between PHAC and WIV to authorize the transfer is not necessary as “no one owns the IP” and “hope there is another way around”. On October 18, 2018, a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) was provided by WIV regarding Ebola and Henipah viruses amongst others. Ms. QIU travelled to Wuhan / WIV on October 19, 2018, the day after receiving the MTA. PHAC appears to have approved this shipment on November 2, 2018 with the pathogens then being sent on March 31, 2019. A Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) article published in open sources on June 14, 2020 revealed that based on information obtained via an ATIP request, this shipment to WIV contained fifteen virus strains. (S)

18. Service investigation reveals an application form, from June 2018, was signed by Ms. QIU for a “Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Advanced Customer Cultivation Project” with WIV (herein referred to as “WIV Project 1”). This project aims to “cultivate national
high-level biosafety talents, to output significant scientific and technological breakthroughs and achievements, and to promote the scientific and technological support capabilities for biosafety and public health”.

Ms. QIU and [1] were both listed as project designers and managers, and [1] as working on mRNA vaccine construction. WIV Project 1 included a budget of 1,500,000 RMB (approximately $300,000 CAD) and was to take place from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2021. One objective of this project was to establish mouse-adapted and guinea pig-adapted Ebola viruses (EBOV), with the aim of rescuing both adapted viruses through reverse genetics for study / production of mRNA vaccines. Another objective of WIV Project 1 was to help WIV set up procedures and protocols for animal research activities. Under the application’s section of “Review opinions of applicant’s organization”, it states:
VIII. Review opinions of applicant’s organization

We are in the process of applying for the official permit to transfer BSL-4 pathogens from Canada to China. To avoid confusing the leaders, it’s better not to let National Microbiology Laboratory know about this project. And since there will be no budget transfer for China to Canada, it’s not so necessary to have the opinion from National Microbiology Laboratory.

Of the fifteen viruses mentioned in the CBC article published in open sources on June 14, 2020, at least five virus strains from the March 31, 2019 BSL-4 pathogen shipment from the NML to WIV were referenced in WIV Project 1. According to information available to the Service, PHAC was not aware of this project. The desire on the part of WIV Project 1 members to keep this project secret from the NML suggests that the PHAC-approved transfer of BSL-4 pathogens to WIV contained strains that – unbeknownst to PHAC and the NML – were to be used in WIV Project 1. (S)

19. Another expected outcome of WIV Project 1 was to publish four to six high impact peer review articles. In January 2019, Ms. QIU accepted an invitation by to become an Editorial Board member of *Virologica Sinica*, the official journal of the *Chinese Society for Microbiology*. Ms. QIU had previously submitted an article to this journal in 2017 and upon publication, it became copyright property of WIV. (S)

20. Service investigation reveals that, in the spring of 2019, and other WIV employees were approved by a Chinese evaluation committee to conduct a “CAS High-end User Nurturing Project” at WIV (herein referred to as “WIV Project 2”). Ms. QIU was listed as being in charge of “Overall Planning”, with handling “Project Design” and performing “Animal Infection”. WIV Project 2 included a budget of 250,000 RMB/year (approximately $50,000 CAD) and was to take place from June 2019 to May 2021. planned to use reverse genetics in order to create synthetic virus strains. This was to assess cross-species infection and pathogenic risks of bat filoviruses for future vaccine development purposes, which suggests that gain-of-function (GOF) studies were possibly to take place. According to open sources, GOF studies are comprised of research conducted to improve the ability of a pathogen to cause disease in order to help define the fundamental nature of human-pathogen interactions. These studies contain various biosafety and biosecurity risks, and the US government paused funding on GOF research with potential pandemic pathogens in 2014. In 2015, was involved in GOF experiments with US researchers as part of a study that created a hybrid version of a bat coronavirus; one related to the virus that caused Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),
which could jump directly from bats to humans. The international scientific community raised concerns as to whether or not it should allow laboratory research that increased the virulence, ease of spread or host range of dangerous pathogens. Some scientists disapproved of the study, noting that it was a “new, non-natural risk” and “provided little benefit and reveals little about the risk that the wild virus in bats poses to humans”. However, this study was allowed to continue, under review, by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). (S)

PRC Military Associations

21. Open sources state that as per China’s key national research and development (R&D) priorities for 2017 – 2022, the PRC seeks to support national defense research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications. Ms. QIU was listed online as a co-author on an NML research paper which included other individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China. AMMS is the highest medical research institution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC and is comprised of eighteen units, eleven of which are specialized research institutes responsible for the health service tasks of the PLA. These tasks include the development of military biotechnologies, biological counter-terrorism and the prevention and control of major diseases.

22. Under the “Employer’s Opinion” section of her TTP Application, it states that “[Ms. QIU] is very eager to promote the development of biosecurity industry in our country [PRC]. She has deep cooperation relations with the Academy of Military Medical Sciences”. It also states that Ms. QIU has been a visiting professor at the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB) of AMMS since April 2016. (S)

23. Service investigation reveals that, on CVs destined for Chinese audiences, Ms. QIU listed the following employment experiences among her credentials:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Research Scientist</td>
<td>Wuhan Institute of Virology</td>
<td>October 2018</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Professor</td>
<td>Hebei Medical University</td>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Research Fellow</td>
<td>National Institutes for Food and Drug Control (China)</td>
<td>January 2017</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Professor</td>
<td>Beijing Institute of Biotechnology</td>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Service has noted that the above-referenced PRC-based employment experiences have been omitted on Ms. QIU’s CVs that were destined for Canadian audiences, such as the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and in her 2018 and 2019 application for promotion at PHAC. (S)
24. Service investigation reveals that when providing edits on a research paper by one of her visiting students from the PRC, Microsoft User “Xiangguo Qiu” highlighted “Institute of Military Veterinary, Academy of Military Medical Sciences” and made the comment, “Can you take off this affiliation?” on June 20, 2019. The version of this paper submitted to the scientific journal *Viruses* on June 24, 2019 did not include a reference to AMMS. (S)

25. Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU was nominated for an “international cooperation award” circa 2016 by [redacted] from AMMS. In regards to Ms. QIU’s collaborations highlighted in this nomination, it is stated that she “…cooperated in a timely manner with experts from AMMS” including [redacted] and experts from other organizations such as [redacted] from the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The nomination also indicates that Ms. QIU “…used Canada’s Level 4 Biosafety Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens…and achieved brilliant results”. This included a 2013 visit wherein [redacted] and his team came to the NML, after which Ms. QIU “…consulted with the leaders and experts of both China and Canada on matters related to cooperation, and provided the Chinese side with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of convenience for China”. Service information indicates that [redacted] is also known as [redacted].

26. Service investigation indicates additional collaborators mentioned in this “international cooperation award” nomination as individuals from Tianjin CanSino Biotechnology Inc. [redacted] Service investigation reveals an airline ticket receipt for Ms. QIU, for travel to Beijing in April 2018, booked by an e-mail address associated to CanSino Biotechnology Inc.
27. Major General, PLA / Top Virologist, AMMS (Chief 1)

Major General, PLA / Top Virologist, AMMS (Chief 2)

28. As pictured in open sources wearing a PLA uniform, is a Major General, is noted as the top virologist at AMMS and China’s chief biological weapons defense expert engaged in research related to biosafety, bio-defence and bio-terrorism.

29. Pictured above in open sources

Service information reveals that CAS works closely with the PLA to acquire Western technologies and have worked together on multiple research projects and papers since 2012.

Service investigation reveals that Ms. QIU and have worked together on multiple research projects and papers since 2012. (S//CEO)

30. Service investigation reveals that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH was a post-doctoral student of Ms. QIU at the University of Manitoba (UoM) working with CHENG Keding, is a research assistant at AMMS’ Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB). According to open sources, the BIB is a research institute engaged in the study of biological high technology in the PLA.

Service investigation reveals that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH was brought to UoM as a visiting scientist by Ms. QIU on a scholarship reportedly paid through the Chinese embassy in Canada.

Service information indicates that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH holds a Chinese Public Affairs passport. Service information also reveals that Restricted Visitor #1, CSCHAH indicated her residence as being which is Ms. QIU and CHENG Keding’s second property. Open sources
Security Screening Interviews

Interview 1

31. Ms. QIU was previously interviewed by the Service on March 19, 2020 in relation to her Secret clearance (herein referred to as “Interview 1”). As noted in our initial security assessment, during this interview Ms. QIU discussed matters related to security practices at the NML, knowledge of PRC military and intelligence associates, scientific collaboration with foreign researchers and her own loyalty to Canada vs. China. (P//MUWS)

32. In relation to security practices at the NML, during Interview 1, Ms. QIU did not take responsibility for her security violations and instead blamed PHAC for not being clear as to what was required of her and when. She stated, “I never got the proper training... I always tried my best to follow the policy. I don’t think I made any terrible mistakes... for sure the mistakes they found on me, I’m not alone... to blame myself, I didn’t do anything.” As a scientist who works with “fatal viruses”, when asked why she thinks she requires a security clearance for her employment, Ms. QIU responded, “That’s a really good question.” She thought it was to protect information but was simply a job requirement. (P//MUWS)

33. Ms. QIU stated that she was only aware of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) after taking over a project from her predecessor at the NML wherein one collaborator had AMMS associations. Ms. QIU indicated that she had no more information on AMMS or any possible Chinese military connections. Ms. QIU routinely stated that she did not previously think about the fact that her scientific research could be used by foreign entities for nefarious purposes such as biological weapons development and stated that her collaborators were “probably doing the work to advance science for good... for the possibility to save lives. That’s all we think about as scientists.” (P//MUWS)

34. In Interview 1, Ms. QIU was directly questioned as to what she would do if she were approached by the Chinese government to conduct exclusive research for the betterment of Chinese people. Ms. QIU responded, “Well, it depends on what they asked me to do, it’s just like collaboration.” She explained that if the research would not have an effect on or damage Canada then she would say yes because collaboration is common practice. When questioned if there were instances where the NML Director would not have known what she was working on or who she was working with, Ms. QIU responded, “Right, yeah. Possibly, yeah... so basically if I think there’s something important or there’s potential, I would go to them to let them know how we are going to deal with this.” The investigator furthered “But not in every instance?” and Ms. QIU responded indicating that was correct. (P//MUWS)
35. On June 19, 2020, a second security interview was conducted with Ms. QIU (herein referred to as “Interview 2”). During this interview, Ms. QIU was questioned thoroughly on her finances, knowledge of Chinese individuals and institutions with military associations, and awareness of and involvement in PRC-sponsored talent programs and associated research activities. At the interviewer’s discretion, Ms. QIU was presented with documentation which was obtained by the Service. (P//MUWS)

36. At the beginning of Interview 2, Ms. QIU was provided a recap of what was discussed during Interview 1 and the definitions of what it means to be truthful and fulsome in responses as part of the security clearance process was explained again. She was presented with the opportunity to clarify or change any responses from Interview 1, to which she responded that previously she did not know, but now believes, that her eldest son provided her and her husband, CHENG Keding, with money collected from renting rooms in the past year to individuals in their second home; Ms. QIU explained that her son, who lives in Toronto, ON, manages the rental property remotely and her husband sometimes helps with maintenance. When asked, Ms. QIU could not give an estimate of the amount of money they had received from their son. Further, Ms. QIU claimed not to know any of the past or current tenants residing at their residence and when questioned specifically if anybody she or her husband had worked with at PHAC or the University of Manitoba (UoM) had ever rented rooms at [REDACTED], she repeatedly stated, “I don’t think so.” When asked if there was anything else, in any capacity, that she wanted to clarify, change, add or revisit in relation to her answers from Interview 1, Ms. QIU responded in the negative. (P//MUWS)

37. During Interview 2, Ms. QIU initially stated that she had no other bank accounts besides two joint Canadian accounts with her husband. However, later on, when pressed for information and presented with a name [REDACTED] possibly relating to conflicting banking information, Ms. QIU admitted, “Okay, I have an account in China…but I just put 1000 RMB in that account, that’s it.” When asked the name of the bank associated to this account, she responded, “What’s the bank, umm, I think it’s China Commercial Bank…I think so.” Ms. QIU initially stated she has only held this account for one year but then corrected herself stating maybe more than one year, maybe two years; she was unsure. She stated her only purpose for opening this account was for simple day-to-day transactions for when she was traveling within China and she mentioned her husband was aware of this account. Ms. QIU stated nobody else has access to this Chinese account. (P//MUWS)

38. When asked directly if all of the collaborations she has worked on over the years were approved by or done with the knowledge of PHAC, after a pause, Ms. QIU responded, “Umm, yes.” Similar to Interview 1, Ms. QIU stated that for some small experiments in the exploratory stages, PHAC was not made aware. However, Ms. QIU, aside from the small experiments she
did not seek approval for from PHAC, stated that PHAC would have records of everything. She
certified that she has never intentionally withheld anything from PHAC, including any records
or work ever done with anybody outside of PHAC, and when queried as to if she has ever signed
any agreement with anybody or any entity related to research work that has not been made
known to PHAC, she replied, “No, I don’t think so.” Ms. QIU was later questioned specifically
on her work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), and when asked if there were any
agreements or projects between them besides PHAC-approved training, she simply responded,
“No.” (P//MUWS)

39. When questioned about being nominated for or offered awards by any other
governments, research centres or universities, Ms. QIU stated, after much thinking, “You know,
people from China, they umm tried, tried to nominate me [for] an award, that’s one, and uh, I
didn’t get it.” Ms. QIU somewhat explained that it was an international medical collaboration
award in 2016 or 2017 with her nominator being [redacted]. This award, however, was
intended for scientists born outside of China so Ms. QIU did not qualify. Ms. QIU stated that she
made the Executive Director of the NML, [redacted], aware of this award at the time and
stated that he signed the nominating documents. Ms. QIU confirmed that besides the document
NML had to sign, she had never received any other documentation, notification or filled out any
application related to this award. (P//MUWS)

40. Ms. QIU initially denied knowing of or working with anyone that has been involved in
military research or that is connected to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC or any
military research institutes. Ms. QIU simply responded “no” when asked if she herself has ever
worked for any Chinese military institute, either paid or unpaid, as a visiting scholar, visiting
researcher or adjunct professor. Later on, Ms. QIU was reminded that in Interview 1 she had
mentioned [Individual 17] had collaborated with AMMS. She was therefore questioned again if
she knew anyone else besides [Individual 17] affiliated to AMMS, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences (CAS) or any other military medical institutes in China, to which she responded, “No.”
When asked again if she herself has ever held any position in any capacity with any military
medical institutes she responded in the negative. (P//MUWS)

41. The interviewer then mentioned the name [Individual 18] and asked if Ms. QIU knew of
this individual. Ms. QIU admitted that [Individual 16] was “probably one of the nominators”.
When asked who [Individual 16] works for, Ms. QIU stated, “She works for antibody
development, I think, I don’t know a lot about her work.” After further questioning, long pauses
and stumped words, Ms. QIU revealed that [Individual 16] works for the Institute of Medical
Science. Ms. QIU described her relationship with [Individual 16] and stated they have never met
or spoken in any capacity. Immediately afterwards, the interviewer mentioned the name
[Individual 19]. When asked what relationship, if any, Ms. QIU has with [Individual 19] she stated they simply
worked together on the Ad-5 Ebola vaccine with the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology (BIB)
and mentioned, “…she [Individual 19] probably has some position there or something.” Ms. QIU
then revealed that she is aware that [Individual 19] is the Director of the BIB. (P//MUWS)
42. Following this, the interviewer provided open source pictures of and
in full PLA uniform and asked if Ms. QIU recognized either of the individuals. Ms.
QIU was able to identify both individuals by name, stating “Yeah, I think I saw their picture.
yeah.” The interviewer highlighted that is a Major General in the PLA and
is a senior researcher at AMMS. Ms. QIU claimed not to know much about
and stated never having worked directly with. She again stated that she has never
met either of them in person. Ms. QIU was unsure as to why would nominate her
for an award as they have never had direct collaboration. After being told is involved
in bioweapons research and this is publicly available knowledge, Ms. QIU responded, “She
is?... I wasn’t aware, I didn’t know.” Ms. QIU claimed she did not research
background previously and was dismissive when asked if she thinks her [Ms. QIU’s]
collaborations with other institutions, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), have
assisted in advancing the capabilities of the PLA. When asked directly if she thinks it would be
important to do some background checks on who she collaborates with in regards to deadly
pathogens and related research, Ms. QIU responded, “Well I dunno, I guess. Before I never
thought about it.” (P//MUWS)

43. After the interviewer explained in detail to Ms. QIU the major threat posed to the security
of Canada by activities emanating from PRC military, intelligence and security organizations and
associated threat actors, Ms. QIU was given another opportunity to reveal anyone she may know
of connected to these types of entities. After pausing for over a minute, Ms. QIU was pressed
further and eventually mentioned her post-doctoral student from the BIB, 
Ms. QIU claimed not to know much about collaborators or anybody she has
worked with, including when asked if was a Restricted
Visitor (RV) at PHAC, confirmed, but did not provide much further information. Ms. QIU was
then again questioned on any other nominations that she may have been a part of in relation to
any Chinese researchers or institutions. Ms. QIU quietly admitted to being nominated for a
“foreign academician” award last year by and a few other
individuals. She mentioned that she withdrew “because of my situation” (i.e. being escorted from
the NML) but stated that she had also been nominated for this same award in the past. When
asked why she did not disclose these award nominations or volunteer any of her affiliations,
associations or connections to outside entities other than PHAC in either of her security
interviews, Ms. QIU responded that it was not in her mind and she did not know it was related or
think it was relevant. Ms. QIU was then asked one final time if there were any other awards,
recognition, programs, memberships, or anything else that she was ever nominated for, or that
she has sought, with any foreign institute. Ms. QIU, after pausing a while, responded, “I don’t
think so.” (P//MUWS)

44. The interview described with Ms. QIU her relationship and collaboration with WIV.
Ms. QIU described that in 2017, on one of her trips to China for a conference, she was invited by
the Vice-Director of WIV to visit the laboratory. Ms. QIU accepted and went for
“...half a day, on the way back to Beijing.” Ms. QIU explained that WIV had initially asked her
to come twice annually to provide training, which she discussed with PHAC. Ms. QIU explained
that she only went there once for this purpose, in autumn of 2017. When asked if Ms. QIU has communicated or maintained a relationship with [REDACTED] since then, she stated that [REDACTED] invited her back to WIV for a “2018 international emerging virus conference”. Ms. QIU later revealed that WIV had asked her to come work for them but she turned them down [REDACTED]. Ms. QIU did not want to work there full-time or part-time. Ms. QIU repeatedly responded in the negative when asked if there are or have even been any work or project agreements that exist between her and WIV besides the PHAC-approved training. (P///MUWS)

45. Ms. QIU also described how after WIV got certified (i.e. got their BSL-4 certification), she acted simply as a messenger to help transfer viruses to them from the NML. Ms. QIU passed the information along to the Chief of Special Pathogens at the NML and was involved in the back and forth communication and preparation of documents with WIV. Conversations regarding a virus shipment first took place in summer of 2018 in Beijing, China between Ms. QIU and the Director of WIV [REDACTED]. When asked directly multiple times if she and employees at WIV had ever discussed trying to “find another way” to get the virus samples routed to the PRC, Ms. QIU responded in the negative, but ultimately added, “I don’t remember.” (P///MUWS)

46. The interviewer questioned Ms. QIU on her knowledge of Chinese talent programs, including the “Thousand Talents Program” (TTP) specifically. Ms. QIU was hesitant in responding, but somewhat described that in 2017/2018 a WIV employee, either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] (Ms. QIU could not remember), had “mentioned” the TTP to her. However, Ms. QIU was not qualified and did not want to take part. When asked why she did not previously disclose this offer to the interviewer despite their detailed conversation regarding WIV, Ms. QIU explained that she knew from a friend that there were age limits to the TTP and therefore she never really looked at it seriously. She explained why she never made anyone at PHAC aware of this offer, stating “I never really applied...nothing happened...I never really planned to go...I should disclose that to anyone?...I said no.” Even outside of PHAC personnel, Ms. QIU responded that she had never discussed this offer with anybody. Other than the offer from WIV, when asked directly by the interviewer, “Has anybody ever suggested or asked you to apply for a talents program in China?”, Ms. QIU immediately responded, “No.” (P///MUWS)

47. Ms. QIU was then presented with a “hypothetical situation” wherein she was offered a position at a Chinese institute under the TTP. It was explained that the talents program agreement may state that anything Ms. QIU might produce in relation to her work under this agreement would belong to or be owned by the Chinese institute, such as WIV, rather than PHAC and would be obfuscated from PHAC. To this, Ms. QIU responded, “It basically [does] not apply to me, and, uh, I never agreed...I said no...”. When asked outright if she has ever applied in any capacity for the TTP, has filled out or received an application for a talents program, or been notified that she was nominated for a talents program, Ms. QIU continually quickly responded, “No.” After further discussion, the interviewer gave Ms. QIU one final opportunity to adjust her statements related to any talent program applications that she may have
been involved in, in any way whatsoever. When asked if there was anything else she wished to mention, Ms. QIU responded “I don’t think so.” (P//MUWS)

48. Ms. QIU was ultimately presented incrementally with various Chinese talent program applications and agreements filled out in her name. This included the “Application Form for the State “Thousand Talent” Project” (TTP Application), the “CAS 2019 Annual International Talent Plan / President’s International Fellowship Initiative” (CAS ITP) and the “Hebei Medical University High Caliber Talent Bringing-in Agreement” (HBU Agreement). Despite the interviewer reading out various portions of each agreement and indicating their direct inconsistencies with Ms. QIU’s previous interview answers, Ms. QIU denied knowing about these applications. Her story somewhat varied throughout this portion of the interview, but she continually stated that she had nothing to do with filling out any applications herself, was not aware that some applications were considered talent programs, was not sure why she was listed as holding certain positions at Chinese institutions including AMMS, and that nothing in relation to these applications was ever completed or finalized. Ms. QIU stated outright at one point that she had never received any of the talent program applications, stating, “No, I didn’t receive [them], no.” When continually pressed, certain details came out contrary to her position of “not knowing” about these applications or associated communications, projects and activities. This included her stating that she did not make PHAC aware as she did not think they were real positions or offers and she did not remember if she signed any of the applications or agreements. Throughout this entire section of the interview, Ms. QIU was presented with multiple opportunities to refute, clarify, change or add to her previous statements, but did not do so in a concise manner. Of note, Ms. QIU stated explicitly that she had never received any emails about the status of any applications and in regards to Ms. QIU’s TTP Application before he came to Canada. Ms. QIU stated that she and had no communication about her TTP Application prior to him coming to Canada. (P//MUWS)

49. In regards to any of her past business work or travel in China, Ms. QIU stated that PHAC was always made aware and she has always disclosed everything, including any activities conducted with WIV. When questioned on her work with private companies, Ms. QIU mentioned CanSino (i.e. CanSino Biotechnology Inc.), which was part of the Ad-5 Ebola vaccine that was linked with and the BIB. Ms. QIU stated that she has never worked with CanSino directly, other than conducting animal experiments at the NML. Ms. QIU is confident that there are full records at PHAC and UoM for this work. When asked directly, multiple times, if any private company, including CanSino, or any other research institution, has ever paid for her travel to China, compensated her for any of her research work, or provided any remuneration of any kind for anything at all, after numerous pauses, Ms. QIU responded, “I don’t think so” and “I don’t remember”. Ms. QIU stated that she has never accepted any travel reimbursements from any private company, entity or individual and has never “double-dipped” at PHAC’s expense. (P//MUWS)
50. When questioned as to what her plans are should PHAC not reinstate her at the NML, Ms. QIU responded, “I don’t know, I never thought about it because I always think I’m going back to work soon.” She furthered, “I’m thinking, I believe I will go back to the work…Ms. QIU explained that she feels bad for the students as “…they are waiting for me to come back…so much projects I need to publish.” She stated, “To be honest, I never ever thought I would be in this situation at all. Never.” Similar to what was stated in Interview 1, Ms. QIU still feels that she was not made aware of PHAC’s security policies and procedures, never got the proper training, was always trying to follow the rules and did not do anything intentionally wrong. At the end of Interview 2, when presented with one final opportunity to add or discuss anything at all that may be useful to the Service’s investigation into her security clearance or PHAC’s future decision regarding her employment, Ms. QIU offered nothing and responded “Really, you know better than me…” (P//MUWS)

Service Assessment

51. **Loyalty:** Further to our security assessment provided to PHAC on June 30, 2020, the Service assesses that Ms. QIU developed deep, cooperative relationships with a variety of People’s Republic of China (PRC) institutions and has intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC Government, and herself, without regard for the implications to her employer or to Canada’s interests. It is clear that Ms. QIU not only failed to inform her employer of these activities but made efforts to conceal her projects with PRC institutions. The Service further assesses that because of her extensive knowledge of the harmful effects of dangerous pathogens on human health, Ms. QIU should have been aware of the possibility that her efforts to engage clandestinely with the PRC in these research areas could harm Canadian interests or international security. The Service therefore assesses that Ms. QIU has engaged, may engage or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act (Section 2(a)). (S)

52. **Reliability as it relates to loyalty:** The Service assesses that Ms. QIU repeatedly lied in her security screening interviews about the extent of her work with institutions of the PRC Government and refused to admit to any involvement in various PRC programs, even when documents were put before her. Despite being given every opportunity in her interviews to provide a truthful version of her association with PRC entities, Ms. QIU continued to make blanket denials, feign ignorance, or tell outright lies. Even when confronted by the interviewer and being told that she was not being forthright, and that this lack of candour could have an effect on her security clearance and career, Ms. QIU declined to be truthful. Overall, the Service assesses that Ms. QIU’s answers to a multitude of interview questions were simply not credible, which reflects adversely on her personal trustworthiness and therefore her basic reliability, the primary building block of a security clearance. (S)

53. The Service also assesses that Ms. QIU was reckless in her dealings with various PRC entities, particularly in her lack of respect for proper scientific protocols regarding the transfer of
pathogens and in working with institutions whose goals have potentially lethal military applications that are manifestly not in the interests of Canada or its citizens. Ms. QIU also gave access to the NML to at least two employees of a PRC institution whose work is not aligned with Canadian interests, and consistently asserted that she had very limited knowledge of these institutions’ mandates, despite an abundance of evidence that she was actually working with or for them. The Service therefore assessed that because of adverse features of character – dishonesty, reckless judgement and lack of respect for accepted rules and norms – Ms. QIU has acted, may act and may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada. We also assess that she has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information. (S)

54. Finally, the Service assesses that should Ms. QIU be reinstated at the NML, or retain an HPTA security clearance, Canada’s national security and the health of individuals may be put into jeopardy as there is no indication, based on our extensive research and interviews of her, that she would change her behavior in any respect. We assess that despite her enormous scientific knowledge and contributions, her behavior is incompatible with holding a Government of Canada security clearance. (S)

55. The authority to deny, revoke or suspend clearances rests with your departments. However, the Service requests that you inform us of any change to the status of the subject’s HPTA clearance. Please complete the Notification of Security Clearance Form (Form 4195e; available at www.csis-scrs.gc.ca) and return it to the mailing address provided (ATTN: Security Screening, Client Liaison). Should you wish to discuss this assessment, please contact Client Liaison at [contact information] to schedule a meeting. (C)

Yours sincerely,

Chief
Security Screening Branch
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

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FOR CONCURRENCE

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Review for Cause of Security Status:
Dr. Xiangguo QIU

SUMMARY

- The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your concurrence on recommendations to revoke the Reliability Status and Secret Security Clearance of Dr. Xiangguo QIU, an employee of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). Dr. QIU is currently suspended without pay due to the suspension of her Reliability Status.

- A Review for Cause is a reassessment of an individual's eligibility to hold a security status or clearance previously granted. It is a formal process that is initiated when new information is uncovered or reported about an individual that may call into question their reliability and/or loyalty to Canada.

- In this case, PHAC conducted a Review for Cause to assess Reliability, Loyalty to Canada and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada, as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security (PGS) and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS).

- Your concurrence is being sought on the recommended course of action.

BACKGROUND:

PHAC conducted a fact finding in 2018, followed by an Administrative Investigation in 2019 to investigate possible security breaches at the NML by Dr. QIU. The Administrative Investigation determined that Dr. QIU had breached a number of PHAC policies and the Treasury Board Secretariat Policy on Government Security.

Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC's Deputy Chief Security Officer (DCSO) provided the Administrative Investigation report to Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS), which in turn conducted a security assessment of the individual.
CSIS performed the Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CSIS Act and the TBS SSS under the TBS PGS. This assessment consisted of a review of the Administrative Investigation report, a forensic analysis of the electronic content of Government of Canada (GC) devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. Xiangguo QiU, as well as two security interviews with Dr. QiU in Winnipeg.

In July 2020, CSIS provided a written briefing summarizing the results of their security assessment, including a summary of the two interviews conducted with Dr. Xiangguo QiU in March 2020 & June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns. As a result, PHAC launched a Review for Cause.

The Review for Cause for Dr. Xiangguo QiU has been completed and the final report is attached as Appendix A.

CONSIDERATIONS:

This Review for Cause was triggered as a result of adverse information being presented to the Security Screening Section of PHAC. The review considered information collected during a preliminary fact finding, the Administrative Investigation, the CSIS Security Assessment and an additional security interview.

In accordance with Section 7 [Adverse Information] of the TBS Standard on Security Screening, adverse information obtained pursuant to a CSIS security assessment is the primary determinant of whether a security clearance or site access clearance can be granted. If there are reasonable grounds to believe that either of the following conditions applies, the security clearance or site access clearance may be denied, revoked, or suspended pending further investigation, as appropriate:

a) In the case of loyalty, the individual has engaged, is engaged, may engage, or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as that term is defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; or

b) In the case of reliability as it relates to loyalty, because of personal beliefs, features of character, association with persons or groups considered a security threat, or family or other close ties to persons living in countries that pose a security risk to Canada, the individual has acted, is acting, may act or may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada; or the individual has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information.

The SSS directs that if adverse information is uncovered related to the reliability or loyalty of an individual who is undergoing or who has undergone security screening, it must be reported to the designated security official of client departments and agencies so that appropriate action can be taken to Review for Cause, deny, or revoke, as
appropriate, a security clearance or site access clearance. Adverse information can, but may not be, sufficient grounds to deny or revoke a security status or clearance. When uncovered, such information is to be used as the basis for further investigation, including a security interview.

When Adverse Information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment that may negatively affect the performance of duties or that may lead to an inability or unwillingness to safeguard sensitive information, assets or facilities, a Review for Cause of the security status or clearance previously granted to the individual must be conducted.

When a Review for Cause is conducted or when a decision is being considered to deny or revoke a security status or clearance, departments and agencies must, while ensuring that the interests of government are protected, ensure that decisions are made using a fair procedure, and that actions and decisions are appropriate to the situation.

A Reliability Status is the minimum standard of security screening for positions requiring unsupervised access to GC protected information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for reliability status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the employer's interests. In determining reliability, the question to be answered is whether the individual can be trusted to safeguard information, assets and facilities, and be relied upon not to abuse the trust that might be accorded and to perform the assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on and not pose a security risk to the GC. In other words, is there reasonable cause to believe that the individual may steal or misuse valuables, exploit assets and information, fail to safeguard information and assets entrusted to him or her, or exhibit behaviour that would reflect negatively on his or her reliability.

A Security Clearance is the standard of security screening for all positions requiring access to Government of Canada classified information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for a security clearance appraises an individual's loyalty to Canada and their reliability as it relates to that loyalty. In determining loyalty, the question to be answered is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual has engaged, is engaged, or may engage, in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act and whether he or she has disclosed, may disclose or may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information.

OPTIONS:

Option 1: Revoke Dr. Xiangqiu Qiu's Reliability Status

Employees who want to challenge a decision to deny, suspend or revoke a reliability status may do so through the applicable grievance procedures or file a complaint with
the Canadian Human Rights Commission if they believe that the decision was based on one or more prohibited grounds, as listed in the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Revocation of Dr. QIU’s Reliability Status would mean that her Secret Security Clearance would no longer be valid, as a valid Reliability Status is a requirement to hold a security clearance. Dr. QIU would no longer meet the terms and conditions of employment and would be terminated administratively.

The employee can grieve a decision to revoke a reliability status. Once the grievance process has been exhausted, the employee can refer the grievance to the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (FPSLREB). The FPSLREB has full jurisdiction to review the Chief Security Officer’s (CSO) decision to revoke on a “for cause” standard. The FPSLREB has jurisdiction to review the substance of the employer’s decision to revoke an employee’s reliability status. The adjudicator may look into the cause of the revocation, determine if it is sufficient and if it was directly related to a security risk, and may substitute its interpretation of the facts and risks to that of the employer. The FPSLREB decision can be judicially reviewed to the Federal Court of Appeal.

If the FPSLREB allows the grievance and overturns the revocation of reliability status, the result would be for the employee to be reinstated retroactively and granted their position back.

Option 2: Revoke Dr. Xiangguo QIU’s Secret Security Clearance

A valid SECRET security clearance is required for the position held by Dr. QIU. Revocation of this security clearance would mean that Dr. QIU no longer meets the terms and conditions for this position and she would then be terminated administratively. Her Reliability status would then be administratively cancelled and the security file annotated accordingly. Dr. QIU could grieve the termination by arguing that her Reliability Status is still technically valid because no determination had been made in that regard. She may then refer the grievance to the FPSLREB.

The deputy head must send, within 10 days after the decision is made, a notice informing the individual of the revocation of the security clearance.

Pursuant to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is the formal review body in cases concerning denial of a security clearance. Pursuant to Section 18 (1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, this right of review is available if a decision is made by a deputy head to deny employment to an individual or to dismiss, demote or transfer an individual or to deny a promotion or transfer to an individual.

The employee can challenge a decision to revoke by filing a complaint with NSIRA. Once a complaint is filed, the Government leads with evidence to justify the process.
leading up to the revocation of the security clearance and the evidence upon which the revocation was based. This is primarily done in-camera and ex-parte after which NSIRA will generate an unclassified summary to be given to the Complainant (i.e. the employee). Usually CSIS will defend its security advice and the Department in question will defend any subsequent investigation and final decision. Both CSIS and the Department may have to defend the procedural fairness aspects of the process, depending upon how the matter unfolded. Thereafter, there is usually an in-camera hearing where the agencies will present the information they can and at which the Complainant gets a chance to tell their side of the issue(s). Witnesses, including the Complainant, can be cross-examined at this time.

NSIRA will then consider/decide the issue and make a non-binding recommendation to the Deputy Head on whether or not to reinstate a security clearance. When the Deputy Head disagrees with NSIRA's recommendation to re-instate a clearance, the Office of the National Security Advisor, Privy Council Office (PCO), must be consulted before a final decision is made. The Deputy Head must inform the Chair of NSIRA of their decision in writing.

Where the Deputy Head agrees with NSIRA's recommendation and where the reliability status is not revoked, the employee would be reinstated retroactively and granted their position back.

Option 3: Revoke Dr. Xiangguo Qiu's Reliability Status and Secret Security Clearance

Rejection of both the Reliability Status and the Secret Security Clearance of Dr. Qiu is well supported in this Review for Cause. Information collected reflects a recurring pattern of questionable judgment that may negatively affect the performance of duties and that may lead to an inability or unwillingness to safeguard sensitive information, assets or facilities. In accordance with the TBS SSS and the findings above, it is recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. Qiu's Reliability Status.

Information collected reveals a very likely potential for negative influence and intimidation by a foreign entity that is hostile towards Canada. In accordance with the TBS SSS and the findings above, it is further recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. Qiu's Secret Security Clearance.

The effect of a decision to revoke both Dr. Qiu's Reliability Status and her Secret Security Clearance will leave no doubt as to her suitability to continue to hold a security status within the Government of Canada both from a Reliability (features of character) and from a Loyalty perspective with regard to National Security. This approach mitigates the risk of a grievance claiming entitlement to a position at a lower security level, as she would still hold a valid Reliability Status.
The employee can grieve the decision to revoke the Reliability Status to the FPSLREB and can challenge the decision to revoke the Secret Security Clearance by filing a complaint with NSIRA.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In accordance with the findings of the Review for Cause, it is recommended that you indicate your concurrence to Option 3, by signing the concur block below;

[Signature]
Assistant Deputy Minister
Corporate Services Branch
and Chief Security Officer for PHAC

☐ do not concur
☐ concur

President, PHAC ___________________________ Date ___________________________

Contact: Director, Security Screening,
Contracting and Other Arrangements,
Regional Security, and Investigations,
Ottawa

Attachment:

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Review for Cause of Security Status:
Dr. Keding CHENG

SUMMARY

- The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your concurrence on recommendations to revoke the Reliability Status and Secret Security Clearance of Dr. Keding CHENG, an employee of the Public Health Agency's of Canada's (PHAC) at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). Dr. CHENG is currently suspended without pay as a result of the suspension of his Reliability Status.

- A Review for Cause is a reassessment of an individual's eligibility to hold a security status or clearance previously granted. It is a formal process that is initiated when new information is uncovered or reported about an individual that may call into question their reliability and/or loyalty to Canada.

- In this case, PHAC conducted a Review for Cause to assess Reliability, Loyalty to Canada and Reliability as it relates to Loyalty to Canada; as set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Government Security (PGS) and the TBS Standard on Security Screening (SSS).

- Your concurrence is being sought on the recommended course of action.

BACKGROUND:

PHAC conducted a fact finding in 2018, followed by an Administrative Investigation in 2019 to investigate possible security breaches at the NML by Dr. CHENG. The Administrative Investigation determined that Dr. CHENG had breached a number of PHAC policies and the Treasury Board Secretariat Policy on Government Security.

Due to national security concerns raised during the investigation, PHAC's Deputy Chief Security Officer (DCSO) provided the Administrative Investigation report to Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS), which in turn conducted a security assessment on the individual.
CSIS performed a Security Assessment pursuant to section 13 of the CSIS Act and the TBS SSS under the TBS PGS. This assessment consisted of a review of the Administrative Investigation report, a forensic analysis of the electronic content of Government of Canada (GC) devices and network accounts assigned to Dr. Keding CHENG, as well as two security interviews with Dr. CHENG in Winnipeg.

In July 2020, CSIS provided a written briefing summarizing the results of their security assessment, including a summary of the two interviews conducted with Dr. Keding CHENG in March 2020 & June 2020. This classified briefing provided PHAC with new adverse information and raised additional security concerns. As a result, PHAC launched a Review for Cause.

The Review for Cause for Dr. Keding CHENG has been completed and the final report is attached as Appendix A.

CONSIDERATIONS:

This Review for Cause was triggered as a result of adverse information being presented to the Security Screening Section of PHAC. The review considered information collected during a preliminary fact finding, the Administrative Investigation, the CSIS Security Assessment and an additional security interview.

In accordance with Section 7 [Adverse Information] of the TBS Standard on Security Screening, adverse information obtained pursuant to a CSIS security assessment is the primary determinant of whether a security clearance or site access clearance can be granted. If there are reasonable grounds to believe that either of the following conditions applies, the security clearance or site access clearance may be denied, revoked, or suspended pending further investigation, as appropriate:

a) In the case of loyalty, the individual has engaged, is engaged, may engage, or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as that term is defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; or

b) In the case of reliability as it relates to loyalty, because of personal beliefs, features of character, association with persons or groups considered a security threat, or family or other close ties to persons living in countries that pose a security risk to Canada, the individual has acted, is acting, may act or may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada; or the individual has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way, sensitive information.

The SSS directs that if adverse information is uncovered related to the reliability or loyalty of an individual who is undergoing or who has undergone security screening, it must be reported to the designated security official of client departments and agencies so that appropriate action can be taken to Review for Cause, deny, or revoke, as
appropriate, a security clearance or site access clearance. Adverse information can, but may not be, sufficient grounds to deny or revoke a security status or clearance. When uncovered, such information is to be used as the basis for further investigation, including a security interview.

When Adverse Information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment that may negatively affect the performance of duties or that may lead to an inability or unwillingness to safeguard sensitive information, assets or facilities, a Review for Cause of the security status or clearance previously granted to the individual must be conducted.

When a Review for Cause is conducted or when a decision is being considered to deny or revoke a security status or clearance, departments and agencies must, while ensuring that the interests of government are protected, ensure that decisions are made using a fair procedure, and that actions and decisions are appropriate to the situation.

A Reliability Status is the minimum standard of security screening for positions requiring unsupervised access to GC protected information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for reliability status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the employer's interests. In determining reliability, the question to be answered is whether the individual can be trusted to safeguard information, assets and facilities, and be relied upon not to abuse the trust that might be accorded and to perform the assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on and not pose a security risk to the GC. In other words, is there reasonable cause to believe that the individual may steal or misuse valuables, exploit assets and information, fail to safeguard information and assets entrusted to him or her, or exhibit behaviour that would reflect negatively on his or her reliability.

