Prime Minister Justin Trudeau shakes hands with troops following a press conference regarding Canada's new defence policy at CFB Trenton, in Trenton, Ont., on April 8.Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press
Wesley Wark is a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and writes on national security and intelligence issues for his Substack newsletter.
Canada’s new defence policy, released today, makes two big promises. One is to enhance our ability to protect Canada’s sovereignty and interests in the Arctic; the other is to remake the CAF as a technologically advanced fighting force. Both promises will require big spending increases over an extended period.
The most significant advancement, however, may have less to do with buzzy technology and more to do with Canadian defence thinking at large.
The long-awaited policy defines Arctic security as “our most urgent task,” which is made clear by its title – “Our North, Strong and Free” – and the cover illustration of a Canadian frigate navigating through ice-free waters under the Northern Lights. The need for greater attention to the Arctic is premised on the effects of climate change, including in opening up the region to maritime transit and resource exploitation, and on heightened geopolitical tensions in the region, including Russian and Chinese activities.
The new-look defence of the Arctic will include enhanced basing capabilities, a fleet of airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS, of which the CAF currently has none), deployment of ground and under-sea sensor capabilities to monitor activities in the region, the building of a satellite ground station in the Arctic, enhanced foreign intelligence capabilities, and new tactical helicopters that can operate in the high North. Alongside these capabilities, the defence policy promises improved capabilities of satellites looking down from space, and sets out that the government will “explore options” for a new submarine fleet with operational capacity under the ice.
But if Canada hopes to achieve a technologically cutting-edge military, there are a lot of capability gaps still to be filled, including new weaponry and planning for vastly increased data capabilities in the coming age of AI and quantum computing. Next-generation weaponry would include air-to-air missiles, ground air-defence systems, and long-range, land-based missile and artillery systems. DND will look at options for acquiring surveillance and strike drones and sophisticated counter-drone capabilities, with much of this based on lessons being learned from Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Command and control of a technologically modernized CAF will require enhanced communications capabilities, more and more of which will be based on satellite systems, including for accurate navigational capacity. This will also demand sophisticated and hardened computer capabilities.
The defence policy also acknowledges the need for Canada to have “much better eyes and ears in space.” This is an area in which Canada lags. However, we are home to cutting-edge technological and industry capabilities, and catching up is possible.
Improving our eyes and ears in space means not just developing an ability to have situational awareness in an increasingly crowded environment of low-Earth orbits, but creating capacity to use space platforms (satellites and high-altitude unmanned aircraft) to monitor the Earth’s surface for broad security purposes, including collecting intelligence on conflict zones and threats, and monitoring the effects of climate change. Satellites trained on the Arctic will be particularly important for the future of Canadian defence policy.
Perhaps most importantly, though, is that the DND and its partners are also considering releasing a public threat assessment document to underpin the policy. That they may do so suggests that the ministry is looking to bring the public along in thinking about the singular importance of the Arctic to Canada’s defence and broader contribution as an allied partner to NATO and NORAD. This is crucial, as spending forecasts for the new defence policy have both a five-year horizon (for a projected $8-billion commitment) and a 20-year horizon (for $73-billion) – big numbers that are beyond the remit of the current or future governments. Political buy-in will be necessary.
The new policy will also be anchored in a commitment to produce a national-security strategy every four years. Canada has not done so since 2004, despite multiple independent external appraisals stressing the need for such a strategy to ensure all Canadians understand the nature of the threat environment, what resources and tools will be needed to confront it, and the road map for government action. This innovation, as well as a vow to establish “a more regular cycle of review” for Canadian defence policy, signals a major shift, recognizing the risk of ad-hoc and episodic thinking about defence needs and the importance of embedding defence outlooks into the broader compass of national-security considerations.
The new policy, then, is a marker of new ambitions for Canadian defence. For the vision to become reality, it will be important for all political parties to identify their defence policies in their election platforms in 2025 (or earlier, depending on the political gods) so that voters can then have their say on this vision.