Two weeks ago the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance was born. Now that the cheers are dying down it's time to re-examine the process and consequences of a possible Reform-Canadian Alliance transformation.
Last week, Reform members were mailed a referendum asking them to vote on whether they agree to the merger. A positive vote is extremely important to Canadian Alliance. Without it, Canadian Alliance is dead and the whole United Alternative exercise will have been in vain.
Although United Alternative is supposed to be a campaign to unite the right under one banner, the reality is that it will disband a 65,000-strong Reform Party to join up with a few hundred high-profile political activists under the new name of Canadian Alliance.
At the UA convention in Ottawa last month, there were 800 Reformers among the 1,100 attendees. In spite of the organizers' efforts to attract more people to the convention -- and despite there being no criteria on registration -- there were simply not enough non-Reformers who were interested enough to dish out $200. The marriage of Reform and other political activists is therefore not an equal partnership. And the unequal partnership has become even more unequal after Joe Clark's declaration that his Progressive Conservative Party will have nothing to do with it.
Why, then, did Preston Manning and his supporters push so hard for UA? There are two reasons. First, it's a repackaging and marketing strategy. Following the 1997 federal election and the loss of the only Reform seat in Ontario, organizers concluded that it was the redneck, extremist image of the Reform Party, plus its Western origins, that led to its being locked out east of the Ontario/Manitoba border. By softening Reform's image, the rest of Canada could be won. Things have to start from the top, so we witnessed a change of Mr. Manning's personal image, from the pitch of his voice to his hairstyle to the removal of his eye glasses -- all to enhance his appeal to the more "sophisticated" Central Canadian voters.
To me, such reasoning is simplistic; it's about perception rather than reality. As chairman of the Reform Party, I travelled across the country and I understand Canadian voters to be intelligent. They have had no problem with Reform principles, policies, name or Western origin. When Reform's perceived racism became an issue, it was quickly squelched by pointing out that I was of Chinese extraction, an immigrant, and was elected by mainstream Reformers to chair the party.
I believe that if Reform is to win over Central and Eastern Canada, it's a question of time, not image. It's important to remember that in the 1997 election, there were more Ontario votes for Reform than in all the western provinces combined. The assertion that Ontario does not vote Reform is groundless.
It's also important to note that a number of studies undertaken since the 1997 election showed that were the Reform and Progressive Conservative votes to be added together, it would deprive the Liberals of only a handful of seats and would not significantly change the electoral landscape.
Looking back, I believe the main reason for Reform's Ontario wipeout was that the party spread its resources too thin. In the 1997 election, we slated a candidate in every Ontario riding but one, a shotgun approach that deprived some winnable ridings of much-needed support. The defeat in Ontario was strategic, not political.
If Mr. Manning wanted to win Ontario, he should have called a leadership race in that province immediately after the 1997 election -- which made Reform the Official Opposition -- and before the controversy over his move to Stornoway developed. Just coming out of a successful election, Mr. Manning could have won easily and claimed the Ontario mandate.
By forfeiting such a logical route and pursuing the UA path at the 1998 London Reform Assembly, the party inflicted much pain and agony on itself, not to mention the waste of two years time and resources. The United Alternative can hardly be considered an intelligent investment.
The second reason some are pushing the new Canadian Alliance is to give more power to the leader. According to the new party's constitution, the leader is responsible for the overall direction of the party; all candidates must obtain his or her endorsement. Meanwhile, the constitution reduces to just 30 days the time in which grassroots members can debate proposed constitution and policy resolutions before a convention. All this means that, compared with the Reform Party, Canadian Alliance will run more like a traditional top-down political party.
The top-down style of Canadian Alliance has already been demonstrated by the manner of its birth. The UA proposal, important as it was, was not debated along with other resolutions in the usual manner by the constituency associations when the Reform party assembled in London. Instead, it was introduced directly to the assembly as a "wildcard" resolution and was voted on quickly following a brief debate.
In addition, the constitution, "Declared Policies" and other important documents of Canadian Alliance were all written by appointed task forces, and the formation of the party was guided by an appointed steering committee. While the Reform Party must be accountable to its members, Canadian Alliance has no constituency to be accountable to. It is worth noting that all UA committee appointments were made by senior staff members of the Reform leader's office.
Should Reform vote to merge with Canadian Alliance, it's interesting to note the transitional rules in Canadian Alliance's constitution. These rules state that provided there is a leadership race within six months, the leader of the merging party (Reform) will become the leader of Canadian Alliance until a new leader is chosen, and the leader will also remain leader of the Official Opposition.
This hardly creates a level playing field for the anticipated leadership race. Mr. Manning will enjoy the visibility of being leader of the Opposition, the financial resources from his parliamentary allocation, and the party's Ottawa expense allowance of more than $2-million, plus his accessibility to parliamentary and party machinery -- making him a formidable opponent to other leadership contenders. Such potential contenders as Stephen Harper, Stockwell Day and Tony Clement would stand little chance against Mr. Manning. Should the UA referendum pass, there won't be a leadership race, there will be a coronation.
Whatever happens, when the dust settles and a leader is elected, it will be September. Either Canadian Alliance or the Reform Party will be in disarray, weakened by internal strife and unprepared for an election. Should the Liberals call an election in the fall or the winter, bets are that they'll win power again. Canada's current economic good times work to the Liberals' advantage -- yes, we all hate high taxes, but having a job makes the burden of paying taxes bearable.
In my view it will take a miracle for either Canadian Alliance or the Reform Party to hold on to the 60 seats won in 1997. Should the referendum pass and Canadian Alliance become a reality but fail to make any electoral gain, the anti-UA Reformers will point to UA as the culprit. On the other hand, should Reformers vote down UA and the Reform Party continue -- and then fail to produce more than 60 seats -- UA proponents will level blame at the stubborn Reformers.
Canadian politics is a merciless business, and I'm not optimistic. If United Alternative is not the beginning of the end of a Western Canadian populist movement, it might be the beginning of the end for the man who started it. The lesser of the two evils is to vote "No" on the referendum. Gee Tsang is immediate past chairman of the Reform Party of Canada. He resigned his chairmanship in January.