A Security Clearance is the standard of security screening for all positions requiring access to Government of Canada classified information, assets, facilities or information technology systems. Security screening for a security clearance appraises an individual's loyalty to Canada and their reliability as it relates to that loyalty. In determining loyalty, the question to be answered is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual has engaged, is engaged, or may engage, in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act and whether he or she has disclosed, may disclose or may be induced to disclose, or may cause to be disclosed in an unauthorized way sensitive information.

OPTIONS:

Option 1: Revoke Dr. Keding CHENG's Reliability Status

Employees who want to challenge a decision to deny, suspend or revoke a status may do so through the applicable grievance procedures or file a complaint with the Canadian
Human Rights Commission if they believe that the decision was based on one or more prohibited grounds, as listed in the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Revocation of Dr. CHENG’s Reliability status would mean that his Secret security clearance would no longer be valid, as a valid Reliability Status is a requirement to hold a security clearance. Dr. CHENG would no longer meet the terms and conditions of employment and would be terminated administratively.

Revocation of Dr. CHENG’s Reliability Status would mean that his Secret Security Clearance would no longer be valid, as a valid Reliability Status is a requirement to hold a security clearance. Dr. CHENG would no longer meet the terms and conditions of employment and would be terminated administratively.

The employee can grieve a decision to revoke a reliability status. Once the grievance process has been exhausted, the employee can refer the grievance to the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (FPSLREB). The FPSLREB has full jurisdiction to review the Chief Security Officer’s (CSO) decision to revoke on a “for cause” standard. The FPSLREB has jurisdiction to review the substance of the employer’s decision to revoke an employee’s reliability status. The adjudicator may look into the cause of the revocation, determine if it is sufficient and if it was directly related to a security risk, and may substitute its interpretation of the facts and risks to that of the employer. The FPSLREB decision can be judicially reviewed to the Federal Court of Appeal.

If the FPSLREB allows the grievance and overturns the revocation of reliability status, the result would be for the employee to be reinstated retroactively and granted their position back.

Option 2: Revoke Dr. Keding CHENG’s Secret Security Clearance

A valid SECRET security clearance is required for the position held by Dr. CHENG. Revocation of this security clearance would mean that Dr. CHENG no longer meets the terms and conditions for this position and he would then be terminated administratively. His Reliability Status would then be administratively cancelled and security file annotated accordingly. Dr. CHENG could grieve the termination by arguing that his Reliability Status is still technically valid because no determination had been made in that regard. He may then refer the grievance to the FPSLREB.

The deputy head must send, within 10 days after the decision is made, a notice informing the individual of the revocation of the security clearance.

Pursuant to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is the formal review body in cases concerning denial of a security clearance. Pursuant to Section 18 (1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, this right of review is available if a
decision is made by a deputy head to deny employment to an individual or to dismiss, demote or transfer an individual or to deny a promotion or transfer to an individual.

The employee can challenge a decision to revoke by filing a complaint with NSIRA. Once a complaint is filed, the Government leads with evidence to justify the process leading up to the revocation of the security clearance and the evidence upon which the revocation was based. This is primarily done in-camera and ex-parte after which NSIRA will generate an unclassified summary to be given to the Complainant (i.e. the employee). Usually CSIS will defend its security advice and the Department in question will defend any subsequent investigation and final decision. Both CSIS and the Department may have to defend the procedural fairness aspects of the process, depending upon how the matter unfolded. Thereafter, there is usually an in-camera hearing where the agencies will present the information they can and at which the Complainant gets a chance to tell their side of the issue(s). Witnesses, including the Complainant, can be cross-examined at this time.

NSIRA will then consider/decide the issue and make a non-binding recommendation to the Deputy Head on whether or not to reinstate a security clearance. When the Deputy Head disagrees with NSIRA’s recommendation to re-instate a clearance, the Office of the National Security Advisor, Privy Council Office (PCO), must be consulted before a final decision is made. The Deputy Head must inform the Chair of NSIRA of their decision in writing.

Where the Deputy Head agrees with NSIRA’s recommendation and where the reliability status is not revoked, the employee would be reinstated retroactively and granted their position back.

Option 3: Revoke Dr. Keding CHENG’s Reliability Status and Secret Security Clearance

Revocation of both the Reliability Status and the Secret security clearance of Dr. CHENG is well supported in this Review for Cause. Information collected reflects a recurring pattern of questionable judgment that may negatively affect the performance of duties and that may lead to an inability or unwillingness to safeguard sensitive information, assets or facilities. In accordance with the TBS SSS and the findings above, it is recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. CHENG’s Reliability Status.

Information collected reveals a very likely potential for negative influence and intimidation by a foreign entity that is hostile towards Canada. In accordance with the TBS SSS and the findings above, it is further recommended that PHAC revoke Dr. CHENG’s Secret Security Clearance.

The effect of a decision to revoke both Dr. CHENG’s Reliability Status and his Secret Security Clearance will leave no doubt as to his suitability to continue to hold a security
status within the Government of Canada both from a Reliability (features of character) and from a Loyalty perspective with regard to National Security. This approach mitigates the risk of a grievance claiming entitlement to a position at a lower security level, as he would still hold a valid Reliability Status.

The employee can grieve the decision to revoke the Reliability Status to the FPSLREB and can challenge the decision to revoke the Secret Security Clearance by filing a complaint with NSIRA.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In accordance with the findings of the Review for Cause, it is recommended that you indicate your concurrence to Option 3, by signing the concur block below;

[Signature]
Assistant Deputy Minister
Corporate Services Branch
and Chief Security Officer for PHAC

☐ do not concur
☐ concur

President, PHAC

Date

Contact: Director, Security Screening, Contracting and Other Arrangements, Regional Security and Investigations, Ottawa

Attachment:

Notification: Revocation of Reliability Status

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch, Chief Security Officer, PHAC, Ottawa

70 Columbine Driveway
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K9

Dr. QIU,

This letter is to inform you that the Review for Cause of your security status has been completed and a decision has been made to revoke your Reliability Status. The decision to revoke your Reliability Status took into consideration: your position at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) and the tasks you performed there, your access to high-security areas, assets and information, as well as the adverse information and allegations, the security risks associated with them, and your responses.

As a result of adverse information assessed during the Review for Cause, coupled with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Security Assessment and the findings of the Administrative Investigation, it is found that you committed serious security breaches and violated policies of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the Treasury Board Policy on Government Security.

The considerations for the revocation include the fact that you circumvented established policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information by violating the PHAC Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Network Standard and allowing exchanges of sensitive information with unauthorized individuals. You shipped antibodies outside of the NML and entered into collaborations without authorization, and without a material transfer or a collaborative research agreement. You were untruthful in interviews when describing your relationship, associations and activities with government agencies and government research and talent programs of another country. You lacked truthfulness and transparency in the information you provided until evidence was presented.
During the entire process, you did not express remorse or regret. You failed to accept responsibility for your actions and deflected blame onto PHAC. You did not display any signs of corrective behaviour, rehabilitation or desire for a resolution of the situation. You failed to appreciate the impact of your actions on PHAC and the Government of Canada. These actions and behaviours call into question your honestly, reliability and trustworthiness.

After careful review of all of the relevant information, it is determined that you can no longer be trusted to safeguard information, assets and facilities. You cannot be relied upon not to abuse the trust accorded to you and to perform your assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on PHAC and not pose a security risk to the Government of Canada and PHAC.

You have a right to file a grievance in accordance with the provisions of your collective agreement.

Respectfully,

[Redacted]

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch / Chief Security Officer for Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada

cc: Vice President, Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch, Ottawa
Dr. Xianguo QIU

Notification: Revocation of Security Clearance

[Name redacted]
President, Public Health Agency of Canada
100 Colonnade Rd
Nepean, ON K2E 7M3

Dr. QIU,

This letter is to inform you that the Review for Cause of your security status has been completed and I have decided to revoke your Security Clearance. This decision was rendered after careful review of all of the information gathered during the Administrative Investigation, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Security Assessment and the Security Interview held at the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) office. As a result of adverse information, it was found that you have violated policies of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the Treasury Board Policy on Government Security.

As per the CSIS Security Assessment, you failed to take precautions to safeguard Government of Canada (GC) assets and information when dealing with foreign entities. In addition, you conducted activities abroad without the express permission of PHAC and intentionally hid these activities from your employer. You have shared sensitive information and assets, applied to external talent programs and associated with foreign organizations without the express permission and authorization from PHAC. You also demonstrated a lack of honesty and transparency in the information you provided until evidence was presented.

My decision to revoke your Security Clearance took into consideration your position at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML), the tasks you performed on behalf of NML while travelling abroad and your access to high-security areas that hold dangerous materials.

In light of the nature and seriousness of the security breaches identified in the Review for Cause, I have concluded that your actions call into question your loyalty to Canada and your reliability as it relates thereto. You present a vulnerability to PHAC due to the very real potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress by a foreign entity. This presents an unacceptable risk to the Government of Canada.
You have the right to file a complaint with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency within thirty (30) days of receipt of this letter.

Respectfully,

President, Public Health Agency of Canada

cc: Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch, Chief Security Officer, PHAC, Ottawa
Notification: Revocation of Reliability Status

Dr. Keding CHENG

JAN 9 2021

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch, Chief Security Officer, PHAC Ottawa
70 Columbine Driveway
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K9

Dr. CHENG,

This letter is to inform you that the Review for Cause of your security status has been completed and a decision has been made to revoke your Reliability Status. The decision to revoke your Reliability Status took into consideration: your position at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) and the tasks you performed there, your access to high-security areas, assets and information, as well as the adverse information and allegations, the security risks associated with them, and your responses.

As a result of adverse information assessed during the Review for Cause, coupled with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Security Assessment and the findings of the Administrative Investigation, it is found that you committed serious security breaches and violated policies of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the Treasury Board Policy on Government Security.

The considerations for the revocation include the fact that you circumvented established policies and guidelines regarding the sharing of sensitive information by violating the PHAC Acceptable Use of Electronic Devices and Network Standard and allowing exchanges of sensitive information with unauthorized individuals. You failed to protect PHAC's network, information and assets. You were untruthful in interviews when describing your collaborations, relationships and activities, and those of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, with individuals and entities of another country. You lacked truthfulness and transparency in the information you provided until evidence was presented.

Canada

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During the entire process, you did not express remorse or regret. You failed to accept responsibility for your actions and deflected blame onto PHAC. You did not display any signs of corrective behaviour, rehabilitation or desire for a resolution of the situation. You failed to appreciate the impact of your actions on PHAC and the Government of Canada. These actions and behaviours call into question your honesty, reliability and trustworthiness.

After careful review of all of the relevant information, it is determined that you can no longer be trusted to safeguard information, assets and facilities. You cannot be relied upon not to abuse the trust accorded to you and to perform your assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on PHAC and not pose a security risk to the Government of Canada and PHAC.

You have a right to file a grievance in accordance with the provisions of your collective agreement.

Respectfully,

[Name Redacted]

Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch / Chief Security Officer for Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada

cc: Vice President, Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch, Ottawa
Dr. Kading CHENG

Notification: Revocation of Security Clearance

[redacted]
President, Public Health Agency of Canada
100 Colonnade Rd
Nepean, ON K2E 7M3

Dr. CHENG,

This letter is to inform you that the Review for Cause of your security status has been completed and I have decided to revoke your Security Clearance. This decision was rendered after careful review of all of the information gathered during the Administrative Investigation, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Security Assessment and the Security Interview held at the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) office. As a result of adverse information, it was found that you have violated policies of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the Treasury Board Policy on Government Security.

As per the CSIS Security Assessment, you failed to take precautions to safeguard Government of Canada (GC) assets and information. In addition, you have shared sensitive information, provided unauthorized access to NML and conducted unauthorized collaboration with external entities without the express permission and authorization from PHAC. You also demonstrated a lack of honesty and transparency in the information you provided until evidence was presented.

My decision to revoke your Security Clearance also took into consideration your position at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML), the tasks you performed on behalf of NML and your access to high-security areas with dangerous materials.

In light of the nature and seriousness of the security breaches identified in the Review for Cause, I have concluded that your actions call into question your reliability as it relates loyalty to Canada. You present a vulnerability to PHAC due to the very real potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress by a foreign entity. This presents an unacceptable risk to the Government of Canada.
You have the right to file a complaint with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency within thirty (30) days of receipt of this letter.

Respectfully,

[Redacted]

President, Public Health Agency of Canada

cc: Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch, Chief Security Officer, PHAC, Ottawa
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu

January 20, 2021

Subject: Administrative Termination of Employment

Dear Dr. Qiu,

This is further to letters dated January 19, 2021, from [redacted] and [redacted], President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, in which you were informed of the revocation of your reliability security status and your security clearance respectively.

As outlined in your letter of offer, maintaining a valid security clearance is a condition of employment for your position. Reliability status is a condition of employment for all Federal Public Servants. As your reliability status and security clearance have been revoked, you no longer meet these essential conditions of employment.

Consequently, by the authority delegated to me under paragraph 12 (1) (e) of the Financial Administration Act, I am administratively terminating your employment at the Public Health Agency of Canada, effective close of business today.

You have the right to submit a grievance within 25 days of receipt of this letter, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the RE collective agreement.

I appreciate that this may be a stressful time, and remind you that the Employee Assistance Program is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. You can access their confidential services at any time by calling 1-800-268-7708.

Respectfully,

Vice President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

c.c. Labour Relations
Dr. Keding Cheng

January 20, 2021

Subject: Administrative Termination of Employment

Dear Dr. Cheng,

This is further to letters dated January 19, 2021, from [redacted] and [redacted] President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, in which you were informed of the revocation of your reliability security status and your security clearance respectively.

As outlined in your letter of offer, maintaining a valid security clearance is a condition of employment for your position. Reliability status is a condition of employment for all Federal Public Servants. As your reliability status and security clearance have been revoked, you no longer meet these essential conditions of employment.

Consequently, by the authority delegated to me under paragraph 12 (1) (e) of the Financial Administration Act, I am administratively terminating your employment at the Public Health Agency of Canada, effective close of business today.

You have the right to submit a grievance within 25 days of receipt of this letter, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the SP collective agreement.

I appreciate that this may be a stressful time, and remind you that the Employee Assistance Program is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. You can access their confidential services at any time by calling 1-800-268-7708.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

Vice President
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Public Health Agency of Canada

cc. Labour Relations
## BACKGROUND INFORMATION: OUTREACH BY CSIS

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Outreach from CSIS to PHAC NML SDG for general discussion on security matters (conversations they regularly have with science Departments). CSIS outline on modus operandi of adversarial States and ways in which certain state actors target individuals who may be unaware of their own potential vulnerability. NML SDG provision of the names of two employees who potentially fall within this category.

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<th>CSIS' initial checks and contact with the Agency’s DSO.</th>
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## IDENTIFICATION OF SECURITY INCIDENTS

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Identification of a patent in China containing the name of the female employee from the DSO’s open source checks.

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<th>Confirmation to the DSO of two visitor-related security incidents involving the male employee.</th>
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## PRELIMINARY DSO REVIEW OF INCIDENTS

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## FACT-FINDING PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES

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<tr>
<td>NSMD, IMSD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed February 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial seizure of work related effects (i.e. laptops, USB keys, cellphones, etc.). Forensic mirror images of devices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSMD, IMSD</th>
<th>DSO, ADM CSB</th>
<th>TARGET DATE / STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed February 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Develop IT Scope for seized work related effects (i.e. laptops, USB keys, cellphones, etc.). Forensic mirror images of devices and eDiscovery key words for corporate email.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial review of eDiscovery results from corporate email key words search results.</th>
<th>LEAD</th>
<th>APPROVER</th>
<th>TARGET DATE / STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Completed, to be incorporated into Administrative Investigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obtain current collaboration agreements and/or support letters currently in place</th>
<th>LEAD</th>
<th>APPROVER</th>
<th>TARGET DATE / STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incomplete received some documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review current collaboration agreements and/or support letters currently in place</th>
<th>LEAD</th>
<th>APPROVER</th>
<th>TARGET DATE / STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Completed December 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identify any ongoing collaborations without an agreement in place</th>
<th>LEAD</th>
<th>APPROVER</th>
<th>TARGET DATE / STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Completed as part of Administrative Investigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAD</th>
<th>TARGET DATE / STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Updated April 8, 2021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## PRE-INVESTIGATION ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform VP of fact-finding results and seek authorization to conduct</td>
<td>VP IDPC</td>
<td>Completed – Approval provided June 2019 (first discussions occurring in April 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal administrative investigation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue letters and communications advising employees of investigation</td>
<td>SDG IDPC,</td>
<td>Completed – 5 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and leave with pay decision. Ensure any conditions relating to their</td>
<td>supported by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status are identified. Confirm employees are remaining at home with</td>
<td>LR, NSMD and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continued pay.</td>
<td>legal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete management Check list items (including collection of: IDs,</td>
<td>SDG, IDPC &amp;</td>
<td>Completed – 5 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keys, lists of staff and student, obtain all IT devices, provide to</td>
<td>LR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSMD and escort staff as required for security concerns)</td>
<td>DSO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise restricted visitors, employees and other stakeholders of</td>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Completed – 5 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action taken and as required</td>
<td>VP IDPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seize work related effects (i.e. laptops, USB keys, cellphones, etc.)</td>
<td>IDPC, NSMD</td>
<td>Completed – 5 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish list of seized devices, from fact-finding and Administrative</td>
<td>NSMD</td>
<td>Completed – 11 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation, ensure continuity of evidence.</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror images of devices seized work related effects (i.e. laptops,</td>
<td>IMSD</td>
<td>Completed – Feb (3); 26 July (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USB keys, cellphone, etc.)</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## INITIATE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Select Investigator</td>
<td>NSMD</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop, review and approve TORs for the investigations</td>
<td>LR, NSMD,</td>
<td>Completed – 8 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VP IDPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish contract for Investigator</td>
<td>NSMD and MAMD</td>
<td>Completed - July 12, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide TOR – Mandate to the Investigator</td>
<td>NSMD</td>
<td>Completed – 9 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review the Fact Finding Report</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>Completed - Week of July 9 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop initial Investigative Plan (adjust as required during</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>Completed - Week of July 22, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Investigation)</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set Investigative Team (InvT) operational touch points:</td>
<td>Weekly or as</td>
<td>Completed - Throughout the Administrative Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Investigator(s)</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsible Parties</th>
<th>Key Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify primary list of individuals for interviews (Others may be added based on investigation)</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD &amp; InvT</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB, to recommend to Senior Management Completed - Week of July 9, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop primary questions for each interview – In collaboration with Subject Matter Experts (other Qs may come up through investigation)</td>
<td>Legal, NSMD, LR &amp; InvT</td>
<td>Legal, DSO/ ADM CSB, will share with share with Senior Management Completed - Week of July 15, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct initial review of eDiscovery results from corporate email key words search results.</td>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>N/A                                            Completed - up to 3 weeks, July 26, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze results from initial eDiscovery results from corporate email key words search results,</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD, InvT</td>
<td>N/A                                            Completed - Week of August 5, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review IT Forensic mirror images, if required and depending on findings. An additional contract may be required given the skill sets required to work on the mirror image review. Investigative Plan may have to be adjusted to reflect.</td>
<td>NSMD, IT Sec / contractor as required</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB                                    Completed - External resource identified and contract in progress for start Aug 14, 2019. <strong>the number of records for review will have to be considered in timelines</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain and retain mirror images to ensure NSMD has access to the images as the devices may be required by the RCMP, (waiting for appropriate court documents).</td>
<td>NSMD, IT Sec / contractor as required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze findings from Forensic mirror images</td>
<td>NSMD, IT Sec / contractor as required</td>
<td>DSO/ ADM CSB                                    Completed – Investigator - 3 original laptops/desktop - 9 Aug</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Updated April 8, 2021
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK Description</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct interviews of individuals (First group)</td>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed - August 5 – August 9, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will take up to two weeks and dependant on the availability of the interviewees, Note: respondents will be interviewed after all other identified individuals have been interviewed.</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze information gathered during investigation</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct interviews of individuals (Second group)</td>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed - August 19 – August 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will take up to two weeks and dependant on the availability of the interviewees, Note: respondents will be interviewed after all other identified individuals have been interviewed.</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of information gathered during investigation</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANALYSIS AND REPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare preliminary reports (without findings)</td>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed - September 2, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share preliminary reports with VP IDPC for awareness</td>
<td>DSO/CSB ADM</td>
<td>VP IDPC</td>
<td>Completed - 2 days - October 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review preliminary reports by Privacy Management Division to ensure there are no privacy concerns in sharing with respondents</td>
<td>PMD</td>
<td>DSO/ADM CSB/VP IDPC</td>
<td>Completed - 2 days - October 10 (concurrent with VP IDPC review)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share preliminary reports with Labour Relations for awareness</td>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>CSB, LR</td>
<td>Completed - October 3, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare of final draft reports</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed - 1 week following receipt of feedback, week of October 14, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide final draft reports to VP IDPC, to share with respondents</td>
<td>Investigator, DSO</td>
<td>VP IDPC</td>
<td>Completed - 1 day – October 14, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide final draft reports to respondents, providing Rights to Respond</td>
<td>SDG, VP IDPC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Completed - 2 weeks October 28, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Updated April 8, 2021
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Completeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review respondents' comments and prepare final reports (with findings - Unfounded or Founded Allegations)</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>Completed - 1 week following receipt of feedback October 28, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct interviews of individuals (third round)</td>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>Completed - 3 days December 10, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will take up to two weeks and dependant on the availability of the interviewees. Note: respondents will be interviewed after all other identified individuals have been interviewed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare final reports</td>
<td>Investigator, NSMD</td>
<td>Completed - 2 weeks the week of December 16, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POST-INVESTIGATION ACTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Completeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receive final report from investigator and share with CSO and VP for review and approval.</td>
<td>DSO/ADM CSB, VP IDPC</td>
<td>Completed - February 5, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Concerning Contravention of Intellectual Property Policy Intellectual property (IP) allegations for one of the respondents:  
  - Seek legal opinion on contravention of Public Servants inventions Act and breach of license agreement;  
  - Determine if further investigation is warranted relating to IP allegations;  
  - Articulate findings on IP related allegations | CLEL, VP IDPC | Completed - January 24, 2020 |
| Completed - March 27, 2020 (VP deems allegation 5 inconclusive and 6 unfounded) |                   |                |
| Assess final reports to establish recommendations and actions to be considered and taken. | All parties (NSMD, LR, Legal, President, VP IDPC, ADM, SDG) | Completed – occurred from mid-February to April 13, 2020 when LR and Sec. provided recommendation package to ADM CSB. |
| Revise for any identified errors to be actioned by investigator        | Investigator/IMSD | Completed – February 5, 2020 Revisions based on feedback |
| Confirm approval of final report                                       | DSO/ADM CSB, VP IDPC | Completed - February 6, 2020 Administrative |
### INV2019-1 & INV2019-2 – Investigative Critical Path

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Target Date / Status</th>
<th>Investigator reports with results agreed to and signed off by [redacted]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide final report to Privacy Management Division for severing of information protected by the <em>Privacy Act</em></td>
<td>CSO/DSO</td>
<td>Completed – February 4, 2020 Reports shared with PMD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DECISION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice President, Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch, Ottawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide final reports to Respondents with sufficient time for respondents to review the report and consult with their union representative. If any allegations are founded, issue a letter to accompany the report advising them that as a result of the founded allegations a disciplinary hearing will be scheduled. If no allegations are founded, a face-to-face meeting can be held to advise them of the results and provide closure.</td>
<td>IDPC with support from IMSD and LR</td>
<td>Completed – 4/4 allegations were founded for one party and 4/6 for the other party. Letters sent via courier to both parties on Feb 21 and confirmation of receipt on Feb 25.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue invitation for a disciplinary hearing – if allegations are founded.</td>
<td>IDPC with LR support Labour Relations Advisor, Winnipeg</td>
<td>Completed – invitation included with final reports sent on February 21.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct disciplinary hearing with respondents - Discuss findings and provide an opportunity for respondent to defend their actions.</td>
<td>IDPC with LR support VP IDPC [redacted] and [redacted]</td>
<td>Completed – held March 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and analyze information obtained during disciplinary hearing, including a review of relevant jurisprudence.</td>
<td>IDPC with LR, CLEL A/Manager Security Operations, Western Canada, Winnipeg</td>
<td>Completed April 13 – ADM CSB reviewed documentation with client and captured decisions in a summary note which was shared with client seeking their approval.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider Review for Cause based on the findings of the administrative investigation.</td>
<td>VP IDPC, President and CSO</td>
<td>Completed – April - Informed decision not to pursue review for cause at this time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine quantum and necessity of corrective measures and reintegration.</td>
<td>IDPC with LR support</td>
<td>Partially complete - April 13 - Informal discussion between</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Updated April 8, 2021*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Target Date/Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM CSB, Pres and VP. Quantum informally determined but further consultation is required. Focus is on disciplinary measures and training.</td>
<td>ADM CSB, Pres and VP. Quantum informally determined but further consultation is required. Focus is on disciplinary measures and training.</td>
<td>Not complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue invitation for discipline rendering meeting to communicate any corrective measures to be implemented (even if none to be taken, a meeting should be held to communicate this decision and close the matter).</td>
<td>IDPC with LR support</td>
<td>Partially complete April 22 – letter is drafted; however disciplinary process paused due to new information related to external investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare disciplinary/closure letter.</td>
<td>LR</td>
<td>IDPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare meeting invitation, speaking points for VP, reintegration plan (including security measures if necessary), etc.</td>
<td>LR/Sec IDPC</td>
<td>Completed – April 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Render and communicate discipline decision as it relates to implementing discipline.</td>
<td>IDPC with LR support</td>
<td>To be held within 1 week of the corrective measures formally being decided upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify steps necessary to implement any discipline if pursued.</td>
<td>LR/pay IDPC</td>
<td>To be completed after rendering discipline decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify steps necessary to reintegrate employees back into workplace, if necessary.</td>
<td>IDPC with support from Comms/LR/Sec</td>
<td>To be completed after any disciplinary measure is implemented, if necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEW INFORMATION FROM CSIS**

- CSIS to conduct interviews (1st round)
  - **LEAD:** CSIS
  - **TARGET DATE/STATUS:** Completed March 19 (Mrs) and 20, 2020 (Mr).
- CSIS to provide initial assessment to CSO
  - **LEAD:** CSIS
  - **TARGET DATE/STATUS:** Completed – April 9, 2020
- CSIS to conduct interviews (2nd round)
  - **LEAD:** CSIS
  - **TARGET DATE/STATUS:** Completed - June 19, 2020
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSIS to provide final briefs to CSO</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Completed - June 30 (Mrs) and July 7, 2020 (Mr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO to confirm recommendation to pursue Review for cause (security status and/or clearance) based on new information.</td>
<td>CSO/DCSO</td>
<td>Completed: New information from CSIS on 30 June &amp; 7 July 2020 has found significant adverse information for which a Review for Cause (for each individual) is strongly recommended to take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send letters to individuals advising of the adverse information, and that an interview will be scheduled to allow the opportunity to discuss the security concerns with a PHAC Investigator/interviewer, and present information that will either validate or refute the information.</td>
<td>Letter from Chief Security Officer (CSO)</td>
<td>Completed on August 20, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop questions which will guide the discussion and challenge the individuals to provide a response to the concerns. The initial questions, per any investigative interview, may be supplemented by additional questions, depending on the answers received.</td>
<td>CSO/DSO Interviewer from National Security Management Division (NSMD)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP sends letters to employees informing them that she is putting on hold any decisions related to the Administrative Investigation and that they are suspended without pay as a result of the Review for Cause</td>
<td>Letter from VP IDCP</td>
<td>Completed on August 21, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform employees of interview considerations:</td>
<td>Investigator / interviewer from National Security Management</td>
<td>Included in the letter to the individuals inviting them to the interview and at the outset of the interview in the preamble.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Expectations in terms of cooperation;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The reasons they are being interviewed;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The need for the investigator to ascertain all relevant facts;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The potential outcomes/consequences of the Review for Cause (RFC) investigation; and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**INV2019-1 & INV2019-2 – Investigative Critical Path**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Department/Role</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Their rights and obligations to self-declare any incident, behaviour or action that has occurred, or has the potential to occur that may cause the individual to act in a manner that is uncharacteristic.</td>
<td>Division (NSMD)</td>
<td>Completed August 20 (included in the letter for the interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide individuals with the opportunity to be accompanied by someone, such as a union representative, legal counsel (at their expense) or anyone else of their choosing, provided they are not party to the process (i.e., involved in the breach/incident). The individual should be made aware that they are to respond to the questions directly, not through the person accompanying them. The person accompanying them must address the interviewee only and respect the process and may be asked to leave if they disrupt the interview.</td>
<td>CSO/DSO Outlined in the letter from Chief Security Officer (CSO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct the interviews in a respectful and professional manner. Care will be taken to avoid any comments or behaviours that could intimidate or be perceived as badgering or threatening the interviewees or their support person. In certain situations, individuals may not want to engage in discussion. If an individual decides not to answer a question, they will be informed that the CSO (or delegated authority) may have to make a decision based on available information, without the individual's input. The investigator will note the question as well as the individual's refusal to answer.</td>
<td>Investigator / interviewer from National Security Management Division (NSMD)</td>
<td>Completed August 26, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record the interviews to ensure accuracy and ability to review statements. If the individuals object to the use of a recording device, the investigator will inform the individuals that the investigator's written notes will become the official record for the interview.</td>
<td>Investigator / interviewer from National Security Management Division (NSMD)</td>
<td>Completed August 26, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Investigator to explain, at the beginning of the interview, how the interview will be conducted and what is expected from the interviewee.

[Updated April 8, 2021]
### INVESTIGATIVE CRITICAL PATH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Date/Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewees. The Investigator will also verify that the individuals from</td>
<td>National Security Management Division (NSMD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clearly understand the purpose of the interview and remind the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interviewees of their rights and responsibilities and ensure that they are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understood. Remind the interviewees that they will be able to ask</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questions and will be reminded that the confidentiality of statements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cannot be guaranteed as information is subject to the Privacy Act and/or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Information Act and/or its disclosure might be otherwise</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>required by law. Should the interviewees request a second interview to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update or clarify their responses and in order to ensure due process,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this should be granted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weigh the information once all of the information is collected, which</td>
<td>Investigator / interviewer from National Security Management Division (NSMD);</td>
<td>Completed – December 9, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should be weighed against the following considerations:</td>
<td>Director, Security Screening, and DCSO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the relevance of the fact to the allegations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How important is the evidence?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does it substantiate or disprove the allegations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If the evidence is not directly related to the allegations, does it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reveal other important information or lead to another source?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there gaps or inaccuracies that require further investigation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a report outlining the results of the interview for each</td>
<td>Investigator / interviewer from National Security Management Division (NSMD)</td>
<td>First drafts completed September 17 (Mrs.) and 18 (Mr.), 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual which will be provided to the Director, Security Screening,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHAC who will review and ensure the interview covered the concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>identified, and is factual in the representation of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual’s responses / rebuttal. This report may also be peer-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reviewed by the lead investigator for this case.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share the reports with the Centre for Labour Employment Law (CLEL)</td>
<td>DCSO</td>
<td>September 18, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representative, as well as with the Access to Information and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Updated April 8, 2021*
**INV2019-1 & INV2019-2 – Investigative Critical Path**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privacy (ATIP) representative for review and to ensure compliance with relevant legislation prior to sharing with the individuals.</th>
<th>CSO or DCSO</th>
<th>Completed October 20, 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share the reports with the individuals by the Deputy Chief Security Officer (DCSO) or Chief Security Officer (CSO), in order for them to review for accuracy regarding their statements. Given the planned travel of these individuals, they will have <strong>5 days</strong> to respond. A nil response will be deemed as acceptance of the information contained in the reports.</td>
<td>Investigator / interviewer from National Security Management Division (NSMD); Director, Security Screening, and DCSO</td>
<td>Completed November 13th including legal review (HC LS, CSIS LS, TBS LS, CLEL and TBS Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upon receipt of the reviewed reports from the individuals, the Director, Security Screening will assess the information. The assessment will take into consideration: any relevant information from the Administrative Investigation Reports; the reports received from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); information on the individuals’ security screening files; information from the RFC interviews and the individuals’ response to the reports. The Director, Security Screening will also ensure that the language used in any correspondence or reports is impartial and unbiased and that the investigation report does not include moral judgments or unsubstantiated facts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of risk and threshold:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When assessing whether an employee’s reliability status should be revoked, a risk assessment should be drafted containing all of the following information:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employee’s name, position, title, group and level;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brief outline of employee tasks and accesses (physical access, information, databases, etc.);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Summary of all adverse information/allegations (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Security risks associated with the adverse information and allegations (2);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employee explanations (3);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Updated April 8, 2021*
### INV2019-1 & INV2019-2 – Investigative Critical Path

- The risk analysis should also contain possible mitigating and aggravating factors. An addition of factors 1, 2 and 3 will indicate what will be the impact on the organizational risk tolerance level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present the finalized reports and assessment to the DCSO, PHAC, for</td>
<td>DCSO</td>
<td>Completed Nov 13th, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final review and revision, as necessary, prior to submitting to the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO, PHAC. Recommendations regarding revocation, or not, of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security status or clearance, will form a part of this final report.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO to brief the President, PHAC on the findings and include any</td>
<td>CSO &amp; President,</td>
<td>Completed Nov 17th. Revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recommendations to undertake revocation action or not, for the</td>
<td>PHAC</td>
<td>reports requested. Revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President to endorse and approve.</td>
<td></td>
<td>reports submitted to President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>December 7, 2020 after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>review by CLEL and TBS Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President to review reports and concur with the recommendations</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Completed December 9, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO signed RFC reports</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Completed December 14, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Stakeholder update on RFC</td>
<td>CSO and stakeholders</td>
<td>Completed December 14, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalize briefing note and prepare letters for revocation</td>
<td>CSO and DCSO</td>
<td>Completed January 7, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President renders the decision. (10 day clock to deliver decision</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Completed January 25, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to subjects begins once decision is made)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform the individual, via letter, of a decision to revoke (either</td>
<td>CSO and President</td>
<td>Completed January 25, 2021 (</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Security Status or the Clearance) or not. The letter will</td>
<td></td>
<td>effective day of Revocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>include information about avenues of recourse if appropriate</td>
<td></td>
<td>actions is January 19, 2021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>depending on the decision rendered. (A decision to revoke means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that the individual no longer meets the terms and conditions of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment in the Government of Canada).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Updated April 8, 2021
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>INV2019-1 &amp; INV2019-2 – Investigative Critical Path</strong></th>
<th><strong>PROTECTED B</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depending on the decision rendered, issue subsequent letter from management, as drafted by Labour Relations. If a revocation is decided, the letter will indicate that as a result of not meeting the terms &amp; conditions of employment, that the individual’s employment is henceforth terminated.</td>
<td>Management &amp; LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grievance Procedure: grievances submitted August 5, 2020 regarding the investigation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identical grievances were filed by the two employees on August 5, 2020 alleging that the investigation and disciplinary processes were a violation of procedural fairness and the collective agreement; and that they are victims of discrimination. The employees have requested to have the grievances heard separately and directly at the final level by the VP, as the decision-maker.</td>
<td>VP IDPC &amp; LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule the grievance hearings the week of August 24, 2020, the week of the VP’s return from leave, and the week before the employees leave the country.</td>
<td>VP IDPC &amp; LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR provides advice and guidance to the ADM throughout the grievance process. Once the grievances are heard, LR will assist the ADM to determine whether the grievances have merit, and draft replies for consideration. The employer has 20 work days to respond to the grievances at final level, unless the parties agree to extend the timelines.</td>
<td>VP IDPC &amp; LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the grievances are denied, the employees may refer them to adjudication before the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board. The deadline for referral to adjudication is 40 calendar days from the date the final level replies are received, or 40 calendar days from the date on which the replies were due, if no reply is issued. Timelines may be extended by mutual agreement of the parties.</td>
<td>IDPC &amp; LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grievance Procedure: grievances submitted February 9 and 11, 2021 regarding Termination and Revocation of Reliability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identical grievances were filed on February 9th and 11th, 2021 regarding termination of employment and revocation of reliability</td>
<td>VP IDPC &amp; LR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Updated April 8, 2021**
status. It was argued that the decisions did not respect procedural
fairness, were made in bad faith, constituted disguised discipline,
and were discriminatory. The employees have requested to have
the grievances heard separately and directly at the final level by the
VP, as the decision-maker. Termination grievances always proceed
directly to the final level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status.</th>
<th>VP IDPC &amp; LR</th>
<th>Grievances heard April 6, 2021.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Other
| Grievance replies are to be issued by May 6, 2021. The union will then have 40 calendar days to refer them to adjudication. | VP IDPC & LR | Deadline for grievance replies is May 6, 2021. |
| Reviews | LEAD | TARGET DATE/STATUS |
| Procure a service contract to compare patents | IDPC with support from legal | Completed: Decision made not to pursue based on VP's decision on March 27 where Allegation 5 unfounded and 6 inconclusive. |
| Complete the chronology of activities undertaken by the NML to address procedural and policy issues brought to light in the Administrative Investigation | All Parties | Completed Aug 15-2020 |
We would need a letter from their BSO to confirm they can accept and safely handle these viruses. Personally I don't believe in MTAs for these materials but we would need to look into Agency regulations.

Dave

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Rogers network.

Hi Dave,

The CL4 of China from Wuhan has contacted me for possibility to receive Nipha and Ebola viruses from us. If possible, what paper work needs to be done beside the import permit from them and export permit from us? MTA?
Pts advise!
Thanks!
Qiu
Dept. of Medical Microbiology
University of Manitoba
Ph:1-204-789-5097 (lab)
1-204-784-7548(O)
Fax: 1-204-789-2140
email: xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca

From: [mailto: ]
Sent: 2018-06-28 5:40 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc:  
Subject: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear Professor QIU:

Thank you very much for providing us with your continued and generous support and assistance with regard to the introduction of EBOV and NiV!

As per the content of our previous exchanges, my organization has drafted a request letter and a biosafety statement in accordance with the matters that were discussed previously. Please review the attached electronic versions. Would this satisfy the request from your organization?

Please feel free to contact us at any time if you have any questions or if there is anything that we can do!

All the best,

[Signature]

----------------------

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Xiao Hong Shan 44,
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
P.R. China
Tel/Fax: 
Email:  

----------------------
From:                        
Sent: 2018-07-10 11:50 AM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: He, Shihua (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: Re: RE: Re: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear Dr. Qiu,

We will deal with it strictly as you wish. I’m sorry for the trouble caused you because I didn’t quite catch your meaning before!

Tomorrow we will draft a new agreement "between scientists", if you have more specific requirements for these viruses, please feel free to tell me, we will keep your request together on the terms of the new agreement.

Best wishes,

-----原始邮件-----
发件人:"Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)"
发送时间:2018-07-10 21:34:18 (星期二)
收件人:"He, Shihua (PHAC/ASPC)"
主题: RE: Re: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear

I just went through the draft MTA your Institute initiated.

I am afraid I can’t sign it as I don’t have the authority, even our Chief of Special Pathogens can’t sign it as it is still formal MTA and none of the scientists is entitled to sign. It has to be go through our IP office.

I am sorry for this situation but there is really not much I can do on our side with the MTA. Hope there is another way around.

Best,

Qiu

Xiangguo Qiu, M.D

Head, Vaccine Development & Antiviral Therapy
Special Pathogens Program  
National Microbiology Laboratory  
Public Health Agency of Canada  
1015 Arlington Street H2410  
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2  
Adjunct Professor  
Dept. of Medical Microbiology  
University of Manitoba  
Ph:1-204-789-5097 (lab)  
1-204-784-7548(O)  
Fax: 1-204-789-2140  
email: xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca

From: [redacted]  
Sent: 2018-07-10 6:11 AM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: [redacted], He, Shihua (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: Re: Re: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear Dr. Qiu,

Thank you again for your strongly support!

According to the content of the communication this morning, please check the attached MTA we have drafted.

After you confirm the content, would you please sign and send it back to us before July 12th? Thank you!

Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions.

Best wishes,

[Signature]

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences  
Xiao Hong Shan 44,  
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
Dear [Name],

The MTA will be initiated by our IP office. I will check with them and try my best to push. But again, MTA usually takes quite long time in our agency. I can't guarantee the MTA will be ready by Thursday. Sorry about this.

Again, generally speaking, MTA usually is requested by the Institute which provides the materials, I don't understand why MTA is has be in place in this case if PHAC doesn't request it? Most of these viruses are from outbreak isolates and technically no one owns the IP.

Best,
Qiu

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Rogers network.

---

From: [Name]
Sent: Monday, July 9, 2018 2:49 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: [Name]
Subject: 回复: 回复: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear Dr. Qiu,

In order to promote the import of pathogens, the leaders of our institute will have a coordination meeting with the entry-exit inspection and quarantine department next week to negotiate on the import of highly pathogenic pathogens. Therefore, we need to complete the submission of the EBOV and NiV import application materials as soon as possible this week to enter the list of consultations.

