In June of 1991, a new dawn was supposed to begin breaking over relations between aboriginals and other British Columbians.
In that month, at a colourful ceremony, Brian Mulroney, B.C. premier Mike Harcourt and aboriginal leaders heralded an era of treaty-making across the province, and created the B.C. Treaty Commission to help make that happen. Nineteen years later, only two treaties have been signed, with the Tsawwassen First Nation (400 people) and the Maa-nulth First Nations on Vancouver Island (2,125 people).
By any reasonable measure, therefore, the treaty-making process has been a disappointment - or, to be less polite, a failure. Two treaties in 19 years. At that rate, a century or more would pass before those aboriginals interested in treaties with the Crown would sign one.
Don't forget, too, that about 40 per cent of B.C.'s bands (as defined by the Indian Act) - 88 out of 198 - don't want treaties. They are refuseniks who don't recognize the sovereignty of Canada or B.C. and, therefore, aren't interested in treaties at all.
Most of B.C.'s territory, unlike the rest of Canada, lacks treaties. With that gap has come uncertainty about who "owns" what, who can invest and where, and who has "title" to the land. With that gap, too, has come the B.C. version of the national stage: the spread between aboriginal living standards, health outcomes and educational levels and those of the non-aboriginal population.
Treaties, it was hoped, would bring better economic possibilities for aboriginals and "certainty" in response to unanswered questions about ownership, title and territory. Treaties would create, in the words of a 1991 report, "a new relationship based on mutual trust, respect, and understanding - through political negotiations."
Fine words, noble sentiments, difficult realities. Aboriginals in the treaty-negotiating process have borrowed almost half a billion dollars, and the first of those loans are due in August of 2011. "We've spun our wheels and haven't gone anywhere," admits Sophie Pierre, chief commissioner of the B.C. Treaty Commission.
It's hardly the commission's fault. It doesn't order treaties or negotiate them; it tries to facilitate negotiations and raise public awareness of the importance of treaties. If the two governments and aboriginals don't want to negotiate, or don't negotiate in good faith, or can't overcome internal obstacles, the commission is not to blame.
Ms. Pierre, a former elected chief of a band in southern B.C., might best be described as a patient optimist. She's seen all the delays and knows the obstacles, yet remains convinced that more treaties are on the way.
Four or five more are very close to moving from agreement in principle to final settlement, which must then be ratified by the aboriginal groups in question. A few nagging obstacles from Ottawa have recently been removed, such as exempting final settlement over access to fish, a function of the scientific uncertainty over stock levels.
In Chuck Strahl, the federal Indian Affairs Minister, Ms. Pierre sees hope and commitment. "Chuck Strahl is one of the best I've dealt with. He's from British Columbia and he knows what he is talking about."
Success might breed more success - if more treaties are signed, it might encourage other aboriginals and the two governments to recommit themselves to the process of negotiation.
Still, the obstacles are immense, and finger-pointing is endemic. Ms. Pierre sees the lack of a mandate for federal negotiators as an ongoing problem, and wishes Prime Minister Stephen Harper would come to B.C. and restate Ottawa's commitment to treaties.
B.C. Premier Gordon Campbell got so frustrated by the lack of progress in negotiating treaties that he made a rather astonishing, if vaguely defined, offer to recognize aboriginal title holus-bolus. But aboriginal leaders, including some who had worked with the Premier in conceiving the idea, backed away in the face of local suspicions about Mr. Campbell's motives. Ms. Pierre thinks they were wrong to scuttle the Premier's initiative, and regrets the missed opportunity.
For aboriginal nations/bands, many of whose populations are quite small, negotiating treaties is fraught with difficulties, one of the most obvious being the widespread overlapping of claims to territory between and among aboriginal nations/bands. The suspicion about government, and the need for extensive consultation with communities, means a very, very slow process. And, of course, failure to negotiate treaties deepens skepticism that the objective is worth the effort.
B.C., while not completely giving up on treaty negotiations, is getting on with signing specific agreements short of treaties for land, revenue-sharing and governance with bands that want to do business.
Some are leaping at the chance; others prefer waiting until treaties are complete. And still others, mostly in the B.C. Interior, refuse to talk to Ottawa or Victoria because they don't recognize the two governments as having any sway whatsoever over their "traditional territories."
The new dawn of treaties forecast in 1991 shows only the faintest hues almost two decades later.