The fallout from what happened on the Gaza-bound flotilla is typical of a confrontation that puts rhetoric before solutionsUriel Sinai
The Gaza-bound flotilla and the Israeli intervention to stop it has been portrayed as an attack by Islamic terrorists, and their willing dupes, against a Jewish democratic state. It has also been portrayed as the overreaction of a Jewish apartheid entity determined to prevent the delivery of minimal relief aid to the dispossessed. Both sides back their arguments with assertions that their cause is supported by international law.
Too often, simplistic rhetoric and its unwilling accomplice, international law, dominate debate and feed the cycle of accusation, counteraccusation and abuse that sustain this century-old confrontation between Zionists and Palestinians, Muslims and Jews. While these tactics may provide some emotional satisfaction, they solve nothing. Instead, they intensify mistrust and hatred, making solutions still more difficult.
The deaths in the attack on the ship Mavi Marmara are inexcusable. Nor can Israel defend the lack of proportionality. The raid on the flotilla was indeed a botched operation, and it warrants full investigation, not a feeble cover-up. Rather than using force with restraint, Israel's modus operandi has too often become the iron fist, whatever the outcome and however self-defeating.
Israel will suffer erosion of its legitimacy within the U.S. administration and beyond, and risks diplomatic isolation. Despite cautious language, President Barack Obama must be frustrated and unhappy. Perhaps more troubling still in realpolitik is the loss of Israel's privileged relationship with Turkey, already under pressure in Ankara from growing Islamic influence. Turkey's ambassador has been withdrawn from Tel Aviv and joint military exercises have been cancelled. The Israeli action could mean the end of military co-operation, arms sales and intelligence sharing.
On the other hand, the flotilla's organizers (certain of which have been accused of ties to terrorism) knew their ships would be intercepted and counted on that reality to draw attention to Gaza's very real and too-often ignored humanitarian predicament. According to oral evidence and film footage, at least some on the Mavi Marmara were prepared, even eager, for confrontation. And those who expected Israel not to enforce the Gaza blockade chose to ignore reality. Having long established a clear policy on intervention, there was every reason to expect it would be implemented. Had the Israeli government not done so, there would have been widespread criticism across the country's political spectrum. The coalition would have split and the government could well have fallen.
Whatever the case, live fire into a bellicose crowd, however provocative that crowd may be, fails the sniff test. Benjamin Netanyahu's statement when departing Ottawa on Monday showed none of the usual bravado, but rather a chagrined and concerned Israeli leader, already calculating the costs.
Although there are now suggestions that the blockade could be resolved with transit searches in the Israeli port of Ashdod, the well-honed ultranationalist rhetoric of the Arab-Israeli dispute will no doubt continue unabated. It is part of the rhythm of life for both sides. Given their record, the prognosis is not propitious. The discourse makes violence more and more routine and people lose their humanity.
There are ways they can end this bloody embrace. But they require fair-minded, reflective strategies that take account of both sides' deeply held emotions, cultures and belief systems: strategies that discount exclusion and demonization. These solutions require an understanding of what makes the other side tick. Attempts to prove, by international law or otherwise, that one side has the greater right is time ill spent. What counts are the psychological, sociological, demographic and strategic realities.
There are many good ideas out there: that Israelis get the 78 per cent of the British mandate territory of Palestine they held when the fighting ended in 1948 and the Palestinians get the remaining 22 per cent for their state; that West Jerusalem become the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine; that Israeli settlements not accommodated by land swaps be dismantled. With the Palestinian population west of the Jordan River nearly equal to the Jewish population and growing, no Palestinian leader can settle for less and survive. If the Israelis cannot give on this, even with safeguards, the game is over.
As the more powerful actor, the initial responsibility for creating a benign climate lies with Israel, in stopping settlements in the West Bank and easing the Gaza blockade. Certainly, the Palestinians must respond meaningfully and truly commit. But it is moderates on both sides who should be empowered, not the Hamas rejectionists and the Israeli ultranationalists. This does not mean being soft. It means being real.
Michael Bell is former Canadian ambassador to Israel, the Palestinian territories, Egypt and Jordan. He is Paul Martin Senior Chair on International Diplomacy at the University of Windsor.