The most important materials of the online declaration is MTA, if the other materials need more time, could you please prepare MTA first and send it to us before July
12th?

If there is anything we can do, please feel free to contact us.

Looking forward to your reply!

Best wishes,

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Xiao Hong Shan 44,
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
P.R. China
Tel/Fax: 
Email: 

发件人：
发送时间：2018-07-04 10:33
收件人：xiangguo.qiu
抄送：
主题：回复：RE: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear Dr. Qiu,

Thank you very much for this useful information. The PDF version of request letter and biological safety laboratory assurance are attached.

According to requirements of the Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau in China, the materials we still need to submit are as follows:

1. MTA;

2. Descriptive materials of the virus strains, including the biological characteristics, sterilization, inactivation methods and effectiveness. The quickest way to prepare this material is that you can provide relevant articles with the required information instead, and I will prepare the descriptive materials.

3. Test report. Please see the attached template for your reference.

If you have any questions in preparing these materials, please feel free to contact us.

Best wishes,
The letters look good to me. Pls can you send it as PDF file and send it to me again? The person who is in charge on our side is on vacation this week and hopefully we can start the paper work next week.

Attached is our CL4 annually recertification for this year and let me know if you need anything else.

Best regards,

Qiu

Xiangguo Qiu, M.D

Head, Vaccine Development & Antiviral Therapy

Special Pathogens Program

National Microbiology Laboratory

Public Health Agency of Canada

1015 Arlington Street H2410

Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2

Adjunct Professor
From: [mailto:]
Sent: 2018-06-28 5:40 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: 
Subject: request letter of EBOV & NiV

邱教授：

您好！

关于EBOV和NiV的引进，非常感谢您一直以来为我们提供的大力支持和帮助！

按照我们之前沟通的内容，我单位已经按照之前商量的事项拟好了request letter和生物安全声明。电子版请见附件，请您审阅。不知是否满足贵单位的要求？

如有问题或者还有任何我们可以做的，请随时联系！

祝好

[签名]

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Xiao Hong Shan 44,
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
P.R. China
Tel/Fax:
Email:
Hi Tracy,

Please see attached for the request letter from Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and let me know if there are any concerns/questions.

Dave, we had discussed this some time ago and you are agreed to send the viruses once all the documents are in place.

Thanks!

Qiu
Sounds like a plan. Let's meet up on Monday morning. I doubt any of the internal paperwork has been started yet.

Dave

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: "Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC)"
Date: 2018-09-14 3:44 PM (GMT-06:00)
To: "Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)"
Cc: "Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)"
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Dave

I will touch base with you early next week to see what stage the paperwork was at for Tracy's side of this process - I can then better track the related TA and associated paperwork and then follow up on my end with documentation that might already be in process.

In the interim, can you send me the original attachment/application from Qiu (as indicated at the start of this email chain) as a starting point for me to review. Do you know if a transfer application (SES-F-052) was already submitted for processing?

From there, I will work with your section and the requesting lab, as well as reach out the key personnel for MTAs/MoUs, as required.

Thanks very much!

Have a lovely weekend.

Hannah Richards
A/Safety Officer
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
hannah.richards@canada.ca

Telephone | Téléphone 204-789-5005
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

From: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-14 3:24 PM
To: Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC);
Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: Fw: viruses to be exported to China

Hi dave,

Hannah is acting for Tracy and will help in getting the paperwork in place. Hannah acted for Allan last time so she is aware of the transfer approval process. Please contact Hannah directly,

Cathy

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Friday, September 14, 2018 9:59 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: Re: viruses to be exported to China

We would of course not send anything out without appropriate paper work, MTAs, certifications, letters from BSOs etc. They are requesting material from us due to collaboration with Dr. Qiu. Historically it's also been easier to obtain material from us as opposed to US labs. I don't think other, closer labs have the ability to ship these materials. We can certainly ask about their stocks and see if we can get some.

Dave

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------

From: "Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)"
Date: 2018-09-14 9:17 AM (GMT-06:00)
To: "Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)"
Cc: "Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)"
Cc: "Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)"
Cc: "Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)"

Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Dave,

I have some concerns here.

- No certifications are provided, they simply cite they have them.
- What is the nature of the work, and why are our materials required? (ie. these are surely available from other, more local labs).
- MTAs would be required, not generic ‘guarantees' on their storage and usage.
- Are there materials that they have that we would benefit from receiving? Other VHF? High path flu?
- Good to know that you trust this group. How did we get connected with them?

Matt

From: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-12 2:13 PM
To: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: FW: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Cathy,

We haven't heard back from Tracey regarding this. Is there any issues from your perspective top send out these isolates? I trust the lab and would be personally fine to sign off for SP.

Dave

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-10 2:36 PM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,
Pls see attached for the request letter from Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and let me know if there are any concerns/questions.
Dave, we had discussed this some time ago and you are agreed to send the viruses once all the documents are in place.
Thanks!
Qiu
Hi Ladies,

I’m not sure if you are are of this request from Dave. I may have asked you this already but I’ve Can someone please contact Dave to follow up and see what he needs form us?

Thanks,

cAthy

Catherine Robertson
Director, Biiorisk and Occupational Safety Services
Public Health Agency of Canada
National Microbiology Laboratory
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg
Manitoba R3E 3P6
Tel: 204 789-6079 (office)
204-229-8275 (cellphone)
Fax: 204 789-2069
e-mail: catherine.robertson@canada.ca

Hi Cathy,

We haven’t heard back from Tracey regarding this. Is there any issues from your perspective top send out these isolates? I trust the lab and would be personally fine to sign off for SP.

Dave

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-10 2:36 PM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: viruses to be exported to China
Hi all,

Pls see attached for the signed form and returned by our Chinese colleagues.

Thanks!

Qiu

---

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-10-25 10:57 AM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,

We have the forms filled out, we are just waiting for signatures from the China BSOs.

Thanks!

Anders

---

From: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-10-25 9:24 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Morning Qiu,

Are you still planning on sending samples to China. If so, please fill out the SES-F-052 form (attached), and return it back to me.

Thank you

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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Hi Tracy,

Thanks for the following up. We will drop the form off once it is completed!

Best,

Qiu

From: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2018-10-01 11:12 AM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC); Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Morning Qiu,

Just touching base on the China shipment. Once the SES-F-052 form has been completed, please drop it off via email or in person.

Thanks

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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From: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-21 11:01 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Morning Qiu

Sorry for the delay.

Thank for you providing the letter that the lab is in fact able to handle the pathogen in question. We still need to complete the transfer form, SES-F-52A (attached to this email).

Please drop off the form when it is completed,
Thanks

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-10 2:36 PM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,

Pls see attached for the request letter from Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and let me know if there are any concerns/questions.
Dave, we had discussed this some time ago and you are agreed to send the viruses once all the documents are in place.
Thanks!

Qiu
From: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2018-09-21 9:14 AM  
To: Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC); Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC); Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: Re: viruses to be exported to China  

Follow Up Flag: Follow up  
Flag Status: Completed  

I don't think there is a huge urgency on this shipment, been a bit of a crazy week for me. I will be back in the lab next Friday.

Dave

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: "Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC)"
Date: 2018-09-21 9:08 AM (GMT-06:00)
To: "Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)"
Cc: "Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)"
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Cathy,
Just trying to connect with Dave to be brought up to speed; we have been missing each other this week.
Will try to touch base next week, or if Tracy is back, I will leave it in her hands 😊

Cheers
Hannah
Hannah Richards
A/Safety Officer
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
hannah.richards@canada.ca
Telephone | Téléphone 204-789-5005
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

From: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-20 4:09 PM
To: Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC); Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: FW: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Ladies;,
I'm not sure if you are aware of this request from Dave. I may have asked you this already but I've
Can someone please contact Dave to follow up and see what he needs from us?

Thanks,
Catherine Robertson
Director, Biorisk and Occupational Safety Services
Public Health Agency of Canada
National Microbiology Laboratory
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg
Manitoba R3E 3P6
Tel: 204 789-6079 (office)
204-229-8275 (cellphone)
Fax: 204 789-2069
e-mail: catherine.robertson@canada.ca

From: Safronet, David (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-12 2:13 PM
To: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC);
Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: FW: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Cathy,

We haven’t heard back from Tracey regarding this. Is there any issues from your perspective to send out these isolates? I trust the lab and would be personally fine to sign off for SP.

Dave

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-10 2:36 PM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronet, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,

Pls see attached for the request letter from Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and let me know if there are any concerns/questions.
Dave, we had discussed this some time ago and you are agreed to send the viruses once all the documents are in place.
Thanks!

Qiu
Hekki Xiang,

Thank you for your feedback.

Please confirm shipment dims to determine packaging required.

Regards,

[Date Redacted]

---

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca]
Sent: 15 October 2018 10:49
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: [Redacted] || DG Shipment to Wuhan Institute of Virology

Dear [Redacted],
Thanks for the following up and sorry for the delayed reply. We don’t have an exact date yet at this points as some of the paper work (import permit and export permit, etc). Once we got all the documents ready, I will give you the date for shipment.
*required temperature: -160oC(ship on dry ice)
*needed supplies (box, data loggers, dry ice): yes to all.

Best regards,

Xiangguo Qiu, M.D
Head, Vaccine Development & Antiviral Therapy
Special Pathogens Program
National Microbiology Laboratory
Public Health Agency of Canada
1015 Arlington Street H2410
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2

Adjunct Professor
Dept. of Medical Microbiology
University of Manitoba
Ph:1-204-789-5097 (lab)
1-204-784-7548(O)
Fax: 1-204-789-2140
email: xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2018-10-15 7:33 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: [Redacted] || DG Shipment to Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hello,

Please advise when the samples will be ready for pick-up and if you need any supplies from [Redacted]. Thank you.

Regards,
This e-mail, including any attachments, may contain confidential and/or privileged information. It is for the sole use of the intended recipient. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it from your system. Any unauthorised copying, disclosure, distribution, use or retention of this e-mail or the information in it is strictly forbidden. Please note we reserve the right to monitor all e-mail communication for quality assurance, policy compliance and/or security purposes.

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Jouez votre rôle pour aider à préserver l’environnement. N’imprimez pas ce message courriel à moins que cela ne s’avère absolument nécessaire.

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this e-mail unless absolutely necessary

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 09 October 2018 07:59
To: 'xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca'
Cc:
Subject: RE: [Redacted] || DG Shipment to Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hello,

I would like to follow up on this shipment. Thank you

Regards,
From: [Redacted]
Sent: 30 September 2018 13:13
To: 'xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca'
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] || DG Shipment to Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hello,

We received a shipment request for an Ebola virus shipment from your location going to Wuhan Institute of Virology in China. Please provide the paperwork and permit for this shipment and confirm the following--
* ready date/time
* required temperature
* needed supplies (box, data loggers, dry ice)

Thanks,
## NML Transfer Application for Pathogens and Toxins

**Date Issued:** 2017-02-08

### TRANSFEROR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Head/ Designate:</th>
<th>David Safronet</th>
<th>Contact Person:</th>
<th>Xiangguo Qiu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NML Location:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSCHAH</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1015 Arlington St, Winnipeg, MB, R3E 3R2</td>
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<td>U of Guelph</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Stone Rd West, Guelph, ON, N1G 3W4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lethbridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22608 Township Road 9-1, Lethbridge, AB, T1J 3Z4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other: Click here to enter text.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department/Unit:</td>
<td>Special Pathogens Program</td>
<td>Telephone:</td>
<td>204-784-7548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin of Material:</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Import Permit or Transfer Letter No.:</td>
<td>P14-3865 (Makona), P05670 (MA-Zebov) P-05100 (ass. Ebola), P15000 (Bebov), P05978 (Hendra), P05671 (Nipah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Group / Material:</td>
<td>RG2, RG3, RG4</td>
<td>SSBA, Priens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathogen/Target and description of material(s)* to be transferred:</td>
<td>Ebola and Henipaviruses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RECIPIENT LABORATORY

| Recipient Name:         | Wuhan Institute of Virology |
| BSO Email:              |                               |
| Organization Name:      | Chinese Academy of Sciences   |
| Department:             | Wuhan Institute of Virology   |
| Street Address:         | Xiao Hong Shan No.44          |
| City:                   | Wuhan                         |
| Prov/State:             | Hubei                         |
| Country:                | China                         |
| Postal/Zip Code:        | 430071                        |
| Telephone:              |                               |
| Fax:                    |                               |
| For Canadian Labs:      | Room number(s) where Priens, RG3, RG4 or SSBA material will be used or stored: Click here to enter text. |
| Work Intent:            | Stock virus culturing         |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Laboratory**</th>
<th>Include one or more of the following documentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recipient Import Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laboratory Certification Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Documentation from Institute Director or Biosafety Officer indicating they meet the biosafety and biosecurity requirements to work safely with the exported material.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Examples of materials include (but are not exclusive): cultures, various infected specimens (serum, blood, tissue, etc), toxins, etc.

** For international laboratories: an import permit, certification letter, or documentation from the institute’s Director or Biosafety Officer indicating they meet the biosafety and biosecurity requirements to work safely with the exported material.

*** Canadian laboratories receiving proficiency panels with RG2 or RG3 samples that mimic primary specimens for instrument calibration, performance determination of a laboratory’s tests or measurements, and/or monitoring a laboratory’s continuing performance may be exempt from PHAC licensing requirements.

Recipient acknowledgement:
1. PHAC makes no representations and gives no warranties of any nature, expressed or implied, with respect to the Materials.
2. The Materials shall be used only on the Recipient’s premises and under suitable containment conditions.

**2018-10-18**

Recipient’s BSO / Director / Licence Holder Signature

Date (YYYY-MM-DD) **2018-10-18**

Transferor Signature

Date (YYYY-MM-DD)

Transferring BSO (or designate) Signature

Date (YYYY-MM-DD)
Dear Dr. Qiu,

Please find and check the attached transfer application. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us.

Thank you again for all your great support and help during this time.

Best wishes,

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Xiao Hong Shan 44,
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
P.R. China
Tel/Fax: [redacted]
Email: [redacted]

Dear [redacted],

I just went through the draft MTA your Institute initiated.

I am afraid I can’t sign it as I don’t have the authority, even our Chief of Special Pathogens can’t sign it as it is still formal MTA and none of the scientists is entitled to sign. It has to be go through our IP office.

I am sorry for this situation but there is really not much I can do on our side with the MTA. Hope there is another way around.

Best,

Qiu
Xiangguo Qiu, M.D  
Head, Vaccine Development & Antiviral Therapy  
Special Pathogens Program  
National Microbiology Laboratory  
Public Health Agency of Canada  
1015 Arlington Street H2410  
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2

Adjunct Professor  
Dept. of Medical Microbiology  
University of Manitoba  
Ph:1-204-789-5097 (lab)  
1-204-784-7548(O)  
Fax: 1-204-789-2140  
email: xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca

---

From:  
Sent: 2018-07-10 6:11 AM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: He, Shihua (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: Re: Re: request letter of EBOV & NiV

Dear Dr. Qiu,

Thank you again for your strongly support!  
According to the content of the communication this morning, please check the attached MTA we have drafted.  
After you confirm the content, would you please sign and send it back to us before July 12th? Thank you!  
Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions.

Best wishes,

---

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences  
Xiao Hong Shan 44,  
430071 Wuhan, Hubei  
P.R. China  
Tel/Fax:  
Email:
Dear [Name],

The MTA will be initiated by our IP office. I will check with them and try my best to push. But again, MTA usually takes quite long time in our agency. I can’t guarantee the MTA will be ready by Thursday. Sorry about this.

Again, generally speaking, MTA usually is requested by the Institute which provides the materials, I don’t understand why MTA is has be in place in this case if PHAC doesn’t request it? Most of these viruses are from outbreak isolates and technically no one owns the IP.

Best,

Qiu

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Rogers network.

Dear Dr. Qiu,

In order to promote the import of pathogens, the leaders of our institute will have a coordination meeting with the entry-exit inspection and quarantine department next week to negotiate on the import of highly pathogenic pathogens. Therefore, we need to complete the submission of the EBOV and NiV import application materials as soon as possible this week to enter the list of consultations.

The most important materials of the online declaration is MTA, if the other materials need more time, could you please prepare MTA first and send it to us before July 12th?

If there is anything we can do, please feel free to contact us.

Looking forward to your reply!

Best wishes,

[Name]
Dear Dr. Qiu,

Thank you very much for this useful information. The PDF version of request letter and biological safety laboratory assurance are attached.

According to requirements of the Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau in China, the materials we still need to submit are as follows:

1. MTA;
2. Descriptive materials of the virus strains, including the biological characteristics, sterilization, inactivation methods and effectiveness. The quickest way to prepare this material is that you can provide relevant articles with the required information instead, and I will prepare the descriptive materials.
3. Test report. Please see the attached template for your reference.

If you have any questions in preparing these materials, please feel free to contact us.

Best wishes,

[Signature]
抄送：
主题： RE: request letter of EBOV & NIV

Dear [Name],

The letters look good to me. PIs can you send it as PDF file and send it to me again? The person who is in charge on our side is on vacation this week and hopefully we can start the paper work next week.

Attached is our CL4 annually recertification for this year and let me know if you need anything else.

Best regards,

Qiu

Xiangguo Qiu, M.D
Head, Vaccine Development & Antiviral Therapy
Special Pathogens Program
National Microbiology Laboratory
Public Health Agency of Canada
1015 Arlington Street H2A10
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2

Adjunct Professor
Dept. of Medical Microbiology
University of Manitoba
Ph: 1-204-789-5097 (lab)
1-204-784-7548 (O)
Fax: 1-204-789-2140
email: xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca

From: [mailto: ]
Sent: 2018-06-28 5:40 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: [mailto: ]
Subject: request letter of EBOV & NIV
您好！

关于EBOV和NiV的引进，非常感谢您一直以来为我们提供的大力支持和帮助！

按照我们之前沟通的内容，我单位已经按照之前商量的事项拟好了request letter 和生物安全声明，电子版请见附件，请您审阅。不知是否满足贵单位的要求？

如有问题或者还有任何我们可以做的，敬请随时联系！

祝好

Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Xiao Hong Shan 44,
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
P.R. China
Tel/Fax: 
Email:
Here is a copy of the final signed TA for everyone’s record. Qiu when do you expect to ship these viruses?

Good morning

Here is the processed TA. Please have Mike sign the document, provide me back signed copy, and you are good to go.

Thanks

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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All done! Dave did it this morning.
Hi Anders,

Pls can you have Dave signed and forward to Tracy?

Thanks!

Qiu

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

Morning,

As Dave is the one responsible for the transfer, we still require his signature as the transferor. Please have Dave sign and return it to me.

Thanks

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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Hi all,

Pls see attached for the signed form and returned by our Chinese colleagues.

Thanks!

Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2018-10-25 10:57 AM  
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,

We have the forms filled out, we are just waiting for signatures from the China BSOS.

Thanks!

Anders

From: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2018-10-25 9:24 AM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Morning Qiu,

Are you still planning on sending samples to China. If so, please fill out the SES-F-052 form (attached), and return it back to me.

Thank you

Tracy Drew  
Safety Officer  
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986  
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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Hi Tracy,

Thanks for the following up. We will drop the form off once it is completed!

Best,

Qiu

Morning Qiu,

Just touching base on the China shipment. Once the SES-F-052 form has been completed, please drop it off via email or in person.

Thanks

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Richards, Hannah (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Morning Qiu

Sorry for the delay.

Thank you for providing the letter that the lab is in fact able to handle the pathogen in question. We still need to complete the transfer form, SES-F-52A (attached to this email).

Please drop off the form when it is completed,
Thanks

Tracy Drew
Safety Officer
1-204-789-7638/1-204-784-5986
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

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From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-10 2:36 PM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,

Pls see attached for the request letter from Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and let me know if there are any concerns/questions.
Dave, we had discussed this some time ago and you are agreed to send the viruses once all the documents are in place.

Thanks!

Qiu
Hi Tracy,

There seems to be a difference in the shipping address for the lab, on the application we stated it should be;

Wuhan Institute of Virology  
Xiao Hong Shan No.44  
Wuhan, Hubei, China  
430071

But the permit states a different address in Beijing.

Sorry for not noticing this earlier.

Thanks!

Anders Leung  
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie  
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada  
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale  
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2  
anders.leung@canada.ca  
Telephone | Téléphone 204-789-7665 / Facsimile | Télécopieur 204-789-2140  
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
MEDIA LINES

ISSUE: On June #, 2019, the Public Health Agency of Canada launched an administrative investigation into possible policy breaches by two employees working at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, Manitoba. The employees are on leave until the investigation is completed.

KEY MESSAGES:

- The Public Health Agency of Canada takes the integrity of the scientific research conducted at the National Microbiology Laboratory very seriously.
- For privacy reasons, we cannot comment further on this matter.
- There is no risk to the health and safety of Canadians.

If pressed on the investigation (only if investigation details are released by either employee)

- An investigation is underway at the National Microbiology Laboratory.
- As the investigation is ongoing, we cannot comment further at this time.
- The Agency is taking the necessary steps to resolve the matter.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q1. What are the allegations against the employees?

For privacy reasons, we cannot comment.

Q2. Is there a risk to Canadians since the employees worked at the National Microbiology Laboratory?

No, there is no risk to the health and safety of Canadians.

Q3. How long will the employees be on leave?

For privacy reasons, we cannot comment.

Q4. When did the alleged incident(s) occur?

As the matter is ongoing, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q5. What actions did management take between the time of the alleged incident(s) and placing the employees on leave?

As the matter is ongoing, we cannot comment further at this time.
Q6. How does this affect the employees' relationship or status with any universities they were working with and outside collaborators?

For privacy reasons, we cannot comment.

Q7. Are the police involved?

As the matter is ongoing, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q8. When will the investigation be completed?

We are taking steps to ensure due process is followed. The matter will be concluded as expeditiously as possible.
MEDIA LINES
Administrative Investigation at the National Microbiology Laboratory

ISSUE: On July 5, 2019, the Public Health Agency of Canada launched an administrative investigation into possible policy breaches by two scientists working at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, Manitoba.

KEY MESSAGES:

- Canada's National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) is known worldwide for its scientific expertise and contributions to global health.
- That is why the Public Health Agency of Canada takes the NML's supporting policies and procedures very seriously.
- For privacy reasons, we cannot comment further on this matter.
- There is no risk to the health and safety of Canadians.

The following presents various scenarios that would necessitate different key messages. Information about the administrative investigation could become public via the scientists themselves, colleagues working in the lab, collaborators (including universities they work with), and allies in the broader scientific community.

Scenario: Scientists at Home

Questions are raised—either internally or by the media—about the status and whereabouts of the scientists.

Key Messages:

- Canada's National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) is known around the world for its scientific excellence and contributions to global health.
- We can assure Canadians that there is absolutely no risk to the Canadian public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.
- The NML's greatest assets are the world-class scientists who work in the facility—we value the exceptional role they play in protecting the health of Canadians.
- For privacy reasons, we cannot comment on measures that may be taken regarding any employee.
Scenario: Administrative Investigation

The media become aware of an administrative investigation at the NML and ask questions.

Key Messages:

- Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) is known around the world for its scientific excellence and contributions to global health.
- We can assure Canadians that there is no risk to the public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.
- Its greatest assets are the world-class scientists who work in the facility—we value the exceptional role they play in protecting the health of Canadians.
- We can confirm that an administrative investigation is underway at the NML.
- For privacy reasons, we cannot comment further.
- The Agency is taking the necessary steps to resolve the matter as expeditiously as possible.

Scenario: Level 4 Lab and the Health and Safety of Canadians

Media are reporting that one or both scientists work in Canada’s only level 4 lab at the National Microbiology Laboratory, and have access to infectious agents (e.g., Ebola, Lassa fever), stoking fears among Canadians, partners and other levels of government.

Key Messages:

- Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) is known around the world for its scientific excellence.
- We can assure Canadians that there is no risk to the public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.
- Safety and security are paramount at the NML, and the lab continues to meet or exceed all national and international standards for containment laboratories.
- The lab is licensed under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act and its regulations to carry out controlled activities with human pathogens and toxins.
- Infectious pathogens are stored and handled in the highest level of biocontainment labs according to the strictest standards for safety and security.
• Protocols followed by the NML are based on international standards developed by the World Health Organization as well as on the Canadian Biosafety Standards.

**Scenario: Different Treatment and Connection to China**

PHAC is accused of investigating the scientists and treating them differently because of their Chinese heritage, bringing media attention to the administrative investigation, and linking it to Canada-China relations.

**Key Messages:**

• PHAC values diversity and is firmly committed to having a workplace that is inclusive and reflective of Canadian society.

• PHAC scientists are committed to scientific excellence and work closely with scientists across Canada and around the world, including with scientists in China.

• PHAC values this collaboration, and the fundamental role it plays in protecting the health of Canadians.

• All employees are expected to adhere to policies, protocols and practices governing the protection and security of Government of Canada property, including the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector.

*If pressed on whether there is a link to challenges in Canada-China relations*

• The Government of Canada is treating this as a standalone issue.

**Scenario: Potential Loss of Intellectual Property**

Media raise questions in relation to allegations that both scientists may have been sharing unauthorized information with organizations abroad without proper collaboration agreements in place.

**Key Messages:**

• All employees of the Government of Canada are expected to adhere to the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector.

• The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is committed to protecting the information and assets of the Government of Canada.
• The Government of Canada and PHAC have measures in place to safeguard intellectual property, including the Public Servants Inventions Act and the PHAC Policy on Intellectual Property.

• The Government of Canada and PHAC have policies and standards to help keep our systems and data secure, such as the Policy on Government Security. For example, monitoring is carried out to detect and respond to security incidents.

**Scenario: Delay in Taking Action**

PHAC is criticized for the length of time it took to examine the matter and to take action once concerns came to light.

**Key Messages:**

• We took the necessary steps to ensure due process was followed.

**Scenario: Risks Related to Ebola**

The scientific community rallies around one of the scientists because of her world-renowned work on Ebola. High-profile figures criticize PHAC publicly for having the scientist at home when there is an ongoing outbreak of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Key Messages:**

• Canada has a long history of leadership and collaboration on the world stage.

• The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) will continue to work with our international partners to protect the health of our citizens and people around the world.

• In collaboration with international partners, PHAC continues to closely monitor the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• PHAC’s contribution to addressing Ebola goes beyond any one individual.

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:**

**Q1. What prompted PHAC to initiate an administrative investigation?**

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.

**Q2. What are the allegations against the scientists?**

For privacy reasons, we cannot comment.
Q3. Is there a risk to Canadians since the scientists worked at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML)?

No, there is no risk to the health and safety of Canadians. The NML is licensed under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act and its regulations to carry out controlled activities with human pathogens and toxins. Infectious pathogens are stored and handled in the highest level of biocontainment labs according to the strictest standards for safety and security.

Q4. How long will the scientists be at home?

For privacy reasons, we cannot comment on measures that may be taken regarding any employee.

Q5. When did the alleged incident(s) occur?

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q6. What actions did management take between the time of the alleged incident(s) and the scientists’ being at home?

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q7. How does this affect the scientists’ relationship or status with any universities they were working with and outside collaborators?

For privacy reasons, we cannot comment.

Q8. When will the investigation be completed?

We are taking steps to ensure due process is followed. The matter will be concluded as expeditiously as possible.

Q9: What is the difference between a Fact Finding exercise and an Administrative Investigation?

A Fact Finding is an initial assessment that is undertaken once allegations are first brought to management’s attention. An administrative investigation is a formal process of assessing allegations.

Q10. Is this another example of the Government muzzling scientists?

The Government of Canada firmly stands behind the principle that scientists can discuss their important work with each other, with the media and with Canadians. In 2017, the Government made a commitment to scientific integrity through a Memorandum of Agreement that encourages scientists and researchers to speak openly about their scientific work without undue interference.

Q11. How long have you known there was an issue?

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.
Q12. Who is undertaking the investigation? Is this something that security services are involved in?

The Public Health Agency of Canada is the lead on the administrative investigation, and is reaching out to external parties as required.

Q13. Has this happened before and what did you do about it?

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q14. Have you referred this to security agencies?

PHAC has advised the RCMP of possible policy breaches. As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q15. Is this espionage?

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.

Q16. What kinds of security clearances are required at the NML and how are they granted?

A Secret level clearance is required to work at the NML. In addition, for employees working with human pathogens and toxins, a clearance under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) is also required.

A Secret clearance is granted by filling out the appropriate forms, which are sent to RCMP and CSIS for their respective assessment. If any adverse information is uncovered, it is shared with the department to determine if it poses a risk to the Department.

For the HPTA clearance, it is a similar process but goes above and beyond where Law Enforcement Records Checks are conducted. The findings are reviewed at the Interdepartmental Security Advisory Forum (ISAF). The ISAF is responsible to provide a recommendation to grant or not to grant a HPTA clearance to the President of the Public Health Agency of Canada.

Q17. What has changed since one of the scientists received an award for her work on Ebola?

As the matter is being examined, we cannot comment further at this time.
MINISTERIAL MEDIA LINES
Administrative Investigation at the National Microbiology Laboratory

ISSUE: On July 5, 2019, the Public Health Agency of Canada launched an administrative investigation into possible policy breaches by two scientists working at its National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, Manitoba.

MINISTERIAL KEY MESSAGES:

• I am aware that there is a matter under review at the National Microbiology Laboratory.

• I can assure Canadians that there is absolutely no risk to the Canadian public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.

• Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory is known around the world for its scientific excellence and contributions to global health.

• For privacy reasons, I cannot comment further.

• Further questions should be directed to the Public Health Agency of Canada.
Media responses on the NML

July 12 2019 to April 19, 2021

July 12,13, 15, 2019


Response (the same answer was delivered regardless of the question):

We are looking into an administrative matter at the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) and are taking steps to resolve it expeditiously. On May 24, 2019, The Public Health Agency of Canada has advised the RCMP of possible policy breaches. There is no employee from the NML under arrest or confined to their home.

We can assure Canadians that there is no risk to the public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.

For privacy reasons, we will not comment further.

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July 30, 2019 - Winnipeg Free Press

Q1. We have enough corroboration to report on a Level 4 pathogens being sent to China earlier this year, despite the lack of a Material Transfer Agreement. ]

To advance scientific work worldwide, the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) routinely shares samples of pathogens and toxins with partner laboratories in Canada and in other countries. These transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard and Standard Operating Procedures of the NML. All transfers of Risk Group 4 samples follow strict transportation requirements and are authorized by senior officials at the lab. The NML also tracks and keeps electronic records of all shipments of samples in accordance with the HPTA.

On the specific shipment to China earlier this year, we can confirm that we have all records pertaining to the shipment, and that all protocols were followed as directed by the above Acts and Standards.

Q2. How is the investigation proceeding; has Xiangguo Qui been arrested?

The Public Health Agency of Canada continues to look into an administrative matter at the NML and we cannot comment further. We can assure Canadians that there is no risk to the public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.

----------------
July 31, 2019 - [Redacted], CBC

Q1. I understand Canada is not allowed to send anything to other countries or labs without the IP office negotiating and having a material transfer agreement in place - to protect the Crown's intellectual property rights should the material being sent lead to any kind of notable discovery. Can you confirm if there is one between the Special Pathogens program and the Chinese government and/or the Chinese Academy of Sciences? Is it illegal to ship pathogens without it?

Q2. What and how much virus was sent? (This will be on the TDG - transportation of dangerous goods paperwork)

To advance scientific work worldwide, the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) routinely shares samples of pathogens and toxins with partner laboratories in Canada and in other countries. These transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/h-5.67/> (HPTA), the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/T-19.01/> , the Canadian Biosafety Standard<https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/canadian-biosafety-standards-guidelines/second-edition.html> and Standard Operating Procedures of the NML. All transfers of Risk Group 4 samples follow strict transportation requirements and are authorized by senior officials at the lab and the NML tracks and keeps electronic records of all shipments of samples in accordance with the HPTA. Agreements for the transfer of materials are determined on a case-by-case basis.

On the specific shipments to China earlier this year, we can confirm that we have all records pertaining to the shipment, and that all protocols were followed as directed by the above Acts and Standards. The shipment to China earlier this year contained Ebola and Henipah viruses.

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August 1, 2019 - [Redacted], National Post

Q1. Can you confirm that this occurred?

To advance scientific work worldwide, the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) routinely shares samples of pathogens and toxins with partner laboratories in Canada and in other countries. These transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/h-5.67/> (HPTA), the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/T-19.01/> , the Canadian Biosafety Standard<https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/canadian-biosafety-standards-guidelines/second-edition.html> and Standard Operating Procedures of the NML. All transfers of Risk Group 4 samples follow strict transportation requirements and are authorized by senior officials at the lab and the NML tracks and keeps electronic records of all shipments of samples in accordance with the HPTA.

On the specific shipment to China earlier this year, we can confirm that we have all records pertaining to the shipment, and that all protocols were followed as directed by the above Acts and Standards.

Q2. And was this related to the matter that was passed on to the RCMP for investigation? I find that there is a lot of information out there that is perhaps telling part of the story, but not the whole story, which I think is very confusing for the public and shrouding this whole situation in unnecessary mystery. Anything that can shed more light on it would be helpful!

The Public Health Agency of Canada continues to look into an administrative matter at the NML and we cannot comment further. We can assure Canadians that there is no risk to the public and that the work of the NML continues in support of the health and safety of all Canadians.
January 27, 2020 – Ming Pao

I am [REDACTED] with Mingpao Saturday Magazine of Mingpao Newspaper Canada Ltd.

I want to get updated information about Ms. Xiang Guo Qiu, a scientist at the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg. Ms. Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng were secored out of the lab in July 2019 and under investigation.

Ms. Qiu visited Wuhan National Biosafety lab at least 5 times before last year.

Rumor say Ms. Qiu’s case related to Wuhan coronavirus broke out in China.
- where is Ms. Qiu and her husband?
- Can she still be able to work at Canada National Lab as before?

This is misinformation and there is no factual basis for claims being made on social media. For privacy reasons, we will not comment further.

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April 14 – CBC [REDACTED]

Our last response stands. To respect privacy, no further details on the individuals will be disclosed.

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April 15 – Globe and Mail

Last year, scientist Xiangguo Qiu was removed from her duties at the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory.

My questions: Has Ms. Qiu been reinstated to those duties? Has her husband, Keding Cheng, resumed his relationship with the laboratory?

For privacy reasons, we will not comment further.

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April 20 – National Post – [REDACTED]

Because of her visits to Wuhan and other reasons, there is tremendous public interest now in the case Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, who were removed from the NML last year. I feel that there needs to be some update on that, if only to squelch the widespread, largely uninformed speculation about the case. I had a couple of questions:

Has PHAC’s inquiry into the alleged administrative issues around these two been completed? If so, what was the result?
Are Qiu and Cheng back at work at the NML?
Was any Impropriety Identified in the transport of Ebola and henipavirus samples to China? Can you explain the results of that inquiry?

---
In response to a request from the Institute for viral samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses, the Public Health Agency of Canada sent samples for the purpose of scientific research in 2019. The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) shares samples with other public health laboratories—as they do with the NML—to contribute to the advancement of science. Transfers are subject to strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogen and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the NML.

The NML also provides training to international laboratory professionals, and has previously trained scientists from many countries including China.

As for your questions regarding Dr. Qiu and Cheng. For privacy reasons, we will not comment on individual employees.

Any speculation about the role of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)’s scientists in the emergence of the novel coronavirus has no factual basis.

---No offense, but I don’t think you answered a single one of my questions!

As I understand from information you provided me last year, the export of those samples was the subject of an inquiry by PHAC, and obviously is a matter of some public interest. Can you just say what was the outcome of that inquiry? Or if there was no inquiry and it was all a routine matter, please indicate that?

I would ask the same regarding the inquiry into administrative issues you referenced last year. Has that been completed and, if so, what was the outcome?

Re. Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng, I'm not asking for any private information about them, simply whether they are on the job now as employees of PHAC, or not.

I agree with you about the COVID-19 virus and PHAC scientists; that is pure fantasy. But I can say from the many emails I receive about this and posts I see on social media, these other matters, with their connection to the WIV lab in Wuhan, have led to much speculation, most of it groundless I'm sure.

I think the only way to end that conjecture is to illuminate what has actually happened with this matter. I don’t think you can expect the public to just forget this ever happened.

Re. the queries that Andre was handling, I assume I should follow up with him about those?

I’ll follow up again on your question regarding the inquiry/administrative matter.

As for employee status, we will not comment on the status of individual employees.

I’ll be in touch with you tomorrow.

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For privacy reasons, we will not comment further.

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April 22, 2020 – CBC

Sorry for not getting back to you sooner. We respectfully decline the request for an interview. Any speculation about the role of the Public Health Agency of Canada’s scientists in the emergence of the novel coronavirus has no factual basis.

May 1, 2020 – CBC

Q. Can you give me an update on the investigation into the possible administrative breach, what you’ve discovered so far, and the status of the scientists involved?

The administrative review remains underway. We cannot provide further details.

Q. Also, have there been/are there any bat studies going on at NML? Was Qiu involved in any bat research?

Scientists at the National Microbiology Laboratory have not been involved in research involving bats, beyond a 2012 investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that sampled wildlife species, including bats, to test for pathogens, including the Ebola virus.

May 6, 2020 – National Post

Q1. Has Health Canada or PHAC had any dealings with the WIV lab? Has HC or PHAC had or currently have any concerns about the safety of the research being done there?

In response to a request from the Institute for viral samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses, the Public Health Agency of Canada sent samples for the purpose of scientific research in 2019. The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) routinely shares samples with other public health laboratories—as they do with the NML—to contribute to the advancement of science. Transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogen and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the NML.

The NML also routinely provides training to international laboratory professionals, and has previously trained scientists from many countries including China.

If Pressed

For privacy reasons, we will not comment on private circumstances of individual employees

Any speculation about the role of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)’s scientists in the emergence of the novel coronavirus has no factual basis.
FOLLOW UPS

NATIONAL POST + CBC QUESTION re Administrative Matter
Q1. What was the outcome of the inquiry last year into “administrative” or policy matters at the NML, associated with the removal of the two researchers from the lab? (National Post)
Q. Can you give me an update on the investigation into the possible administrative breach, what you’ve discovered so far, and the status of the scientists involved? (CBC)

The administrative review remains underway. We cannot provide further details.

CBC QUESTION re, Bat studies:
Also, have there been/are there any bat studies going on at NML? Was Qiu involved in any bat research?

Scientists at the National Microbiology Laboratory have not been involved in research involving bats, beyond a 2012 investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that sampled wildlife species, including bats, to test for pathogens, including the Ebola virus.

NATIONAL POST FOLLOW UP re, Wuhan Institute of Virology:
Q2. Has PHAC or Health Canada had any concerns about bio-safety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology BSL-4 lab, along the lines apparently expressed in a U.S. diplomatic cable in 2018, reported on here?

The Public Health Agency of Canada does not have any information on biosafety concerns in regards to this institute.

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June 11, 2020 - CBC

PHAC-A-2019-000061/AB

Q1. We are finally getting details on the list of pathogens sent - on the first page and also on p. 153. It looks like much more was shipped than we were originally led to believe - 30 vials. While they are all under the Ebola umbrella, they are all different viruses. I'm also told you only need a small volume, 10 microlitres to infect cells to grow more virus and make your own stock. Each vial has 500 microlitres. So one vial could be used to make infect 50 new cell cultures, within which the virus itself is multiplying. ***Why did NML send so much?***

This shipment included 15 strains of virus. It is standard practice to ship two vials of each strain in case the receiving lab encounters problems growing the virus from the stock. This second vial is provided to reduce the need for multiple Risk Group 4 (RG4) shipments.

The aliquot volume of 250-500 µL is the standard storage condition for virus stocks. It is not standard practice to thaw virus stocks to change the amount of virus being shipped since this increases manipulation of the sample and can compromise the stock quality. The Special Pathogens Standard Operating Procedure SP-CL4-PR-004-1, “Preparation of Working Virus Stocks for CL4,” provides the following directive: “8.17. g. Dispense the desired volume (aliquots of 250 µL and 500 µL are preferred).”

Q2. ***Where was this shipment of Ebola and Henipah virus sent to?*** I understand the third-party issue, but in September 2018, the head of the lab, Matthew Gilmour, expressed some concerns about the paperwork, the nature of the work and why the NML’s materials were required, that MTA’s would be required, not generic ‘guarantees’ on the storage and usage. He also said, “Good to know that you trust this group. How did we get connected with them?”
Part of the response from David Safronetz was: "I trust the lab and would be personally fine to sign off for SP."
At one point, Mike Drobot also asks to what agency or institution are they going? He loops in Matt and Steve.
If the Chinese lab involved was public or university-connected, surely Matthew Gilmour would know about it and wouldn’t have to ask what it was.
Sending level-4 pathogens outside recognized research labs is concerning, especially in these times. I think there is a case to be made for identifying the lab in question. I think it’s in the public’s best interest to know this.

As reported in a National Post article on May 5, 2020, in response to a request from the Wuhan Institute of Virology for viral samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) sent samples for the purpose of scientific research in 2019. The NML routinely shares samples with other public health laboratories—as they do with the NML—to contribute to the advancement of science. Transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the NML.

