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editorial

French President Francois Hollande stands among students as they observe a minute of silence at the Sorbonne University in Paris to pay tribute to victims of Friday's Paris attacks, Nov. 16, 2015.© POOL New / Reuters/Reuters

Over the past decade and a half, the Western world went to war in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The first two were full-scale invasions; the last involved an extensive bombing campaign. These military missions achieved their aims, at least in the short term: Each of the targeted regimes was removed from power. But beyond that, the results are mostly a failure. The old regimes were overthrown – and what replaced them was chaos, and worse. These are not success stories.

Which brings us to the aftermath of the Paris bombings. The muscular rhetoric deployed in recent days by many world leaders carries a certain ring of familiarity. French President François Hollande and former U.S. president George W. Bush are not political bedfellows, but that didn't stop them from arriving at the similar conclusion that traumatic terrorist attacks represented an act of war, to be met by war. Mr. Hollande immediately launched air strikes, and called on allies and adversaries to join forces against the so-called Islamic State.

Yes, IS must be opposed, beaten back, marginalized and eliminated. But what is the path most likely to achieve that victory? What lessons can be learned from Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya? The Western coalitions in each of those cases had overwhelming military, technological and financial superiority. And yet victory remained beyond their grasp. Why? What must be done differently?

It is in the interests of any intelligent government or business – or army or security agency – to revisit past failings before planning future action. The past 14 years are a testament to the power of unforeseen consequences. The governments and leaders involved in the response to Paris, including Canada's, must carefully consider their next moves – by thoughtfully considering the failures of the recent past.

The objective in Syria isn't to express anger or build political tough-guy cred. It is to find a resolution of multifaceted conflicts involving the Syrian regime, various opposition groups and the fanatical Islamic State. Beyond Syria, there is the wider question of largely home-grown radicalism, inspired in part by IS, but often only loosely tied to it.

The West wants to destroy IS and remove brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad from power. But how to do that while avoiding a Libyan result? In Libya, an unsavoury regime was replaced by a failed state and a growing Islamism. One threat was replaced by a larger one.

Military action against IS may be necessary. The same goes for removing Mr. Assad from power. But that leaves open the question of how to achieve these objectives in a way likely to lead to a stable political order in Syria – or at least less violence and radicalism.

The language of the autumn 2015 recalls that of 2001. Has the thinking underpinning it evolved? For the West to win, and the long-abused people of Syria to find peace, it must.