Peter Jones is a professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He previously served as a senior policy analyst in the Security and Intelligence Secretariat of the Privy Council Office.
From the beginning of the Gaza war, there have been concerns about regional escalation. The danger most often cited is that Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group backed by Iran, will enter the conflict on the side of Hamas, which receives similar support from Tehran. Though Hezbollah has been cautious so far, America’s military deployment to the region speaks to the fears of what could happen.
This situation demonstrates the precariousness of the state of deterrence in the Middle East. Lacking the ability to strike Israel directly, Iran has built up Hezbollah so that, should Israel strike Iran, Tehran could respond by having tens of thousands of missiles fired on Israel from Lebanon. Iran’s arming of the Houthi rebel group in Yemen is motivated by the same impulse, and by a desire to meddle in regional conflicts to keep enemies off-balance; in recent weeks, the Houthis have disrupted trade routes in the Red Sea with attacks on cargo ships.
But this deterrence policy is ultimately flawed, because Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis each have their own interests. Imagine if either of the Cold War superpowers had not quite been able to hit the other, and had provided shorter-range weapons to friends to retaliate on their behalf. Could you be certain the friend would do it? What if the friend gets into a fight of their own and used these weapons for their own purposes?
A deterrent only works if it is not fired; if you have to use it, it means that deterrence has broken down. So the Gaza conflict puts Iran in a difficult position: It doesn’t want Hezbollah to become fully engaged, lest Hezbollah use Tehran’s deterrent.
When the dust settles on the war in Gaza, the Iranians may seek alternatives to their current deterrence posture. To be stable, this would require engaging with Israel. Even at the lowest points of the Cold War, the superpowers spoke through diplomatic channels to try to understand each other’s strategic concerns. Such a dialogue between Iran and Israel is very unlikely. Moreover, the calculations behind decisions to use force are different, and while I do not believe that certain actors are inherently irrational, it is the case that their calculations may be based on different rationales. This is why the two sides would need to understand each other for deterrence to be stable.
But Israel and Iran are not prepared to enter into any kind of relationship. They are presently engaged in a behind-the-scenes confrontation in Lebanon and Syria which threatens to escalate.
Looking ahead, the single most important thing for regional stability would be to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would allow Arab countries to work more openly with Israel and the U.S. to thwart Iran. Though some smaller Gulf countries were prepared to recognize Israel recently, Saudi Arabia remains the big prize, and that requires progress on Palestine (as much as the Saudis want to work with Israel, and do so behind the scenes).
Resolution of the Palestinian issue would also stabilize Israel as a Jewish democracy. The violent, religious, extremist settler parties upon whom Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu relies to remain in power could be consigned back to fringes of Israeli politics where they belong, ridding the government of their messianic territorial impulses. This is why U.S. President Joe Biden has been calling for change, in the interest of progress toward a two-state solution.
The idea of Israel making peace with the Palestinians to enter into a deterrent relationship with Arab countries against Iran is not new. Three decades ago, prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, one of Israel’s greatest military minds, understood this imperative. It is why he was prepared to enter into negotiations with Yasser Arafat, though it obviously pained him – and why an extremist, religious settler assassinated Mr. Rabin.
Of course, there is another way out. The Iranian regime could be toppled. Just over a year ago, hundreds of thousands of Iranians were in the streets trying to do just that, after the death of Mahsa Amini. But the Ayatollahs and their supporters are powerful and determined to remain in power. Much as we might hope for their demise, it seems a slender reed on which to rest any hopes of regional stability.
The alternative to these scenarios is a prolonged period of unstable deterrence in the Middle East. Israel and Iran will muddle along, each trying to gain an advantage and block the other’s attempts to do so. Periodic clashes will erupt, each of which will threaten to escalate. It is not a pretty picture.