Q3. Apr 3 - p 146 After the shipment, there are questions from Ottawa about what was sent, where it was sent, was there proper paperwork. “We didn’t do anything wrong. Just that because of the nature of the pathogens and where it was going they (the higher ups in PHAC) wanted to know if we did our due diligence.” Was Ottawa sufficiently informed about this shipment?

The process for shipments of RG4 pathogens is outlined under the Emergency Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) process. Following the NML’s notification of the Health Portfolio Operations Centre (HPOC) in Ottawa, as is noted on page 144, the HPOC advised the Centre for Biosecurity (CB). CB is the regulatory authority responsible the HPTA and its regulations. Consistent with its regulatory role, the CB contacted the NML to confirm that all required documentation was completed and procedures followed. This was confirmed, as outlined in page 146.

Q4. The first requests for this shipment date back to September 2018 - six months before it actually happened. How unusual is that?

This is not unusual. It reflects the time required for documentation, verification of permits, approvals and establishing appropriate shipping and logistics arrangements to transfer an RG4 pathogen according to the requirements of the HPTA and Transport Canada’s Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act.

Q5. Jay Krishnan asks about the phrase “the crown doesn’t regulate the crown” from Foreign Affairs - what is this and what does this mean? Why is it necessary?

This phrase indicates that PHAC is not regulated by Global Affairs Canada under the Export and Import Permits Act. With respect to the shipment of pathogens to institutions outside Canada, the NML must comply with all applicable requirements of the HPTA, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, and the Canadian Biosafety Standard.

Q6. Did NML get any payment or viruses in return from this agency? If so, what?

No payment nor viruses were received in return.

Q7. What paperwork is required in a shipment like this? Was it all provided?

All required documentation according to the provisions of the HPTA was in place.

Under the HPTA, the NML requires the requesting laboratory to provide:

- Laboratory certification (if the country has a certification scheme);
• Import permit (if the requesting country issues such permits. Not all countries issue import permits); and/or
• Letter from Director of Laboratory or Biosafety Officer of the institute attesting that the laboratory meets the containment requirements for safely working with a particular risk group of pathogens (if the country does not have a certification scheme).

Shipment of pathogens requires:

• NML transfer application/authorization and NML shipment requisition (both internal documents); and
• ERAP notification (for RG4 samples) and Transportation of Dangerous Goods documentation which includes shippers' declaration, waybill and list of pathogens in package (both as per Transport Canada).

Q8. How unusual is the request by China for photos/video of the pickup process?

The request for photos or video was made by the shipping company. PHAC cannot comment on the commercial practices and requirements of third party companies.

A-2019-000602/AB2

Q9. ***My very first request about this case generated a lot of urgent responses internally - high impact/high complexity. e.g. John Taylor, A/director investigations and regional security management was involved, PCO comms - lots of sharing of media lines between departments. Why was security management involved when I was told it was not a national security issue?

Security management was involved as they were the contract authority for the fact finding and subsequent administrative investigation reports.

Q10. Why were people like Sandra Entwistle, departmental security officer communicating with RCMP about this? Was that political interference?

Actions taken by a departmental official do not constitute political interference. As part of her regular duties, the departmental security officer communicates regularly with Government of Canada security partners.

Q11. Was the PMO contacted about this story? What were the instructions? Please provide a definition for "administrative matter"

Neither the Public Health Agency of Canada nor Health Canada contacted the Prime Minister's Office. An "administrative matter" generally refers to an issue that is linked to administrative policies and procedures.

Q12. What is the difference between a fact-finding mission and an administrative investigation?

A fact-finding exercise is the precursor to a formal administrative investigation. A fact-finding exercise gathers and documents information pertaining to an issue to determine whether the facts warrant the initiation of an in-depth investigation to determine or confirm what occurred, the factors that contributed to the issue being investigated and whether it constitutes misconduct. The purpose of an administrative investigation is to establish whether an employee's behaviour or actions were inappropriate and culpable, and whether the actions constitute misconduct that might warrant the imposition of corrective measures. An investigation is therefore a means of establishing factual and documented findings.

Q13. p. 193 you prepared some media lines about the values and ethics code and measures in place to safeguard....? What?
Media lines are prepared in anticipation of questions that may arise. Administrative investigations often generate questions related to values and ethics.

**Q14. Is this case connected in any way to Xiangguo Qiu’s shipment of Ebola and Henipah to an unknown agency in China several months earlier, in March 2019? I know there were questions raised by Ottawa at the time - did those concerns lead to this investigation?**

The administrative investigation is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China. Samples were provided in accordance with policies and procedures required under the HPTA.

**Q15. I was told at the time you were taking steps to resolve this as expeditiously as possible. It’s been almost a year. What have you done in the last year and what is the status of this case?**

Administrative investigations are impartial, thorough and in-depth. They are also procedurally fair and respect the rights of individuals. The investigation has not yet concluded.

**Q16: Was this package sent to the Chinese military - is NML is doing Ebola studies in collaboration with the Academy of Military Medical Sciences in China?**

[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6384069/](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6384069/)

No shipments were made to the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. NML scientists participated in the research study, referenced above, along with other academic institutions. This study is a part of the laboratory’s Ebola research program and, in this case, contributed to the assessment of potentially life-saving Ebola treatments. The NML is committed to global public health efforts to find effective vaccines and treatments for infectious diseases.

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**June 22, 2020 – Winnipeg Free Press**

Q1. Is it accurate that The administrative investigation is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China?

The administrative investigation is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China. Samples were provided in accordance with policies and procedures required under the *Human Pathogens and Toxins Act* (HPTA).

Q2. Is it accurate that viral samples of Ebola and Henipah were sent in response to a request from the Wuhan Institute of Virology for those samples?

Q4. Is it accurate that the National Microbiology Lab routinely shares samples with other public health labs?

As reported in a *National Post article* on May 5, 2020, in response to a request from the Wuhan Institute of Virology for viral samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) sent samples for the purpose of scientific research in 2019. The NML routinely shares samples with other public health laboratories—as they do with the NML—to contribute to the advancement of science. Transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the HPTA, the *Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act*, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the NML.

Q3. Is it accurate that PHAC is taking steps to resolve this case as quickly as possible and that administrative investigations are impartial, thorough and in-depth. They are also procedurally fair and respect the rights of individuals?
Administrative investigations are impartial, thorough and in-depth. They are also procedurally fair and respect the rights of individuals. The investigation has not yet concluded.

More broadly (please answer these later as they may require some looking into) about the Ebola/Henipah shipment:

Q5. Please comment on the apparent confusion over how to package the samples and the contention that NML staff originally did not safety package these viruses or decontaminate it. CBC claims "It appears the NML's shipper initially planned to send the viruses in inappropriate packaging and only changed it when the clients in China flagged the problem."

Q6. What has changed in PHAC protocol since the package was sent? It appears there was confusion between Tunney's Pasture and Winnipeg over where the package was going, what was in it, and whether it had the proper paperwork.

The process for shipments of RG4 pathogens is outlined under the Emergency Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) process. Following the NML's notification of the Health Portfolio Operations Centre (HPOC) in Ottawa, the HPOC advised the Centre for Biosecurity (CB). CB is the regulatory authority responsible the HPTA and its regulations. Consistent with its regulatory role, the CB contacted the NML to confirm that all required documentation was completed and procedures followed.

The shipping 'mistake' that was referred to in the article published by the CBC on June 14, makes reference to a typo on the type of packaging, and it was fixed before anything had been shipped.

Five weeks before the shipment date (March 29, 2019), there was an e-mail exchange between Special Pathogens (SP) and [redacted] Following this email [redacted] had been in touch with the Wuhan Institute of Virology that had pointed out the typo (from February 20, 2019). When [redacted] informed SP shipper of the correction, it was noted by our staff member that a typo had occurred in the original email. This email correspondence occurred five weeks before the shipment date (March 29, 2019). The shipment of samples was carried out in full compliance with regulations under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act that ensure the safe transport of material.

The transfer of Risk Group 4 (RG4) materials is a highly complex process that involves multiple checks and balances within the laboratory to prevent errors from occurring. To support this endeavour, in January 2017, a standard operating procedure (SOP) titled "Procedure for transferring Risk Group 4 Pathogens" was established (SP-CL4-PR-003-3). This document outlines step-by-step procedures that must be followed when shipping an RG4 pathogen and the numerous stakeholders that are engaged in the process.

Furthermore, a chain of custody form has been established to document each step in the transfer procedure (SP-CL4-PR-F-003-3). Oversight is provided at numerous levels to ensure compliance with Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) and the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA).

7) Was there a Material Transfer Agreement for the shipment, or not? The ATIP documents suggest there wasn't an MTA. I reported there wasn't one in August 2019. That month, the National Post has PHAC saying that "Contrary to a recent news report, all appropriate precautions, including protections for the government's intellectual property, were taken before the viruses were shipped, spokesman Eric Morrissette said."

It was determined that a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) was not required for the sharing of these samples given that the purpose was to facilitate research to benefit human health and advance scientific enquiry on preventing and treating infectious diseases. In this case, and for this purpose, there was no desire to put constraints on appropriate scientific use.

The shipment of samples was carried out in full compliance with regulations under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act that ensure the safe transport of material.
The NML has assessed its procedures with respect to case-by-case decisions on the requirement for MTAs. In the interests of assuring clarity and removing any ambiguity on the use of MTAs, the NML has instituted the requirement for MTAs whenever RG-3 or RG-4 samples are shared.

Q8. Does PHAC do any gain-of-function experiments? Are there any parameters such as limiting which viruses can undergo gain-of-function experiments such as by BSL?

The research performed at the NML is always done in pursuit of the betterment of public health, both within Canada and as part of global health initiatives. For example, as part of the development of the life-saving VSV-Ebola vaccine, the NML adapted the vaccine in order to test its efficacy in pre-clinical research studies. The NML complies with all regulations administered and enforced by the Public Health Agency of Canada’s Centre for Biosecurity (CB) pertaining to the planning and conduct of research that may result in dual use. Specifically, a risk assessment is mandatory for any activities with a new or emerging pathogen, any major changes to existing techniques or any work with animal models. This risk assessment determines whether any potential exists for dual use within the work being done. If the potential exists, the risk assessment must be reviewed by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which is mandated to decide whether the research project will go ahead. All IBC assessments are conducted independently from the scientists associated with these research projects.

Q9. Are gain-of-function experiments banned in Canada?

Gain-of-function experiments can be a critical step in the development of life-saving therapeutics and vaccines. Therefore, gain-of-function experiments are not banned in Canada; however, they are heavily regulated to ensure that the benefits outweigh the risks and that any resulting risks are mitigated. PHAC’s CB administers and enforces regulations under the HPCTA. All research within Canada with the potential for dual use including gain-of-function research falls under these regulations. In addition to requiring a licence to manipulate pathogens and toxins, all research facilities performing research on pathogens must submit a plan for administrative oversight that demonstrates how institutions identify, assess and manage research activities with dual-use potential. A licence will not be granted to any institution unless this plan is approved by the CB.

The NML requires completion of a risk assessment prior to proceeding with any work involving a new or emerging pathogen, any major changes to existing techniques or any work with animal models. This risk assessment process determines whether any potential exists for dual use within the work being proposed. Should this potential exist, the risk assessment must be reviewed by the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which is mandated to determine whether the research project will go ahead.

**August 31, 2020 - CBC**

Q. I'd also like to get an update on the search for a new boss.

The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) has initiated the recruitment process to hire the next Scientific Director General of the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML). This position is critical to Canada’s capacity to protect Canadians from infectious disease threats and to respond effectively to disease outbreaks and emergency situations. The NML’s leading edge scientific expertise is a national asset that extends to global efforts to detect and respond to existing and new pathogens that threaten the
health of populations. As the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates, the national laboratory is at the centre of Canada’s scientific response that includes detection and characterization of SARS-CoV-2 using genomic technology; collaboration in vaccine development; and the development, standardization and validation of diagnostic tests used by clinicians to support patient care.

The leader of the NML has a prominent role in Canada’s scientific, clinical and public health communities and in major international initiatives. To support our objective to recruit a renowned scientific leader, an external Recruitment Panel was established in June 2020, chaired by Dr. Lorne Tyrrell, an eminent virologist at the University of Alberta.

The focus of the first phase of the Panel’s work was to define the requirements of the position based on the leadership role of the NML and its essential relationships with academia, industry, and public health laboratory systems both domestically and globally.

We are now moving into the recruitment phase which will entail wide advertisement of this leadership opportunity, nationally and internationally, along with targeted recruitment measures to attract the most highly qualified candidates.

Q. Are there any developments in the case of Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng? Are they still on paid leave? Are they doing any research at all?

For privacy reasons, we will not comment further.

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October 15, 2020 - Medscape

Q1. I am a journalist reporting for Medscape Medical News and I have been following the ZMapp work of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her subsequent removal from the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg and RCMP investigation. As conspiracy theories over infectious diseases grip international communities, I wanted to circle back at this time for an update on this important Canada and China controversy. Is your team able to offer an update on the status of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu’s case and employment status?

Any speculation about the role of Public Health Agency of Canada scientists in the emergence of the novel coronavirus has no factual basis. For privacy reasons, we will not comment on the administrative matter nor on personal circumstances of individual employees.

FOLLOW UP

Thanks Eric for your note and compassionate approach. The optics of a rising-star Governor General Award decorated scientist studying RNA viruses who is then unceremoniously escorted from her desk along with her Chinese team under RCMP investigation and never heard from again are not good.

I hear what you are saying about unfounded speculation over a naturally-occurring biohazard and employment privacy concerns and I respect that. On my new beat, I have renewed interest in the security of our national laboratory and hub for our country’s national response to the largest pandemic of our time that is documented to have begun in China.

Dr. Xiangguo Qiu’s reputation and case has called good work into question and some transparency will be needed. I’ve reached out to the RCMP about the police involvement and I’m wondering if your team might be able to share other information for Canadians in the days ahead?

For privacy reasons, we will not comment further.
January 19, 2021 – Freelance Author

Full response sent on February 5, 2021

PART I (Sent to Media Relations directly)

Q1. I would like to confirm that the Public Health Agency of Canada has let go Keding Cheng and Dr. Xiangguo Qiu from their jobs at the National Microbiology Laboratory. This must have happened quite recently as I called asking for Qiu only a few weeks ago and she still had a voice mail message on the Laboratory’s system. I would appreciate if you would tell me exactly when this happened, why this happened and whether or not charges have been laid by the RCMP.

Q2. I also need to confirm some facts with regard to when both of them began work with National Microbiology Laboratory and the various titles they have held while employed there. Is it possible for you to confirm that they both began to work at the Laboratory on or around 2003? Or was that only Xiangguo Qiu? Can you tell me when exactly Keding Cheng began to work directly under Xiangguo Qiu in the Special Pathogens Program? It looks to me as if they began to work closely together in late 2018 or 2019. I would appreciate it if you could give me the dates upon which they first entered employment at the Laboratory, their titles over the years, and the years in which those titles changed. I would also appreciate if you could tell me when they were granted security clearances to work at the Lab and whether they were landed immigrants or Canadian citizens at that time.

Q3. As I’m sure you are aware, Xiangguo Qiu’s name was prominent in some of those theories. I am trying to explain to readers who they are, when they came to the NML, the kind of work they did there. Does that help you? And can you give me a timeline please?

Q4. Finally, I am unable to find a record that Dr. Xiangguo Qui was awarded a doctorate from the University of Manitoba. I am aware that both she and her husband hold MSc degrees but not doctorates. Is that correct?

The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021. We cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for reasons of confidentiality.

Please refer to the RCMP for questions on the status of their investigation.

PART II (Sent to Logan Banadyga)

Q4. I am interested to know when this non human primate study was begun. I see the original publication with the great results on macaques was published in 2019. was the work on this paper done in 2019?

The nonhuman primate experiment that is the focus of the mBio paper was completed in 2017. Subsequent sample analyses, as well as follow-up in vitro and in vivo (ferret) experiments were primarily performed in 2018 and 2019.

NOTE FOR BACKGROUND ONLY – NOT PART OF THE MEDIA RESPONSE: Qiu is listed as a corresponding author on both the mBio paper and the Nature Communications paper (PMID: 30631063) that preceded it. Her @canada.ca email address is listed on both papers.

Q5. And can you give me an email address for the last author (Dr. Qiu)?

We cannot disclose personal email addresses.

PART III (Sent to Media Relations for Mike Drebot)
Q6. I would like to speak to Mike Drobot directly. I want to ask Mike Drobot about what was required for people to qualify for security clearances in the early days at NML, that is, the period from 2000 when it opened until the end of 2006. He was there from 1988 and would be best positioned to answer that question.

The Public Health Agency of Canada politely declines the request for interview.

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February 5, 2021 - CBC

I am seeking confirmation that Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng have been fired from the National Microbiology Lab and PHAC.

I have three sources telling me staff was told at a meeting of the special pathogens unit yesterday. Can you please confirm that?

Can you also give me an update on the investigation into the possible administrative breach, what you've discovered so far, and the status of the scientists involved?

Note from reporter: We have enough independent corroboration to publish it in the morning, but I would prefer to get an official comment from you first.

Response:

The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021.

We cannot disclose additional information or comment further for reasons of confidentiality.

FOLLOW UP

Does this have anything to do with the possible policy breach and administrative matter?

Does this conclude the internal review?

Are any charges being laid?

We cannot disclose additional information or comment further for reasons of confidentiality.

Please refer to the RCMP for questions on the status of their investigation.

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February 8, 2021 - Winnipeg Free Press

1) I would like you to send me the statement sent to CBC about the National Microbiology Lab; in the past you have asked me to instead list specific questions, and so please include: the date Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng had their employment with PHAC terminated; why PHAC is not saying the cause of this (was it directly related to the "administrative" issue or "policy breach")?

2) Why did those two stay on the payroll for 18 months until they were sacked?

3) Does PHAC have any response to the criticism that the lack of information around this situation is encouraging conspiracy theories?

The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021.
We cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for reasons of confidentiality.

March 4, 2021 – Global News –

Could I please get an update on the QIU case? Is PHAC looking at changing oversight of staff based on this case? What is QIU’s status?

Did PHAC not find it odd that the China side seemed pressureful about getting these materials from Canada? Did this pressure, or a lack of diligence from PHAC, contribute to dangerous transportation of these materials? Is it usual for PHAC staff to tell others “the Crown doesn’t regulate the Crown” when looking at issues of expediting movement or shipment of materials China has requested from Canada?

The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021.

We cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for reasons of confidentiality.

March 23, 2020 – G&M

Q1. Can you tell me when they were fired?
Q2. Why were they fired?
Q3. Were they fired because of the shipment of virus samples to China?

The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021. We cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for privacy reasons and confidentiality.

Q4. Is the investigation by PHAC/National Microbiology Lab over?

Yes, our review has been completed.

Q5. Are they still in Canada?

For privacy reasons, we are not able to respond to this question.

Q6. Are they Canadian citizens or Permanent Residents?

For privacy reasons, we cannot confirm the individual status of an employee, however we can say that they had to be eligible to legally work in Canada when they worked at the National Microbiology Laboratory.

Q7. Why did lain Stewart refuse to tell MPs (Monday night at committee) the reason for these employees’ termination?

At this time we are seeking advice on what additional information can be disclosed, bearing in mind national security and privacy reasons, and a response will be provided to the Committee before (or by) the indicated deadline.
Hi Eric

This thread not only confirms the March 31 departure, but is also a good example of the scope of communication involved in the ERAP process (incl. prov and airport authorities). We can add more on ERAP tomorrow if this a valuable line to go down.

Matt

(via mobile)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.APSC@CANADA.CA>
Date: March 31, 2019 at 3:08:18 PM CDT
To: "Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)" <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>, "Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)" <steven.guercio@canada.ca>, "Drebont, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)" <mike.drebont@canada.ca>, NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nmlspecial.pathogens.lnm-nml.asp.aspc@canada.ca>, "CSCHAI SES (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>, "OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>, "OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: "OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.APSC@CANADA.CA>
"OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.APSC@CANADA.CA>
Subject: Re: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

Please be advised that the RG4 shipment has departed Toronto for Beijing on flight AC031.

ERAP teams can now stand down.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
The RG4 shipment is scheduled to depart Toronto for Beijing on Air Canada Flight AC 031 on March 31 at 14:45 EDT.

The Air Canada Cargo air waybill tracking number for this shipment is [Redacted].

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

The Risk Group 4 shipment has been picked up by [Redacted] from the NML in Winnipeg.

The tracking number for this shipment is [Redacted]. This shipment is en-route to China via Toronto.

Please note - once this shipment departs from the airport in Toronto, ERAP teams can stand down.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

********new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ********

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433

******** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ********

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:03 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>
Cc: HPSC-CPSC, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpsc-cpsc@canada.ca>

Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866) 262-8433

****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866) 262-8433

**** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

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Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; 

'oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca' 'oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: HPCC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpcc-cops@canada.ca>

Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866) 262-8433

****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

Directeur du centre des opérations
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Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
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1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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Re: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [redacted] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866) 262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie /Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866) 262-8433

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This is from the IFAP database that the QC is keeping now.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement #</th>
<th>Tracking</th>
<th>Counter</th>
<th>Date Document Initiated (YY-MM-DD)</th>
<th>Date EMA Initiated (YY-MM-DD)</th>
<th>Date Wiped (YY-MM-DD)</th>
<th>Date Compliant (YY-MM-DD)</th>
<th>ISO (Function)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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4. persons exporting human pathogens and toxins outside of Canada must take reasonable care to satisfy themselves that the intended recipient will
follow applicable biosafety and biosecurity standards and policies in the foreign jurisdiction.
NML Shipping Requisition

Requested Ship Date: (YYYY-MM-DD)

Originator Information:

Name:
Department:
Room Number: Telephone Number:

Person Responsible: Please check box if same as Originator

Name:
Title:
Room Number: Telephone Number:

**NOTE:** Person Responsible must have knowledge and expertise related to contents and would be contacted in case of emergency relating to the shipment

Recipient:  
- [ ] CL2 Laboratory
- [ ] CL3 Laboratory
- [ ] CL4 Laboratory

*PHAC License No. "Domestic shipments only"

[ ] Domestic
[ ] International

Receiving Lab Name: Name of Receiver:

Address: City:
Prov./State: Country: Postal/Zip Code:

Telephone Number: Email:

Preferred Courier:

Account Number:

Originator Acting as Courier

Description of Material: Please select all that apply

- [ ] RG2
- [ ] RG3
- [ ] RG4
- [ ] Bacteria
- [ ] Virus
- [ ] Prion
- [ ] Non-infectious

- [ ] Antibody
- [ ] Culture
- [ ] Toxins
- [ ] Antigen
- [ ] Nucleic Acids
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Blood Product
- [ ] Recombinant Material
- [ ] Cells
- [ ] Tissue

- [ ] Chemical
- [ ] Radiological
- [ ] Proficiency Panel

Origin of Biological Pathogen or Toxin:  
- [ ] Domestic
- [ ] International

Obtain CFIA Transfer Permit and/or Complete SES-F-052A

Note: Refer to SES-WI-052

Complete inventory of items being shipped: Please attach list if require additional space

Include any and all chemical solutions, their concentration as well as related MSDS from the manufacturer or MSDS Online Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Name</th>
<th>Quantity/Volume per Primary Container</th>
<th>Number of Primary Containers</th>
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CAN.PHAC.0001.0035 68 of 267
1. Has your supervisor been notified and agreed to the outgoing shipment?  □ YES  □ NO

2. For biological pathogens or toxins; a CFIA Permit or NML Transfer Authorization is required?  □ YES (please attach)  □ NO
   (See SES-W1-068 for information)

3. Are other special permits required?  □ YES (please attach)  □ NO
   (See SES-W1-068 for information)

4. Is the material being sent under (as part of) an agreement?  □ YES (please attach)  □ NO
   (If unsure, please contact the Office of Business Development and Intellectual Property at Ext. 2120)

5. Is a commercial invoice or B13A required?  □ YES (please attach)  □ NO
   (If unsure, please contact Shipping and Receiving at Ext. 2046)

6. Special handling Instructions?
   □ Dry Ice  □ Cold Packs  □ Room Temp.  □ Other: ____________________________

7. For items from CL3 and CL4: Please describe the method of physical or chemical treatment used to decontaminate the inside and outside of the sealed container (Provide SOP number if applicable)

Other comments or important information:

Originator signature (not required if emailed) ______________________ Date (YYYY-MM-DD) ______________________

ALL SPECIMENS MUST BE IN SPECIMEN SHIPPING ROOM (R1130) BY NOON

Completed Shipping Requisitions Required:  Cut off for shipping specimens:

| 48 hours for Domestic shipment | Room Temp: Thursday at noon |
| 5 business days for International shipments | Within the City: Daily by 2 pm |
| 5 business days for Proficiency Panels | Domestic: |
| | Dry Ice: Wednesday at noon |
| | Cold Pack: Thursday at noon |
| | International: |
| | Dry Ice: Monday at noon |
| | Cold Pack: Tuesday at noon |

In case of an emergency shipment, please contact Ext. 6091 and we will do our best to accommodate.

Please use “EMAIL” button to send COMPLETED FORM TO SPECIMEN SHIPPING if you wish to use their service for packaging and labelling.

If you have any questions in regard to shipping specimens, please contact Specimen Shipping at EXT. 6091/6096 or via email at phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca

Important Disclaimers:

Please note that obtaining transfer letters or any other special permits will be responsibility of the Originator.

A copy of the Shipping Requisition must be left with Specimen Shipping or Shipping and Receiving for ALL shipments regardless of if the originator is acting as the courier
MEDIA LINES

Employment status of two National Microbiology Laboratory scientists

BACKGROUND

In June 2019, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) launched a review into the conduct of two scientists (Drs. Qiu and Cheng) of the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) with respect to their adherence to various Government of Canada and departmental policies.

The launch of the review of an administrative matter garnered significant media attention with NML employees speaking anonymously to the media about not only the implicated scientists but also about the culture at the NML. Several reporters follow-up regularly for updates.

The following media lines will be used reactively for media calls only once it is confirmed that the two individuals receive the letters.

Note that a separate RCMP investigation is still underway.

KEY MESSAGES

- The review has been completed.

- We can assure Canadians that their heath and safety is not compromised and that the National Microbiology Laboratory continues to play a critical role in protecting the health and safety of Canadians.

- We cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for privacy reasons and confidentiality.

If asked about the status of the employees

- The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021.

- We cannot comment further.
If asked about the length of time the matter was under review

- The Public Health Agency of Canada worked expeditiously while respecting the principles of procedural fairness and ensuring appropriate due diligence.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q1. Are security partners involved?
It is normal procedure for the Agency to consult with security partners as required. It would be inappropriate to comment any further given privacy and other considerations.

Q2. Is there a link between the scientists and China and did that lead to them no longer being employed by PHAC?
We cannot disclose specific information nor comment further.

Q3. Is there a risk to national security?
The Government of Canada takes any threat to Canada's national security seriously and works with federal partners to keep Canadians safe. As you can expect, we do not publicly comment, or confirm or deny the specifics of investigations, operational interests, methodologies or activities.

Q4. Is the NML currently collaborating with China on any scientific research? Will Canada continue to collaborate and share scientific information with China?
There are no current collaborations between the NML and labs/institutions in China. Canada's National Microbiology Laboratory is known around the world for its scientific excellence and contributions to global health. PHAC engages in important scientific research relationships to advance public health research and science aimed at improving public health. Collaborations with labs outside of Canada is critical to advance public health research into infectious diseases.

Q5. Is the RCMP investigation complete? Why is it taking so long? Have charges been laid?
Refer to the RCMP.
**INQUIRY OF MINISTRY**

**DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENT AU GOUVERNEMENT**

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<th>BY/DE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<td>Q-533</td>
<td>Mrs. Jansen (Cloverdale—Langley City)</td>
<td>June 15, 2020</td>
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</table>

Reply by the Minister of Health  
Réponse de la ministre de la Santé

Signed by Mr. Darren Fisher

**QUESTION**

With regard to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the National Microbiology Lab (NML) to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China: (a) who in China requested the transfer; (b) other than the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which laboratories in China requested the transfer; (c) for the answers in (a) and (b) which are affiliated with the military of China; (d) on what date was the WIV's request for the transfer received by the NML; (e) what scientific research was proposed, or what other scientific rationale was put forth, by the WIV or the NML scientists to justify the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses; — See full text of the question attached.

**REPLY / RÉPONSE**

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<th>ORIGINAL TEXT</th>
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Public Health Agency of Canada

(a) The Director of National Biosafety Laboratory, Wuhan Institute of Virology.

(b) Only the WIV requested the transfer.

(c) N/A.

(d) June 28, 2018.

(e) Research on infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of the Ebola virus (EBOV) and the Nipah virus (NiV).

(f) 12 strains of EBOV and 3 strains of NiV were authorized for transfer.

(g) For shipping purposes, a nominal monetary value of $75.00 was assigned to the samples. It was never intended to be an invoice for payment and no payment was received.

(h) No compensation was received.

(i) No. The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) complies with all applicable requirements of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act (TDGA), and the Canadian Biosafety Standard when sharing samples of pathogens and toxins with partner laboratories in Canada and in other countries.

(j) There were no conditions on the transfer of the material to WIV. The NML ensured all applicable requirements of the HPTA, the TDGA and the Canadian Biosafety Standard were followed.

(k) The NML received a letter from the Director of the National Biosafety Laboratory (WIV), outlining the intent to study these viruses under their National Key Research and Development Plan. The intended areas of study were infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of EBOV and NiV. The Director also guaranteed in his signed attestation letter that the viruses will only be used for research purposes. The virus samples were not transferred to any other institutions as outlined in part (b).
The NML is required, as per the Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations (HPTR), to receive, from any laboratory requesting pathogens, proof that they have the containment level of laboratory required for handling that pathogen. In this case, the Biosafety Officer at the WIV provided an official written statement (as specified in the HPTR) outlining the WIV facility had the appropriate containment for the pathogens being shipped.

(l) The Government of Canada does not have jurisdiction to audit and inspect laboratories in other countries. The NML is required, as per the HPTR, to receive, from any laboratory requesting pathogens, proof that they have the containment level of laboratory required for handling that pathogen. This is in the form of a certification or license from a regulatory body in that country or, in countries who do not have such schemes, an attestation from a Biosafety Officer in the facility stating that the laboratory meets the necessary containment level. In this case, the Biosafety Officer at the WIV provided an official written statement (as specified in the HPTR) outlining the WIV facility had the appropriate containment for the pathogens being shipped.

(m) See the previous response to part (l).

(n) No follow up was required, as per question (b) there were no other institutions.

(o) It was determined that intellectual property protections were not required for the sharing of these samples given that the purpose was to facilitate research to benefit human health and advance scientific enquiry on preventing and treating infectious diseases.

(p) The NML has a variety of EBOV strains stored in the Containment Level 4 (CL4) of the NML. This shipment contained samples representative of approximately 60% of the EBOV strains housed in the CL4. Two vials per strain were shipped which represents less than 1% of the total EBOV housed in the CL4.

(q) There are six papers (including the one referenced in this part) listed with at least one author with Special Pathogens affiliation and one author with an affiliation to the military of China. They are:
   - A Chimeric Sudan Virus-Like Particle Vaccine Candidate Produced by a Recombinant Baculovirus System Induces Specific Immune Responses in Mice and Horses;
   - Identification of a clinical compound losmapimod that blocks Lassa virus entry;
   - Tangeretin, an extract from Citrus peels, blocks cellular entry of arenaviruses that cause viral hemorrhagic fever;
   - Equine immunoglobulin F(ab') 2 fragments protect mice from Rift Valley fever virus infection;
   - Treatment with hyperimmune equine immunoglobulin or immunoglobulin fragments completely protects rodents from Ebolavirus infection; and
   - Equine-Origin Immunoglobulin Fragments Protect Nonhuman Primates from Ebolavirus Disease.

There are no unpublished studies that we are aware of that were performed with scientists affiliated with the military of China.

(r) There are no current collaborations at the NML with the WIV, China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences, or other parts of China’s military establishment.

(s) There was a typo that occurred in an email on February 5, 2019, between Special Pathogens and [REDACTED]. This email correspondence occurred five weeks before the shipment date (March 29, 2019). Material was shipped using the correct packaging.

(t) No error was made – see the previous response to part (s).

(u) These comments relate to the administrative process associated with transit through Toronto. The process for shipment through Vancouver is simpler.

(v) On March 29, 2019, the risk group 4 (RG4) shipment was scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg between 13:30-14:00 EDT. No flight number was provided.

On March 31, 2019, the RG4 shipment had departed Toronto for Beijing on flight AC031.

On April 1, 2019, PHAC was notified that the package had arrived safely in Wuhan.
(iv) It is the responsibility of the courier, as the NML does not control what airlines and airports are used to ship the samples.

(v) The other names listed are different strains of EBOV and NiV. No other viruses were shipped.

(vi) No other viruses have been sought by or transferred to the WIV.

(vii) All transfers of RG4 samples follow strict transportation requirements and are authorized by senior NML officials. The NML tracks and keeps electronic records of all shipments of samples in accordance with the HPTA and the HPTR.

On the specific shipment to China, PHAC confirmed that all protocols were followed as directed by legislation and Standards.

(viii) Documents provided through the Access to Information Act (ATIA) were processed in accordance with the ATIA.

(ix) In Canada, PHAC administers the HPTA and the HPTR.

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has oversight on export of any controlled materials, including risk group 3 and RG4 pathogens, under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). Under the EIPA, anyone (unless otherwise excluded, such as Crown organizations) wishing to export any materials included on the Export Control List or to a country included in the Area Control List must first receive a Permit to Export from GAC.

As per standard practice in consultation with GAC, the NML is not required to obtain an export permit.

References:
HPTA and HPTR
https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/H-5.67/

EIPA
https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/e-19/

(cc) Canada does have a legal framework for this. See the response for (bb) above.

(dd) With respect to the transfer to the WIV, the NML complied with all applicable requirements of the HPTA, the TDGA, and the Canadian Biosafety Standard.

The NML is authorized and licensed under the HPTA and the TDGA to ship RG4 pathogens. When shipping RG4 pathogens, the NML is required to submit an Emergency Response Assistance Plan to Transport Canada. For the shipment to WIV, all TDGA documentation was submitted correctly. See also (l) above.

(ee) See the response to part (bb) above.

(ff) See the previous response to part (l).

(gg) There have been no requests from the NML for material from the WIV.
Q-533 — June 15, 2020 — Mrs. Jansen (Cloverdale—Langley City) — With regard to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the National Microbiology Lab (NML) to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China: (a) who in China requested the transfer; (b) other than the Wuhan institute of Virology (WIV), which laboratories in China requested the transfer; (c) for the answers in (a) and (b) which are affiliated with the military of China; (d) on what date was the WIV’s request for the transfer received by the NML; (e) what scientific research was proposed, or what other scientific rationale was put forth, by the WIV or the NML scientists to justify the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses; (f) what materials were authorized for transfer pursuant to Transfer Authorization NML-TA-18-0480, dated October 29, 2018; (g) did the NML receive payment of $75, per its commercial invoice of March 27, 2018, for the transfer, and on what date was payment received; (h) what consideration or compensation was received from China in exchange for providing this material, broken down by amount or details of the consideration or compensation received by each recipient organization; (i) has the government requested China to destroy or return the viruses and, if not, why; (j) did Canada include, as a term of the transfer, a prohibition on the WIV further transferring the viruses with others inside or outside China, except with Canada’s consent; (k) what due diligence did the NML perform to ensure that the WIF and other institutions referred to in (b) would not make use of the transferred viruses for military research or uses; (l) what inspections or audits did the NML perform of the WIV and other institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that they were able to handle the transferred viruses safely and without diversion to military research or uses; (m) what were the findings of the inspections or audits referred to in (l), in summary; (n) after the transfer, what follow-up has Canada conducted with the institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that the only research being performed with the transferred viruses is that which was disclosed at the time of the request for the transfer; (o) what intellectual property protections did Canada set in place before sending the transferred viruses to the persons and institutions referred to in (a) and (b); (p) of the Ebola virus strains sent to the WIV, what percentages of the NML’s total Ebola collection and Ebola collection authorized for sharing is represented by the material transferred; (q) other than the study entitled “Equine-Origin Immunoglobulin Fragments Protect Nonhuman Primates from Ebola Virus Disease”, which other published or unpublished studies did the NML scientists perform with scientists affiliated with the military of China; (r) which other studies are the NML scientists currently performing with scientists affiliated with the WIV, China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences, or other parts of China’s military establishment; (s) what is the reason that Anders Leung of the NML attempted to send the transferred viruses in incorrect packaging (type P6850), and only changed its packaging to the correct standard (type P6820) after being questioned by the Chinese on February 20, 2019; (t) has the NML conducted an audit of the error of using unsafe packaging to transfer the viruses, and what in summary were its conclusions; (u) what is the reason that Allan Lau and Heidi Wood of the NML wrote on March 28, 2019, that they were “really hoping that this [the transferred viruses] goes through Vancouver” instead of Toronto on Air Canada, and “Fingers crossed!” for this specific routing; (v) what is the complete flight itinerary, including airlines and connecting airports, for the transfer; (w) were all airlines and airports on the flight itinerary informed by the NML that Ebola and Henipah viruses would be in their custody; (x) with reference to the email of Marie Gharib of the NML on March 27, 2019, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens were requested by the WIV; (y) since the date of the request for transfer, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens has the NML transferred or sought to transfer to the WIV; (z) did the NML inform Canada’s security establishment, including the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communication Security Establishment, or other such entity, of the transfer before it occurred, and, if not, why not; (aa) what is the reason that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) redacted the name of the transfer recipient from documents disclosed to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) under the Access to Information Act, when the PHAC later willingly disclosed that information to the CBC; (bb) does Canada have any policy prohibiting the export of risk group 3 and 4 pathogens to countries, such as China, that conduct gain-of-function experiments, and in summary what is that policy; (cc) if Canada does not have any policy referred to in (bb), why not; (dd) what is the reason that the NML or individual employees sought and obtained no permits or authorizations under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Export Control Act, or related legislation prior to the transfer; (ee) what legal controls prevent the NML or other government laboratories sending group 3 or 4 pathogens to laboratories associated with foreign militaries or laboratories that conduct gain-of-function experiments; (ff) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he writes that “no certifications [were] provided [by the WIV], they simply cite they have them”, why did the NML proceed to transfer Ebola and Henipah viruses without proof of certification to handle them safely; and (gg) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he asked “Are there materials that [WIV] have that we would benefit from receiving? Other VHF? High path flu?”, did the NML request these or any other materials in exchange for the transfer, and did the NML receive them?
INQUIRY OF MINISTRY
DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENT AU GOUVERNEMENT

PREPARE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKING "ORIGINAL TEXT" OR "TRANSLATION"
PÉRPARER EN ANGLAIS ET EN FRANÇAIS EN INDiquANT "TEXTE ORIGINAL" OU "TRADUCTION"

QUESTION NO./N° DE LA QUESTION: Q-534

BY/DE: Mrs. Jansen (Cloverdale—Langley City)

DATE: June 16, 2020

Reply by the Minister of Health
Réponse de la ministre de la Santé

Signed by Mr. Darren Fisher

PUBLIC HEALTH

Public Health Agency of Canada

(a) Due process is being followed in the execution of this administrative investigation.

(b) An administrative investigation pertaining to possible policy breaches is underway.

(c) The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) has no knowledge pertaining to this.

(d) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(e) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(f) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(g) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(h) There is no connection.

(i) Funding has not been solicited or received by the National Microbiology Laboratory from any Chinese institution.

(j) Conclusion of the investigations depend on the completion of due process.
COVID-19 – NML INVESTIGATION (NP/CBC)

- In 2019, the National Microbiology Lab shared lab samples with the Wuhan Institute of Virology
- The NML routinely shares samples with other laboratories, to help advance the international community’s knowledge of certain illnesses
- These shipments are not related to the outbreak of COVID-19 or research into the pandemic

*If pressed:*

- There is no connection between the National Microbiology Lab and the outbreak of COVID-19

*If pressed on safety*

- These transfers follow strict protocols.
- Any transfer must meet requirements of several different Canadian laws and regulations, as well as standard operating procedures of the NML.
- All safety protocols were followed.

*If pressed on investigation into researchers*

- The administrative investigation is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China
- As this is an ongoing investigation, I cannot comment further.

*If pressed on sample sharing*

- The National Microbiology Lab routinely shares samples with other public health laboratories—as they do with the NML—to contribute to the advancement of science.
- The NML routinely provides training to international laboratory professionals, and has previously trained scientists from many countries, including China.

UPDATED: June 14, 2020
Anticipatory Questions: SOCI Appearance June 26, 2020

Physical Distancing Measures (HPOC)

1. In light of the large anti-black racism protests happening across the world and in Canada, has PHAC changed its recommendations on physical distancing to allow other large events?

