"We have an obligation to see this thing through," Liberal foreign-affairs critic Bob Rae said upon returning from Afghanistan.
Just what is this "thing" that must be seen through? A military defeat of the Taliban and its allies? A peaceful, democratic Afghanistan? A regional settlement? A demonstrably rising standard of living? A diminution of the poppy trade?
Defining the "thing" in Afghanistan has been a shifting target, and it so remains. Nine years into the war, violence has spread to previously peaceful parts of the country, and is nowhere near ended in the southern and eastern provinces, especially Kandahar, where Canadians are stationed until the end of 2011.
When speaking of the "thing," it worth remembering what one of the greatest military strategists of all time once remarked. General Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian thinker, said: "Once the effort required gets so huge that it is no longer balanced by the value of the political purpose, it must be abandoned."
Von Clausewitz's dictum applies in spades to Afghanistan. The Americans are vastly increasing their presence, at great financial cost to their treasury at a time when it is broke. Canada has already lost 147 soldiers, with many others wounded - a number the government will not reveal. The effort by those two countries, to say nothing of others, has indeed been "huge," given that NATO publics are largely against the war, for a political purpose whose goal might be laudable but whose achievement is dubious.
It is estimated by the U.S. military that a successful counterinsurgency takes about 13 years, if conditions are right. If the recent U.S. buildup is the starting point for this counterinsurgency, does anyone really believe the Americans will spend a decade fighting in Afghanistan, when their country is fiscally busted and their people tired of war? If the starting point is taken to be the eviction by force of the Taliban nine years ago, that still leaves four tough years ahead.
The Americans are making a "tout pour le tout" bet that the application of considerable force in a short space of time can squeeze the Taliban. To this end, they will bring the fight to the Taliban, assuming the Taliban are willing to give fight, and finance and otherwise support warlords who will fight the Taliban for regional control with U.S. money.
It is unclear whether the "thing" in U.S. thinking involves squeezing the Taliban military so that at least some of its leaders might negotiate with the government in Kabul, or defeating the Taliban and its allies militarily.
Either way, time is not on the Americans' side, since they and NATO are interlopers in a country that has always resented outsiders. The Americans have already indicated they are going to be pulling out, so why would anyone believe the short-term application of military force will work over the long haul, when the Americans themselves are not in for that haul?
An argument can be made that since NATO went in together, its countries should exit together; that is, some kind of alliance solidarity should be shown. Perhaps this is the "thing" to which Mr. Rae referred, in which case Canada could remain after 2011 far from the battlefield, training the Afghan army and carrying out aid programs.
The nub of that issue is training. Training, to be effective, is not done with a piece of chalk and a board, but involves accompanying troops as they fight, and fighting with them if necessary. Are Canadians, and are Canadian Liberals in particular, prepared for that kind of "training" mission?
It would seem that Mr. Rae is ready, but then as we are learning, when a designated spokesperson for the Liberal Party speaks, he or she apparently is speaking without much party authority, such is the division within the caucus.
Everyone is assuming that history would repeat itself - that if the Taliban returned to control some portion of Afghanistan, it would take over the entire country and invite its pals from al-Qaeda back to establish training camps to plot massacres of Americans and other infidels.
Both prospects are possible of course but unlikely, given the tribal nature of Afghanistan and changes in Pakistan, where the government finally understands the Taliban threat to that country.