Even two weeks later, Hamas leaders and Israelis are still stunned by the Islamist group's unexpected majority win in the Palestinian parliamentary election. Maybe that's why, as cartoon wars rage in Europe, the Israeli-Palestinian front is relatively quiet. Although President Mahmoud Abbas (a Fatah moderate) hasn't really been independent since his own election a year ago, it's now crystal clear: Like it or not, Hamas is here to stay as a political force, and any effort to ignore it probably will backfire.
Because Israelis are also confused, they're resorting to familiar slogans. For the far right, Hamas's win is evidence of Muslims' unending hatred for Israel's existence and a vindication of the "no partner for peace" stand. Better to stay put, they argue. For the far left, Hamas's win proves the folly of unilateral actions (such as the Gaza pullout and the West Bank security barrier) that undermined Mr. Abbas and the Palestinian Authority.
But such facile reactions are dangerous. On the one side, demonizing Hamas may well lead to the very scenario Israel fears most. Although Hamas believes that al-Qaeda's global terrorism has damaged Islam and prefers to distance itself from Iran, isolation and lack of Western aid might push it into the Iranian camp. Some Israeli security officials quietly recognize this and argue that Hamas in government may actually stop al-Qaeda from gaining a foothold in Palestinian refugee camps.
On the other side, it's equally risky to accept the claim that "power tames extremists" at face value. Short of Hamas's adherence to the pre-election ceasefire and its mixed messages on future relations with Israel and the use of violence, it's far too early to discern hard evidence of moderation.
What this adds up to is a moment of extreme danger and potential opportunity in which Israeli and Palestinian actions can reinforce negative or positive developments. In Robert Putnam's "two-level game" theory of international negotiations, leaders first negotiate internally, then externally to protect the domestic coalition they've developed. Throughout a decade of failed talks, neither Israeli nor Palestinian leaders were honest in their "internal" negotiations -- thereby impeding efforts to reach an "external" agreement. The result was that Palestinians resorted to terrorism and Israel expanded settlements, thus destroying trust.
Now, though, the two internal landscapes are different. Yasser Arafat, the masterful dissembler, is gone and the Palestinian playing field is level for the first time since the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas's parliamentary majority means it can escape neither accountability nor the inevitable web of practical ties with Israel. (For this very reason, Hamas wants Fatah in a unity government, while Fatah's initial instinct is to stay in opposition and leave Hamas exposed.) Now, any decisions taken by the Palestinian Legislative Council will reflect a broader constituency. And if Hamas's disciplined campaign is any indication of future performance, it could be more dependable than Fatah ever was in dealing with opposition factions such as Islamic Jihad.
In Israel, too, there's the opportunity for a different internal negotiation. After Gaza, there's widespread support for withdrawal from much of the West Bank, and acting prime minister Ehud Olmert (who'll probably be re-elected) says he'll map the country's future borders. The easy answer to the Hamas win is to do so without talking; but with Ariel Sharon off the political stage, more Israelis quietly question the wisdom of acting unilaterally with no deal in hand.
Unexpectedly, then, Hamas and Israel may have an interest in hammering out a new status quo. Even after the Palestinian election, surveys show that most Israelis and Palestinians support a two-state resolution of the conflict. More than 70 per cent of Palestinians believe Hamas should change its position on elimination of Israel, and more than 60 per cent of Hamas voters favour an immediate return to negotiations. Israelis doubt Hamas's intentions, but many believe in negotiating with it. Everyone fears the repercussions of a new wave of terrorism and retaliation.
The key, then, is for Israel to initially put Hamas to realistic tests while letting the fragile Palestinian political constellation stabilize. For example, Hamas's commitment to clean government should be encouraged; demands regarding Israel could start with an extended ceasefire and acceptance of existing agreements binding the Palestinian Authority (including the Oslo accords that recognize Israel); a new Palestinian cabinet might include legislators who aren't members of Hamas; and there'd be zero tolerance for Arafat-style doublespeak from Hamas leaders.
Don't expect any Israeli politician to admit this before the March 28 election -- but if in return for a guarantee of quiet, Israel will have to expedite the evacuation of illegal outposts and outlying settlements and signal its intention to withdraw virtually to the 1967 borders, all of this could provide the basis for future talks. Around here, stranger things have happened.