- No, the Public Health Agency of Canada has not changed its recommendations on physical distancing. The pandemic is still not over, and there continues to be a risk of contracting COVID-19. The Agency is working on developing risk mitigation tools for situations where abiding by public health measures is challenging or not possible.

- The Agency has published a Risk Mitigation Tool Events for Gatherings and Events operating during COVID-19. This tool provides practical advice on ensuring that gatherings and events operate in the safest way possible, thus preventing and limiting COVID-19 spread.

- It is recommended that Canadians wear a non-medical mask when physical distancing is not possible.

- Canadians who have attended a large social gathering are advised to self-monitor for symptoms for 14 days and to contact their provincial or territorial public health authority on when to seek testing.

- If people develop any symptoms, it is important that they immediately isolate, contact their local public health authority and follow their advice.

Other considerations:

- It is also important to note that for some people wearing a non-medical mask or cloth face covering is NOT recommended, including young children under the age of 2 years or anyone who has trouble breathing, is unconscious, incapacitated or otherwise unable to remove the mask on their own.

2. While many jurisdictions in the world, including some in Canada, have changed their physical distance guidelines away from a strict 2m distance, why has PHAC not also updated its advice?

- Current evidence indicates the virus that causes COVID-19 is mainly spread by droplets produced by an infected person through coughing and sneezing. This is why physical distancing is an essential public health control measure.

- Public Health Agency of Canada guidance should be read in conjunction with relevant provincial, territorial, and local legislation, regulations and policies.

- Refer to answer for Q1 for physical distancing measures.
PPE and Procurement

3. How does PHAC test PPE once it’s arrived in Canada? What does it do with PPE that doesn’t meet its standards?

- PPE and medical supplies received by the Public Health Agency of Canada, whether procured internationally or domestically, are verified to meet the technical specifications for healthcare settings for COVID-19 prior to distribution to provinces and territories. This process is supported by testing capacity within the Nation Research Council.

- For example, a KN95 respirator undergoes visual inspection to verify for defects in design and construction, and is tested to confirm performance expectations. Surgical masks undergo a fluid resistance test.

- Supplies that do not meet specifications are subsequently assessed for potential use in non-healthcare settings.

- Test results are also used to inform future procurements. Public Services and Procurement Canada and the Agency work with suppliers to address issues at the source or avoid purchasing from unreliable suppliers in the future once issues are identified.

Contract Tracing (HPOC)

4. Is the government planning to use an app for the purposes of contact tracing? Has the Privacy Commissioner been consulted on the development of this app? How will the privacy of Canadians be safeguarded with this app?

- The Prime Minister announced on June 18th that a national exposure notification app, called COVID Alert, is in development, using exposure notification technology designed by Google and Apple.

- The federal government is collaborating with the Province of Ontario and leveraging their expertise to develop a national app, based on the COVID Shield model, which was developed by a group of volunteers from Shopify. Ontario is expected to be the first province to implement use of the app, targeting July 1st, while other provincial and territorial jurisdictions will follow when they are ready.

- Note that this is an exposure notification app, not a contact tracing app. It is another useful tool for Canadians to use to keep themselves, their loved ones, and their communities safer. This app does not replace contact tracing—a critical public health function. Contact tracing will continue to be performed manually when outbreaks are registered with local health authorities.
• The protection of Canadians’ privacy is a priority for the Government of Canada. The app will undergo a thorough privacy assessment, and all data provided to the app will be securely stored and protected. The Government is engaging with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to ensure that the app is in line with federal privacy requirements.

• The exposure notification approach used by Apple and Google is a decentralized, anonymous system—it is designed to work without storing or using any personally identifying information on any of the systems involved. This approach safeguards the privacy of Canadians by keeping all personal information on their own phones.

If asked about other GoC apps for COVID-19:

• The Canada COVID-19 app provides general information and resources about COVID-19 to all Canadians.

• The ArriveCAN mobile app is designed to collect mandatory information that will support compliance and enforcement of the mandatory 14-day quarantine or isolation requirements. This is pursuant to Emergency Orders under the Quarantine Act, every incoming traveller must provide information to the Government of Canada about their quarantine or isolation plans.

• ArriveCAN is not a contact tracing app, and does not overlap with any existing mobile or digital solution. ArriveCAN is strictly for incoming travellers to submit their mandatory information in support of the Public Health Agency of Canada’s compliance and enforcement mandates under the Emergency order of the Quarantine Act.

Vaccine Research (IDPC)

5. Why has the government signed a vaccine research and development agreement (CanSino) with the Chinese communist regime?

• The National Research Council of Canada (NRC) has signed a collaboration agreement with CanSino Biologics (CanSinoBIO), a privately-held company listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. The NRC and CanSinoBIO have been working together since 2013, and previously collaborated on the development of vaccines against tuberculosis and Ebola.

• CanSinoBIO has developed a candidate vaccine that is one of the most advanced potential vaccines against COVID-19 in the world.

• The NRC collaboration will allow the candidate vaccine to be manufactured on-site at the NRC’s facilities in Montreal, for the purposes of Canadian clinical trials (i.e. testing in humans for safety and efficacy, under the full oversight and authority of Health Canada).

• If it is proven safe and effective, and approved by Health Canada, this collaboration will also allow the NRC to produce doses of the vaccine for emergency pandemic use in Canada, potentially making Canadians among the first in the world to have access to a safe and effective vaccine against COVID-19.

The NESS

6. Was the NESS was adequately funded or maintained enough to respond to a global pandemic such as COVID-19? The NESS provides surge capacity to provinces and territories when their own resources have been exhausted, and fills a niche role in stockpiling certain rare and high-value assets, such as smallpox vaccine.

• The National Emergency Strategic Stockpile (NESS) was built on the assumption that provincial, territorial, and local governments would be prepared for the most common emergencies. Jurisdictions have traditionally sourced PPE directly from known suppliers, and the NESS has historically only carried relatively small amounts.

• Since 2012-13, the annual base funding for the NESS has remained stable and has been approximately $3 million a year. This funding is included in the overall funding identified for the Health Security Infrastructure program area reported in Public Accounts.

• Additional funding has historically been provided to the NESS through internal reallocation decisions and incremental funding decisions where the Public Health Agency of Canada has received funding linked to specific purchases, such as for a four-year investment in medical countermeasures against smallpox and anthrax that began in 2015-16.

• The Government of Canada will continue to work closely with the provinces and territories to procure the health supplies necessary to continue responding to the pandemic.

Modelling (IDPC)

7. **What is PHAC’s response to criticisms of the Canadian COVID-19 modelling?**
   - Some have accused PHAC of censoring data provided to scientists. If true, why does PHAC censor data before disclosing it?

• The Public Health Agency of Canada’s use of modelling aligns with Canadian and international approaches. It is based on methods that are used routinely among infectious disease modellers. The Agency has published the methods, which were developed in collaboration with 4 university-based modellers, used to develop COVID-19 models in the CCfR, a peer reviewed journal, providing full details on how models are generated (including how the case estimates were obtained and the scenarios under which different case numbers would be expected). More information on the Agency’s modelling methods will be published shortly.

• Contrary to, view that a single model should be applied in our analysis, Public Health Agency of Canada modelling experts use a synopsis of modelling studies to obtain
estimates because this approach provides greater certainty compared to outputs from a single model that could have unseen flaws.

- The Agency is committed to making data publicly available, under the appropriate conditions that protect privacy and that are in keeping with data-sharing agreements with third parties.

Data Collection (HPOC)

8. **Will PHAC mandate the collection of race based/desegregated data in relation to COVID-19? Why hasn’t the government used its powers to make better data collection mandatory?**

- The health consequences of the pandemic are likely to differ across sub-populations. Those Canadians who before the pandemic were at greater risk of poor health are likely to be at greater risk of suffering its direct and indirect (or secondary) consequences. Given this, the Public Health Agency of Canada and its partners are undertaking a number of activities to improve Canada’s knowledge of the impact of COVID-19 on racialized communities.

- First, the Agency has completed a review of published literature on race and COVID-19. While there is limited evidence available overall and in Canada, studies to date do show that people reporting Black, Asian or Hispanic race appear to have a higher chance of COVID-19 infection than those who are White. Data is conflicting regarding the role race/ethnicity may play in severity of infection (i.e. hospitalization, ICU admission and death).

- Second, through the Special Advisory Committee (SAC) on COVID-19 governance, Federal/Provincial/Territorial governments are exploring the inclusion of race/ethnicity as a key variable within the national data set for COVID-19. This means that race/ethnicity would be expected to be collected and reported to the Public Health Agency of Canada for COVID-19 cases.

- Third, the Agency is engaging with various partners to undertake specialized surveys and enhanced surveillance activities among key populations of interest. Studies to explore COVID-19 impact and unintended consequences of COVID-19 related public health measures on racialized communities are a key component of this work. In addition, the Agency and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research will coordinate efforts to facilitate research activities related to burden and impact of COVID-19 among racialized and marginalized communities, to further enhance and expand the knowledge base.

- Finally, the Public Health Agency of Canada is working with other partners to expand the knowledge base on racialized communities and COVID-19. Statistics Canada, for example, plans to release new ethno-cultural data from new data collection initiatives, with new data points expected starting in summer of 2020.
Border Measures

9. By late January countries such as Australia has closed their borders to all travel from China, whereas Canada kept its borders open until March. Why was the government so slow to react with its border closures?

- Each country makes decisions based on their own risk assessment and unique factors such as geographic proximity to major outbreaks, travel patterns, etc.

- In January, Canada began to monitor COVID19 closely, and issued a targeted travel health notice for Wuhan, China on January 7, 2020. We subsequently issued a progressive number of travel health notices, first for mainland China, and then other countries that experienced outbreaks of COVID-19, including Iran, Italy, and South Korea.

- On March 13th, Canada recommended against all non-essential international travel, and published a travel health notice to this effect on March 14, 2020. On March 16th, Canada banned the entry of all foreign nationals, except U.S. citizens, entering Canada. This was expanded to include U.S. citizens, in agreement with the United States, on March 18, 2020. These extraordinary measures have helped to reduce the introduction and further spread of COVID-19 in Canada.

10. Earlier in the pandemic, Dr. Tam stated that taking a person’s temperature was an ineffective method of screening for COVID-19. Now, the government has mandated mandatory temperature checks of travellers boarding flights into Canada and temperature checks when they arrive in Canada as well. Why has the government changed its policy stance so late in the pandemic?

- Airport temperature screening has been endorsed by the International Air Transport Association and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Canadian implementation of this measure will support international alignment and further build confidence and trust in the global aviation system.

- Temperature screening is just one of the measures being taken by the Government of Canada at Canadian ports of entry in response to COVID-19. Other measures include:
  - Enhanced screening, including health assessments;
  - Assessments of public in transit at ports of entry; and
  - Confirming the requirement for travellers to have a suitable place to quarantine for 14 days as per the Government of Canada’s Emergency Order under the Quarantine Act.

- Temperature screening is one way to identify individuals who may be sick, and it may also act as a deterrent for mildly ill air travellers. That said, temperature checks will not necessarily detect cases of COVID-19, as fever is not usually the first symptom of COVID-19, and in some cases, fever never develops. For example, during the SARS outbreak, 2.3 million travellers were screened using thermal scanners, and no cases of SARS were detected using this method.
• That said, as we reopen society and travelling increases, it is prudent to err on the side of caution and further enhance screening measures when possible. Public health advice will evolve in keeping with the evolution of the pandemic.

11. How long does the government intend to keep the US-Canada border closed for? When does the government expect to open up all international travel?

• Current border restrictions remain in place. The Government of Canada will take a cautious approach to reducing measures related to international travel, including travel across the Canada-United States border.

• The decision to ease the current border measures will be made in consultation with provincial, territorial and international governments, and will be based on science and an assessment of domestic and international public health measures.

LTC Facilities (IDPC)

12. A witness at a recent SOCI meeting stated that she believes delays in receiving direction and guidelines from PHAC/PT health authorities caused direct harm in LTC facilities. Why did PHAC take so long to give out the necessary guidelines?

• Protecting long-term care residents and staff is a priority and the Public Health Agency of Canada is working with provinces and territories on all aspects of their response to COVID-19 for this population.

• Developing the Infection Prevention and Control for COVID-19: Interim Guidance for Long Term Care Homes required consultation with jurisdictions and additional experts from across Canada to develop the information needed to protect residents and staff. The science on transmission of COVID-19 continues to evolve rapidly, and this guidance reflects the considered synthesis of the most recent findings on COVID-19 transmission.

• This document reflects the carefully considered and evidence-based development needed to provide the greatest protection to residents and staff of long-term care facilities in Canada.

Non-Medical Mask Use (IDPC)

13. Why has PHAC been giving inconsistent advice around the usefulness of non-medical masks? Will it admit that it may have caused harm early on in the pandemic by not issuing the right guidelines?

• The emergence of evidence that the virus can be unknowingly transmitted by infected people before they develop symptoms (pre-symptomatic transmission) or who may never
develop symptoms (asymptomatic transmission), led the Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health to advise that people could wear non-medical masks and face coverings as an additional layer of protection in settings where physical distancing might not be possible.

International Issues

14. Given the inconsistent and often faulty advice given by the WHO, does the government continue to trust, without verifying, information from the WHO?

- The ever-evolving COVID-19 pandemic has created an unprecedented situation where global cooperation on health has never been more important. Working together with our multilateral organizations - such as the World Health Organization (WHO) - are helping us accomplish together what cannot be done alone.

- Canada continues to appreciate the WHO’s critical leadership and coordination in the COVID-19 response, particularly in the areas where the WHO has a clear value-added role – overseeing the International Health Regulations, driving global research collaboration, supporting most vulnerable countries, and leading the UN system’s global health response.

- The WHO has also been providing technical guidance and advice to countries based on the best-available evidence in a context which has been rapidly evolving, as all have learned more about COVID-19, as new evidence has emerged, and as our experience with the response has grown.

- We have and continue to engage and collaborate with many types of international partners through various means and at multiple levels. For instance, Canada has engaged bilaterally with the United States and the United Kingdom to discuss our respective COVID-19 responses. These discussions are valuable opportunities to learn from each other and strengthen our domestic responses.

- The entire global community will have lessons to learn following this pandemic. The WHO may not be perfect, but Canada is fully committed to supporting a WHO that is a strong, effective, and accountable institution. Canada has consistently supported the need for an independent, comprehensive post-crisis review of the global response to COVID-19, including the actions of the WHO. We expect this review will include the technical guidance provided by WHO, and consider options to enhance WHO’s critical normative role as a science-based organization to strengthen the development, issuance, and uptake of WHO technical guidance.

Others

15. On January 25, the WHO assessed the risk of a COVID-19 event to be moderate at the global level, while PHAC assessed the risk for Canada as low. On February 2, the WHO changed that threat level to high. Yet after that date, you continued to insist the risk to Canada was low.
Why did PHAC insist on recommending the risk to Canadians was low, when clearly it was not? (HPOC)

- In March 2020, the public health risk assessments evolved based on the risk of COVID-19 to Canadians in Canada at that time. The risk to the public within Canada evolved from being assessed as low (as there was no evidence that COVID-19 was circulating within the Canadian population), to low for the general population and moderate for the elderly and those with underlying medical conditions, followed by high for the full population because of the appearance of community spread of COVID-19 within the Canadian population.

- The Public Health Agency of Canada used a risk assessment framework to guide decision-making for public health measures and decisions related to COVID-19. The level of risk identified by the Agency took into account both the likelihood and the impact of a COVID-19 outbreak occurring in Canada. The reports considered the most recent scientific literature, as well as the current epidemiology within Canada (such as the number of cases in Canada, the presence of community spread, the number of hospitalizations and deaths due to the virus).

16. Can you explain why the National Microbiology Lab (NML) transferred samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) only months after the RCMP started an investigation into Chinese researchers at the NML, including one researcher that was involved in sending the samples?

- The administrative investigation into two researchers at the NML is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China. The NML routinely shares samples with other laboratories, to help advance the international community’s knowledge of certain illnesses.

17. How are the decisions to award sole-source contracts made? Why were other companies, one of which had received a letter of intent, left out of the running?

- Normally, Government Contracts Regulations require the solicitation of bids; however, for procurements not subject to trade agreements, the regulations allow for exceptions where the need is a pressing emergency where delay would be injurious to the public interest.

- Given the current pandemic, there was an urgency to ensure sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity of critical inputs required for diagnostic testing. A contract was subsequently awarded on June 12, 2020.

- The key considerations in awarding this sole source contract included:
  - suitability of product (‘fit for purpose’)  
  - availability of required product volume
- delivery timeframes

- The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) continues to seek products to bolster domestic supply of the raw materials needed for laboratory testing, and welcomes further discussion with... as they continue product development and augmentation of production capabilities.

- The NML actively seeks to diversify its supply chain to obtain materials from various vendors to support domestic capacity and would certainly consider procuring products from alternate sources, including...
**INQUIRY OF MINISTRY**
**DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENT AU GOUVERNEMENT**

PREPARE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKING "ORIGINAL TEXT" OR "TRANSLATION"
PRÉPARER EN ANGLAIS ET EN FRANÇAIS EN INDiquANT "TEXTe ORIGINAL" OU "TRADUCTION"

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Signed by Mr. Darren Fisher

Reply by the Minister of Health
Réponse de la ministre de la Santé

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**QUESTION**

With regard to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China; (a) who in China requested the transfer; (b) other than the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which laboratories in China requested the transfer; (c) for the answers in (a) and (b) which are affiliated with the military of China; (d) on what date was the WIV’s request for the transfer received by the NML; (e) what scientific research was proposed, or what other scientific rationale was put forth, by the WIV or the NML scientists to justify the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses; — See full text of the question attached.

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**Public Health Agency of Canada**

(a) The Director of National Biosafety Laboratory, Wuhan Institute of Virology.

(b) Only the WIV requested the transfer.

(c) N/A.

(d) June 28, 2018.

(e) Research on infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of the Ebola virus (EBOV) and the Nipah virus (NiV).

(f) 12 strains of EBOV and 3 strains of NiV were authorized for transfer.

(g) For shipping purposes, a nominal monetary value of $75.00 was assigned to the samples. It was never intended to be an invoice for payment and no payment was received.

(h) No compensation was received.

(i) No. The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) complies with all applicable requirements of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act (TDGA), and the Canadian Biosafety Standard when sharing samples of pathogens and toxins with partner laboratories in Canada and in other countries.

(j) There were no conditions on the transfer of the material to WIV. The NML ensured all applicable requirements of the HPTA, the TDGA and the Canadian Biosafety Standard were followed.

(k) The NML received a letter from the Director of the National Biosafety Laboratory (WIV), outlining the intent to study these viruses under their National Key Research and Development Plan. The intended areas of study were infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of EBOV and NiV. The Director also guaranteed in his signed attestation letter that the viruses will only be used for research purposes. The virus samples were not transferred to any other institutions as outlined in part (b).
The NML is required, as per the *Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations* (HPTR), to receive, from any laboratory requesting pathogens, proof that they have the containment level of laboratory required for handling that pathogen. In this case, the Biosafety Officer at the WIV provided an official written statement (as specified in the HPTR) outlining the WIV facility had the appropriate containment for the pathogens being shipped.

(i) The Government of Canada does not have jurisdiction to audit and inspect laboratories in other countries. The NML is required, as per the HPTR, to receive, from any laboratory requesting pathogens, proof that they have the containment level of laboratory required for handling that pathogen. This is in the form of a certification or license from a regulatory body in that country or, in countries who do not have such schemes, an attestation from a Biosafety Officer in the facility stating that the laboratory meets the necessary containment level. In this case, the Biosafety Officer at the WIV provided an official written statement (as specified in the HPTR) outlining the WIV facility had the appropriate containment for the pathogens being shipped.

(m) See the previous response to part (i).

(n) No follow up was required, as per question (b) there were no other institutions.

(o) Intellectual property protections are not required for the sharing of samples.

(p) The NML has a variety of EBOV strains stored in the Containment Level 4 (CL4) of the NML. This shipment contained samples representative of approximately 60% of the EBOV strains housed in the CL4. Two vials per strain were shipped which represents less than 1% of the total EBOV housed in the CL4.

(q) There are six papers (including the one referenced in this part) listed with at least one author with Special Pathogens affiliation and one author with an affiliation to the military of China. They are:

- A Chimeric Sudan Virus-Like Particle Vaccine Candidate Produced by a Recombinant Baculovirus System Induces Specific Immune Responses in Mice and Horses;
- Identification of a clinical compound losmapimed that blocks Lassa virus entry;
- Tangeretin, an extract from Citrus peels, blocks cellular entry of arenaviruses that cause viral hemorrhagic fever;
- Equine immunoglobulin F(ab')2 fragments protect mice from Rift Valley fever virus infection;
- Treatment with hyperimmune equine immunoglobulin or immunoglobulin fragments completely protects rodents from Ebola virus infection; and
- Equine-Origin Immunoglobulin Fragments Protect Nonhuman Primates from Ebola Virus Disease.

There are no unpublished studies that we are aware of that were performed with scientists affiliated with the military of China.

(r) There are no current collaborations at the NML with the WIV, China's Academy of Military Medical Sciences, or other parts of China's military establishment.

(i) There was a typo that occurred in an email on February 5, 2019, between Special Pathogens and [redacted]. This email correspondence occurred five weeks before the shipment date (March 29, 2019). Material was shipped using the correct packaging.

(i) No error was made – see the previous response to part (s).

(u) These comments relate to the administrative process associated with transit through Toronto. The process for shipment through Vancouver is simpler.

(v) On March 29, 2019, the risk group 4 (RG4) shipment was scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg between 13:30-14:00 EDT. No flight number was provided.

On March 31, 2019, the RG4 shipment had departed Toronto for Beijing on flight AC031.

On April 1, 2019, PHAC was notified that the package had arrived safely in Wuhan.
(iv) It is the responsibility of the courier, as the NML does not control what airlines and airports are used to ship the samples.

(v) The other names listed are different strains of EBOV and NiV. No other viruses were shipped.

(vi) No other viruses have been sought by or transferred to the WIV.

(vii) All transfers of RG4 samples follow strict transportation requirements and are authorized by senior NML officials. The NML tracks and keeps electronic records of all shipments of samples in accordance with the HPTA and the HPTR.

On the specific shipment to China, PHAC confirmed that all protocols were followed as directed by legislation and Standards.

(vi) Documents provided through the Access to Information Act (ATIA) were processed in accordance with the ATIA.

(bb) In Canada, PHAC administers the HPTA and the HPTR.

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has oversight on export of any controlled materials, including risk group 3 and RG4 pathogens, under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). Under the EIPA, anyone (unless otherwise excluded, such as Crown organizations) wishing to export any materials included on the Export Control List or to a country included in the Area Control List must first receive a Permit to Export from GAC.

As per standard practice in consultation with GAC, the NML is not required to obtain an export permit.

References:
HPTA and HPTR
https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/H-5.67/

EIPA
https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/e-19/

(cc) Canada does have a legal framework for this. See the response for (bb) above.

(dd) With respect to the transfer to the WIV, the NML complied with all applicable requirements of the HPTA, the TDGA, and the Canadian Biosafety Standard.

The NML is authorized and licensed under the HPTA and the TDGA to ship RG4 pathogens. When shipping RG4 pathogens, the NML is required to submit an Emergency Response Assistance Plan to Transport Canada. For the shipment to WIV, all TDGA documentation was submitted correctly. See also (i) above.

(ee) See the response to part (bb) above.

(ff) See the previous response to part (f).

(gg) There have been no requests from the NML for material from the WIV.
Q-25

— September 23, 2020 — Mrs. Jansen (Cloverdale—Langley City) — With regard to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China: (a) who in China requested the transfer; (b) other than the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which laboratories in China requested the transfer; (c) for the answers in (a) and (b) which are affiliated with the military of China; (d) on what date was the WIV's request for the transfer received by the NML; (e) what scientific research was proposed, or what other scientific rationale was put forth, by the WIV or the NML scientists to justify the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses; (f) what materials were authorized for transfer pursuant to Transfer Authorization NML-TA-18-0480, dated October 29, 2018; (g) did the NML receive payment of $75, per its commercial invoice of March 27, 2019, for the transfer, and on what date was payment received; (h) what consideration or compensation was received from China in exchange for providing this material, broken down by amount or details of the consideration or compensation received by each recipient organization; (i) has the government requested China to destroy or return the viruses and, if not, why; (j) did Canada include, as a term of the transfer, a prohibition on the WIV further transferring the viruses with others inside or outside China, except with Canada's consent; (k) what due diligence did the NML perform to ensure that the WIF and other institutions referred to in (b) would not make use of the transferred viruses for military research or uses; (l) what inspections or audits did the NML perform of the WIV and other institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that they were able to handle the transferred viruses safely and without diversion to military research or uses; (m) what were the findings of the inspections or audits referred to in (l), in summary; (n) after the transfer, what follow-up has Canada conducted with the institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that the only research being performed with the transferred viruses is that which was disclosed at the time of the request for the transfer; (o) what intellectual property protections did Canada set in place before sending the transferred viruses to the persons and institutions referred to in (a) and (b); (p) of the Ebola virus strains sent to the WIV, what percentages of the NML's total Ebola collection and Ebola collection authorized for sharing is represented by the material transferred; (q) other than the study entitled "Equine-Origin Immunoglobulin Fragments Protect Nonhuman Primates from Ebola Virus Disease", which other published or unpublished studies did the NML scientists perform with scientists affiliated with the military of China; (r) which other studies are the NML scientists currently performing with scientists affiliated with the WIV, China's Academy of Military Medical Sciences, or other parts of China's military establishment; (s) what is the reason that Anders Leung of the NML attempted to send the transferred viruses in incorrect packaging (type PI650), and only changed its packaging to the correct standard (type PI620) after being questioned by the Chinese on February 20, 2019; (t) has the NML conducted an audit of the error of using unsafe packaging to transfer the viruses, and what in summary were its conclusions; (u) what is the reason that Allan Lau and Heidi Wood of the NML wrote on March 28, 2019, that they were "really hoping that this [the transferred viruses] goes through Vancouver" instead of Toronto on Air Canada, and "Fingers crossed!" for this specific routing; (v) what is the complete flight itinerary, including airlines and connecting airports, for the transfer; (w) were all airlines and airports on the flight itinerary informed by the NML that Ebola and Henipah viruses would be in their custody; (x) with reference to the email of Marie Gharib of the NML on March 27, 2019, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens were requested by the WIV; (y) since the date of the request for transfer, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens has the NML transferred or sought to transfer to the WIV; (z) did the NML inform Canada's security establishment, including the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, or other such entity, of the transfer before it occurred, and, if not, why not; (aa) what is the reason that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) redacted the name of the transfer recipient from documents disclosed to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) under the Access to Information Act, when the PHAC later willingly disclosed that information to the CBC; (bb) does Canada have any policy prohibiting the export of risk group 3 and 4 pathogens to countries, such as China, that conduct gain-of-function experiments, and in summary what is that policy; (cc) if Canada does not have any policy referred to in (bb), why not; (dd) what is the reason that did the NML or individual employees sought and obtained no permits or authorizations under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Export Control Act, or related legislation prior to the transfer; (ee) what legal controls prevent the NML or other government laboratories sending group 3 or 4 pathogens to laboratories associated with foreign military or national laboratories that conduct gain-of-function experiments; (ff) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he writes that "no certifications [were] provided [by the WIV], they simply cite they have them", why did the NML proceed to transfer Ebola and Henipah viruses without proof of certification to handle them safely; and (gg) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he asked "Are there materials that [WIV] have that we would benefit from receiving? Other VHF? High path flu?", did the NML request these or any other materials in exchange for the transfer, and did the NML receive them?
**INQUIRY OF MINISTRY**

**DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENT AU GOUVERNEMENT**

**PREPARE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKING “ORIGINAL TEXT” OR “TRANSLATION”**

**PRÉPARER EN ANGLAIS ET EN FRANÇAIS EN INDiquANT “TEXTE ORIGINAL” OU “TRADUCTION”**

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<td>Mrs. Jansen (Cloverdale—Langley City)</td>
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Signed by Mr. Darren Fisher

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**QUESTION**

With regard to both the administrative and RCMP investigations of the National Microbiology Lab (NML), Xiangguo Qiu, and Keding Cheng: (a) with respect to the decision of the NML and the RCMP to remove Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng from the NML facilities on July 5, 2019, what is the cause of delay that has prevented the NML and the RCMP investigations concluding; (b) in light of a statement by the Public Health Agency of Canada to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation which was reported on June 14, 2020, and which stated, “the administrative investigation of [Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng] is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China”, what are those two scientists being investigated for; (c) did Canada receive information from foreign law enforcement or intelligence agencies which led to the investigations against Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng, and, in summary, what was alleged; (d) which other individuals apart from Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng are implicated in the investigations; (e) are Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng still in Canada; (f) are Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng cooperating with law enforcement in the investigations; (g) are Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng on paid leave, unpaid leave, or terminated from the NML; (h) what connection is there between the investigations of Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng and the investigation by the United States National Institutes of Health which has resulted in 54 scientists losing their jobs mainly due to receiving foreign funding from China, as reported by the journal Science on June 12, 2020; (i) does the government possess information that Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng solicited or received funding from a Chinese institution, and, in summary what is that information; and (j) when are the investigations expected to conclude, and will their findings be made public?

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Public Health Agency of Canada

(a) Due process is being followed in the execution of this administrative investigation.

(b) An administrative investigation pertaining to possible policy breaches is underway.

(c) The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) has no knowledge pertaining to this.

(d) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(e) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(f) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(g) The information requested is considered personal information and is subject to the Privacy Act. Therefore PHAC will not comment on details pertaining to individual employees.

(h) There is no connection.

(i) Funding has not been solicited or received by the National Microbiology Laboratory from any Chinese institution.

(j) Conclusion of the investigations depend on the completion of due process.
Key Messages and Q’s and A’s – CACN - March 22, 2021

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1. Research Collaboration and Transfers of Products

What is NML currently doing with China? Is the NML currently collaborating with China on any scientific research? Will Canada continue to collaborate and share scientific information with China? [from approved MLs]

- No current collaborations between the NML and labs/institutions in China.
- Canada’s NML is known around the world for scientific excellence/ contributions to global health.
- PHAC engages in important scientific research relationships to advance PH research and science aimed at improving PH. Collaborations with labs outside of Canada critical to advance PH research into infectious diseases.

Why does PHAC engage in academic collaborations with other countries? Why is it beneficial for the Public Health Agency of Canada to enter in to such collaborative research projects internationally? Are there not risks? What are the benefits?

- PHAC’s researchers/scientists part of global community of scientific and scholarly expertise - their contribution critical to maintaining/enhancing credibility and reputation of PHAC and our experts, and PHAC contribution to Canada’s social and economical development.
- we encourage and facilitate domestic and international scientific research, collaborations and partnerships with the external research and development communities in universities and colleges, and in PT or Indigenous governments - linkages provide opportunities to leverage global expertise, knowledge and infrastructure in developing research and scientific knowledge to address a wide scope of PH issues for the benefit of Canadians.
- PHAC recognizes the various challenges presented by current threats to research security, nationally and internationally, and is engaged with federal departments and international counterparts in raising awareness and enhancing dialogue among the research community, and engaging with partners on threat definition and solution implementation.
- PHAC adopted a new Scientific Integrity Policy in 2019. Scientific integrity involves the application of concepts of transparency, openness, high quality work, avoidance of conflict of interest and ensuring high standards of impartiality and research ethics. Employees involved in science or research must uphold and conform to the standards of responsible research and science excellence.
Agreements with Working Officials

- NML Science Excellence Program launched in September 2019 - strengthening policies and processes that allow for appropriate scientific collaboration while adhering to established security controls.
- Steering Committee oversight to strengthen the scientific administration of the organization.
- NML finalizing the *Engagement of Working Official Policy*, which includes a *Working Official Agreement* - formalizes the relationship between PHAC and Working Officials, including IP rights and use of PHAC facilities.
- The Science and Security Working Group reviews all proposed Working Official Agreements, *Collaboration Agreement* must also be signed for all collaborations.
- All Working Officials require an appropriate *security clearance* prior to entering the NML, and a *Material Transfer Agreement* must be in place before any movement of research materials.
- For all current COVID-19 projects, NML has *Research Plan* in place that covers associated risks. All projects (and associated risks) recorded and monitored in the NML’s Science Planning Information System.

The transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the NML to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China (On Oct 29, 2019, 12 strains of EBOV and 3 strains of NiV were authorized for transfer) [based on written Q-25]

- NML complies with all applicable requirements of the *Human Pathogens and Toxins Act* (HPTA), the *Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act* (TDGA), and the Canadian Biosafety Standard when sharing samples of pathogens and toxins with partner laboratories in Canada and in other countries.
- June 28, 2018, NML received a letter from the Director of the National Biosafety Laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) outlining intent to study Ebola virus (EBOV) and the Nipah virus (NiV) under their National Key Research and Development Plan.
- Areas of study were infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of EBOV and NiV. WIV Director also guaranteed in his signed attestation letter that the viruses will only be used for research purposes. The virus samples were not transferred to any other institutions.
- NML is required, as per HPTRs, to receive, from any laboratory requesting pathogens, proof that they have the containment level of laboratory required for handling that pathogen. In this case, the Biosafety Officer at the WIV complied.
• IP protections were not required for the sharing of these samples - purpose was to facilitate research to benefit human health and advance scientific enquiry on preventing and treating infectious diseases.

Publications with scientists affiliated with the military of China
There are six papers listed with at least one author with Special Pathogens affiliation and one author with an affiliation to the military of China
• [remit]

Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs)
• NML’s Science Excellence Program strengthening policies and processes that allow for appropriate scientific collaboration while adhering to established security controls.
• (as of early 2020) for clarity to employees and safeguards for our science, MTAs are required for all sharing or receiving of biological materials with other research organizations.

Why was an MTA not used for the WIV transfer in 2018?
• Complex decisions on what constituted an appropriate use of a MTA.
  o global partnerships, open science and collaboration as core aspects of our work
  o need to balance this against agreements in place that dictate the terms of collaboration.
• In this case, relationship building with WIV, sharing done to foster robust global health agenda by enabling scientific advancements on pathogens with potentially significant societal consequences.

IP protection
• As IP has evolved, so did PHAC approach to IP as it pertains to public health - current approach aimed at balancing the protection of commercial interests and helping promote development of accessible IP to bring PH solutions to those in need (particularly important during a pandemic).
• PHAC participated in GoC National Research Security Coordination committee that identifies emerging research security issues and act as a secure Government of Canada forum for info-sharing on research security issues.
2. NML Security (Physical)

Physical Security in the NML

- Entrance to the NML requires two-step verification process - includes photo ID and access card prepared by the Security Management Division at the facility.
- All persons are subject to extra random screening, entering or leaving the facility, with x-ray scans of effects at front entrance.
- All entry and movement of staff and visitors restricted to approved areas of the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health. Access card entry only into each zone, and all high security laboratories.
- PHAC National Security Management Division provides security awareness briefings and training, security investigations, internal physical security risk assessments and background verification for all staff and visitors.
- Threat and Risk Assessment’s are regularly conducted by external agents for the physical security infrastructure as well as all the IT networks.

Security protocols for foreign academics

- Restrictions may be imposed on Visiting Scientists, or Working Officials, all of whom must have Secret security clearance, that can include escort in and out of the facility and constant supervision and other restrictions as necessary.
3. PPE Procurement / Quality Assurance / Export Requirements /Contract Disputes

Canada’s donation of PPE to China
• GoC donated PPE to China in January 2020 to support ongoing efforts to prevent COVID-19 spread.
• Donation did not compromise Canada’s domestic preparedness.
• Donation included 27,870 coveralls, 50,000 face shields and 200,000 nitrile gloves, which were close to expiry or considered surplus to Canada’s needs.
• Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned the favour in spring 2020 with a generous donation of PPE and test kits.

Testing of products and quality assurance: [from QP note]
• Products undergo quality verification before distribution to PTs – process supported by testing capacity within the PHAC, NRC and independent laboratories.
• Products that fail to meet technical specifications for the healthcare sector are not distributed to PTs for frontline healthcare response.
• HC continues to monitor authorized medical devices for safety and effectiveness after authorization for use in Canada.
• HC takes appropriate action to protect the health and safety of Canadians, if concerns arise.

What is role of NML in testing of PPE?
[nil – limited to testing of reagents and supplies used by NML]

If asked how many N95 or KN95 masks have been rejected for failing to meet federal standards: [from response to approved senate question S-125]
• Approximately 200,000 N95 and 10 million KN95 masks have failed to meet the technical specifications for healthcare settings for COVID-19 response.

If asked about products that fail to meet technical specifications, contract disputes or incorrect items received: [from response to approved senate question S-125]
• NESS works with PSPC to determine the appropriate recourse as outlined in the contract.
• could include returning product to supplier for full refund/replacement.
If asked about evolving export requirements: [From a previously approved QP note, has been publicly disclosed]

- In May 2020, the Government of China imposed more stringent certification and customs regulations for masks and other PPE aimed at addressing quality control of exported products.
- As an importer, PHAC required to sign joint declaration with exporter attesting that products meet standards/certification requirements of the destination country.
- For products not certified as medical devices in China, the joint declaration stipulates that the item is “not for medical use” even if it meets Canada’s technical specifications for healthcare settings.
- All PPE supplies distributed by PHAC to PTs are labelled confirming they meet the GoC’s technical specifications for healthcare settings.

PPE and forced labour: [from previously approved HESA supplementary messages]

- GoC committed to addressing risk of forced labour and human trafficking in federal procurement supply chains through the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking.
- PSPC able to speak to work it is undertaking to ensure we do business with ethical suppliers.

PPE procurements linked to Xinjiang, China: [from previously approved HESA supplementary messages]

- GoC aware of the risks of forced labour associated with international and Chinese supply chains.
- GoC favoured a made-in-Canada solution to ramp up domestic production of PPE to reduce exposure to global supply chains that could be vulnerable to forced labour.
4. WHO/Bilateral/Multilateral Health Collaboration

Bilateral and Multilateral Relations in Health

*Any questions relating to foreign policy issues and the broader bilateral relationship (i.e. Meng Wanzhou and related consular cases, human rights in China, Hong Kong, etc.)
  - refer to Global Affairs Canada.

General line
  - As the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve around the world, Canada will continue to work closely with its international partners, including the WHO and China, to reduce risks to Canadians and the global community.

What is the current status of the Canada-China relationship in health?
  - Canada and China share longstanding relationship in health that dates back to MOU signed in 1995 calling for regular dialogue on health-related issues.
  - Under MOU, Canada-China Policy Dialogue on Health (CCPD) is main vehicle for formal bilateral engagement, including at the ministerial level.
  - since 2014, engagement primarily in health-related multilateral fora (WHO, the Global Health Security Agenda, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Health Working Group)
  - also more technical level fora related to food and consumer product safety (HC mandate)

How do Canada and China engage at multilateral fora?
  - primarily limited to participation in same meetings, such as annual World Health Assembly.
  - very limited bilateral engagement on the margins of these events.
  - last bilat at ministerial level took place on margins of WHA in May 2018 - introductory meeting where respective health priorities discussed.

What are your plans for future collaboration in health with China?
  - We have no specific plans for future collaboration that departs from the nature of our current engagement.
  - PHAC’s primary objective is protecting the health and safety of Canadians. We will continue to engage with China on health issues, where it advances this objective.
  - This has been, and will continue to be, our guiding principle as we move forward in the relationship.
WHO

Undue Chinese Influence on WHO. What are Canada’s views on allegations of undue Chinese influence on the WHO?

• We value WHO’s global leadership and coordination during pandemic, and have confidence WHO is working with and for all Member States

• Continued commitment to the WHO towards making it a strong, accountable, inclusive and well-governed institution, whose actions and recommendations are guided by Member States, and best available science/evidence.

• We will continue to actively participate in oversight and accountability review processes for the WHO, including any comprehensive review of the global COVID-19 response

• This includes the work of the Independent Panel on Pandemic Preparedness and Response, which is leading an impartial and independent evaluation of the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Origins Mission - What is the current status of the international expert mission to trace the origins of SARS-CoV-2?

• In January, an international team of experts (no Canadians) convened by WHO undertook a joint mission with Chinese counterparts to trace the zoonotic origins of Sars-CoV-2 and its route of introduction into the human population

• Preliminary findings shared earlier this month. Experts unable to determine origins, but concluded that most likely scenario was from an animal host (likely a bat) via an intermediary host species.

• The mission will produce two reports: a summary version expected shortly, and a full report.

• This is one step in a longer-term effort to identify the origins of the virus. A key outcome will be the identification of further studies to advance this work.

What has been Canada’s role in mission?

• Canada has been a strong supporter of this mission and its findings.

• Canada co-sponsored a WHA resolution in May 2020 that called for this work, and raised its importance in bilateral discussions with WHO and during Jan 2021 WHO Executive Board Meeting.

• No Canadians participated - mission team was comprised of 17 Chinese and 17 international experts from 10 countries.

What is Canada’s position on the mission and its findings?

