Mokhtar Lamani is former head of the office of the UN-League of Arab States Joint Special Representative for Syria in Damascus. He will be a panelist at this week's conference on Canadian foreign policy, sponsored by the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History and the Canadian International Council, at Trinity College (May 13-15).
The Islamic State stunned the world in June of 2014 when it occupied a territory the size of Portugal across Syria and Iraq. The United States was quick to lead a coalition in an air-strike campaign.
This strategy was successful in achieving one goal and one goal only: It quickly showed the limits of such a reactionary approach and highlighted the complexities of this crisis.
The coalition stands on very shaky ground. With no boots on the ground, it must rely, at least in Iraq, on a weakened and deeply sectarian Iraqi army that is mainly bolstered by Shia militias. They are effectively pitting a dangerous and extremist faction against a terrorist IS, leaving civilians stuck in the middle, unsure who will deal the next blow.
Indeed, little was done to hinder the terrifying progress of IS militants and they have continued their offensive within not only Syria and Iraq, but into other countries and new regions.
The world has faced its fair share of brutal and barbaric regimes. That alone should be a reason to worry about IS, but the most startling is the group's surprising sophistication:
- IS has the dexterity to train the new generation of jihadists. It is able to fill its ranks with those who have found, in extremism, the ideal outlet for their criminal impulses. In more than 80 countries, it has been able to attract new recruits as well as successfully target those disappointed by al-Qaeda's wait-and-see policy in bringing one of its goals to fruition: the creation of a caliphate. IS is also alarmingly successful in recruiting children under the age of 18 through The Cubs of the Caliphate branch. More than 500 kids were recruited in 2015;
- IS is well versed in warfare tactics. Its Sandfish Strategy, named after a stealthy desert reptile with the ability to attack and retreat deep into the sand, is well supported by the group's increasing resources, including check points and oil wells;
- Despite its predilection for archaic brutality, IS uses sophisticated and modern technology to spread its message. Its videos provide an unnerving contrast between content and quality;
- IS's carefully planned shock-and-awe tactics are terrorism in its purest form, with an unbridled lust for cruelty against men, women and children alike, along with the systemic destruction of the region's incredibly rich religious, sectarian, ethnic and cultural heritage;
- IS is politically astute and opportunistic. It shows openness toward other terrorist groups within the Salafi movement. Nigeria's Boko Haram as well as others in Mali, Yemen, Libya and many more are invited into the fold as provinces (wilayas) of the Islamic State, reaching a total of 24 provinces around the world. IS will also take on competing forces for monopoly as is currently the case with the Syrian al-Qaeda branch.
IS and al-Qaeda thrive in troubled times. The numerous crises afflicting the region, all involving local, regional and international players with conflicting agendas, have created deeply fragmented societies. In the absence of a driving force toward national reconciliation or unity, there is an empty space to be filled. It has allowed extremist groups to take root and grow into complex, ever-changing organisms using religion as both shelter and driving force.
The case of Iraqi Sunnite marginalization under former Iraqi Shia prime minister Nouri al-Maliki is a good example. For many of them, the Iraqi army, itself mostly Shia, was seen as an occupying force. It is no coincidence that IS forces in Iraq are mostly homegrown (80 per cent). By contrast, 25 per cent of IS forces in Syria are locally recruited.
IS knows that wars are not won by the air – and banks on it. It also knows full well that Sunnite civilians fear Shia militias of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Iraq has already had its share with the Awakening Forces in 2007 and the people fear a second round.
IS, as monstrous as it is, must be recognized for what it is: a symptom of the deeper problems plaguing the Middle East and the subsequent political vacuum in the region.
The current international military- and security-based response is not only insufficient, it's useless.
A global and multidisciplinary approach able to cater to the political, social, economic, cultural and educational challenges posed by these complex crises is indispensable. This approach must take into account the entire system that lead to extremism, not just violent incidents on the ground. Prevention and rehabilitation, locally and internationally, must be part of every discussion on the matter.
A few initiatives, still isolated but growing in numbers, have started to adopt a systemic approach. The Danish approach of social reintegration for former jihadists or Montreal's newly launched multidisciplinary centre for the prevention of radicalization are examples to encourage.