An image of Iran's Bushehr reactor, collected by the GeoEye-1 satellite on Feb. 18, 2010The Associated Press
An old issue - Russia's construction of a nuclear reactor in the Iranian city of Bushehr - seemingly indolent for so many years, suddenly turned virulent this month when the Russians announced they would begin fuelling the mammoth reactor. It's a decision likely to prove dangerous both in terms of substance and symbolism.
For many years, Moscow had found creative reasons to continually delay completing and fuelling the reactor, either because of Western pressure or because of its desire to maintain leverage over Tehran. Both the United States and the European Union, which pushed through tougher sanctions against Iran in June under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, hoped Russia would again delay fuelling the reactor. The strong opposition to Bushehr is part of a broader effort by Western democracies to prevent the fanatical Islamist regime from acquiring nuclear weapons. The decision by Moscow to have the state-run nuclear corporation Rosatom move tonnes of enriched uranium fuel into the reactor this Saturday sets into motion a veritable political chain reaction.
In terms of substantive dangers, it may be argued that Bushehr is only tangentially related to Iran's purported nuclear weapons program. The Russians also will contend they have an agreement with Iran to return the spent fuel to Russia. This is crucial - once fuel is irradiated, it will begin to produce plutonium that can be used in atomic weapons.
The problem is - given the poor record of Russian control over nuclear materials, vast systemic and corrosive Russian corruption and Iranian determination - it's difficult to ensure with a high degree of confidence that Tehran won't gain access to fissile materials. Even if this could be assured, however, the additional nuclear know-how that Iran is bound to gain from operating the advanced reactor is likely to serve a dual purpose and thereby boost prospects for Tehran's nuclear weapons program.
More important than the direct long-term dangers from Bushehr is the destructive symbolism and its effects. Just when new sanctions against Iran are beginning to have some teeth, Tehran has won a huge PR victory with grave practical implications. The Russian move sets the stage for additional sanctions violations or avoidance by the Kremlin, and gives greater licence to China and others to provide Iran with goods, technology and income that can enable the extremist Islamist regime to speed toward becoming a nuclear power. Further, it sends a message to Western allies that the Russian "reset button," which Barack Obama's administration offered in order to ease tensions, entails restraints on the West only.
Still, given Western concerns - largely expressed through quiet diplomacy so far - why did Russia move ahead now?
There are three main motivating factors. First, Russia has become increasingly assertive internationally, convinced that, in the long term, buoyed by its vast natural resources and clever diplomacy, it will regain superpower status. Moscow also seems convinced that, in light of America's timid reaction to its attack on Georgia and pressures on Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and the growing energy dependency of Western Europe on Russia, it has a great deal of freedom of movement. Assertive Russian actions and mischief seem low risk and low cost to Moscow.
Second, Russian leaders, President Dmitry Medvedev included, have pushed forcefully for Russian regional dominance, and this includes at least key parts of the Middle East. But Turkey, an old rival, has also become vastly more assertive. The Erdogan government, which some suspect of considerable Islamist sympathies, has not only challenged Israel but has built powerful ties with Iran and Syria. It also has very clear ambitions in the region and is seeking to become a powerful and possibly dominant force. In the past few months, Ankara has moved significantly closer to Tehran and Damascus - not only rhetorically but also economically and militarily. Russia wants to stay ahead of Turkey, it seems, by playing its own Iranian card.
Third, although Moscow understands that a nuclear Iran would present a profound long-term danger, it also seems to believe it can control the "process." Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in particular, seems to feel that Russia can manipulate Iran, enhance Moscow's regional power and diminish U.S. influence by selling weapons and providing nuclear technology to Tehran but still retain the ability to short-circuit its nuclear weapons development at the very last minute. This is an extraordinarily risky gamble and, in light of Iran's determination and inventiveness, a foolish one.
It is certainly legitimate for Russia to protect its national interest, but how it perceives and pursues that interest is the problem. Superpower restoration for a Russia saddled with a unidimensional, energy-based economy confronting a dire demographic decline is a dangerous pipe dream. Enhancing regional power seems more attractive and realistic, but encouraging Iranian nuclear ambitions and gravely undermining sanctions could prove to be an extremely costly mistake where the world, including Russia, may have to pay a very heavy price.
Aurel Braun is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Toronto. His latest book is NATO-Russia Relations in the 21st Century.