• Canada has repeatedly emphasized the need for China to be open and transparent as part of this important process and has shared our expectations for timely, complete, and unfettered access, including directly with Chinese counterparts.
• Mission is an important example of international scientific collaboration to advance global health security.
• Canada will continue to work closely with other countries and WHO, including with respect to addressing concerns about the level of access that the mission team received in Wuhan.

Is Canada satisfied with the WHO’s role in this investigation?
• As a Member State organization, WHO does not have powers over China (or other Member States), so it must work with China to gain access for the international expert team.
• Member States must meet their obligations under the IHRs (i.e. the sharing of timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed PH information).
• We are aware of reports that the WHO team did not receive complete and unfettered access.
• WHO has made clear that it reserves the right to disagree on the joint report findings.

What are Canada’s views on the theory promoted by Chinese authorities that the virus could have entered the Wuhan market via imported frozen food packaging?
• These scientific studies must follow the facts – to review the full report and receive more details before commenting on preliminary theories

5. Early Stages of the Pandemic and GPHIN / GPHIN Report

GPHIN
• Established in 1997, the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) is PHAC’s open-source event-based global surveillance system.
• GPHIN provides early-warning and situational awareness for potential CBRN public health threats worldwide - includes monitoring of infectious disease outbreaks.
• The first report of a mysterious pneumonia outbreak in China, which would later be known as COVID-19, was detected by GPHIN on the evening of December 30, 2019.
• This information was distributed to Canadian PH practitioners at FPT levels on December 31, 2019 via the GPHIN Daily Report.
• Enhanced reporting and surveillance began immediately and enabled a rapid response. By the evening of December 31, 2019, the significance of this event was clear in the PH surveillance community.

Interim report released March 20 [from MLQAs]

Key messages
• Established in 1997, GPHIN is an open source event-based surveillance system intended to provide early-warning and situational awareness for potential CBRN PH threats worldwide, including monitoring of infectious disease outbreaks.
• **In November 2020**, Minister of Health announced independent panel review

• This independent review will provide opportunity to identify:
  o capabilities of the existing system;
  o its role in detecting and informing the Agency’s response to COVID-19;
  o opportunities for system enhancements; and
  o opportunities to improve how the Agency synthesizes, shares and leverages key information sources for early detection.

• GoC looks forward to receiving the final report and recommendations from the External Review Panel in late spring. The Panel’s recommendations will be used to support PHAC in determining how this global public health surveillance system can best serve Canadians and the international community.

**What is the Government of Canada’s response to this interim report from the Panel?**

• GoC welcomes the interim update from the External Review Panel on the progress of this important review.

• PHAC will be considering both the interim and final reports in determining how GPHIN can best serve Canadians and the international community.

• interim report: (1) highlights the Panel’s approach and work to date on this review, which includes a look at the past and present state of GPHIN, from its creation in the 1990s to its current operations; (2) provides overview of GPHIN’s structure and functions; and (3) GPHIN’s initial detection of what would become the COVID-19 pandemic.

• report also points to where Panel plans to focus attention as it begins to develop recommendations, such as:
  • the operational context, role and mandate of GPHIN;
  • governance structures that support GPHIN;
  • partnerships and flows of information between GPHIN and stakeholders, domestically and globally;
  • lessons learned from COVID-19 and opportunities to improve the system; and
  • advice on the next generation of public health intelligence systems and the future of surveillance tools.

**Why was the review requested?**

• The review was requested to support and enhance PHAC’s ability to detect, monitor and respond to public health issues of concern.
• Since GPHIN was established in 1997, a significant number of non-governmental entities now conduct open source surveillance and alerting alongside governmental systems. These global shifts have impacted the role that GPHIN plays in Canada and on the world stage.

**What did PHAC learn in its review that prompted the Minister to request an independent review of GPHIN?**

• Minister received briefings about GPHIN, including an overview of the system since its inception, the role of GPHIN during COVID-19, and how processes had evolved over time.
• Decision for independent review was to assess how GPHIN can continue to meet today’s public health needs. Panelists selected based on experience and expertise.

**Were the Panel members Ministerial appointments or Governor in Council appointments?**

• Minister appointed Panel members.

**How much will this review cost?**

• estimated $150,000 over 2020-21 and 2021-22 FYs.

**When will the final report be completed and will it be made public?**

• review anticipated to take 5-6 months, with Minister receiving final report in late spring 2021. The report will be made publicly available.

**Will this review overlap with the Auditor General of Canada’s audit of PHAC’s surveillance and data programs?**

• may be common elements between the OAG performance audit about Pandemic Preparedness and Response being conducted and this independent review.

**About GPHIN**

**What is the difference between a GPHIN Alert and other GPHIN information products and their distribution?**

• GPHIN develops and distributes a variety of PH surveillance information products free of charge to subscribers, including:
  • GPHIN Daily Report: a summary of relevant public health articles from around the world on key topics distributed to Canadian public health officials. It highlights the main domestic and international issues or reports in order to facilitate early warning and ongoing situational awareness of emerging or evolving public health risks or threats in Canada and worldwide.
  • GPHIN Alert: an email with a highlighted article about a health event of potential interest to international and domestic subscribers.
  • GPHIN Platform: a searchable public health surveillance database available to all subscribers (public health professionals).
• GPHIN also produces other reports on an as-requested basis.

• A GPHIN Alert does not include a risk assessment or recommendations for specific action or response.

About GPHIN and COVID-19

What was GPHIN’s early response to COVID-19?
• The first report of a mysterious pneumonia outbreak in China, which would later be known as COVID-19, was described in Agence France-Presse on the evening of December 30, 2019.

• This information was disseminated quickly to public health authorities through multiple mechanisms, including:
  • The December 31, 2019, GPHIN Daily Report distributed to Canadian public health practitioners at the federal, provincial and territorial levels;
  • A posting on the widely subscribed Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED); and
  • An official reporting from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission.

• The WHO stood up its Incident Management Support Team on January 1, 2020.

• Enhanced reporting and surveillance began immediately and enabled a rapid response. By the evening of December 31, 2019, the significance of this event was clear in PH surveillance community.

Was the program shut down?
• never been shut down. While number of alerts has decreased over the past years, GPHIN has continued to operate without reductions in its team size or budget.

• Canadian users including FPT government officials, have maintained access to the GPHIN Daily Report and receive timely information about PH issues. GPHIN program’s health expertise continues to contribute to global PH surveillance knowledge for the WHO and countries, regions and Canada.

If the program wasn’t shut down, why did the number of alerts decrease over the past number of years?
• GPHIN activity over this period, including the GPHIN Daily Report, GPHIN Alerts, and updates to the GPHIN Platform, are part of the subject matter being examined by the External Review Panel for this review requested by the Minister of Health.
If needed:

- PHAC implemented a standard operating procedure on the issuance of GPHIN alerts in September 2020 to clarify the process.
- The decision to issue a GPHIN Alert begins with the GPHIN analysts and the senior epidemiologist considering whether a signal meets the criteria set out in the International Health Regulations (2005) for a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Other considerations include whether the event could or represent a CBRN incident posing an immediate threat to human health or the environment. The Director of PHAC’s Office of Situational Awareness then reviews the case.

Q12. Why wasn’t a GPHIN alert sent for COVID-19?

- Canada’s response to the initial report of the “mysterious pneumonia” in China was swift. Enhanced surveillance and reporting began immediately. A GPHIN alert would not have made Canada’s response to COVID-19 faster or more effective as information had already been disseminated widely through a number of other mechanisms.

- GoC looks forward to receiving the final report and recommendations from the Panel in late spring. We trust that the Panel’s recommendations will support PHAC in determining how we can position the global PH surveillance system to best serve Canadians and the international community.
Employment status of two National Microbiology Laboratory scientists

SYNOPSIS / POTENTIAL QUESTION

- Questions arose from opposition MPs at the special committee on Canada-China relations of March 22, 2021 regarding the employment status of the 2 NML Scientists. The Committee has given the President of PHAC until Friday March 26 2021 to explain.

- Why was the employment of two Public Health Agency of Canada scientists terminated?

SOMMAIRE/ QUESTION POTENTIELLE

-  

KEY MESSAGES

- Status of employment:
  I can confirm that the two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021.

- Request for details:
  At this time, I cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for national security and privacy reasons. A response will be provided to the Committee before the indicated deadline.

- Impact on Canadians:
  I can assure Canadians that their health and safety is not compromised and that the National Microbiology Laboratory continues to play a critical role in protecting the health and safety of Canadians.

MESSAGES CLÉS

IF PRESSED...

Q1. Are security partners involved?
It is normal procedure for the Agency to consult with security partners as required. It would be inappropriate to comment any further given privacy and other considerations.

Q2. Is there a link between the scientists and China and did that lead to them no longer being employed by PHAC?
We cannot disclose specific information nor comment further.

Q3. What is the risk to national security?
The Government of Canada takes any threat to Canada’s national security seriously and works with federal partners to keep Canadians safe. As you can expect, we do not publicly comment, or confirm or deny the specifics of investigations, operational interests, or activities.
Q4. Is the NML currently collaborating with China on any scientific research? Will Canada continue to collaborate and share scientific information with China?
There are no current collaborations between the NML and labs/institutions in China. Canada's National Microbiology Laboratory is known around the world for its scientific excellence and contributions to global health. PHAC engages in important scientific research relationships to advance public health research and science aimed at improving public health. Collaborations with labs outside of Canada is critical to advance public health research into infectious diseases.

Q5. Is the RCMP investigation complete? Why is it taking so long? Have charges been laid?
Refer to the RCMP

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<th>BACKGROUND/CONTEXTE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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CONTACT: Daryl Gauthier, Director General Human Resources HC/PHAC (343-542-2293)

Approved by: Debbie Beresford-Green, ADM Corporate Services HC/PHAC (613)946-3200
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>28-Jun-2018</td>
<td>Request letter received for samples</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Sep-2018</td>
<td>SES received the request for shipment and provided a package of what was required from the Wuhan lab</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Management informed of request</td>
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<td>29-Oct-2018</td>
<td>Transfer Authorization issued</td>
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<tr>
<td>01-Jan-2019</td>
<td>Qiu was provided all documents required to complete</td>
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<td>05-Feb-2019</td>
<td>Typo made in an email to [redacted] regarding packaging type (PI650)</td>
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<td>20-Feb-2019</td>
<td>[redacted] advises that the Wuhan lab has flagged the typo (packaging should be PI620)</td>
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<td>26-Feb-2019</td>
<td>NML confirms that packaging should be PI620</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Feb-2019</td>
<td>[redacted] requested certificate approval of packaging</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-Mar-2019</td>
<td>Samples stored at NCFAD until all paperwork is completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NML Senior Management informed of the pending shipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-Mar-2019</td>
<td>NML Operations Centre advised of the shipment</td>
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<td>Paperwork sent to [redacted]</td>
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<td>27-Mar-2019</td>
<td>Documents sent to NML Specimen Receiving</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer request sent to CFIA - asked for additional information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Answers provided to CFIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERAP notification issued by NML OC (HPOC acknowledged receipt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customs invoice and shipper declaration sent to [redacted]</td>
</tr>
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28-Mar-2019 CEPR requested information about the shipment
29-Mar-2019 received approval to send the shipment
29-Mar-2019 Shipment picked up by
Shipping notification sent to ERAP group
Dangerous goods declaration is revised to include dry ice
31-Mar-2019 Shipment sent to Wuhan on flight AC031 from Toronto
01-Apr-2019 Shipment arrived in Wuhan
Search Packages

PO Number: 
Internal Tracking Number: 
Counter Tracking Number: 
Client Name: 
Company Name: 
Incoming □ Outgoing □ Both

Start Date: 2018-08-01 Format: (yyyy-mm-dd)
End Date: 2018-08-27 Format: (yyyy-mm-dd)
Courier: 
Search

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<td>Shipment ID: 474b3358bc05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courier Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courier:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Route: AIR FREIGHT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conf No:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billing Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill To: DEPARTMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department: HML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account No:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Material Desc.: INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE AFFECTING HUMANS (EBOLA VIRUS, HENIPAVIRUS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous: ✓ TDG Document Required: ✓ For Specimen Receiving: ✓</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Shipment Details

Created: 2019-03-21 12:17 PM
Created By: 
Shipmet ID: 
Primary Package ID: 
Courier Tracking No: 
Contact Phone: 
Incoming: ✓ Processing Complete: ✓
From Client
Name: QiU XIAOHUI
Company: PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CHINA
Address: 1013 America Drive
Postal/Zip: 20032
City: Washington
State/Prov: Nebraska
Country: China
To Client
Name: WUPHAN INSTITUTE OF Virology
Company: WUPHAN INSTITUTE OF Virology
Address: No. 44 KACHTONGHAN
Postal/Zip: 430301
City: Wuhan
State/Prov: People's Republic
Country: China

CAN.PHAC.0001.0035
http://ishipt.phac-aspc.gc.ca/Public/SearchPackages.aspx
112 of 267
2019-08-27
Search Packages

PO Number:  
Internal Tracking Number:  
Courier Tracking Number:  
Client Name:  
Company Name:  
Incoming:  
Outgoing:  
Both:  
Start Date: 2018-02-01  
End Date: 2018-04-07  
Courier:  

Search Results

- Shipment ID: 151179  
- Shipment ID: 151179

Shipmetn Details

- Created: 2018-12-21 10:34 AM
- Primary Package ID: 151179

- Shipment ID: 151179
- Contact Phone:  
- From Client:  
- Name:  
- Company:  
- Address:  
- City:  
- Province:  
- Country:  
- To Client:  
- Name:  
- Company:  
- Address:  
- City:  
- Province:  
- Country:  

- Order Information
  - PO Number:  
  - Ordered By:  

- Courier Information
  - Courier:  
  - Route:  
  - Conr No:  

- Billing Information
  - Bill To:  
  - Department:  
  - Account No:  

- Special Information
  - Biological Material Details:  
  - Description:  
  - Quantity:  
  - Weight:  
  - Dimensions:  
  - Remarks:  

- Existing Memos

  - Memo:  
    - Date: 2018-12-21 10:34 AM
    - Text:  

- Recomendation:  
  - Prohibit Reentry:  
  - On Receipt by Specimen Receiving:  
  - Temporary in Package:  

- Additional Information

- CAN.PHAC.0001.0035  
- 113 of 267  
- 2019-08-27
TRANSFEROR

Section Head/Designate: David Safronetz

Contact Person: Xiangguo Qiu

NML Location:
- ☑ CSCHAH
  1015 Arlington St, Winnipeg, MB, R3E 1R2
- ☑ Guelph
  110 Stone Rd West, Guelph, ON, N1G 3W4
- ☑ Lethbridge
  225089 Township Road 9-1, Lethbridge, AB, T1J 3Z4

Department/Unit: Special Pathogens Program

Telephone: 204-784-7548

Origin of Material:
- ☑ Domestic
- ☑ Imported

Import Permit or Transfer Letter No.:
- P14-3865 (Makona), P05670 (MA-Zebov) P-05100 (ass. Ebola), P15000 (Bebov), P05978 (Hendra), P05671 (Nipah)

Department of Environment Permit No.

Risk Group / Material (select all that apply):
- ☑ RG2
- ☑ RG3
- ☑ RG4
- ☑ SSBA
- ☑ Prions

Pathogen/Toxin and description of material(s)* to be transferred:
- Ebola and Henipah viruses

RECIPIENT LABORATORY

Recipient Name:

Biosafety Officer (BSO):

BSO Email:

Organization Name: Chinese Academy of Sciences

BSO Telephone No.:

Department: Wuhan Institute of Virology

Street Address: Xiao Hong Shan No.44

City: Wuhan

Province/State: Hubei

Country: China

Postal/Zip Code: 430071

Telephone:

Fax:

For Canadian Labs: Room number(s) where Prions, RG3, RG4 or SSBA material will be used or stored:

Work Intent: Stock virus culturing

Canadian Laboratory:
- ☑ CCL2
- ☑ CCL2+ CCL3
- ☑ CCL4

International Laboratory**
- ☑ Include one or more of the following documentation
  - ☑ Recipient Import Permit
  - ☑ Laboratory Certification Letter
  - ☑ Documentation from Institute Director or Biosafety Officer indicating they meet the biosafety and biosecurity requirements to work safely with the exported material.

PHAC Licence No.: Click here to enter text

Expiry Date: Click here to enter text.

Recipient acknowledgement:
1. PHAC makes no representations and gives no warranties of any nature, expressed or implied, with respect to the Materials.
2. The Material shall be used only on the Recipient's premises and under suitable containment conditions.

Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 2018-10-18

Transferor Signature

Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 2018-10-18

Transferring BSO (or designate) Signature

Page 1 of 2
**SHIPPER'S DECLARATION FOR DANGEROUS GOODS**

**Shipper**
Dr. Xiengguo Oiu (204-784-7548)
Public Health Agency of Canada - NML
1015 Arlington St.
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3E 3R2

**Consignee**
Chinese Academy of Sciences - Wuhan Institute of Virology
Xiao Hong Shan No 44
Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430071

Two completed and signed copies of this Declaration must be handed to the operator.

**WARNING**
Failure to comply in all respects with the applicable Dangerous Goods Regulations may be in breach of the applicable law, subject to legal penalties.

**TRANSPORT DETAILS**
This shipment is within the limitations prescribed by

| Passenger and Cargo Aircraft | XXXLY |

**Airport of Destination (optional):**

**Shipment type (delete non-applicable)**
NON-RADIOACTIVE

**NATURE AND QUANTITY OF DANGEROUS GOODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN or ID No.</th>
<th>Proper Shipping Name</th>
<th>Class or Division (subdivision hazard)</th>
<th>Packing Group</th>
<th>Quantity and Type of Packing</th>
<th>Packing Unit</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN 2614</td>
<td>Infectious substance, affecting humans (Ebola virus, Henipavirus)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>30 vials x 0.5 ml</td>
<td>620</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional Handling Information**
1-888-CAN-UTEC (226-8832), 613-996-6666
PHAC NML ECC Director: 1-866-262-8433

I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are fully and accurately described above by the proper shipping name, and are classified, packaged, marked and labelled/ placarded, and are in all respects in proper condition for transport according to applicable international and national governmental regulations. I declare that all of the applicable air transport requirements have been met.

Name of Signatory

Date

Signature

(See warning above)

**CAN.PHAC.0001.0035  115 of 267**
Sorry guys,  
I just got to this.  
Tracy is off ____ and I just got back. I'll go over the request and put together a package of what we need from the requesting lab. We usually ask for evidence of certification or a statement from the lab director.

Cathy

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

We would of course not send anything out without appropriate paper work, MTAs, certifications, letters from BSOs etc. They are requesting material from us due to collaboration with dr Qiu. Historically it's also been easier to obtain material from us as opposed to US labs. I don't think other, closer labs have the ability to ship these materials. We can certainly ask about their stocks and see if we can get some.

Dave

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone

-------- Original message --------
From: "Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)" <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>  
Date: 2018-09-14 9:17 AM (GMT-06:00)  
To: "Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)" <david.safronetz@canada.ca>, "Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)" <catherine.robertson@canada.ca>  
Cc: "Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)" <mike.drebot@canada.ca>, "Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)" <steven.guercio@canada.ca>  
Subject: RE: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Dave,

I have some concerns here.
- No certifications are provided, they simply cite they have them.
- What is the nature of the work, and why are our materials required? (ie. these are surely available from other, more local labs).
- MTA's would be required, not generic 'guarantees' on their storage and usage.
- Are there materials that they have that we would benefit from receiving? Other VHF? High path flu?
- Good to know that you trust this group. How did we get connected with them?

Matt

From: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-12 2:13 PM
To: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Drebout, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: FW: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Cathy,

We haven’t heard back from Tracey regarding this. Is there any issues from your perspective to send out these isolates? I trust the lab and would be personally fine to sign off for SP.

Dave

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2018-09-10 2:36 PM
To: Drew, Tracy (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: viruses to be exported to China

Hi Tracy,

Pls see attached for the request letter from Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and let me know if there are any concerns/questions.
Dave, we had discussed this some time ago and you are agreed to send the viruses once all the documents are in place.

Thanks!

Qiu
I am in the process of putting together an email regarding our first conversation.

Maybe we can have a meeting later to discuss.

Cathy

Catherine Robertson
Director, Biorisk and Occupational Safety Services
Public Health Agency of Canada
National Microbiology Laboratory
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg
Manitoba R3E 3P6
Tel: 204 789-6079 (office)
    204-229-8275 (cellphone)
Fax: 204 789-2069
e-mail: catherine.robertson@canada.ca

Hi Qiu,

To send something to China (or any country), you will need to complete SES-F-052 which includes signatures from the recipient and their facility BSO. You as the importer (or Dave as the Section Chief) will also need to sign off on it. You will also need to obtain the country’s import permit and/or laboratory certification for verification that they are approved to work with the material you are sending them.

Once you have the completed application and the import permit/certification, please bring it to me for review. I will give you a Transfer Authorization (TA) that will need to be reviewed and signed off by Mike Drebot (divisional policy) before you can send the package. Include the TA along with China’s import permit, and other relevant shipment documentation (NML requisition, TDG paperwork, courier waybill, etc) when you send it out.

As a FYI, make sure you notify the NML OCD that you will be sending out a package containing a RG4 pathogen for ERAP purposes as soon as you have details on when you will be sending it and the route the package will be taking.

Feel free to drop by if you have any questions about any of this.
Hi Allan,

Qiu is planning to send cultures to a CL4 lab in China; could you let her know all the required docs please?

Cathy, do you have the phrase “the crown doesn’t regulate the crown” in writing from the Foreign affairs please? Qiu seem to remember something like was included in previous exports from our CL4, thanks

-Jay
Burrows, Andrea (HC/SC)

From: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-01-24 2:25 PM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: RG4 viral culture export to CL4 lab in China

We don’t have anything in writing but when we try to get an export permit, we are told we don’t need one.

Cathy

Catherine Robertson  
Director, Bioshirk and Occupational Safety Services  
Public Health Agency of Canada  
National Microbiology Laboratory  
1015 Arlington Street  
Winnipeg  
Manitoba  
Tel: 204 789-6079 (office)  
204-229-8275 (cellphone)  
Fax: 204 789-2069  
e-mail: catherine.robertson@canada.ca

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-01-24 10:48 AM  
To: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: RG4 viral culture export to CL4 lab in China

Thanks! Jay,

Cathy, I thought you said something like that ”the crown doesn’t regulate the crown” and we should include a sentence like that somewhere (I forgot where) when the shipment to be sent out during our discussion in the hallway(outside Jay’s office) sometime ago.

Thanks a lot everyone!

Qiu

From: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-01-24 10:37 AM  
To: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RG4 viral culture export to CL4 lab in China

Hi Allan,

Qiu is planning to send cultures to a CL4 lab in China; could you let her know all the required docs please?

Cathy, do you have the phrase “the crown doesn’t regulate the crown” in writing from the foreign affairs please? Qiu seem to remember something like was included in previous exports from our CL4, thanks
-Jay
Thanks Anders et al, I think we are good for documentation on this May shipment.
Michael

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)  <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-18 12:09 PM
To: Drebot, Mike  <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan  <allan.lau@canada.ca>; Krishnan, Jay  <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>
Cc: Safronetz, David  <david.safronetz@canada.ca>; Strong, Jim  <jim.strong@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo  <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; Gilmour, Matthew  <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven  <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Robertson, Catherine  <catherine.robertson@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: Paperwork for Special Pathogens pathogen transfers to China

Hi Mike,

I wasn’t part of the initial conversation for the shipment but I have the original request letter from China and the NML forms, attached in email.

Anders

From: Drebot, Mike  <mike.drebot@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-18 12:04 PM
To: Lau, Allan  <allan.lau@canada.ca>; Krishnan, Jay  <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>
Cc: Safronetz, David  <david.safronetz@canada.ca>; Leung, Anders  <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Strong, Jim  <jim.strong@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo  <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; Gilmour, Matthew  <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven  <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Robertson, Catherine  <catherine.robertson@canada.ca>
Subject: Paperwork for Special Pathogens pathogen transfers to China

Thanks Allan, I have cc’d Qiu and Jim as well. To what agency or institution are the Ebola, etc. cultures / materials going to?
Have also informed Matt and Steve so they are in the loop.
Thanks again,
Michael

Mike Drebot, PhD, ARMCCM
Hello,

Anders came to see me and I did not realize that this process was started back in October of last year while I was on leave. We do have all the proper documentation from China and the Transfer Authorization (NMI-TA-18-0480) was issued on Oct. 29, 2018.

As a note, the expiry date of the Transfer Authorization is 2019-08-10, which coincides with the expiry date of our RG4 license. If the shipment is not completed by that date, a new Transfer Authorization will need to be issued with the new RG4 license number and expiry date before the samples are transferred.

Allan

Hi Mike,

Allan has not received any paperwork yet for the transfer to China; there is a paperwork he initiated this morning to temporarily store viral cultures in NCFAD CL4. He and Anders will make sure no
cultures leave the building without all the paperwork and your final sign off as usual, thanks

-Jay
Hi Mike,

They’re going to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Science.

Allan

From: Drebott, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebott@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-18 12:04 PM
To: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>; Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC) <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC) <david.safronetz@canada.ca>; Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Strong, Jim (PHAC/ASPC) <jim.strong@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Robertson, Catherine (PHAC/ASPC) <catherine.robertson@canada.ca>
Subject: Paperwork for Special Pathogens pathogen transfers to China

Thanks Allan, I have cc’d Qiu and Jim as well. To what agency or institution are the Ebola, etc. cultures / materials going to?
Have also informed Matt and Steve so they are in the loop.
Thanks again,
Michael

Mike Drebott, PhD, ARMCCM
Director, Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens
National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3E 3R2

Associate Professor
Department of Medical Microbiology
University of Manitoba

E-Mail: Mike.Drebott@canada.ca
Phone: (204) 789-6059
Fax: (204) 789-2082

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-18 11:56 AM
To: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC) <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC) <david.safronetz@canada.ca>; Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: Paperwork for path transfers to China

Hi all,

Anders came to see me and I did not realize that this process was started back in October of last year while I was on leave. We do have all the proper documentation from China and the Transfer Authorization (NML-TA-18-0480) was issued on Oct. 29, 2018.

As a note, the expiry date of the Transfer Authorization is 2019-08-10, which coincides with the expiry date of our RG4 license. If the shipment is not completed by that date, a new Transfer Authorization will need to be issued with the new RG4 license number and expiry date before the samples are transferred.

Allan

---

From: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC) <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-18 11:41 AM
To: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>
Cc: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>; Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC) <david.safronetz@canada.ca>; Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Subject: Paperwork for path transfers to China

Hi Mike,

Allan has not received any paperwork yet for the transfer to China; there is a paperwork he initiated this morning to temporarily store viral cultures in NCFAD CL4. He and Anders will make sure no cultures leave the building without all the paperwork and your final sign off as usual, thanks.

-Jay
Hi,

I just wanted to give the EOC an heads up that we are potentially sending out a RG4 shipment to China on Thursday or Friday this week. Once details are confirmed within the company, I will let you know.

Thanks!

Anders Leung
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
anders.leung@phac-aspc.gc.ca
Telephone | Téléphone 204-789-7665 / Facsimile | Télécopieur 204-789-2140
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
That's right.
Thankst

Qiu

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:33 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); Jay Krishnan
Subject: RE: China shipment

Hi Qiu,

Are you sending two vials of each of these?

Allan

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:15 AM
To: Jay Krishnan <jkrishnan@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: FW: China shipment

Fyi...

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:12 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: He, Shihua (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: China shipment

Hi Shihua,

Can you please send me the locations of the mouse and guinea pig adapted viruses from this list? So I can collect the viruses today.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 9:53 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Subject: China shipment
Importance: High
Hi Anders,

Pls find me when you are done your meeting with Mike to discuss the potential shipment to China by Friday.

Thanks!

Qiu
# Commercial Invoice

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<th>March 28, 2019</th>
<th>Export References (i.e., order no., invoice no., etc.):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Shipper/Exporter (complete name and address):</td>
<td>Dr. Xiangguo Qiu (+1-204-784-7548)</td>
<td>Recipient (complete name and address):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Health Agency of Canada - NML</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Sciences - Wuhan Institute of Virology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1015 Arlington Street</td>
<td>Xiao Hong Shan No. 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada</td>
<td>Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of export:</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Importer - if other than recipient (complete name and address):</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Type of packaging</td>
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<td>2 ml cryovial containing 0.5ml</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 ml cryovial containing 0.5ml</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

I declare all the information contained in this invoice to be true and correct.

Signature of shipper/exporter (type name and title and sign): Dr. Xiangguo Qiu

Research Scientist, Special Pathogens

Date: 27/Mar/2019

Check One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOB</th>
<th>C&amp;F</th>
<th>CIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Hi Heidi, you can prefix your ERAP e-mails for this shipment with ERAP 2019-02. I will need the tracking#, who is sending it out, the consignee information and what they are shipping out. If you end up getting any documentation for this shipment, you can drop it off at my desk and I will scan it into the folder as well. No rush, thanks.

Luc

From: OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.aspc@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Semanowich, Gene (PHAC/ASPC) <gene.semanowich@canada.ca>; Fleury, Teresa (PHAC/ASPC) <teresa.fleury@canada.ca>; Audette, Luc (PHAC/ASPC) <luc.audette@canada.ca>; Gordon, Kristina (PHAC/ASPC) <kristina.gordon@canada.ca>; Zozman, Grant (PHAC/ASPC) <grant.zozman@canada.ca>
Subject: FW: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 2:30:34 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC); CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); FO.CNML.OCD_Group_F.ASPC@Gov.Mb.Ca; PHAC.FOCNML_OCD_Group_F.ASPC@Gov.Mb.Ca; PHAC.FOCNML.OCD_Group_F.ASPC@Gov.Mb.Ca; PHAC.FOCNML.OCD_Group_F.ASPC@Gov.Mb.Ca; PHAC.FOCNML.OCD_Group_F.ASPC@Gov.Mb.Ca
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [REDACTED] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

**new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA**

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433

**nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA**
1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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SHIPPER'S DECLARATION FOR DANGEROUS GOODS

Shipper
Dr. Xiaogang Chi (204-784-7548)
Public Health Agency of Canada - NML
1015 Arlington St.
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3E 3R2

Consignee
Chinese Academy of Sciences - Wuhan Institute of Virology
Xiao Hong Shan No.44
Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430071

Two completed and signed copies of this Declaration must be handed to the operator.

WARNING
Failure to comply in all respects with the applicable Dangerous Goods Regulations may be in breach of the applicable law, subject to legal penalties.

TRANSIENT DETAILS
This shipment is within the limitations prescribed for:

PASSenger AND Cargo Aircraft

Airport of Departure (optional):

Airport of Destination (optional):

Shipment type: (delete non-applicable)

NON-RADIOACTIVE

NATURE AND QUANTITY OF DANGEROUS GOODS

Dangerous Goods Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN or ID No.</th>
<th>Proper Shipping Name</th>
<th>Class or Division (subsidary hazard)</th>
<th>Packing Group</th>
<th>Quantity and Type of Packing</th>
<th>Packing Inst</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN 2614</td>
<td>Infectious substance, affecting humans (Ebola virus, Hantaviruses)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>30 vials x 0.5 ml</td>
<td>620</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN 1845</td>
<td>Dry ice</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16 kg Overpack Used</td>
<td>954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Handling Information
1-866-CAN-UTEC (226-8832), 813-996-8658 24HR EMERGENCY CONTACT
PHAC NML EOC Director: 1-866-262-8433 PERSON RESPONSIBLE

I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are fully and accurately described above by the proper shipping name, and are classified, packaged, marked and labeled/placarded and are in all respects in proper condition for transport according to applicable international and national governmental regulations. I declare that all of the applicable air transport requirements have been met.

Name of Signatory:

Date:

Signature:

(See warning above)
Ok. I had looked at this before and saw the paperwork. It all appeared to check out.

Sent from my Bell Samsung device over Canada's largest network.

------- Original message -------
From: "Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)" <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>
Date: 2019-03-27 5:20 PM (GMT-06:00)
To: "Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)" <steven.guercio@canada.ca>
Subject: Fwd: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Hi Steve

I'd like you to be comfortable with this before it goes.

Matt

(via mobile)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>
Date: March 27, 2019 at 1:30:34 PM CDT
To: "Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)" <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>,
"Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)" <steven.guercio@canada.ca>, "Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)" <mike.drebot@canada.ca>, NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.ascp@canada.ca>, "CSCAH SES (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.cschah.ses.asp.ascp@canada.ca>, "OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.ascp@canada.ca>, "OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.ascp@canada.ca>, "NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp.ascp@canada.ca>
Cc: "HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac-aspc.h poc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg
on Thursday, March 28. The shipment will be transported by [redacted] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (666)262-8433

***new e-mail PHAC.OCNVL-DIR-LNMCG.ASPC@CANADA.CA***

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie/Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (666)262-8433

***nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNVL-DIR-LNMCG.ASPC@CANADA.CA***

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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<image001.png>
Hi folks,

Any additional information you can share?

I have told them that shipping samples for research purposes is not uncommon and part of regular NML business. I suspect they will still want more information...

Maureen

---------------------------------------------
Maureen Hartigan
Senior Policy Advisor / Conseillère principal en politiques
Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch | Direction générale de la prévention et du contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Tel.: (613) 797-5082

From: Lefebvre, Christine (PHAC/ASPC) <christine.lefebvre@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-28 8:39 AM
To: Hartigan, Maureen (PHAC/ASPC) <maureen.hartigan@canada.ca>
Subject: Urgent - clarification please

Hi Maureen,

Good morning. CEPR has our daily issues meeting at 8:45, and we have the following in our daily report – can you please confirm what RG4 sample is being shipped, why it’s being shipped to China, etc.

Thank you!

**ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment**

- A Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [redacted] to China.
- Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Thank you,

---------------------------------------------
Christine Lefebvre-Johnston, MSc.
Senior Advisor, CENTRE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
HEALTH SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE BRANCH | Public Health Agency of Canada | Government of Canada

Conseillère principale, CENTRE DE MESURES ET INTERVENTIONS D'URGENCE
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L'INFRASTRUCTURE DE SÉCURITÉ SANITAIRE | Agence de la santé publique du Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
Christine.lefebvre@canada.ca | Tel: 613-407-4300
Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)

From: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 8:15 AM
To: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: FW: Shipping Req. for China Shipment Anders March 27 documents

See L Drive Anders Folder for several March 27 docs

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 12:19 PM
To: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Letkeman, Paul (PHAC/ASPC) <paul.letkeman@canada.ca>; Pushka, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.pushka@canada.ca>; Ashley, Don (PHAC/ASPC) <don.ashley@canada.ca>
Cc: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml/dir-lnmco@canada.ca>
Subject: Shipping Req. for China Shipment

Hi Mike/Paul/Don,

Please see attached shipping requisition, sorry for filling everyone's mailbox with these files again.

Thanks!

Anders Leung
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
anders.leung@canada.ca
Telephone | Téléphone 204-789-7665 | Facsimile | Télécopieur 204-789-2140
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
See L drive Anders folder for 2 docs Shippers Declaration 2 and Commercial Invoice.xls

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 12:00 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi,

Please see attached customs invoice and revised shippers declaration. The shipment will be ready for pickup tomorrow morning at 10:00, again can you please provide us with the route info so we can activate the ERAP teams.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 10:59 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please provide a customs invoice with the following information (if applicable):

Shipper: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Consignee: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Incoterms: EXW
Cargo description: (please confirm with Shipper for below)
Ebola virus//24vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Nipah virus//6vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Total value:
Package in dry ice:

Please send us the invoice at your earliest convenience.
If you have any questions please feel free to contact our office.

Regards,

---

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this e-mail unless absolutely necessary

**From:** Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]  
**Sent:** 27 March 2019 12:03 AM  
**To:**  
**Cc:** NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)  
**Subject:** Re: [Redacted] packaging required

Hi [Redacted],

Can you please send me the flight route for the package so we can activate the provincial ERAP teams?

Thanks!

Anders

---

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 26, 2019 7:58 PM  
**To:** Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC);  
**Cc:** NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)  
**Subject:** RE: [Redacted] packaging required

Hello Andres,

Well received.
Thank you

---

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this e-mail unless absolutely necessary

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 26 March 2019 18:44
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [redacted]
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hi,

Please see attached documents (signed copy will accompany the shipment), please let me know if I am missing any documents. Again please let us know if Thursday or Friday will work for sample pickup.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 1:01 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; [redacted]
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hi Anders,

Pls can you send what paper work required for us to [redacted]?
Thanks!

Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:46 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC);
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi

If we can schedule this for Thursday or Friday morning that would be great.

Thanks!

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:56 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please advise when shipment will be ready for pick up as requested by our office they would like this to arrive before April 1st. Please forward all paperwork at your earliest convenience in order for us to get the ok to send.

Regards,
Hi,

I think that the best contact would be the company that produces the packaging Saf-T-Pak Inc., they should be able to provide you some standards testing/certificates.


Anders

Hi,

My colleague Anders will assist the shipping and he is confused about the request from your side. He will try to help with your request but may need your clarification.

Best regards,

Qiu

Hello,

Client has requested you provide certificate approval since inner DG package provide by you, template now attached.

Best Regards,
Hi,

That is correct, it should be PI620. How in-depth would you like for the pick up process i don't really think we can make a video, maybe pictures?

Thanks!
Anders

Hello Andre,

Client is asking the PI should be 620 instead of 650, please advise if this ok. They are also requesting to take picture or video of whole pick-up process.

Regards
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 05 February 2019 16:51
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC);
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [ ] - packaging required

Hi,

The package will be sent via UN2814 (P650 packaging) and the shipping description and pictures are in the link. The package will be overpacked in dry ice (PI 954) probably around 10-15 kgs depending on where the sample is going to and how long transit will be so I would guess around 20 kgs. The dimensions should be 15 3/8 x 13 5/8 x 12 3/4”.

https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/ltdg/page-1296.html

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-02-01 10:39 AM
To: [ ]
Cc: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [ ] - packaging required

Hi Angelo,

The shipment will contain RG4 agents (Ebola and Nipha viruses).
I cc'd my colleagues Anders and people from our shipping and receiving and they can answer your questions properly.

Best,

Qiu

---

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca]
Sent: January 31, 2019 11:37 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: [Redacted] - packaging required

Hi Qiu,

See below

---

National Microbiology Laboratory
From: Xiangguo Qiu, M.D.
Public Health Agency of Canada
1015 Arlington Street, H2A 0W1
(YWG): WINNIPEG MB CAN

CONSG: Wuhan Institute of Virology, C
ATTN: Chinese Academy of Sciences
Xiao Hong Shan 44, Wuhan

(WUH): WUHAN CHN
Hi there,

Which Shipment we are talking about here? Pls can you specify?

Best regards,

Xiangguo Qiu, M.D
Research Scientist
Head, Vaccine Development & Antiviral Therapy
Special Pathogens Program
National Microbiology Laboratory
Public Health Agency of Canada
1015 Arlington Street H2410
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2

Adjunct Professor
Dept. of Medical Microbiology
University of Manitoba
Ph: 1-204-789-5097 (lab)
    1-204-784-7548 (O)
Fax: 1-204-789-2140
email: xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-01-31 10:25 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: packaging required

Hi there,

Can you please confirm if you require UN2814 packaging for your shipment. Also if you are providing packaging can you provide the below.

1. Pictures of the UN2814 packaging
2. dimensions
3. weight of product

Thanks,
Thanks Heidi.

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 2:47 PM
To: Audette, Luc (PHAC/ASPC) <luc.audette@canada.ca>
Subject: FW: ERAP 2019-02 Shipping Req. for China Shipment

Hi Luc,

This is what Anders has sent so far – I think this has everything you’re looking for.

Thanks,
Heidi

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 12:19 PM
To: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Letkeman, Paul (PHAC/ASPC) <paul.letkeman@canada.ca>; Pushka, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.pushka@canada.ca>; Ashley, Don (PHAC/ASPC) <don.ashley@canada.ca>
Cc: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lmco@canada.ca>
Subject: Shipping Req. for China Shipment

Hi Mike/Paul/Don,

Please see attached shipping requisition, sorry for filling everyone’s mailbox with these files again.

Thanks!

Anders Leung
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Dear [Name],

Thank you for your information.

We hope that the shipment can be started on Thursday morning as planned, because all relevant departments and personnel in China have been prepared for the shipment on Thursday, and it is better not to change the time.

In addition, taking photos or video is not a necessary requirement. We have discussed this matter with Anders before, and everything will be executed according to the regulations of PHAC.

Most importantly, we hope to know the flight routing and time information as soon as possible, thank you!

Please cc all the following email to [Name] who is the general coordinator in charge of the transportation in China. Thank you very much!

Best wishes,

[Name]

Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS

---原始邮件---
主题：RE: packaging required
发件人：[Name]
收件人：[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]
抄送：[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]，[Name]

Good morning,

We have received the ok to send for this shipment. Please confirm if we can pickup the shipment on Friday morning? We would have to send the dry ice data logger to our agent today so they can have it in place for tomorrow.

Also, our China office has asked that you take pictures/video during the packing of the shipment. Is this possible?

