Seventeen things I meant to tell John Baird about Ukraine

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Dear Foreign Minister John Baird,

We met briefly two weeks ago in Riga, while you were visiting the capital of Latvia to show your support for Canada's NATO ally.

While we were riding the elevator, you asked me what I thought was going to happen next in Ukraine. I believe I told you I thought it was going to "get worse before it gets better." Then the elevator stopped and the doors opened.

There's a lot more that I should have said:

1 – There actually aren't that many people taking part in the "pro-Russian" uprising in eastern Ukraine. There are perhaps a few hundred people in and around the regional administration building in Donetsk, a crowd that – unlike the anti-government protests that gripped Kiev earlier this year – doesn't swell much on evenings and weekends. There are even smaller numbers occupying the government offices in cities like Lugansk and Horlivka. At this point, only the depressed industrial city of Slavyansk and its 130,000 residents are fully behind the Donetsk People's Republic.

2 – The "little green men" in Slavyansk aren't as well-trained or well-armed as the disguised Russian forces that took part in the seizure of Crimea. If there are Russian troops there, they've largely remained out of sight. Evidence collected by journalists suggests there are mercenaries with Russian passports in the region, however.

3 – Russia doesn't want to take over Ukraine. It's too expensive to stage a full-blown land war in 2014, especially when your economy is already tipping into recession.

4 – Russia won't accept Ukraine joining the European Union or NATO. Full stop. Which is why I wrote "Russia doesn't want to take over Ukraine" just now instead of "Russia won't invade Ukraine."

5 – Snapping off the Donbass region (Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts) à la Crimea wouldn't increase the Kremlin's leverage in Kiev – it would actually decrease it by taking another 6.7 million Russian-speakers out of Ukraine's pre-crisis population of 46 million. Annexing Crimea has already reduced the number of Russian-speakers in the country by two million. Controlling the Donbass isn't Vladimir Putin's objective here. Controlling Kiev is.

6 – Which is why Moscow keeps talking about the need for a new constitution and "federalization" in Ukraine. They aren't looking at Canada's style of federalism as a model in this, but Bosnia-Herzegovina's. They want to forge an equivalent of the Republika Srpska, some sort of entity – perhaps the Donetsk People's Republic – that would remain in Ukraine and have Russian as its official language. More importantly, Moscow would want it to wield veto power over the foreign and defense policies of the entire country. Even better than an empowered and autonomous Donbass, from Moscow's point of view, would be having more than one pro-Russian republic as an autonomous member of a federal Ukraine. Watch for trouble in cities like Kharkiv and Odessa in the days ahead.

7 – What the Kremlin is proposing – a constitution drafted outside Ukraine – is something no Ukrainian politician can or should accept. The Kremlin is betting it can create enough chaos to force the next President of Ukraine to at least consider accepting.

8 – Sanctions aren't going to change Vladimir Putin's mind. But in the long run, they might change how Russians see Mr. Putin. But you'd better tell Europe that it will take years. (Right now Mr. Putin's popularity is still rising, hitting 82 per cent in the most recent poll.)

9 – Mr. Putin hasn't gone crazy. He's not going to invade Latvia or Estonia or Moldova after he's done remaking Ukraine. I really hope I'm right about this. (That said, as confrontation with the West deepens, I can see him potentially absorbing territories like Trans-Dniestr or South Ossetia that have already applied to join Russia, if only to show the West – and Russians – that he's not backing down.)

10 – Russia won't give Crimea back, under any circumstances. An overwhelming share of Russians support Mr. Putin's narrative that he has only righted an historic wrong by reclaiming Russian land that Nikita Khrushchev inexplicably gave to Soviet Ukraine. Peace in Ukraine will almost certainly involve Kiev and the West coming to terms with the loss of Crimea, however grudgingly.

11 – Ukraine is divided, though not always along the lines many people think. Dichotomies like "pro-Russian" versus "pro-Kiev" – or Russian-speaking versus Ukrainian-speaking – capture only part of the story. To me, the real divide is between those who think of themselves proudly as Ukrainians, and those who wish the Soviet Union still existed. Those in the latter category include many Russian speakers, as well as others who have seen their lives take a turn for the worse economically since 1991. In the West, the Soviet Union meant gulags, and Lenin. In much of eastern Ukraine, it meant guaranteed jobs, decent pensions and free health care.

12 – The West deserves a good share of the blame for the crisis in Ukraine. By cheering on the crowds as they overthrew the elected government of Viktor Yanukovych (who only had a year left in office before he could have been voted out), and then rushing to recognize the interim government, Washington, Brussels and Ottawa helped drive Ukraine into a legal nowhere land, helping set the stage for Moscow's actions in Crimea and the Donbass. The protest outside the regional government building in Donetsk is very consciously designed to look like a pro-Russian "Maidan."

13 – Nor are the Ukrainian government the angels they are sometimes made to appear. The acting government includes seven cabinet members from Svoboda, an organization termed a "neo-Nazi movement" by the World Jewish Congress. Even further out is the ultranationalist Right Sector movement that has refused to leave the streets of Kiev even two months after the revolution that toppled Mr. Yanukovych. Under different circumstances, the West would be condemning Interim President Oleksandr Turchynov and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk for aligning itself with such groups.

14 – The Geneva peace deal was never going to work. It was too vaguely worded. Depending on your point of view, "all illegally seized buildings must be returned to legitimate owners" could mean the separatists in eastern Ukraine had to leave the city halls and police stations they had taken over. Or it could mean that Mr. Turchynov had to hand the presidential palace back to Mr. Yanukovych.

15 – Look out for May 9. Across the former USSR, Victory Day is the most important holiday on the calendar. In south and eastern Ukraine, it will serve as a rallying point for the "Soviet" sector of Ukrainian society. Again, look for things to get even more violent in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odessa. Maybe even Kiev.

16 – The Ukrainian security services are demoralized and hedging their bets. Police and soldiers in eastern Ukraine have taken note of how the Berkut riot police ended up reviled, disbanded and facing criminal actions after following Mr. Yanukovych's orders to disperse anti-government protesters in Kiev. Which is why they've struggled with Mr. Turchynov's order to crack down on separatists in the Donbass. With presidential elections looming on May 25, and the Russian army massed on the other side of the border, they don't know who their boss will be a few weeks' time. Or who will write the history books.

17 – Canada should return its ambassador to Moscow. It's laudable that you have made it so clear Canada will support Ukraine and stand with its allies in this crisis. But at some point we have to find a way to end it.