Why Egypt outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood: Distraction, calculation

Share

The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by the Egyptian military government is the most recent example of a growing political agitation in Egypt, a new climax of an ongoing crisis that has shattered Egyptian society and its political establishment.

For months, since the ousting of president Mohamed Morsi in July, there has been an open confrontation between his Brotherhood and the military-backed interim leadership. Both claim legitimacy; the Brotherhood claims electoral legitimacy and the interim government claims popular legitimacy after the June 30 uprising against Mr. Morsi. The outlawing of the Brotherhood is a bold move, albeit a risky one, by the interim government to assert its authority as the representative of the people of Egypt against a defiant group that still thinks it has the means and ability to challenge the state.

The Dec. 24 bomb attack on security headquarters in the Egyptian city of Mansoura, which killed at least 16, was humiliating to both Egyptian security and military forces. It proved that the Sinai-based Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis radicals, who claimed responsibility for the blast, could reach their core bases and act decisively, despite the army's claim that it has uprooted terrorism from Sinai. Declaring the Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization was possibly a knee-jerk response to the Mansour bombing, and a cover-up of the failure of security forces themselves.

Although there is no material evidence to link the Muslim Brotherhood with this al-Qaeda-style group, many in Egypt view the Brotherhood as bearing political responsibility for the ongoing violence in Egypt, for many reasons:

• The Brotherhood did not disown Ansar Beit Al-Magdis. It is true that the Brotherhood has released statements to condemn violence; however, the tune and the phrasing have varied considerably. For example, the statements printed in English bear a more robust tone, as if they are only aimed at Western ears, rather than to Brotherhood supporters and sympathizers in Egypt.

• More importantly, in all their statements, the Brotherhood has stopped short of demanding that the Sinai radical groups end their use of the political crisis in Egypt as a pretext to their attacks.

• The Brotherhood has turned a blind eye to radicals such as Assem Abdel Magid, who used the sit-ins in Rabaa and Nahda as outlets for threats against the army and the interim leadership.

• Ex-president Morsi pardoned many jailed militants, including, allegedly, a militant leader linked with Ansar Beit el-Magdis, who was imprisoned by Hosni Mubarak’s regime, according to an Egyptian report.

All the above does not amount to concrete evidence against the Muslim Brotherhood and does not make every cadre within the Brotherhood's vast network a terrorist; however, it indicates that the confrontation between the military-backed government and the Muslim Brotherhood has reached an uncompromising state that will either end with victory or surrender. There will be no third option.

The Egyptian government's bold move is based on some domestic and regional calculations:

• First, the military senses that a substantial section of the Egyptian public is increasingly frustrated by the Brotherhood’s defiance, and yearns for more stability – even with the price tag of some oppressive measures.

• Second, the move is a perfect distraction tactic. Now, both the public and observers are avoiding discussing the details of the new constitution or the government’s economic situation for 2014, and busy instead talking about terrorism.

• Third, Egyptian authorities sense that the Brotherhood is now more vulnerable than ever – particularly as Turkey, a key supporter, is preoccupied by its own domestic problems, and while Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, are openly helping Egypt in its battle against the Brothers.

The crucial test for the government will be the referendum on Egypt's amended constitution scheduled for mid-January. If Egypt's authorities succeed in running a free and fair vote without any security incidents, and with high turnout from Egyptian voters, then they can claim victory in its battle against the Brotherhood, who campaigned relentlessly for boycotting the vote. On the other hand, if radical groups manage to disrupt the referendum – or to assassinate high-profile political, Coptic, or military figures – then this could deeply shake confidence in the Egyptian authorities' heavy-handed tactics.

A recent poll, following the bombing in Mansoura, indicates that about 35 per cent blames the Muslim Brotherhood for the Mansoura bombing, while 46 per cent are unsure of where to place blame, and only 15 per cent blame other Islamist groups. Although more polls are needed, these results indicate that a substantial section of the Egyptian public are not paranoid worshippers of conspiracy theories, preferring an 'unsure' reply rather than a definite 'yes;' nonetheless, the Brotherhood should take this poll as a warning sign from the public that many Egyptians do not trust them.

Egypt is witnessing a new and possibly bloody chapter in its post-Mubarak era. It is easy to pontificate ideal solutions, such as reconciliation, but Egypt is not in a perfect state to embrace rationalism. There are loud supporters of both the Brotherhood and the army who openly reject any compromise. We can only hope that both sides will learn that stubbornness is futile – that the Brotherhood will realize that it will be foolish to think that the disintegration of the state will help them to regain power, and the Egyptian interim leadership must be smart enough not to push the thousands of junior Brotherhood cadres into desperation and radicalism. 2014 will be a crucial and interesting year for Egypt.

Nervana Mahmoud is a British-Egyptian blogger and commentator on Middle East issues. She blogs at Nervana and tweets at @nervana_1.