Please confirm.
Hello Anders

Thank you for the paperwork. Once the paperwork has been approved we will contact you to confirm a pick up date and time. We will also advise the routing.

Regards,

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 27 March 2019 1:00 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Dredot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required
Please see attached customs invoice and revised shippers declaration. The shipment will be ready for pickup tomorrow morning at 10:00, again can you please provide us with the route info so we can activate the ERAP teams.

Thanks!
Anders

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-27 10:59 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [redacted] packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please provide a customs invoice with the following information (if applicable):

Shipper: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Consignee: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Incoterms: EXW
Cargo description: (please confirm with Shipper for below)
Ebola virus// 24vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Nipah virus// 6vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Total value:
Package in dry ice:

Please send us the invoice at your earliest convenience.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact our office.

Regards,
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 27 March 2019 12:03 AM
To: [REDACTED] Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC);
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: [REDACTED] - packaging required

Hi [REDACTED],

Can you please send me the flight route for the package so we can activate the provincial ERAP teams?

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 7:58 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC);
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] - packaging required

Hello Andres,

Well received.

Thank you
Hi,

Please see attached documents (signed copy will accompany the shipment), please let me know if I am missing any documents. Again please let us know if Thursday or Friday will work for sample pickup.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xianguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 1:01 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [biol] packaging required

Hi Anders,

Pls can you send what paper work required for us to [redacted]

Thanks!
Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:46 AM
To: [redacted]; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) [redacted]
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) [redacted]
Subject: RE: [biol] packaging required

Hi [redacted]

If we can schedule this for Thursday or Friday morning that would be great.

Thanks!

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:56 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xianguo.qiu@canada.ca> [redacted]
Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please advise when shipment will be ready for pick up as requested by our office they would like this to arrive before April 1st. Please forward all paperwork at your earliest convenience in order for us to get the ok to send.

Regards,

Hi,

I think that the best contact would be the company that produces the packaging Saf-T-Pak Inc., they should be able to provide you some standards testing/certificates.


Anders
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi,

My colleague Anders will assist the shipping and he is confused about the request from your side. He will try to help with your request but may need your clarification.

Best regards,

Qiu

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-02-27 5:15 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); [redacted]
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello,

Client has requested you provide certificate approval since inner DG package provide by you, template now attached.

Best Regards,

---

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this e-mail unless absolutely necessary

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 26 February 2019 11:53
To: [redacted] Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required
Hi,

That is correct, it should be PI620. How in-depth would you like for the pick up process I don't really think we can make a video, maybe pictures?

Thanks!
Anders

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-02-20 7:22 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [redacted] packaging required

Hello Andre,

Client is asking the PI should be 620 instead of 650, please advise if this ok, They are also requesting to take picture or video of whole pick-up process.

Regards
Hey Heidi,

I know it's a new process so in case the package is going through Toronto airport, don't forget to add their hazmat team to the notifications. Gene said he set up a group email so it should be easy to add them.

Allan

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>
CC: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

**new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA**

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433

**nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA**

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guerico, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guerico@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.sp-lnm.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.csfch.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.oscml.lgistics-lnmco@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.oscml.support-lnmco@canada.ca>; ***@gov.mb.ca; gc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: HPSC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.oscml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by *** to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (666)262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
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Fleury, Teresa (PHAC/ASPC)

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:42 AM  
To: OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Fingers crossed!

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:42 AM  
To: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>  
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

I'm just really hoping that this goes through Vancouver....

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>  
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:39 AM  
To: OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMC0.ASPC@CANADA.CA>  
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Hey Heidi,

I know it's a new process so in case the package is going through Toronto airport, don't forget to add their hazmat team to the notifications. Gene said he set up a group email so it should be easy to add them.

Allan

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM  
To: OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMC0.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matt.w.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNMC0 Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <nml.sp-lnm.asp@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmc0.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmc0.asp@canada.ca>; [REDACTED]@gov.mb.ca; PHAC.F OC_NML_OCD_Group F.ASPC <OC_NML_OCD_Group@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>  
Cc: HPDC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>  
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director  
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch  
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health

1 CAN.PHAC.0001.0035  
161 of 267
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guerco, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guerco@canada.ca>; Dreibot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.dreibot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support.soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; lnmco@novmb.ca; ppoc_ml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gov.ca; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: HPoC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [redacted] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
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Hi Marie,

Thanks for getting back to us. Here are the answers to the questions:

1. Not sure where the A-2001-00241-4 permit came from but if its for RG2/3 agents then please keep it off the letter
2. A-2008-00395-4 is the Uganda strain and the new name is Bundibugyo. Sorry for the confusion.

Since there seems to be changes to names of viruses over the past 20 years and just to get ensure that my records match the official import permits issued by CFIA would it be possible to get a copy of all the CFIA import permits issued to the PHAC CL-4 program as well? I think this should also expedite future requests.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 11:27 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Subject: Import permit numbers?

FYI

From: Gharib, Marie (CFIA/ACIA) <marie.gharib@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 11:10 AM
To: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Cc: Safronetz, David (PHAC/ASPC) <david.safronetz@canada.ca>; Laverdiere, Amanda (CFIA/ACIA) <amanda.laverdiere@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: New OBCS permit manager

Hi Allari,

After reviewing the transfer request form and all of the original permits, a few clarifications are required in order to proceed with the completion of your transfer request.
1. A-2001-00241-6 - This permit is for RG3 and RG2 pathogens. (Mopeia virus, Mobala virus, Oliveros virus and Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus [Lab-Adapted Armstrong and We strains])
   Would you like to include these products on the transfer letter?

2. A-2008-00395-4 - We’d like to confirm that the “Ebola Uganda Strain” as listed on the original permit is the “Bundibugyo” strain that is outlined in the description of the transfer request form.

3. The following are not listed in any of the original permit numbers that were indicated on the transfer request form:
   Ebola strains: Mavinga, Makona, Kikwit, Bundibugyo, MA-EOBV, guinea pig adapted EBOV, GP-adapted Sudan
   Henipavirus strains: Malaysia/Bangladesh

   Were these strains imported? If so, please provide the original permit numbers of the permits used to import them.

Once we receive the missing information, we will proceed to process your request.

Thank you,
Marie

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 9:01 AM
To: Gharib, Marie (CFIA/ACIA)
Subject: RE: New OBCS permit manager

Thanks, Marie! 😊

From: Gharib, Marie (CFIA/ACIA) <marie.gharib@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-27 6:29 AM
To: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: New OBCS permit manager

Good morning Allan,

We are currently working on your transfer request (assorted strains of Ebola viruses, etc.) and hope to get it out to you before this Friday.

If you have any further questions, do not hesitate to contact me.

Marie

From: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 2:06 PM
To: Gharib, Marie (CFIA/ACIA)
Subject: RE: New OBCS permit manager

Hi Marie,

Just so you don’t have to scroll all the way down the email chain, our Special Pathogens unit is planning on sending RG4 samples to China in the summer. However, by the time China’s lab is able to access the samples due to a shutdown of our CL4 lab, we won’t be able to access the samples. Therefore, our plan is to transfer these samples over to NCFAD for temporary storage until we can ship. Our CL4 manager, Anders Leung, filed the application last Monday, so I was following up in the hopes we could have the Transfer Permit before we shutdown at the end of this week. We’re much appreciative of any assistance you could offer with this.

Regards,

Allan

Allan Lau
Biosisk Officer | Agent de biolistique
Safety and Environmental Services | Services de sécurité et Services environnementaux
National Microbiology Laboratory at the | Laboratoire national de microbiologie au
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
1015 Arlington Street, Winnipeg, MB, Canada, R3E 3P6
NEW: Allan.lau@canada.ca
Telephone | Téléphone 204-784-5986 / Facsimile | Télécopieur 204-789-2069
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

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From: Falardeaud, Émilie (PHAC/ASPC) <emilie.falardeau@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 12:05 PM
To: Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Cc: Gharib, Marie (CFIA/ACIA) <marie.gharib@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: New OBCS permit manager

Hi Allain,

Marie Gharib, is the one who replaced me. I have cc’d her on this email so that you can connect.
Cheers!

Emilie Falardeau

Manager, Compliance and Enforcement
Centre for Biosecurity
Public Health Agency of Canada / Government of Canada
Eamilie.Falardeau@Canada.ca / Tel.: 343-542-3098

Gestionnaire, conformité et application de la loi
Centre de biosécurité
Agence de la santé publique du Canada / Gouvernement du Canada
Emilie.Falardeau@Canada.ca / Tel.: 343-542-3098

From: Lau, Allan {PHAC/ASPC} <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 12:32 PM
To: Falardeau, Emilie {PHAC/ASPC} <emilie.falardeau@canada.ca>
Subject: New OBGS permit manager

Hi Emilie,

Would you happen to know who replaced you in OBGS? We submitted a CFIA transfer permit application last Monday and I wanted to follow up on it. Our CL4 is shutting down Friday so we were hoping to get the transfer permit in time to transfer samples over to NCFAD.

Thanks and best regards,
Allan

Allan Lau
Biosrisk Officer | Agent de biorisque
Safety and Environmental Services | Services de sécurité et Services environnementaux
National Microbiology Laboratory at the | Laboratoire national de microbiologie au
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
1015 Arlington Street, Winnipeg, MB, Canada, R3E 3P6
NEW: Allan.Lau@canada.ca
Telephone | Téléphone 204-784-5986 / Facsimile | Télécopieur 204-789-2069
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

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Dear Anders and [redacted],

[redacted] is ready to wait, and [redacted] will help to handle cargo then. So when you have the information of flight itinerary, please inform us ASAP.

Thank you all and with best wishes.

Virus Resource and Bioinformation Center,
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Date: 2019-03-29 03:30
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: [redacted] - packaging required

Perfect! Can you please send me the flight itinerary?

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-28 12:38 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: Re: [redacted] - packaging required

We can pickup Friday at 10am.
Dear Anders and dear

Ok, we will make corresponding preparations for shipment start on Friday.

Best wishes,

-------- 原始邮件 --------
主题：RE打包 - packaging required
发件人："Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)"
收件人："Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)"
抄送："NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)","Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)","Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)","OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)","Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)"

Hi

The shipment will be ready for tomorrow morning. Please confirm the pick up time and provide an update for the routing of flights. Unfortunately there is a strict no video/picture policy for this building so this is a no-go.

Thanks!
Anders
Good morning,

We have received the ok to send for this shipment. Please confirm if we can pickup the shipment on Friday morning? We would have to send the dry ice data logger to our agent today so they can have it in place for tomorrow.

Also, our China office has asked that you take pictures/video during the packing of the shipment. Is this possible?

Please confirm.

---

Hello Anders

Thank you for the paperwork. Once the paperwork has been approved we will contact you to confirm a pick up date and time. We will also advise the routing.
Regards,

Hi,

Please see attached customs invoice and revised shippers declaration. The shipment will be ready for pickup tomorrow morning at 10:00, again can you please provide us with the route info so we can activate the ERAP teams.

Thanks!
Anders

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please provide a customs invoice with the following information (if applicable):

Shipper: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Consignee: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Incoterms: EXW
Cargo description: (please confirm with Shipper for below)
Ebola virus// 24vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Nipah virus// 6 vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Total value:
Package in dry ice:

Please send us the invoice at your earliest convenience.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact our office.

Regards.

---

Hi [Name],

Can you please send me the flight route for the package so we can activate the provincial ERAP teams?

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

---

Hello Andres,
Well received.

Thank you

Hi,

Please see attached documents (signed copy will accompany the shipment), please let me know if I am missing any documents. Again please let us know if Thursday or Friday will work for sample pickup.

Thanks!
Anders

---

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 1:01 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; [redacted]
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi Anders,

Pls can you send what paper work required for us to [redacted]?

Thanks!
Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:46 AM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi 

If we can schedule this for Thursday or Friday morning that would be great.

Thanks!

From:anders.leung@canada.ca
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:56 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please advise when shipment will be ready for pick up as requested by our office they would like this to arrive before April 1st. Please forward all paperwork at your earliest convenience in order for us to get the ok to send.

Regards,
Hi,

I think that the best contact would be the company that produces the packaging Saf-T-Pak Inc., they should be able to provide you some standards testing/certificates.


Anders

Hi

My colleague Anders will assist the shipping and he is confused about the request from your side. He will try to help with your request but may need your clarification.

Best regards,

Qiu

Hello,

Client has requested you provide certificate approval since inner DG package provide by you, template now attached.

Best Regards,
Hi,

That is correct, it should be PI620. How in-depth would you like for the pick up process I don't really think we can make a video, maybe pictures?

Thanks!
Anders

Hello Andre,

Client is asking the PI should be 620 instead of 650, please advise if this ok, They are also requesting to take picture or video of whole pick-up process.

Regards
Fleury, Teresa (PHAC/ASPC)

From: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 7:55 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Anderson, Kelly (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: ERAP deactivation

Please make sure you cc the Toronto airport Hazmat team; Kelly has forwarded this info to EOC a couple of weeks ago, thanks

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 7:53 AM
To: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC) <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>; OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; ___________________________@gov.mb.ca
Subject: RE: ERAP deactivation

Just a quick update - it looks like is going to route this shipment through Toronto.

From: Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC) <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-29 7:51 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; ___________________________@gov.mb.ca
Subject: RE: ERAP deactivation

Yes, this is correct, thanks

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 3:44 PM
To: ___________________________@gov.mb.ca; OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Krishnan, Jay (PHAC/ASPC) <jay.krishnan@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: ERAP deactivation

I spoke to Jay Krishnan, our ERAP National Coordinator, about this today and Jay indicated that for this international shipment, the ERAP teams can stand down after the flight has left the airport in Vancouver (we are assuming that the RG4 shipment will be routed through Vancouver but this has not yet been confirmed by ___________________________).

Jay - can you confirm that this is the procedure we will follow?

Thanks,
Heidi

From: ___________________________@gov.mb.ca
Sent: 2019-03-28 3:37 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>
Subject: ERAP deactivation
At what geographical point does the ERAP get deactivated? I understood it to be when the shipment is received. Thanks.
Fleury, Teresa (PHAC/ASPC)

From: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:08 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

HPOC acknowledges receipt. Thank you,

NEW – Unsubscribe feature below

Regards | Sincères salutations

Health Portfolio Operations Centre
Public Health Agency of Canada | Government of Canada
PHAC-ASPC, HPOC-COPS@canada.ca | Tel: 613-952-7940
Centre des opérations du portefeuille de la santé
Agence de la santé publique du Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
PHAC-ASPC, HPOC-COPS@canada.ca | Tél: 613-952-7940

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:03 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)<matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC)
      <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drobot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)<mike.drobot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; FDC_Developments@gov.mb.ca <FDC_Developments@gov.mb.ca>; PHAC.F DC_NML_OCD_Group F ASPC <OC_NML_OCD_Group@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.erap-guelph.asp.aspc@canada.ca>;

---

CC: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)<phac-aspc.hpo-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

1  CAN.PHAC.0001.0035  180 of 287
Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provide when available.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.sp-inm.asp@canada.ca>; CSHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; specimen-rcv@gov.mb.ca'; oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******
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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>;
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [REDACTED] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (888)262-8433
****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ****

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (888)262-8433
****nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ****

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
Hi Qiu,

Can you please ensure the dangerous goods declaration is revised.

The one we have on file for this shipment, doesn't show the dry ice quantity.

Thanks,
1:30-2pm pick up should be fine for us. And the dry ice is needed for this shipment! Thanks for the inquiry.
Anders and Paul/Don, pls correct me if there is an issue with the new pick-up time.

Thanks!

Qiu

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-29 7:43 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); [Redacted] Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Good morning Xiangguo Qiu,

We will have to push the pickup back a little, because the temperature got bumped on the flight and will only arrive in Winnipeg at noon. We can pickup around 1:30-2pm. This doesn’t affect the planned flight to Toronto.

Also, can you confirm if this shipment has dry ice? The DG Declaration doesn’t show a dry ice quantity, so want to make sure its corrected if needed. Need to confirm this before booking the onward flight to Beijing.

Thanks,
Perfect! Can you please send me the flight itinerary?

From: 2019-03-28 12:38 PM
Sent: 2019-03-28 12:38 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

We can pickup Friday at 10am.

From: 28 March 2019 10:40
Sent: 28 March 2019 10:40
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: 回复: packaging required

Dear Anders and dear

Ok, we will make corresponding preparations for shipment start on Friday.

Best wishes,

来自我的华为手机

-------- 原始邮件 --------
主题：RE: packaging required
发件人："Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)"
收件人："Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)"

Hi

The shipment will be ready for tomorrow morning. Please confirm the pick up time and provide an update for the routing of flights. Unfortunately there is a strict no video/picture policy for this building so this is a no-go.

Thanks!
Anders
Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this e-mail unless absolutely necessary.

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-28 8:24 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [Redacted] - packaging required

Good morning,

We have received the ok to send for this shipment. Please confirm if we can pickup the shipment on Friday morning? We would have to send the dry ice data logger to our agent today so they can have it in place for tomorrow.

Also, our China office has asked that you take pictures/video during the packing of the shipment. Is this possible?

Please confirm.
Hello Anders

Thank you for the paperwork. Once the paperwork has been approved we will contact you to confirm a pick up date and time. We will also advise the routing.

Regards,

Hi,

Please see attached customs invoice and revised shippers declaration. The shipment will be ready for pickup tomorrow morning at 10:00, again can you please provide us with the route info so we can activate the ERAP teams.

Thanks!
Anders
Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please provide a customs invoice with the following information (if applicable):

Shipper: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Consignee: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Incoterms: EXW
Cargo description: (please confirm with Shipper for below)
Ebola virus/ 24vial (500ul/vial)/ unit price:
Nipah virus/ 6vial (500ul/vial)/ unit price:
Total value:
Package in dry ice:

Please send us the invoice at your earliest convenience.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact our office.

Regards,
Can you please send me the flight route for the package so we can activate the provincial ERAP teams?

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

Hi [REDACTED]

Well received.

Thank you
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hi,

Please see attached documents (signed copy will accompany the shipment), please let me know if I am missing any documents. Again please let us know if Thursday or Friday will work for sample pickup.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 1:01 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hi Anders,

Pls can you send what paper work required for us to [redacted]?

Thanks!
Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-25 11:46 AM
To: [redacted]; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [redacted]
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hi [redacted],

If we can schedule this for Thursday or Friday morning that would be great.

Thanks!
Leung

From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:56 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please advise when shipment will be ready for pick up as requested by our office they would like this to arrive before April 1st. Please forward all paperwork at your earliest convenience in order for us to get the ok to send.

Regards,
Hi,

I think that the best contact would be the company that produces the packaging Saf-T-Pak Inc., they should be able to provide you some standards testing/certificates.


Anders

Hi,

My colleague Anders will assist the shipping and he is confused about the request from your side. He will try to help with your request but may need your clarification.

Best regards,
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 26 February 2019 11:53
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi,

That is correct, it should be P1620. How in-depth would you like for the pick up process I don’t really think we can make a video, maybe pictures?

Thanks!
Anders
Hello Andre,

Client is asking the PI should be 620 instead of 650, please advise if this ok, They are also requesting to take picture or video of whole pick-up process.

Regards
Hi [REDACTED]

Have you figured out the flight schedules yet? The ERAP teams will need this information.

Thanks!
Anders

---

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:49 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; [REDACTED] Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspco.cnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] - packaging required

Thank you,
Revised version attached.

Hi Anders,

On the declaration (see snapshot below), you need to add a few things:

- "24HR EMERGENCY CONTACT" (before the Canutec #)
- "PERSON RESPONSIBLE" (before the PHAC #)

Additional Handling Information

1-888-CAN-UTE (226-8832), 613-996-6666
PHAC NML EOC Director: 1-866-262-8433
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Sent: 29 March 2019 10:23
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

We will have the dry ice in the package.

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:22 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Perfect. Thank you Anders.

And just to confirm; is [Redacted] providing the dry ice for you?
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Sent: 29 March 2019 10:20
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebok, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi [Name]

Attached is the revised and final signed copy of the shippers declaration and the commercial invoice, which includes the dry ice (15kg). We will have the shipment ready for the scheduled 1:30.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:44 AM
To: [Name]@phac-phac.gc.ca; Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebok, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebok@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Cc: [Name]@phac-phac.gc.ca
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi [Name]

1:30-2pm pick up should be fine for us. And the dry ice is needed for this shipment! Thanks for the inquiry. Anders and Paul/Don, pls correct me if there is an issue with the new pick-up time.

Thanks!

Qiu

From: [Name]@phac-phac.gc.ca
Sent: 2019-03-29 7:43 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); [Name]@phac-phac.gc.ca; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebok, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Good morning Xiangguo Qiu,

We will have to push the pickup back a little, because the temperature got bumped on the flight and will only arrive in Winnipeg at noon. We can pickup around 1:30-2pm. This doesn’t affect the planned flight to Toronto.

Also, can you confirm if this shipment has dry ice? The DG Declaration doesn’t show a dry ice quantity, so want to make sure its corrected if needed. Need to confirm this before booking the onward flight to Beijing.

Thanks,
Perfect! Can you please send me the flight itinerary?

We can pickup Friday at 10am.

Ok, we will make corresponding preparations for shipment start on Friday.
Best wishes,

来自我的华为手机

------- 原始邮件 -------
主题：RE: packaging required
发件人："Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)"
收件人："Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)"
抄送："NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)", "Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)", "Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)", "OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)", "Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)"

Hi,

The shipment will be ready for tomorrow morning. Please confirm the pick up time and provide an update for the routing of flights. Unfortunately there is a strict no video/picture policy for this building so this is a no-go.

Thanks!
Anders
Good morning,

We have received the ok to send for this shipment. Please confirm if we can pickup the shipment on Friday morning? We would have to send the dry ice data logger to our agent today so they can have it in place for tomorrow.

Also, our China office has asked that you take pictures/video during the packing of the shipment. Is this possible?

Please confirm.

Hello Anders

Thank you for the paperwork. Once the paperwork has been approved we will contact you to confirm a pick up date and time. We will also advise the routing.

Regards,
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 27 March 2019 1:00 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); 
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: ---------- packaging required

Hi,

Please see attached customs invoice and revised shippers declaration. The shipment will be ready for pickup tomorrow morning at 10:00, again can you please provide us with the route info so we can activate the ERAP teams.

Thanks!
Anders

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-27 10:59 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; [Redacted] Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; [Redacted] NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca
Subject: RE: ---------- packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please provide a customs invoice with the following information (if applicable):

Shipper: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Consignee: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Incoterms: EXW
Cargo description: (please confirm with Shipper for below)
Ebola virus// 24vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Nipah virus//6vial(500ul/vial)// unit price:
Total value:
Package in dry ice:

Please send us the invoice at your earliest convenience.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact our office.

Regards,
Hi, 

Can you please send me the flight route for the package so we can activate the provincial ERAP teams?

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

Hello Andres,

Well received.

Thank you,
Hi,

Please see attached documents (signed copy will accompany the shipment), please let me know if I am missing any documents. Again please let us know if Thursday or Friday will work for sample pickup.

Thanks!
Anders

---

Hi Anders,

Pls can you send what paper work required for us to

Thanks!
Qiu
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:46 AM  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: ! packaging required  

Hi!  

If we can schedule this for Thursday or Friday morning that would be great.  

Thanks!  

From:  
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:56 AM  
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>;  
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>  
Subject: RE: ! packaging required  

Hello Anders/Xiangguo  

Please advise when shipment will be ready for pick up as requested by our office they would like this to arrive before April 1st. Please forward all paperwork at your earliest convenience in order for us to get the ok to send.  

Regards,
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 27 February 2019 6:34 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC);
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi,

I think that the best contact would be the company that produces the packaging Saf-T-Pak Inc., they should be able to provide you some standards testing/certificates.


Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-02-27 5:28 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi,

My colleague Anders will assist the shipping and he is confused about the request from your side. He will try to help with your request but may need your clarification.

Best regards,

Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-02-27 5:15 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello,

Client has requested you provide certificate approval since inner DG package provide by you, template now attached.

Best Regards,
Hi,

That is correct, it should be PI620. How in-depth would you like for the pick up process I don’t really think we can make a video, maybe pictures?

Thanks!
Anders

---

Hello Andre,

Client is asking the PI should be 620 instead of 650, please advise if this ok, They are also requesting to take picture or video of whole pick-up process.

Regards
Fleury, Teresa (PHAC/ASPC)

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) on behalf of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 3:01 PM
To: Frost, Shelley (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Hi Shelley,

Yes, we're still waiting for the pick-up – I just checked about 10 minutes ago and [redacted] has not arrived yet at the NML.

The tracking # for this shipment is [redacted] but I do not yet know the exact routing (other than that this shipment will travel first to Toronto).

Just FYI – I spoke to the ERAP National Coordinator (Jay Krishnan) yesterday and he indicated that the ERAP teams can stand-down once the shipment leaves the airport in Toronto.

I'll be sending another email as soon as I hear that the shipment is ready for departure from the NML.

Thanks,
Heidi

From: Frost, Shelley (PHAC/ASPC) <shelley.frost@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-29 2:58 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml-dir-lnmco.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.erap-guelph.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Hi again, Heidi,

I was just wondering if you still waiting for shipping details from [redacted]?

Shelley

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:40 AM
To: Frost, Shelley (PHAC/ASPC) <shelley.frost@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Yes, received.

Thanks,
Heidi

From: Frost, Shelley (PHAC/ASPC) <shelley.frost@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:39 AM
Hi,

I received an acknowledgement from HPOC. Just wanted to make sure the message got through to the NML OC?

Thx!

Shelley

From: Frost, Shelley (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:27 AM
To: OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; "OCNML.Doc (PHAC/ASPC)" <phac.ocnml.doc.aspc@canada.ca>; HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Cc: guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.erap-guelph.aspc@canada.ca> <phac.erap-guelph.aspc@canada.ca>; Cornelisse, Mette (PHAC/ASPC) <mette.cornelisse@canada.ca>; Nichani, Anil (PHAC/ASPC) <anil.nichani@canada.ca>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drobot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drobot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp@canada.ca>; Kernaghan, Shaun (PHAC/ASPC) <shaun.kernaghan@canada.ca>; Cook, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.cook@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Hi,

Shawn Kernaghan and Matt Cook from the Ontario ERAP team will be on standby for this shipment. Contact details below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shaun Kernaghan</th>
<th>Research Technologist</th>
<th>Work: 519 826-2618</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHAC-LFZ</td>
<td>110 Stone Road W</td>
<td>Cell:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelph, ON, N1G 3W4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fax: 519 822-2280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:shaun.kernaghan@canada.ca">shaun.kernaghan@canada.ca</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matthew Cook</th>
<th>Research Technologist</th>
<th>Work: 519 826-2648</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHAC-LFZ</td>
<td>110 Stone Road W</td>
<td>Cell:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelph, ON, N1G 3W4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fax: 519 822-2280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:matthew.cook@canada.ca">matthew.cook@canada.ca</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shelley Frost

Safety Manager, IDPC
Public Health Agency of Canada, Government of Canada
Shelley.Frost@canada.ca / 519-826-2604

Gestionnaire de sécurité, PCMI
Agence du la santé publique du Canada, Gouvernement du Canada
Shelley.Frost@canada.ca / 519-826-2604

From: guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.erap-guelph.aspc@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:03 AM
To: Frost, Shelley (PHAC/ASPC) <shelley.frost@canada.ca>; Gill, Chad (PHAC/ASPC) <chad.gill@canada.ca>; Ziebell, Kim
Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.
Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: HPDC-OOPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpdc-oops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (668)262-8433

***new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
 Téléphone (668)262-8433

***** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sented: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.ca@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistique.lnmco.asp.ca@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support.soutien.lnmco.asp.ca@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support.soutien.lnmco.asp.ca@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Cc: HPDC-OOPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpdc-oops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [REDACTED] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.
Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433
****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA *******

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie/Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
 Téléphone (866)262-8433
**** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA *******

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We acknowledge receipt. Thank you.

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Regards | Sincères salutations

Health Portfolio Operations Centre
Public Health Agency of Canada | Government of Canada
PHAC-ASPC/HPOC-COPS@canada.ca | Tel: 613-952-7940
Centre des opérations du portefeuille de la santé
Agence de la santé publique du Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
PHAC-ASPC/HPOC-COPS@canada.ca | Tel: 613-952-7940

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 4:38 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml-dir-lnmco.aspc@canada.ca>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC) <phar.erp-guelph.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; erap@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'; guelph@gtaa.com'
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoec-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure
The Risk Group 4 shipment has been picked up by [REDACTED] from the NML in Winnipeg.

The tracking number for this shipment is [REDACTED]. This shipment is en-route to China via Toronto.

Please note - once this shipment departs from the airport in Toronto, ERAP teams can stand down.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

*****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA *****

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
 Téléphone (866)262-8433

***** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA *****

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:03 AM
To: Gilmore, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmore@canada.ca>; Guerco, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guerco@canada.ca>; Dredot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.dredot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.so-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAHS SES (PHAC/ASPC) <cschahs.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnmllogistics-lnmc.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnmllnmc-support-soutien.asp@canada.ca>; 'bcnml.ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca' <bcnml.ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>; erap.guelph@canada.ca; bcanmlspecimens@gtaa.com; bcanmlspecimens2@gtaa.com; bcanmlspecimens3@gtaa.com; bcanmlspecimens4@gtaa.com; bcanmlspecimens5@gtaa.com; bcanmlspecimens6@gtaa.com; bcanmlspecimens7@gtaa.com;
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch

CAN.PHAC.0001.0035 215 of 267
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp@canada.ca>; CSIHAB SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.csiahb1 ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; [REDACTED]@gov.mb.ca'; [REDACTED]@gov.mb.ca'; [REDACTED]<oc_nml_occ_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; [REDACTED]<oc_nml_occ_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

***new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

Director du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
 Téléphone (866)262-8433

*** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******
From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)

Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM

To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; nml.specimen.receiving@phac-aspc.gc.ca; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlml.species.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>

Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>

Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [REDACTED] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433
****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433
****nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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confidentielles. Si vous n'êtes pas le bénéficiaire voulu ou une personne responsable de livrer cette transmission au bénéficiaire voulu, vous ne pouvez pas dévoiler, copier, ou distribuer cette transmission ou prendre de l'action dans la confiance dessus. Si vous avez reçu cette transmission dans l'erreur, s'il vous plaît contacter l'expéditeur immédiatement par le courriel électronique de retour et immédiatement effacer alors ce courriel y compris tous attaches. Merci.
From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) <heidi.wood@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: March 29, 2019 3:38 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; guelph.erap (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.erap-guelph.asp.ca@canada.ca>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>; guelph.erp@gtaa.com’ <guelph.erp@gtaa.com>
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

Noted. Thanks.

The Risk Group 4 shipment has been picked up by [REDACTED] from the NML in Winnipeg.

The tracking number for this shipment is [REDACTED] This shipment is en-route to China via Toronto.

Please note - once this shipment departs from the airport in Toronto, ERAP teams can stand down.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
 Téléphone (866)262-8433

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada  R3E 3R2
From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASP) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASP)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:03 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASP) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASP) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebout, Mike (PHAC/ASP) <mike.drebout@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASP) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.asp@canada.ca>; CSSAH SES (PHAC/ASP) <phac.cssah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASP) <phac.ocnml.logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASP) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; [redacted]@gov.mb.ca' <[redacted]@gov.mb.ca>; oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca <oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASP) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>; erap.guelph@canada.ca; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASP (PHAC/ASP) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM  
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCN.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp@aspc.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmcn.asp@aspc.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmcn.asp@aspc.ca>; "oc_mnl_oed_group@gov.mb.ca" <oc_mnl_oed_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca>; Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.asp@aspc.ca>  
Cc: HPPO-COPS, PHAC; PHAC/ASPC <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>  
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCN.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433

**** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCN.ASPC@CANADA.CA ******

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Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [redacted] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
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**new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMC.ASPC@CANADA.CA**

Directeur du centre des opérations
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**nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMC.ASPC@CANADA.CA**

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
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Fleury, Teresa (PHAC/ASPC)

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-30 1:20 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); 
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drobot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC); 
Subject: Re: packaging required

Hi all,

Don went in and got the number but it is Thanks Don, you're our hero!

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: 
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 5:08 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); 
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drobot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC); 
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello Leung/Andres,

All exports to china need shipper's exporter# on MAWB, please advise.

Regards
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 29 March 2019 17:36
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>;
Subject: RE: - packaging required

Mainly an update to our collaborators in China, but the package has left the NML about an hour ago. We will be tracking the package over the weekend and hopefully it arrives safely in Beijing. Thanks everyone for assisting in this package.

Anders
Subject: RE: packaging required

Thank you,

---

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this e-mail unless absolutely necessary

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 29 March 2019 10:43
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: packaging required

Revised version attached.

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:29 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-nml-specimen-receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hi Anders,

On the declaration (see snapshot below), you need to add a few things:
- "24HR EMERGENCY CONTACT" (before the Canutec #)
- "PERSON RESPONSIBLE" (before the PHAC #)
Additional Handling Information
1-888-CAN-UTECC (226-8832), 613-995-6666
PHAC NML EOC Director: 1-866-262-8433

---

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 29 March 2019 10:23
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Div-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: ___ - packaging required

We will have the dry ice in the package.

---

From: ___
Sent: 2019-03-29 9:22 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Div-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: ___ - packaging required
Perfect. Thank you Anders.

And just to confirm; is [redacted] providing the dry ice for you?

---

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this email unless absolutely necessary

**From:** Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
**Sent:** 29 March 2019 10:20
**To:** Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [redacted]
**Cc:** NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC);
**Subject:** RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hi [redacted],

Attached is the revised and final signed copy of the shippers declaration and the commercial invoice, which includes the dry ice (15kg). We will have the shipment ready for the scheduled 1:30.

Thanks!
Anders

**From:** Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
**Sent:** 2019-03-29 8:44 AM
**To:** [redacted] Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; [redacted]
**Cc:** NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>
**Subject:** RE: [redacted] - packaging required

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5
CAN.PHAC.0001.0035
227 of 267
Hi 

1:30-2pm pick up should be fine for us. And the dry ice is needed for this shipment! Thanks for the inquiry. Anders and Paul/Don, pls correct me if there is an issue with the new pick-up time.

Thanks!

Qiu

From: [redacted]  2019-03-29 7:43 AM
Sent: 2019-03-29 7:43 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); [redacted] Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC);
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Good morning Xiangguo Qiu,

We will have to push the pickup back a little, because the temperature got bumped on the flight and will only arrive in Winnipeg at noon. We can pickup around 1:30-2pm. This doesn't affect the planned flight to Toronto.

Also, can you confirm if this shipment has dry ice? The DG Declaration doesn't show a dry ice quantity, so want to make sure its corrected if needed. Need to confirm this before booking the onward flight to Beijing.

Thanks,
Perfect! Can you please send me the flight itinerary?

We can pickup Friday at 10am.

Ok, we will make corresponding preparations for shipment start on Friday.

Best wishes,

来自我的华为手机

The shipment will be ready for tomorrow morning. Please confirm the pickup time and provide an update for the routing of flights. Unfortunately there is a strict no video/picture policy for this building so this is a no-go.

Thanks!
Anders
Good morning,

We have received the ok to send for this shipment. Please confirm if we can pickup the shipment on Friday morning? We would have to send the dry ice data logger to our agent today so they can have it in place for tomorrow.

Also, our China office has asked that you take pictures/video during the packing of the shipment. Is this possible?

Please confirm.
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) [mailto:anders.leung@canada.ca]
Sent: 27 March 2019 1:00 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: - packaging required

Hi,

Please see attached customs invoice and revised shippers declaration. The shipment will be ready for pickup tomorrow morning at 10:00, again can you please provide us with the route info so we can activate the ERAP teams.

Thanks!
Anders

From: [name]
Sent: 2019-03-27 10:59 AM
Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please provide a customs invoice with the following information (if applicable):

Shipper: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Consignee: (company name, address, contact person, tel)
Incoterms: EXW
Cargo description: (please confirm with Shipper for below)
Ebola virus // 24 vial [500 ul/vial] // unit price:
Nipah virus // 6 vial [500 ul/vial] // unit price:
Total value:
Package in dry ice:

Please send us the invoice at your earliest convenience.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact our office.

Regards,
Hi

Can you please send me the flight route for the package so we can activate the provincial ERAP teams?

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 7:58 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hello Andres,

Well received.

Thank you
Hi,

Please see attached documents (signed copy will accompany the shipment), please let me know if I am missing any documents. Again please let us know if Thursday or Friday will work for sample pickup.

Thanks!
Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xianguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Sent: 2019-03-26 1:01 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; 
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: - packaging required

HI Anders,

Pls can you send what paper work required for us to 

Thanks!
Qiu

From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-26 11:46 AM
To: 
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: RE: - packaging required

Hi

If we can schedule this for Thursday or Friday morning that would be great.

Thanks!

From: 
Sent: 2019-03-26 10:56 AM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xianguo.qiu@canada.ca>; 
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>
Subject: RE: - packaging required

Hello Anders/Xiangguo

Please advise when shipment will be ready for pick up as requested by our office they would like this to arrive before April 1st. Please forward all paperwork at your earliest convenience in order for us to get the ok to send.

Regards,
Hi,

I think that the best contact would be the company that produces the packaging Saf-T-Pak Inc., they should be able to provide you some standards testing/certificates.


Anders

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-02-27 5:28 PM  
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>  
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>  
Subject: RE: packaging required  

Hi [name],

My colleague Anders will assist the shipping and he is confused about the request from your side. He will try to help with your request but may need your clarification.

Best regards,
Qiu

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2019-02-27 5:15 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); [Redacted]
Subject: RE: [Redacted] - packaging required

Hello,

Client has requested you provide certificate approval since inner DG package provide by you, template now attached.

Best Regards,

Hi,

That is correct, it should be PI620. How in-depth would you like for the pick up process I don’t really think we can make a video, maybe pictures?

Thanks!
Anders
Hello Andre,

Client is asking the PI should be 620 instead of 650, please advise if this ok, They are also requesting to take picture or video of whole pick-up process.

Regards
Hi Shelley,

The flight has departed but I'm just waiting for the Air Canada Cargo website to confirm that the shipment has departed on the flight. I'm assuming this is the case as the Air Canada website indicates that the flight has left the gate and the shipment was booked and accepted.

However, I have no idea how quickly the website is updated but I would say it is likely safe to stand down the ERAP teams.

Thanks,
Heidi

---

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: guelph, erap (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Sunday, March 31, 2019 2:51 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

Hi
Can you please confirm that the parcel has departed Toronto.
Thx
Shelley
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 7:16 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); NML Special Pathogens / LNMC Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC); CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); HOPC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: HOPC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

The RG4 shipment is scheduled to depart Toronto for Beijing on Air Canada Flight AC 031 on March 31 at 14:45 EDT.

The Air Canada Cargo air waybill tracking number for this shipment is [REDACTED]
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 3:38 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC); CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC); keraghel.sp-lnm-aspc@phac-aspc.gc.ca; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC);

Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

The Risk Group 4 shipment has been picked up by [REDACTED] from the NML in Winnipeg.

The tracking number for this shipment is [REDACTED] This shipment is en-route to China via Toronto.

Please note - once this shipment departs from the airport in Toronto, ERAP teams can stand down.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory / Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

********

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:03 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMC0 (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-
Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

DIRECTOR, NML/OC Attribution

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC,OCNML-DIR-LNMCO,ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <mathew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.sp-lnm.asp@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; ; logistique.lnmc0.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; ; logistique.lnmc0.asp@canada.ca>; ; logistique.lnmc0.asp@canada.ca>
Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
 Téléphone (866)262-8433

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drobot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drobot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CCAHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.caschah_ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistique.lnmc.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmc.asp@canada.ca>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>
Cc: HPSC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-asp@phac-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [redacted] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433
*****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMO.ASPC@CANADA.CA *******

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433
***** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMO.ASPC@CANADA.CA *******

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Acknowledge. Thank you.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Sunday, March 31, 2019 4:08 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC); CSCH AH SES (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); generic@gov.mb.ca; PHAC.F OC_NML_OCD_Grup_F.ASPC; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); guelph.erap (PHAC/ASPC);
guelph.erap@ga.com; guelph.erap@gov.ca.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com;
guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com.
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

Please be advised that the RG4 shipment has departed Toronto for Beijing on flight AC031.

ERAP teams can now stand down.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 6:16 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC); CSCH AH SES (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); generic@gov.mb.ca; PHAC.F OC_NML_OCD_Grup_F.ASPC; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); guelph.erap (PHAC/ASPC);
guelph.erap@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com;
guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com; guelph@ga.com.
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

The RG4 shipment is scheduled to depart Toronto for Beijing on Air Canada Flight AC 031 on March 31 at 14:45 EDT.

The Air Canada Cargo air waybill tracking number for this shipment is:

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 3:38 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmore, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike
The Risk Group 4 shipment has been picked up by [redacted] from the NML in Winnipeg.

The tracking number for this shipment is [redacted]. This shipment is en-route to China via Toronto.

Please note - once this shipment departs from the airport in Toronto, ERAP teams can stand down.

---

From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:03 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cscsah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmcn.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCN (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmcn.asp@canada.ca>; [redacted]@gov.mb.ca; 'oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca' 'oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>; erap.guelph@canada.ca; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; [redacted]@gtaa.com; Kernaghan, Shaun (PHAC/ASPC) <kernaghan.shaun@canada.ca>
Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

**new e-mail** PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ********

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433

**nouveau courriel** PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA ********

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.csc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics-logistique.lnmco.asp.csc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp.csc@canada.ca>; Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>

Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 29th. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebok, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebok@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.aso.asp@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>;
Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported by [REDACTED] to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood
Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433
From: Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-04-01 1:45 PM  
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)  
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)  
Subject: RE: packaging required

Thank you to everyone who was involved in this shipment. We very much appreciate everyone's work.
Lisa

From: Tschetter, Lorelee (PHAC/ASPC) <lorelee.tschetter@canada.ca> On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-04-01 1:25 PM  
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>  
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nlm.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.aspc.ocnml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>  
Subject: RE: packaging required

Thanks so much for letting us know everything has safely arrived.
Have a wonderful week!
Lore

Lorelee Tschetter  
Operations Centre Director  
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch  
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health  
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada  
Telephone (866)262-8433  
****new e-mail PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@Canada.CA ******

Directeur du centre des opérations  
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses  
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale  
Agence de la santé publique du Canada  
 Téléphone (204) 789-2021 / Cellulaire: (204) 292-0827  
**** nouveau courriel PHAC.OCNML-DIR-LNMCO.ASPC@Canada.CA ******

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre  
Winnipeg, Canada  R3E 3R2

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From: [redacted]
Sent: 2019-04-01 12:56 PM
To: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC) <anders.leung@canada.ca>; [redacted]; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) <xiangguo.qiu@canada.ca>
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) <lisa.fernando@canada.ca>; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.onml-dir-lnmco@canada.ca>; Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC) <allan.lau@canada.ca>

Subject: [redacted] packaging required

DEAR ALL,

The package has just arrived in Wuhan safely.
We would like to express our sincere gratitude to you all for the continuous support, especially Dr. Qiu and Anders! Thanks a lot!! Looking forward to our further cooperation in the future.

Best wishes,

[redacted]

--- 原始邮件 ---
主题：Re: [redacted] packaging required

发件人："Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)"

收件人：[redacted], "Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)"

抄送："NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC)" , "OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)" , "Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)"

Hi all,

Don went in and got the number but it is [redacted] Thanks Don, you're our hero!!

Thanks!
Anders

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 5:08 PM
To: [redacted], Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [redacted]
Cc: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC); OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC); Lau, Allan (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: RE: [redacted] - packaging required

Hello Leung/Andres,
All exports to China need the shipper’s exporter# on MAWB, please advise.

Regards

Play your part in saving the environment - please do not print this email unless absolutely necessary

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 29 March 2019 17:55
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: packaging required

Hello Leung,

It's booked on Air Canada flight AC-031 Mar 31st from Toronto to Beijing under [Redacted]

Regards
Mainly an update to our collaborators in China, but the package has left the NML about an hour ago. We will be tracking the package over the weekend and hopefully it arrives safely in Beijing. Thanks everyone for assisting in this package.

Anders

Thank you,
Revised version attached.
Please be advised that the RG4 shipment has arrived in Wuhan safe and sound.

Please be advised that the RG4 shipment has departed Toronto for Beijing on Flight AC031.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.
The RG4 shipment is scheduled to depart Toronto for Beijing on Air Canada Flight AC 031 on March 31 at 14:45 EDT.

The Air Canada Cargo air waybill tracking number for this shipment is [REDACTED].

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 3:38 PM
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC); Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC); Dredot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC); NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC); CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC); [REDACTED]@gov.mb.ca; oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC); erap.guelph@canada.ca; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; [REDACTED]@gtaa.com; Kernaghan, Shaun (PHAC/ASPC); Cook, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Shipment Ready for Departure

The Risk Group 4 shipment has been picked up by [REDACTED] from the NML in Winnipeg.

The tracking number for this shipment is [REDACTED]. This shipment is en-route to China via Toronto.

Please note - once this shipment departs from the airport in Toronto, ERAP teams can stand down.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)282-8433

DIRECTEUR DU CENTRE DES OPÉRATIONS
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)282-8433

1015 Arlington Street, Emergency Operations Centre
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-29 8:03 AM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp.lnm.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah.ses.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics.logistique.lnmco.aspc@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support.soutien.lnmco.aspc@canada.ca>; 'password@gov.mb.ca' 'password@gov.mb.ca'; 'oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca' 'oc_nml_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca'; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspc@canada.ca>; erap.guelph@canada.ca; 
Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com; Discussion@gtaa.com;
Cc: HPCO-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpco-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment will be routed through Toronto and is scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg today between 13:30-14:00. Further details will be provided when available.

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (866)262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
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Téléphone (866)262-8433

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From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-28 9:34 AM  
To: OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <PHAC,OCNML-DIR-LNMCO,ASPC@CANADA.CA>; Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp.lnm.aspc@canada.ca>; CSCHAI SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cschah ses.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics.logistique.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support.soutien.lnmco.asp@canada.ca>; [Redacted]; [Redacted]@gov.mb.ca';  oc_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca' <oc_ocd_group@phac-aspc.gc.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.asp@canada.ca>  
Cc: HPOC-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>  
Subject: ERAP Notification 2019-02 - Pending Shipment  

Please be advised that the Risk group 4 shipment is now scheduled to depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Friday, March 22nd. Further details will be forwarded once the courier has provided the routing information and tracking number for this shipment.

Heidi Wood  

Operations Centre Director  
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch  
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health  
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada  
Telephone (966)262-8433  
**new e-mail PHAC,OCNML-DIR-LNMCO,ASPC@CANADA.CA**  

Directeur du centre des opérations  
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses  
Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale  
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
From: Wood, Heidi (PHAC/ASPC) On Behalf Of OCNML DIR / LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 1:31 PM
To: Gilmour, Matthew (PHAC/ASPC) <matthew.gilmour@canada.ca>; Guercio, Steven (PHAC/ASPC) <steven.guercio@canada.ca>; Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) <mike.drebot@canada.ca>; NML Special Pathogens / LNM Agents Pathogènes spéciaux (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.sp-lnm.asp.aspc@canada.ca>; CSHAH SES (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.cshah.ses.aspca@canada.ca>; OCNML Logistics / Logistique LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.logistics.logistique.lnmco.aspca@canada.ca>; OCNML Support / Soutien LNMCO (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.ocnml.support-soutien.lnmco.aspca@canada.ca>; NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) <phac.nml.specimen.receiving.aspca@canada.ca>
Cc: HPPO-COPS, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC) <phac-aspc.hpoc-cops@canada.ca>
Subject: ERAP Notification - Pending Shipment

Please be advised that a Risk group 4 shipment will depart from the NML in Winnipeg on Thursday, March 28th. The shipment will be transported to China. Routing information is still pending for this shipment and will be provided when available.

Heidi Wood

Operations Centre Director
National Microbiology Laboratory/ Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Branch
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Public Health Agency of Canada - Government of Canada
Telephone (666)262-8433

Directeur du centre des opérations
Laboratoire national de microbiologie / Prévention et contrôle des maladies infectieuses

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Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Téléphone (866)262-8433
nouveau courriel PHAC.GCNML-DHC-INMC.OA@PHAC.GOV.CA

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Canada
Thanks Allan,
I figured that. Apparently hPOC contacted them to let them know about ERAP.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

Hi Cathy,
I just phoned Andréanne and let her know some details about the shipment. She was wondering what was sent, where the samples went, if there was proper paperwork, if Matt and Steve knew about it, etc.
We didn’t do anything wrong... just that because of the nature of the pathogens and where it was going they (the higher ups in PHAC) wanted to know if we did our due diligence.

Allan

Hi,
Can you ease give Andréanne a call regarding the recent ERAP shipment.
She would like some information regarding our process and the pathogen.

Cathy

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.
From: Leung, Anders (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-27 12:19 PM
To: NML Specimen Receiving (PHAC/ASPC) ; Letkeman, Paul (PHAC/ASPC) ; Pushka, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) ; Ashley, Don (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: Drebot, Mike (PHAC/ASPC) ; Fernando, Lisa (PHAC/ASPC) ; Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC) ; OC NML-Dir-LNM CO, PHAC-ASPC (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Shipping Req. for China Shipment

Hi Mike/Paul/Don,

Please see attached shipping requisition, sorry for filling everyone's mailbox with these files again.

Thanks!

Anders Leung
National Microbiology Laboratory | Laboratoire national de microbiologie
Public Health Agency of Canada | Agence de la santé publique du Canada
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health | Centre scientifique canadien de la santé humaine et animale
Winnipeg, Canada R3E 3R2
anders.leung@canada.ca

Telephone | Téléphone 204-789-7665 / Facsimile | Télécopieur 204-789-2140
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
Public Health
Agency of Canada
Agence de la santé
publique du Canada

National Microbiology Laboratory

1515 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, MB
R3E 3R2

TRANSFERRED LABORATORY INFORMATION

Transferring Division: Zoonotic Disease & Special Pathogens
Laboratory Contact: Qiu Xiangguo
Phone No: (204) 784-7548
NML PHAC Licence Number: L-R4-25219-18-QQ-00
Date: 2019-08-10
Risk Group: 4

Description of pathogens or toxins to be transferred

Ebola virus, Henipah virus
Stock virus culturing
Transfer letter: P14-3965(Makona), P0670(MA-Zebov), P-05100 (ass. Ebola), P15000(Boebo), P05978 (Hendra), P0671 (Nipah)

Valid CFIA permit required for the organism(s) listed above: YES [ ] N/A [X]
Valid international documentation required for the organism(s) listed above: YES [X] N/A [ ]

RECEIVING LABORATORY INFORMATION

Name of Facility: Chinese Academy of Science
Department: Wuhan Institute of Virology
Address: Xiao Hong Shan No.44
City, Prov, Country, PC: Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430071
Contact Name: [redacted]
Phone No: [redacted]
Receiving BSO: [redacted]
BSO Phone No: [redacted]
Risk Group: 4
PHAC Licence No: n/a
Expiry Date: n/a
International: [X]

Reviewed by:
Director, Zoonotic Diseases & Special Pathogens
Dr. Michael Drebot

Date of review:
(yyyy-mm-dd)

Note: Transfers of similar samples that are being sent by the transferring lab to the same receiving lab can be transferred under this authorization until the expiry date noted in the top right-hand corner. All applicable CFIA permits and/or international permits/documentation must also have a valid date associated with these samples.

Issued By: Tracy Drew
Biorisk Officer
Safety and Environmental Services, NML

Date of Issue: 2018-10-29

CAN.PHAC.0001.0035

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# Commercial Invoice

**Date of Export:** March 28, 2019  
**Export References (i.e. order no., invoice no., etc.):**

**Shipper/Exporter (complete name and address):**  
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu (204-784-7548)  
Public Health Agency of Canada - NML  
1015 Arlington Street  
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada  
R3E 3R2

**Recipient (complete name and address):**  
Chinese Academy of Sciences - Wuhan Institute of Virology  
Xiao Hong Shan No.44  
Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430071

**Country of export:** Canada  
**Country of manufacture:** Canada  
**Country of ultimate destination:** China

**International Air Waybill Number:**  
**Currency:** CAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marks/Nos</th>
<th>No. of pkgs</th>
<th>Type of packaging</th>
<th>Full Description of goods</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Units of measure</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Unit value</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 ml cryovial containing 0.5ml</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.5 kg</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
<td>$60.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 ml cryovial containing 0.5ml</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5 kg</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>15 kg</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total No. of Pkgs:** 1  
**Total Weight:** 16 kg  
**Total Invoice Value:** $75.00

I declare all the information contained in this invoice to be true and correct  
Signature of shipper/exporter (type name and title and sign):  
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu  
Signature of Research Scientist, Special Pathogens:  
Date: 27-Mar-2019  
Terms: FOB  
C&F  
CIF  

CAN.PHAC.0001.0035  
262 of 267
**SHIPPER'S DECLARATION FOR DANGEROUS GOODS**

**Shipper**  
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu (204-784-7548)  
Public Health Agency of Canada - NWL  
1015 Arlington St.  
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3E 3R2

**Consignee**  
Chinese Academy of Sciences - Wuhan Institute of Virology  
Xiao Hong Shan No.44  
Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430074

The completed and signed copies of this Declaration must be handed to the operator.

**TRANSPORT DETAILS**  
This shipment is within the limited quantities prescribed for:  
(delete non-applicable)  
PASSENGERS AND CARGO AIRCRAFT

**Airport of Departure (optional):**

**Airport of Destination (optional):**

**NATURE AND QUANTITY OF DANGEROUS GOODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN or ID No</th>
<th>Proper Shipping Name</th>
<th>Class or Divsion (subcategory hazards)</th>
<th>Packing Group</th>
<th>Quantity and Type of Packing</th>
<th>PackingInstr</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| UN 2814     | Infectious substance, affecting humans (Ebola virus. Henipah virus) | 6.2 |  | 30 vials x 0.5 ml  
TOTAL 15 ml  
1 fibreboard box  
9 kg  
Overpack used | 620 |  |
| UN1845      | Dry Ice              | 9 |  |  | 954 |  |

Additional Handling Information: ERAP: ERP2-00001  
24 Hr Number: CAMJUTEC: 613-906-6556  
ERAP Duty Officer: 1-866-262-8433  
Person Responsible: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu (204-784-7548)

I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are fully and accurately described above by the proper shipping name and are classified, packaged, marked and labelled as required and are in all respects in proper condition for transport according to applicable international and national governmental regulations. I declare that all of the applicable air transport requirements have been met.

Name of Signatory: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu  
Date: March 29, 2019  
Signature: [Signature] (See warning above)
Shipping Contents (2 vials of each virus ~500 ul per vial total ~15 ml)

1. Ebola Makona
   C05
   C07
   C15
2. Mayinga
3. Kikwit
4. Ivory Coast
5. Bundibugyo
6. Sudan Boniface
7. Sudan Gulu
8. MA-Ebov
9. GP-Ebov
10. GP-Sudan
11. Hendra
12. Nipah Malaysia
13. Nipah Bangladesh
Shipping Request Form

Form# MED-F-013A-1
Issue Date: 2014-12-02

Public Health Agency of Canada
Agence de la santé publique du Canada

Internal Use Only

NML Shipping Requisition

DELCIVERED APR 02 2019

Requested Ship Date: (YYYY-MM-DD) 2019-03-29

Originator Information:
Name: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu
Department: Special Pathogens
Room Number: H2140
Telephone Number: (204) 784-7548

Person Responsible: Please check box if same as Originator

Name:
Title:
Room Number:
Telephone Number:

NOTE: Person Responsible must have knowledge and expertise related to contents and would be contacted in case of emergency relating to the shipment

Recipient:

- □ CL2 Laboratory
- □ CL3/4 Laboratory
- □ Domestic
- □ International

*Compliance Letter No.  
**Certification ID No. NML-7A-0480

Receiving Lab Name: Chinese Academy of Sciences
Name of Receiver:
Address: Xiao Hong Shan No. 44
City: Wuhan
Prov./State: Hubei
Country: China
Postal/Zip Code: 430071
Telephone Number: [Redacted]
Email: [Redacted]

Preferred Courier:
Account Number:

Description of Material: Please select all that apply

- □ RG2
- □ RG3
- □ RG4
- □ Bacteria
- □ Virus
- □ Prion
- □ Non-infectious

- □ Antibody
- □ Culture
- □ Toxins

- □ Chemical
- □ Radiological
- □ Proficiency Panel

Origin of Biological Pathogen or Toxin: □ Domestic
- □ International

Obtain Transfer Letter or Complete SES-F-052A Note: Refer to SES-W-068

Complete inventory of items being shipped: Please attach list if not enough space

Include any and all chemical solutions, their concentration as well as related MSDS from the manufacturer or MSDS Online Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Name</th>
<th>Quantity/Volume per Primary Container</th>
<th>Number of Primary Containers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ebola virus and Henipah virus</td>
<td>0.5ml</td>
<td>30 vials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Has your supervisor been notified and agreed to the outgoing shipment?  
   ☑ YES  ☐ NO

2. For biological pathogens or toxins, is a transfer letter required?  
   (See SES-W-068 for Information)  
   ☑ YES (please attach)  ☐ NO

3. Are other special permits required?  
   (See SES-W-068 for Information)  
   ☑ YES (please attach)  ☐ NO

4. Is the material being sent under (as part of) an agreement?  
   (If unsure, please contact the Office of Business Development and Intellectual Property at Ext. 2120)  
   ☑ YES (please attach)  ☐ NO

5. Is a commercial invoice or B13A required?  
   (If unsure, please contact Shipping and Receiving at Ext. 2046)  
   ☑ YES (please attach)  ☐ NO

6. Special handling Instructions?  
   ☑ Dry Ice  ☐ Cold Packs  ☐ Room Temp.  ☐ Other: __________

7. For items from CL3 and CL4: Please describe the method of physical or chemical treatment used to decontaminate the inside and outside of the sealed container (Provide SOP number if applicable)  
   __________________________________________________________________________

Other comments or Important information:  
   __________________________________________________________________________

Dr. Xianguo Qiu

Originator signature (not required if emailed)  

ALL SPECIMENS MUST BE IN SPECIMEN SHIPPING ROOM (R1130) BY NOON

All biological material sent via Specimen Shipping must:

- Be in appropriate leak-proof primary containers. Example, O-ring cryovials, tubes must be wrapped with Parafilm
- Include an inventory list and all required documentation.

Completed Shipping Requisitions Required:  

| 48 hours for Domestic shipment | Room Temp: | Thursday at noon | Within the City: | Daily by 2 pm |
| 5 business days for International shipments | Domestic: | Wednesday at noon | International: | Monday at noon |
| 5 business days for Proficiency Panels | Dry Ice: | Thursday at noon | Cold Pack: | Tuesday at noon |

In case of an emergency shipment, please contact Ext. 6091 and we will do our best to accommodate.

Please use "EMAIL" button to send COMPLETED FORM TO SPECIMEN SHIPPING if you wish to use their service for packaging and labelling.

If you have any questions in regard to shipping specimens, please contact Specimen Shipping at Ext. 6091/6096 or via email at nml.specimen.receiving@phac-aspc.gc.ca

Important Disclaimers:

Please note that obtaining transfer letters or any other special permits will be responsibility of the Originator. A copy of the Shipping Requisition must be left with Specimen Shipping or Shipping and Receiving for ALL shipments regardless of if the originator is acting as the courier.
**TRANSFEROR**

| Section Head/Designee: | David Safronetz
| CSCHAH 1015 Arlington St. Winnipeg, MB, R3E 3R2 |

| Contact Person: | Xiangguo Qiu
| E-mail: |
| Location: |

| NML Location: | DCWI.DRC 745 Logan Ave, Winnipeg, MB, R3E 3L5 |
| Yorkton 110 Stone Rd West, Guelph, ON, N1G 3W4 |
| Lethbridge 23099 Township Road 9-1, Lethbridge, AB, T1J 3Z4 |
| Other: |

| Department/Unit: | Special Pathogens Program |
| Telephone: | 204-784-7548 |

| Origin of Material | Domestic |
| Imported |

| Risk Group / Material (select all that apply) | RG2 |
| RG3 |
| RG4 |
| SSBA |
| Prions |

| Pathogens/Toxins and description of material(s) to be transferred: | Ebola and Henipah viruses |

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**RECIPIENT LABORATORY**

| Recipient Name: |
| BSO Email: |

| Organization Name: | Chinese Academy of Sciences |
| Department: | Wuhan Institute of Virology |

| Street Address: | Xiao Hong Shan No.44 |
| City: | Wuhan |
| Province: | Hubei |
| Country: | China |

| Post/Zip Code: | 430071 |
| Telephone: | |
| Fax: | |

| Work Intent: | Stock virus culturing |

| Canadian Laboratory | LCL2, LCL4, LCL3, LCL4 |
| International Laboratory** | |

| PHAC Licence No.: |

| Exempt*** |

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**Special Instructions:**

- For international laboratories: an import permit, certification letter, or documentation from the institution's Director or Biosafety Officer indicating that they meet the biosafety and biosecurity requirements to work safely with the exported material is required.
- The recipient must ensure that the laboratory's facilities, equipment, and operating procedures are consistent with the regulatory requirements of the recipient's country to ensure safe handling and storage of the materials.
- The recipient must ensure that all personnel involved in the handling and storage of the materials have appropriate training and are familiar with the risks associated with the materials.
- The recipient must ensure that the materials are handled and stored in accordance with all applicable regulatory requirements, including waste management and disposal.
- The recipient must ensure that all information provided in this form is accurate and complete.

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**License Holder Signature:**

Date (YYYY-MM-DD): 2018-10-18

**Transferor Signature:**

Date (YYYY-MM-DD): 2018-10-26

**Receiving BSO (or Designate) Signature:**

Date (YYYY-MM-DD): 2018-10-26

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**RECEIVED** OCT 26 2018

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Dear [Name],

Ok, I understand now, thank you very much for your patience!

Best wishes,

[Name]

Hi [Name],

The overpack box should support 15 kg of dry ice, I don’t think we need to ask [Name1] to add another package of dry ice just that they should top off if necessary. Just a question about all these shipping regulation questions, you do realize that all of this will be completed on our side so you don’t have to worry about all the packaging, notifications, etc. right?

[Name]

Thank you for your information.
According to the link you recommended before, we should use the UN2814 package of STP-310 series this time.

Sorry, since I have not operated this package before, I would like to confirm again whether the package of this size (outer diameter 11 5/8 x 10 x 8") can carry 15KG of dry ice. And besides this package, do I need to ask to add another dry ice package (such as GD115 series)?

Best wishes,

From: [Redacted] (PHAC/ASPC)
Date: 2019-03-17 02:41
To: [Redacted]
CC: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Subject: Re: T0-Taking the Delivery-0311

Hi

My best guess would be 15 kg of dry ice. Normally [Redacted] will top up the dry ice if necessary on route to the final destination.
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Bell network.

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Saturday, March 16, 2019 10:09 AM

To: [Redacted] (PHAC/ASPC)

Cc: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: Re: RE: T0-Taking the Delivery-0311

Dear [Redacted],

Sorry for the late reply!
Thank you so much for taking your precious time to make such meticulous changes to our documents!
In addition, we have two more questions:
How many kilograms of dry ice is needed for this package? What is the total weight of the package?
Thank you!
Best wishes,

[Redacted]

-----原始邮件-----
发件人: [Redacted] (PHAC/ASPC)
发送时间: 2019-03-15 05:51:45 (星期五)
收件人: "Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)"
抄送: 
主题: RE: T0-Taking the Delivery-0311

Hi,

Generally the instructions will work for this shipment and the shipping packaging is appropriate for CL-4 shipments but I made a few changes and deleted a few parts that don't really apply to the shipment. In regards to the video and photos for the packaging of the shipment this is not possible nor allowed according to PHAC policies so you will have to remove all references to the photos and videos. There also seems to be a bit of miscommunication to how the passaging of the sample to [Redacted] is so I removed a lot of the parts where the carrier picks up the package from PHAC. Also this shipment is unique as the package will be sent to CFIA for storage as our lab is shutdown for maintenance but the shipment will be transferred back to PHAC for the shipment to [Redacted] so I would leave those instructions out.

Thanks!

[Redacted]

From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)

Sent: 2019-03-12 9:44 AM

To: [Redacted] (PHAC/ASPC)

Subject: FW: T0-Taking the Delivery-0311

CLEAN 39/308
Hi

Pls see attached and edits where you see fit.

Thanks!

Qiu

From: [Redacted]
Sent: 2019-03-11 10:49 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: T0-Taking the Delivery-0311

Dear Qiu,

The General Administration of Customs of China requires that the entire transportation process plan should be reviewed before it can be implemented. Among them, the transportation work in the PHAC section is set as the first step of the workflow (T0).

Please see the attachment is a draft work plan that according to our own understanding and speculation. Please check its compliance and feasibility. If there is anything wrong, please modify and point it out. Since the lack of time, we would appreciate your feedback within 2 days.

Once again, we would like to express our heartfelt thanks to you for your great support to our work!!

Best wishes,
To: Work Courier to Take the Delivery

(Location: National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada;
Estimated Time: 1 Hour)

This is a general guideline for shipping Risk Group 4 (RG4) agents from the Public Health Agency’s (PHAC) CL-4 facility, and is specific to the one-time shipment to China. This is not to be used for other shipments and PHAC cannot be held responsible for any other use of this document.

1. Responsible Parties and Persons in Charge

1.1 Responsible Parties:

National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC);

Canada Food Inspection Agency (CFIA);

1.2 Persons in Charge:

National Microbiology Laboratory, PHAC (QIU Xiangqiao, Tel: (204) 784-7548; Title: Director);

CFIA (XXX, Tel: (203), XXX-XXXX, Title: XXX);

2. Work Plan
2.1 Preparation

1) The consignee (WIV) shall confirm with the shipper (PHAC) if the latter has obtained the permit to ship the specimens to China.

2) The consignee (WIV) shall

3) The consignee (WIV) shall arrange with the shipper (PHAC) about the shipping work and intention, and sign the transport agreement and confidential agreement.

4) The consignee (WIV) shall establish the work number and the work group, choose strictly the transport personnel from China to ship the specimens to Canada and China, and control strictly the scope of this information as the necessary and indirect participating transport personnel shall not access to or exchange this information.

5) The consignee (WIV) shall inform the Canadian Office on Qiu Xiangqiu, xiangqiu@canada.ca to select the reliable shipper (QIU) and to establish contacts in advance, and confirm the following issues: the identity information of the hand-over person and transport personnel from both sides; the specific vehicle and its safety performance information; the list of necessary equipment and installation for safety transportation; specific transportation route; whether the goods have been prepared well; the type and quality of the goods; the goods’ applicability to GDI 15 dry ice boxes from Xiangqiu (Figure 1); whether the shipper needs to provide the inner packaging.
for dangerous goods of UN2814 (in accordance to the packaging regulations of IATA) (Figure 2); the documents for transportation, air delivery, Emergency Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) and exit; and the time of taking delivery of the goods.

**Assembly Instruction - WC009 GDI 15 Dry Ice**

Figure 1. Example for GDI 15 dry ice box

2.2 Packaging Requirements

The Director of National Microbiology Laboratory, PHAC (QIU Xianru, xianru.qiu@phac-aspc.gc.ca) shall supervise on site, and choose 2 responsible and well-experienced personnel that have relevant training and operation qualifications on Type P620 or UN2814 packaging to operate and ensure the packaging quality. According to the requirements in Part 12 of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods (TDG) Regulations, a person who handles, offers for transport or transports dangerous goods by aircraft between Canada and another country must do so in accordance with the ICAO Technical Instructions (TI) and the subsection 12.1.1(1) in TDG Regulations. The packaging shall be in compliance with the requirements or the standards for Type P620 packaging (Figure 2) and the UN2814. A Type P620 packaging shall consist of a) inner packaging comprising: 1) leakproof primary receptacle(s); 2) leakproof secondary packaging(s) and b) a rigid outer packaging. Make sure that the selected receptacles and packaging meet the relevant IATA requirements, guarantee that the primary receptacles and secondary packaging must withstand 95 kPa internal pressure without any leak and would not be damaged within the temperature range of -40°C to +55°C, and make sure that the packaging is proofed qualified in drop.
tests, leak tests, internal pressure (hydraulic) tests and stacking tests, etc.

![Diagram of packaging](image)

**Figure 2. Example of a Type P620 packaging**

2.3 Sub-packaging and Packaging of the Leakproof Primary Receptacle by PHAC

According to the standard operation requirements about the sample dispensing stipulated by NIA of PHAC, the technicians (name: XXX; Tel: XXXXX; name: XXX; Tel: XXXXX) in P4 lab of PHAC shall adopt the primary receptacles made of asapic, water-proof, leakproof, outward-turning cryopreserved plastic materials. The viruses shall be correctly sub-packaged in the primary receptacles (Figure 3) according to the standard specifications, and the primary receptacles shall be reliably sealed with sealing film. Labels are pasted on the surfaces of primary receptacles to indicate the category of the viruses, SN, name, sample quantity and other information, which will be photographed or recorded into videos for proof.

![Label example](image)

**Figure 2. Example of the Leakproof Primary Receptacle**

2.4 The Absorbent Materials and Leakproof Secondary Packaging

The technicians in P4 lab of PHAC shall package the primary receptacles and secondary packaging
in the core experimental area. When the primary receptacles are loaded into a secondary packaging, they must be separately wrapped to prevent contact with each other. Besides, the outer surface of the primary receptacle shall be lined with sufficient absorbent materials. The primary receptacle should be wrapped with sufficient absorbent materials to completely absorb the entire samples when there is any leak.

![Figure 4. Examples of the absorbent materials and leak-proof secondary packaging.](image)

### 2.5 Labels on the Leak-proof Secondary Packaging

Pass the Class 6.2 label on the outer surface of a secondary packaging at an inclined angle of 45 degrees in a square shape, the shape, color, format and text description of the label must conform to the template design copied by TDG and IATA, and the lower part shall be provided with text description about the hazardous nature.

### 2.6 Attached Documents

Place a list of goods (Figure. 5) between the primary receptacles and the secondary packaging, and attach a detailed list of contents (including name, SN and quantity, etc.), declarations of risks, temperature control substances, identification data of the samples, information about the sender and recipient, and other attached materials which will be put into a transparent waterproof bag that will be pasted on the outer surface of the secondary packaging, **which will be photographed or recorded into videos for proof**.
2.7 UN2814 Outer Packaging and Labels

The above primary receptacles and secondary packaging and attached documents shall be placed in outer packaging, where the secondary packaging must be fixed in the UN2814 outer packaging with a suitable gasket material to protect it from external influences such as breakage and water immersion, etc. during transport. The outside diameter (OD) is 6 1/2 x 6 1/2 x 8. The mailing information shall be posted on the outer packaging, which includes the information of the sender (Qiu Xiangguo, Phone No. (204) 784-7548, National Microbiology Laboratory, 1015 Arlington Street, Winnipeg, MB, R3E 3R2, Canada), the recipient, (Figure 6), hazardous label of the Class 6.2 infectious substances, and the operational label such as "top (this side up)" and etc., and then the outer packaging shall be sealed.

Deleted: , which will be photographed or recorded into videos for proof.
The text on the label is:

IN CASE OF DAMAGE
OR LEAKAGE
IMMEDIATELY
NOTIFY
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
AND

CANUTEC
913-998-6666

Figure 6. Example of outer packaging and labels

2.8 Completion of UN3814 Packaging and Inspection

After packaging completed, the packaging personnel shall carry out joint inspection on the packaging quality, to guarantee that the outer packaging will not be damaged by any vertical impact, and that substances inside will not be sprinkled; check all labels of the receptacles and packaging and the shipping registration forms for completeness and correctness, and check whether the receptacles are placed in correct directions. This process shall be photographed or recorded into videos for proof.

2.9

2.10

2.11
The personnel from PHAC in Canada shall verify the information of the hand-over person and the goods with the personnel of transfer. While verifying, it is not allowed to open the leakproof secondary packaging. When verifying the quantity of the leakproof primary receptacles, it is subject to the real goods' photos and videos provided by PHAC. Then the personnel shall verify the shipping document, which could be self-created but shall show the necessary information, and on the document that has, on the left and right margins, red hatchings that are oriented to the right or to the left (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Example of shipping document
2.12 Integrated packaging
The personnel from [REDACTED] shall be responsible to put the UN2814 packaging into the GDI15 dry ice box. The inner dimension (ID) of the outer box for integrated packaging is 11 5/8 x 10 x 8.
Then the personnel shall add sufficient dry ice, fix and start the thermometer, label the outer packaging, and then complete the integrated packaging (Figure 8), which will be photographed or recorded into videos for proof.

![Diagram of integrated packaging]

Figure 8. Example of integrated packaging

2.13 To take a proof: the pick-up personnel from [REDACTED] shall take photos or videos of the scene on site.

2.14 Transferring the Goods to the Vehicle: the pick-up personnel from [REDACTED] and the transport vehicle—

2.15 To Check the Placard: the pick-up personnel from [REDACTED] shall paste the placard with the UN-number on the transport vehicles and the [REDACTED] shall confirm.
2.16 The goods transported to the vehicles and fixed the pick-up personnel from...and...

2.17...The receiving party...

3. Risk point

According to the operation process of T0 Part, the possible risk points existing at the stage are identified as follows, and the possible combined influence and hazards caused by the risk points on or to the transport task are evaluated; besides, the probability of occurrence of the risks is logically evaluated. The information is as follows:

Risk Identification Table
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Risk point</th>
<th>Hazard and influence degree</th>
<th>Probability of occurrence</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Non-conforming packaging</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Extremely low</td>
<td>Accident due to packaging quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The Security Program

According to the risk points identified in T0 Part, and in reference to the relevant documents, measures to control the risks have been established and specified in the following working program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Risk Point</th>
<th>Measures for Security Control</th>
<th>Support Documents</th>
<th>Implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Packaging Quality Accident</td>
<td>1. To comply with the ICAO Technical Instructions for packaging (Doc 9284, PI620) in 3 layers for UN2814 - Category A; 2. To choose the well experienced and reliable technicians to operate the transportation; 3. To dispatch more personnel to supervise the packaging process; 4. While handing over the goods, verify carefully with the personnel from PHAC before take the delivery.</td>
<td>1. ICAO Technical Instructions 2. TDG Regulations 3. Export and Import Permits Act (R.S.C., 1985, c E-19) 4. Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations (SOR/2015-44)</td>
<td>2.1-2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Emergency Response Plan

The main task for T0 Part is to package and deliver the samples, which is the beginning to guarantee the samples' quality in the transportation. In this part, the emergency response plan is focusing on the packaging quality accident.
5.1 Packaging Quality Accident

According to the risk point identification, the packaging quality accident may occur when both parties find that the packaging does not meet the relevant regulations when the samples are handed over and checked.

1) Once the pick-up personnel from [REDACTED] find that the packaging does not meet the requirements, they shall stop the delivery process immediately;

2) The pick-up personnel from [REDACTED] shall specify the packaging requirements to the relevant personnel from PHAC;

3) The packaging personnel from PHAC shall replace the packaging in a timely manner according to the standard operating procedure for packaging from NL4 of PHAC;

4) If the transport time is not enough to catch the decided flight, both parties will reschedule the goods check and handover.

5.2 Regulatory References

(1) Emergency Response Assistance Plans [REDACTED]

(2) Safety and Security Group [REDACTED]


(4) Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations (SOR/2015-44):

6. Documents Required

6.1 Transfer Authorization issued by PHAC (completed);

6.2 EDRAP issued by Transport Canada (submission by PHAC 24 hours before transportation)

6.3 Application of Import special articles approved by General Administration of Customs of China (TBD)

6.4 Transport Agreement between WIV and [REDACTED] (TBD)
Hi [Redacted] - I note that this WQ is similar to Q-533 prior to prorogation.

NML provided answers below to your questions and validated the tables provided in August (they are still up to date). Let me know if you would like further information or have follow-up questions.

1. How many foreign laboratories has the NML received requests to ship samples to over the past 10 years (and how many of these were fulfilled)?
   a. The NML does not track the exact number of requests to ship samples to other labs due to the high volume of these requests, but it will only send samples to reputable labs who meet the appropriate federal lab requirements. All of the fulfilled requests to ship samples from the last 10 years are in the second table below.

2. How many of these were Ebola strains?
   a. As described in the second table below.

3. How many of these requests were from laboratories located in China?
   a. As described in the second table below, 1 of these shipments was sent to a lab in China (to the WIV, the lab which is referred to in Q-25 itself).

4. Has the NML requested (and received) samples from laboratories located in China over the past 10 years? If so how many and what substances.
   a. No it has not.

5. Has the NML requested (and received) samples from foreign laboratories over the past 10 years? If so how many and what substances?
   a. See the first table below.

Table 1. (Risk Group 4 imports from the last 10 years)
Couple questions regarding Q-25:

How many foreign laboratories has the NML received requests to ship samples to over the past 10 years (and how many of these were fulfilled)?
How many of these were Ebola strains?

How many of these requests were from laboratories located in China?

Has the NML requested (and received) samples from laboratories located in China over the past 10 years? If so how many and what substances.

Has the NML requested (and received) samples from foreign laboratories over the past 10 years? If so how many and what substances? If this list is too long or onerous to compile a brief summary will suffice.
Request Letter

To Public Health Agency of Canada:

This is a request letter for virus strains from BSL-4 laboratory, Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). On behalf of the director of BSL-4 of WIV, I’m writing to request virus strains: Ebola virus (EBOV) and Nipah virus (NiV) from your agency.

WIV, CAS has strong research capabilities and is one of the significant institutes in China devoting to virology. The Wuhan National Biosafety (BSL-4) Laboratory, WIV, CAS, has been built and it has obtained the Accreditation Certificate (CNAS BL0056) issued by China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment (CNAS) and has been approved by the National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China for the qualification to perform experimental activities for highly pathogenic microorganisms last year. Our institute and the research group of BSL-4 had been awarded with national scientific research projects, such as the National Key Research and Development Plan (No. 2016YFC1202200), the Special Research Project of the Health Industry (No. 201302006), and the Advanced Customer Cultivation Projects of Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory with the research of EBOV and NiV. We plan to carry out research on infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of EBOV and NiV. Therefore, WIV CAS is qualified to perform scientific experiments and to use EBOV and NiV in the laboratory. We guarantee that these viruses will only be used for research purposes.

If you agree to provide the viruses mentioned above, your cooperation in this regard will be highly appreciated. Undoubtedly, your generous assistance will further promote exchanges and enhance mutual trust and cooperation between China and Canada. Thanks for your consideration.

We are looking forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]

Director, WIV
(Individual 3)
Biological Safety Laboratory Assurance

To Public Health Agency of Canada:

This is to certify that the National Biosafety laboratory (BSL-4) of Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, has been accredited in accordance with CNAS-CL05:2009 Accreditation Criteria for Laboratory Bio-safety as ABSL-4 laboratory by China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment, and is a facility with effective biosafety containment where the conventional amount of pathogenic microorganisms can be worked with. The qualification to perform experimental activities on highly pathogenic pathogens including Ebola virus and Nipah virus in ABSL-4 laboratory has been authorized by the National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China. Our laboratory meets the facility design criteria, microbiological practices, waste disposal and use of personal protection equipment for work performed at Biosafety Level 4. In addition, the Microorganisms & Viruses Culture Collection Center, WIV, CAS, which is a National Collection Center, fully possesses the qualifications and conditions for the classification of agents from Risk Group 1 to Risk Group 4, and thus guarantees the receiving process and preservation of Ebola virus and Nipah virus for further research. So, the laboratory is full equipped and qualified to receive and handle the Ebola virus and Nipah virus for research purpose.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Biosafety Officer
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
From: [REDACTED] (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 2019-03-19 2:43 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (PHAC/ASPC); Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [REDACTED]  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: P1620 certificate  

We have provided this information to WC China and will advise if this certificate is mandatory.

Regards

The e-mail, including any attachments, may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Due to the nature of the email recipient, if you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it from your system. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure, distribution, or reproduction of this e-mail or the information in it is strictly forbidden. Please note the research the right to monitor e-mail communication for quality assurance, policy compliance, and/or security purposes.

Ce message électronique, y compris les documents joints, peut contenir des informations confidentielles et/ou privilégiées. Si vous ne vous êtes pas adressé au destinataire établi, veuillez le notifier immédiatement et supprimer le message et ses pièces jointes de vos systèmes. Toute violation de confidentialité, révélation ou divulgation, violation ou modification, voire capture de ce message électronique ou de ses informations actuelle ou future est strictement interdite. Veuillez noter que nous nous réservons le droit d'auditer toutes les communications par voie électronique pour maintenir l'exactitude et la sécurité, la confidentialité est protégée par des lois ou des réglementations.

Jouez votre rôle pour aider à protéger l'environnement. N'envoyez pas ce message électronique à moins que cela ne soit absolument nécessaire.

From: [REDACTED] (PHAC/ASPC)  
Sent: 19 March 2019 12:31  
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [REDACTED]  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: P1620 certificate  

Hi,

Again we've shipped many CL-4 pathogens and certificates were never necessary as long as we used the proper Packing Instructions as per international transport regulations. Contact with the manufacturer would be necessary if you need these certificates.
From: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC)
Sent: 2019-03-19 10:12 AM
To: [email]
Cc: [email]
Subject: FW: Pl620 certificate_Wuhan Institute of Virology

Pls take look. I thought we discussed it before with Shuang and it's not necessary.

Thanks!

Qiu

From: [email]
Sent: 2019-03-18 8:33 PM
To: Qiu, Xiangguo (PHAC/ASPC); [email]
Subject: Pl620 certificate_Wuhan Institute of Virology

Hello,
It's possible to provide us a Pl620 certificate approval for this shipment to Wuhan Institute of Virology.
See attached for a temple.

Regards,

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